linux-stable.git/fs, branch v6.18.33 Linux kernel stable tree netfs: Fix potential uninitialised var in netfs_extract_user_iter() 2026-05-23T11:07:21+00:00 David Howells dhowells@redhat.com 2026-05-12T12:33:45+00:00 664736cc1f95198438aa69ae82df9f42c64d0e1c commit 7e3d8db899d54af39fafb2eb3392b0cdae9973b5 upstream. In netfs_extract_user_iter(), if it's given a zero-length iterator, it will fall through the loop without setting ret, and so the error handling behaviour will be undefined, depending on whether ret happens to be negative. The value of ret then propagates back up the callstack. Fix this by presetting ret to 0. Fixes: 85dd2c8ff368 ("netfs: Add a function to extract a UBUF or IOVEC into a BVEC iterator") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260414082004.3756080-1-dhowells%40redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260512123404.719402-9-dhowells@redhat.com cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 7e3d8db899d54af39fafb2eb3392b0cdae9973b5 upstream.

In netfs_extract_user_iter(), if it's given a zero-length iterator, it will
fall through the loop without setting ret, and so the error handling
behaviour will be undefined, depending on whether ret happens to be
negative.  The value of ret then propagates back up the callstack.

Fix this by presetting ret to 0.

Fixes: 85dd2c8ff368 ("netfs: Add a function to extract a UBUF or IOVEC into a BVEC iterator")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260414082004.3756080-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260512123404.719402-9-dhowells@redhat.com
cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
f2fs: fix false alarm of lockdep on cp_global_sem lock 2026-05-23T11:07:20+00:00 Chao Yu chao@kernel.org 2026-05-19T11:53:09+00:00 fac9cfad2f90fa21d81327028c7125889442c005 [ Upstream commit 6a5e3de9c2bb0b691d16789a5d19e9276a09b308 ] lockdep reported a potential deadlock: a) TCMU device removal context: - call del_gendisk() to get q->q_usage_counter - call start_flush_work() to get work_completion of wb->dwork b) f2fs writeback context: - in wb_workfn(), which holds work_completion of wb->dwork - call f2fs_balance_fs() to get sbi->gc_lock c) f2fs vfs_write context: - call f2fs_gc() to get sbi->gc_lock - call f2fs_write_checkpoint() to get sbi->cp_global_sem d) f2fs mount context: - call recover_fsync_data() to get sbi->cp_global_sem - call f2fs_check_and_fix_write_pointer() to call blkdev_report_zones() that goes down to blk_mq_alloc_request and get q->q_usage_counter Original callstack is in Closes tag. However, I think this is a false alarm due to before mount returns successfully (context d), we can not access file therein via vfs_write (context c). Let's introduce per-sb cp_global_sem_key, and assign the key for cp_global_sem, so that lockdep can recognize cp_global_sem from different super block correctly. A lot of work are done by Shin'ichiro Kawasaki, thanks a lot for the work. Fixes: c426d99127b1 ("f2fs: Check write pointer consistency of open zones") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-and-tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/20260218125237.3340441-1-shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> [ adapted context to use plain `init_f2fs_rwsem` instead of mainline's `init_f2fs_rwsem_trace` macro ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 6a5e3de9c2bb0b691d16789a5d19e9276a09b308 ]

lockdep reported a potential deadlock:

a) TCMU device removal context:
 - call del_gendisk() to get q->q_usage_counter
 - call start_flush_work() to get work_completion of wb->dwork
b) f2fs writeback context:
 - in wb_workfn(), which holds work_completion of wb->dwork
 - call f2fs_balance_fs() to get sbi->gc_lock
c) f2fs vfs_write context:
 - call f2fs_gc() to get sbi->gc_lock
 - call f2fs_write_checkpoint() to get sbi->cp_global_sem
d) f2fs mount context:
 - call recover_fsync_data() to get sbi->cp_global_sem
 - call f2fs_check_and_fix_write_pointer() to call blkdev_report_zones()
   that goes down to blk_mq_alloc_request and get q->q_usage_counter

Original callstack is in Closes tag.

However, I think this is a false alarm due to before mount returns
successfully (context d), we can not access file therein via vfs_write
(context c).

Let's introduce per-sb cp_global_sem_key, and assign the key for
cp_global_sem, so that lockdep can recognize cp_global_sem from
different super block correctly.

A lot of work are done by Shin'ichiro Kawasaki, thanks a lot for
the work.

Fixes: c426d99127b1 ("f2fs: Check write pointer consistency of open zones")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/20260218125237.3340441-1-shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com
Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[ adapted context to use plain `init_f2fs_rwsem` instead of mainline's `init_f2fs_rwsem_trace` macro ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
btrfs: do not mark inode incompressible after inline attempt fails 2026-05-23T11:07:20+00:00 Qu Wenruo wqu@suse.com 2026-05-16T19:09:07+00:00 b6437e6f8f3df87b3fea6d808775d88ee4b5b437 [ Upstream commit 2e0e3716c7b6f8d71df2fbe709b922e54700f71b ] [BUG] The following sequence will set the file with nocompress flag: # mkfs.btrfs -f $dev # mount $dev $mnt -o max_inline=4,compress # xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 2k" -c sync $mnt/foobar The inode will have NOCOMPRESS flag, even if the content itself (all 0xcd) can still be compressed very well: item 4 key (257 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 15879 itemsize 160 generation 9 transid 10 size 2097152 nbytes 1052672 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 257 flags 0x8(NOCOMPRESS) Please note that, this behavior is there even before commit 59615e2c1f63 ("btrfs: reject single block sized compression early"). [CAUSE] At compress_file_range(), after btrfs_compress_folios() call, we try making an inlined extent by calling cow_file_range_inline(). But cow_file_range_inline() calls can_cow_file_range_inline() which has more accurate checks on if the range can be inlined. One of the user configurable conditions is the "max_inline=" mount option. If that value is set low (like the example, 4 bytes, which cannot store any header), or the compressed content is just slightly larger than 2K (the default value, meaning a 50% compression ratio), cow_file_range_inline() will return 1 immediately. And since we're here only to try inline the compressed data, the range is no larger than a single fs block. Thus compression is never going to make it a win, we fall back to marking the inode incompressible unavoidably. [FIX] Just add an extra check after inline attempt, so that if the inline attempt failed, do not set the nocompress flag. As there is no way to remove that flag, and the default 50% compression ratio is way too strict for the whole inode. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 2e0e3716c7b6f8d71df2fbe709b922e54700f71b ]

[BUG]
The following sequence will set the file with nocompress flag:

  # mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
  # mount $dev $mnt -o max_inline=4,compress
  # xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 2k" -c sync $mnt/foobar

The inode will have NOCOMPRESS flag, even if the content itself (all 0xcd)
can still be compressed very well:

	item 4 key (257 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 15879 itemsize 160
		generation 9 transid 10 size 2097152 nbytes 1052672
		block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
		sequence 257 flags 0x8(NOCOMPRESS)

Please note that, this behavior is there even before commit 59615e2c1f63
("btrfs: reject single block sized compression early").

[CAUSE]
At compress_file_range(), after btrfs_compress_folios() call, we try
making an inlined extent by calling cow_file_range_inline().

But cow_file_range_inline() calls can_cow_file_range_inline() which has
more accurate checks on if the range can be inlined.

One of the user configurable conditions is the "max_inline=" mount
option. If that value is set low (like the example, 4 bytes, which
cannot store any header), or the compressed content is just slightly
larger than 2K (the default value, meaning a 50% compression ratio),
cow_file_range_inline() will return 1 immediately.

And since we're here only to try inline the compressed data, the range
is no larger than a single fs block.

Thus compression is never going to make it a win, we fall back to
marking the inode incompressible unavoidably.

[FIX]
Just add an extra check after inline attempt, so that if the inline
attempt failed, do not set the nocompress flag.

As there is no way to remove that flag, and the default 50% compression
ratio is way too strict for the whole inode.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
smb: client: Use FullSessionKey for AES-256 encryption key derivation 2026-05-23T11:07:20+00:00 Piyush Sachdeva s.piyush1024@gmail.com 2026-05-15T21:35:02+00:00 2647b8fe2f1f85194092a94d7ca0c4679795da87 [ Upstream commit 5be7a0cef3229fb3b63a07c0d289daf752545424 ] When Kerberos authentication is used with AES-256 encryption (AES-256-CCM or AES-256-GCM), the SMB3 encryption and decryption keys must be derived using the full session key (Session.FullSessionKey) rather than just the first 16 bytes (Session.SessionKey). Per MS-SMB2 section 3.2.5.3.1, when Connection.Dialect is "3.1.1" and Connection.CipherId is AES-256-CCM or AES-256-GCM, Session.FullSessionKey must be set to the full cryptographic key from the GSS authentication context. The encryption and decryption key derivation (SMBC2SCipherKey, SMBS2CCipherKey) must use this FullSessionKey as the KDF input. The signing key derivation continues to use Session.SessionKey (first 16 bytes) in all cases. Previously, generate_key() hardcoded SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16) as the HMAC-SHA256 key input length for all derivations. When Kerberos with AES-256 provides a 32-byte session key, the KDF for encryption/decryption was using only the first 16 bytes, producing keys that did not match the server's, causing mount failures with sec=krb5 and require_gcm_256=1. Add a full_key_size parameter to generate_key() and pass the appropriate size from generate_smb3signingkey(): - Signing: always SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16 bytes) - Encryption/Decryption: ses->auth_key.len when AES-256, otherwise 16 Also fix cifs_dump_full_key() to report the actual session key length for AES-256 instead of hardcoded CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, so that userspace tools like Wireshark receive the correct key for decryption. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Piyush Sachdeva <psachdeva@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Piyush Sachdeva <s.piyush1024@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 5be7a0cef3229fb3b63a07c0d289daf752545424 ]

When Kerberos authentication is used with AES-256 encryption (AES-256-CCM
or AES-256-GCM), the SMB3 encryption and decryption keys must be derived
using the full session key (Session.FullSessionKey) rather than just the
first 16 bytes (Session.SessionKey).

Per MS-SMB2 section 3.2.5.3.1, when Connection.Dialect is "3.1.1" and
Connection.CipherId is AES-256-CCM or AES-256-GCM, Session.FullSessionKey
must be set to the full cryptographic key from the GSS authentication
context. The encryption and decryption key derivation (SMBC2SCipherKey,
SMBS2CCipherKey) must use this FullSessionKey as the KDF input. The
signing key derivation continues to use Session.SessionKey (first 16
bytes) in all cases.

Previously, generate_key() hardcoded SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16) as the
HMAC-SHA256 key input length for all derivations. When Kerberos with
AES-256 provides a 32-byte session key, the KDF for encryption/decryption
was using only the first 16 bytes, producing keys that did not match the
server's, causing mount failures with sec=krb5 and require_gcm_256=1.

Add a full_key_size parameter to generate_key() and pass the appropriate
size from generate_smb3signingkey():
 - Signing: always SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16 bytes)
 - Encryption/Decryption: ses->auth_key.len when AES-256, otherwise 16

Also fix cifs_dump_full_key() to report the actual session key length for
AES-256 instead of hardcoded CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, so that userspace tools
like Wireshark receive the correct key for decryption.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Piyush Sachdeva <psachdeva@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Piyush Sachdeva <s.piyush1024@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
eventfs: Use list_add_tail_rcu() for SRCU-protected children list 2026-05-23T11:07:20+00:00 David Carlier devnexen@gmail.com 2026-05-15T15:36:49+00:00 244575d0c695862bfd59ea3b1754c1e7f88ed454 [ Upstream commit f67950b2887fa10df50c4317a1fe98a65bc6875b ] Commit d2603279c7d6 ("eventfs: Use list_del_rcu() for SRCU protected list variable") converted the removal side to pair with the list_for_each_entry_srcu() walker in eventfs_iterate(). The insertion in eventfs_create_dir() was left as a plain list_add_tail(), which on weakly-ordered architectures can expose a new entry to the SRCU reader before its list pointers and fields are observable. Use list_add_tail_rcu() so the publication pairs with the existing list_del_rcu() and list_for_each_entry_srcu(). Fixes: 43aa6f97c2d0 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418152251.199343-1-devnexen@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> [ adapted scoped_guard(mutex, &eventfs_mutex) block to explicit mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock() pair ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit f67950b2887fa10df50c4317a1fe98a65bc6875b ]

Commit d2603279c7d6 ("eventfs: Use list_del_rcu() for SRCU protected
list variable") converted the removal side to pair with the
list_for_each_entry_srcu() walker in eventfs_iterate(). The insertion
in eventfs_create_dir() was left as a plain list_add_tail(), which on
weakly-ordered architectures can expose a new entry to the SRCU reader
before its list pointers and fields are observable.

Use list_add_tail_rcu() so the publication pairs with the existing
list_del_rcu() and list_for_each_entry_srcu().

Fixes: 43aa6f97c2d0 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418152251.199343-1-devnexen@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ adapted scoped_guard(mutex, &eventfs_mutex) block to explicit mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock() pair ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
nfsd: fix file change detection in CB_GETATTR 2026-05-23T11:07:18+00:00 Scott Mayhew smayhew@redhat.com 2026-04-07T22:08:57+00:00 42558732af4a4d814fce31f1fc1a90660ddc50d7 commit 304d81a2fbf2b454def4debcb38ea173911b72cd upstream. RFC 8881, section 10.4.3 doesn't say anything about caching the file size in the delegation record, nor does it say anything about comparing a cached file size with the size reported by the client in the CB_GETATTR reply for the purpose of determining if the client holds modified data for the file. What section 10.4.3 of RFC 8881 does say is that the server should compare the *current* file size with the size reported by the client holding the delegation in the CB_GETATTR reply, and if they differ to treat it as a modification regardless of the change attribute retrieved via the CB_GETATTR. Doing otherwise would cause the server to believe the client holding the delegation has a modified version of the file, even if the client flushed the modifications to the server prior to the CB_GETATTR. This would have the added side effect of subsequent CB_GETATTRs causing updates to the mtime, ctime, and change attribute even if the client holding the delegation makes no further updates to the file. Modify nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict() to obtain the current file size via i_size_read(). Retain the ncf_cur_fsize field, since it's a convenient way to return the file size back to nfsd4_encode_fattr4(), but don't use it for the purpose of detecting file changes. Remove the unnecessary initialization of ncf_cur_fsize in nfs4_open_delegation(). Also, if we recall the delegation (because the client didn't respond to the CB_GETATTR), then skip the logic that checks the nfs4_cb_fattr fields. Fixes: c5967721e106 ("NFSD: handle GETATTR conflict with write delegation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 304d81a2fbf2b454def4debcb38ea173911b72cd upstream.

RFC 8881, section 10.4.3 doesn't say anything about caching the file
size in the delegation record, nor does it say anything about comparing
a cached file size with the size reported by the client in the
CB_GETATTR reply for the purpose of determining if the client holds
modified data for the file.

What section 10.4.3 of RFC 8881 does say is that the server should
compare the *current* file size with the size reported by the client
holding the delegation in the CB_GETATTR reply, and if they differ to
treat it as a modification regardless of the change attribute retrieved
via the CB_GETATTR.

Doing otherwise would cause the server to believe the client holding the
delegation has a modified version of the file, even if the client
flushed the modifications to the server prior to the CB_GETATTR.  This
would have the added side effect of subsequent CB_GETATTRs causing
updates to the mtime, ctime, and change attribute even if the client
holding the delegation makes no further updates to the file.

Modify nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict() to obtain the current file size
via i_size_read().  Retain the ncf_cur_fsize field, since it's a
convenient way to return the file size back to nfsd4_encode_fattr4(),
but don't use it for the purpose of detecting file changes.  Remove the
unnecessary initialization of ncf_cur_fsize in nfs4_open_delegation().

Also, if we recall the delegation (because the client didn't respond to
the CB_GETATTR), then skip the logic that checks the nfs4_cb_fattr
fields.

Fixes: c5967721e106 ("NFSD: handle GETATTR conflict with write delegation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
netfs: fix error handling in netfs_extract_user_iter() 2026-05-23T11:07:18+00:00 Paulo Alcantara pc@manguebit.org 2026-05-12T12:33:46+00:00 fc6db1e47c5551fd594511df69c3265fd6f71a80 commit 0aad5704c6b4d14007d4eab15883e8524e4310f4 upstream. In netfs_extract_user_iter(), if iov_iter_extract_pages() failed to extract user pages, bail out on -ENOMEM, otherwise return the error code only if @npages == 0, allowing short DIO reads and writes to be issued. This fixes mmapstress02 from LTP tests against CIFS. Fixes: 85dd2c8ff368 ("netfs: Add a function to extract a UBUF or IOVEC into a BVEC iterator") Reported-by: Xiaoli Feng <xifeng@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260512123404.719402-10-dhowells@redhat.com Cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0aad5704c6b4d14007d4eab15883e8524e4310f4 upstream.

In netfs_extract_user_iter(), if iov_iter_extract_pages() failed to
extract user pages, bail out on -ENOMEM, otherwise return the error
code only if @npages == 0, allowing short DIO reads and writes to be
issued.

This fixes mmapstress02 from LTP tests against CIFS.

Fixes: 85dd2c8ff368 ("netfs: Add a function to extract a UBUF or IOVEC into a BVEC iterator")
Reported-by: Xiaoli Feng <xifeng@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260512123404.719402-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfs: fix memory leak on error in xfs_alloc_zone_info() 2026-05-23T11:07:18+00:00 Wilfred Mallawa wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com 2026-04-14T23:45:14+00:00 690b7ca1f9b343b505ff6d02226d40d1911a9d16 commit 592975da8c3ca87b043077e6eafa37665eae7936 upstream. Currently, the 0th index of the zi_used_bucket_bitmap array is not freed on error due to the pre-decrement then evaluate semantic of the while loop used in xfs_alloc_zone_info(). Fix it by allowing for the i == 0 case to be covered. Fixes: 080d01c41d44 ("xfs: implement zoned garbage collection") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15 Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wilfred Mallawa <wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Hans Holmberg <hans.holmberg@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 592975da8c3ca87b043077e6eafa37665eae7936 upstream.

Currently, the 0th index of the zi_used_bucket_bitmap array is not freed
on error due to the pre-decrement then evaluate semantic of the while
loop used in xfs_alloc_zone_info(). Fix it by allowing for the i == 0
case to be covered.

Fixes: 080d01c41d44 ("xfs: implement zoned garbage collection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wilfred Mallawa <wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans Holmberg <hans.holmberg@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ceph: fix BUG_ON in __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() due to stale blob size 2026-05-23T11:07:18+00:00 Viacheslav Dubeyko Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com 2026-04-09T19:43:40+00:00 d5bd8b4e39cfa8b087448adcd48088065cd629d5 commit 0c22d9511cbde746622f8e4c11aaa63fe76d45f9 upstream. The generic/642 test-case can reproduce the kernel crash: [40243.605254] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [40243.605956] kernel BUG at fs/ceph/xattr.c:918! [40243.607142] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [40243.608067] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 498762 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(full) [40243.609700] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [40243.611820] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [40243.612715] RIP: 0010:__ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x1b8/0x1e0 [40243.613731] Code: 0f 84 82 fe ff ff e9 cf 8e 56 ff 48 8d 65 e8 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 4c 8b 62 08 41 8b 85 24 07 00 00 49 83 c4 04 41 89 44 24 fc [40243.616888] RSP: 0018:ffffcc80c4d4b688 EFLAGS: 00010287 [40243.617773] RAX: 0000000000010026 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [40243.618928] RDX: ffff8a773798dee0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [40243.620158] RBP: ffffcc80c4d4b6a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [40243.621573] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a75f3b58000 [40243.622907] R13: ffff8a75f3b58000 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: 000000000000bffd [40243.624054] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a787d1b4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [40243.625331] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [40243.626269] CR2: 000072f390b623c0 CR3: 000000011c02a003 CR4: 0000000000372ef0 [40243.627408] Call Trace: [40243.627839] <TASK> [40243.628188] __prep_cap+0x3fd/0x4a0 [40243.628789] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4e/0xe0 [40243.629474] ceph_check_caps+0x46a/0xc80 [40243.630094] ? __lock_acquire+0x4a2/0x2650 [40243.630773] ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 [40243.631347] ? handle_cap_grant+0x79f/0x1060 [40243.632068] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300 [40243.632696] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3e/0x340 [40243.633429] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300 [40243.634052] handle_cap_grant+0xcf6/0x1060 [40243.634745] ceph_handle_caps+0x122b/0x2110 [40243.635415] mds_dispatch+0x5bd/0x2160 [40243.636034] ? ceph_con_process_message+0x65/0x190 [40243.636828] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300 [40243.637431] ceph_con_process_message+0x7a/0x190 [40243.638184] ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0 [40243.638749] ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0 [40243.639268] process_message+0x16/0x1a0 [40243.639915] ? sg_free_table+0x39/0x90 [40243.640572] ceph_con_v2_try_read+0xf58/0x2120 [40243.641255] ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x300 [40243.641863] ceph_con_workfn+0x151/0x820 [40243.642493] process_one_work+0x22f/0x630 [40243.643093] ? process_one_work+0x254/0x630 [40243.643770] worker_thread+0x1e2/0x400 [40243.644332] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [40243.645020] kthread+0x109/0x140 [40243.645560] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [40243.646125] ret_from_fork+0x3f8/0x480 [40243.646752] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [40243.647316] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [40243.647919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [40243.648556] </TASK> [40243.648902] Modules linked in: overlay hctr2 libpolyval chacha libchacha adiantum libnh libpoly1305 essiv intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common skx_edac_common nfit kvm_intel kvm irqbypass joydev ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl input_leds mac_hid psmouse vga16fb serio_raw vgastate floppy i2c_piix4 pata_acpi bochs qemu_fw_cfg i2c_smbus sch_fq_codel rbd dm_crypt msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore [40243.654766] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Commit d93231a6bc8a ("ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size") moved the required_blob_size computation to before the __build_xattrs() call, introducing a race. __build_xattrs() releases and reacquires i_ceph_lock during execution. In that window, handle_cap_grant() may update i_xattrs.blob with a newer MDS-provided blob and bump i_xattrs.version. When __build_xattrs() detects that index_version < version, it destroys and rebuilds the entire xattr rb-tree from the new blob, potentially increasing count, names_size, and vals_size. The prealloc_blob size check that follows still uses the stale required_blob_size computed before the rebuild, so it passes even when prealloc_blob is too small for the now-larger tree. After __set_xattr() adds one more xattr on top, __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() is called from the cap flush path and hits: BUG_ON(need > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len); Fix this by recomputing required_blob_size after __build_xattrs() returns, using the current tree state. Also re-validate against m_max_xattr_size to fall back to the sync path if the rebuilt tree now exceeds the MDS limit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d93231a6bc8a ("ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size") Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0c22d9511cbde746622f8e4c11aaa63fe76d45f9 upstream.

The generic/642 test-case can reproduce the kernel crash:

[40243.605254] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[40243.605956] kernel BUG at fs/ceph/xattr.c:918!
[40243.607142] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[40243.608067] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 498762 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(full)
[40243.609700] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[40243.611820] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
[40243.612715] RIP: 0010:__ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x1b8/0x1e0
[40243.613731] Code: 0f 84 82 fe ff ff e9 cf 8e 56 ff 48 8d 65 e8 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 4c 8b 62 08 41 8b 85 24 07 00 00 49 83 c4 04 41 89 44 24 fc
[40243.616888] RSP: 0018:ffffcc80c4d4b688 EFLAGS: 00010287
[40243.617773] RAX: 0000000000010026 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[40243.618928] RDX: ffff8a773798dee0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[40243.620158] RBP: ffffcc80c4d4b6a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[40243.621573] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a75f3b58000
[40243.622907] R13: ffff8a75f3b58000 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: 000000000000bffd
[40243.624054] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a787d1b4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[40243.625331] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[40243.626269] CR2: 000072f390b623c0 CR3: 000000011c02a003 CR4: 0000000000372ef0
[40243.627408] Call Trace:
[40243.627839]  <TASK>
[40243.628188]  __prep_cap+0x3fd/0x4a0
[40243.628789]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4e/0xe0
[40243.629474]  ceph_check_caps+0x46a/0xc80
[40243.630094]  ? __lock_acquire+0x4a2/0x2650
[40243.630773]  ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90
[40243.631347]  ? handle_cap_grant+0x79f/0x1060
[40243.632068]  ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300
[40243.632696]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3e/0x340
[40243.633429]  ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300
[40243.634052]  handle_cap_grant+0xcf6/0x1060
[40243.634745]  ceph_handle_caps+0x122b/0x2110
[40243.635415]  mds_dispatch+0x5bd/0x2160
[40243.636034]  ? ceph_con_process_message+0x65/0x190
[40243.636828]  ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300
[40243.637431]  ceph_con_process_message+0x7a/0x190
[40243.638184]  ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0
[40243.638749]  ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0
[40243.639268]  process_message+0x16/0x1a0
[40243.639915]  ? sg_free_table+0x39/0x90
[40243.640572]  ceph_con_v2_try_read+0xf58/0x2120
[40243.641255]  ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x300
[40243.641863]  ceph_con_workfn+0x151/0x820
[40243.642493]  process_one_work+0x22f/0x630
[40243.643093]  ? process_one_work+0x254/0x630
[40243.643770]  worker_thread+0x1e2/0x400
[40243.644332]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[40243.645020]  kthread+0x109/0x140
[40243.645560]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[40243.646125]  ret_from_fork+0x3f8/0x480
[40243.646752]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[40243.647316]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[40243.647919]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[40243.648556]  </TASK>
[40243.648902] Modules linked in: overlay hctr2 libpolyval chacha libchacha adiantum libnh libpoly1305 essiv intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common skx_edac_common nfit kvm_intel kvm irqbypass joydev ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl input_leds mac_hid psmouse vga16fb serio_raw vgastate floppy i2c_piix4 pata_acpi bochs qemu_fw_cfg i2c_smbus sch_fq_codel rbd dm_crypt msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore
[40243.654766] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Commit d93231a6bc8a ("ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS
maximum xattr size") moved the required_blob_size computation to before
the __build_xattrs() call, introducing a race.

__build_xattrs() releases and reacquires i_ceph_lock during execution.
In that window, handle_cap_grant() may update i_xattrs.blob with a
newer MDS-provided blob and bump i_xattrs.version.  When
__build_xattrs() detects that index_version < version, it destroys and
rebuilds the entire xattr rb-tree from the new blob, potentially
increasing count, names_size, and vals_size.

The prealloc_blob size check that follows still uses the stale
required_blob_size computed before the rebuild, so it passes even when
prealloc_blob is too small for the now-larger tree. After __set_xattr()
adds one more xattr on top, __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() is called from
the cap flush path and hits:

    BUG_ON(need > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len);

Fix this by recomputing required_blob_size after __build_xattrs()
returns, using the current tree state. Also re-validate against
m_max_xattr_size to fall back to the sync path if the rebuilt tree now
exceeds the MDS limit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d93231a6bc8a ("ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size")
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ceph: fix a buffer leak in __ceph_setxattr() 2026-05-23T11:07:18+00:00 Viacheslav Dubeyko Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com 2026-04-09T19:26:02+00:00 3fa13ceefbc5f36131110342743994cb3de80637 commit 5d3cc36b4e77a27ce7b686b7c59c7072bcb3fa8e upstream. The old_blob in __ceph_setxattr() can store ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob value during the retry. However, it is never called the ceph_buffer_put() for the old_blob object. This patch fixes the issue of the buffer leak. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 5d3cc36b4e77a27ce7b686b7c59c7072bcb3fa8e upstream.

The old_blob in __ceph_setxattr() can store
ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob value during the retry.
However, it is never called the ceph_buffer_put()
for the old_blob object. This patch fixes the issue of
the buffer leak.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>