<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v6.12.86</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>DaeMyung Kang</name>
<email>charsyam@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-25T09:07:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8c4f9053c76018cb9d972fde449d78e7e77df957'/>
<id>8c4f9053c76018cb9d972fde449d78e7e77df957</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit def036ef87f8641c1c525d5ae17438d7a1006491 ]

rcount is intended to be connection-specific: 2 for curr_conn, 1 for
every other connection sharing the same session.  However, it is
initialised only once before the hash iteration and is never reset.
After the loop visits curr_conn, later sibling connections are also
checked against rcount == 2, so a sibling with req_running == 1 is
incorrectly treated as idle.  This makes the outcome depend on the
hash iteration order: whether a given sibling is checked against the
loose (&lt; 2) or the strict (&lt; 1) threshold is decided by whether it
happens to be visited before or after curr_conn.

The function's contract is "wait until every connection sharing this
session is idle" so that destroy_previous_session() can safely tear
the session down.  The latched rcount violates that contract and
reopens the teardown race window the wait logic was meant to close:
destroy_previous_session() may proceed before sibling channels have
actually quiesced, overlapping session teardown with in-flight work
on those connections.

Recompute rcount inside the loop so each connection is compared
against its own threshold regardless of iteration order.

This is a code-inspection fix for an iteration-order-dependent logic
error; a targeted reproducer would require SMB3 multichannel with
in-flight work on a sibling channel landing after curr_conn in hash
order, which is not something that can be triggered reliably.

Fixes: 76e98a158b20 ("ksmbd: fix race condition between destroy_previous_session() and smb2 operations()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: DaeMyung Kang &lt;charsyam@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit def036ef87f8641c1c525d5ae17438d7a1006491 ]

rcount is intended to be connection-specific: 2 for curr_conn, 1 for
every other connection sharing the same session.  However, it is
initialised only once before the hash iteration and is never reset.
After the loop visits curr_conn, later sibling connections are also
checked against rcount == 2, so a sibling with req_running == 1 is
incorrectly treated as idle.  This makes the outcome depend on the
hash iteration order: whether a given sibling is checked against the
loose (&lt; 2) or the strict (&lt; 1) threshold is decided by whether it
happens to be visited before or after curr_conn.

The function's contract is "wait until every connection sharing this
session is idle" so that destroy_previous_session() can safely tear
the session down.  The latched rcount violates that contract and
reopens the teardown race window the wait logic was meant to close:
destroy_previous_session() may proceed before sibling channels have
actually quiesced, overlapping session teardown with in-flight work
on those connections.

Recompute rcount inside the loop so each connection is compared
against its own threshold regardless of iteration order.

This is a code-inspection fix for an iteration-order-dependent logic
error; a targeted reproducer would require SMB3 multichannel with
in-flight work on a sibling channel landing after curr_conn in hash
order, which is not something that can be triggered reliably.

Fixes: 76e98a158b20 ("ksmbd: fix race condition between destroy_previous_session() and smb2 operations()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: DaeMyung Kang &lt;charsyam@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: replace connection list with hash table</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Namjae Jeon</name>
<email>linkinjeon@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-25T09:07:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ce2e0b83c17f1b330f10f35dca0eecc8ab4393f0'/>
<id>ce2e0b83c17f1b330f10f35dca0eecc8ab4393f0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0bcc831be535269556f59cb70396f7e34f03a276 ]

Replace connection list with hash table to improve lookup performance.

Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: def036ef87f8 ("ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0bcc831be535269556f59cb70396f7e34f03a276 ]

Replace connection list with hash table to improve lookup performance.

Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: def036ef87f8 ("ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: use msleep instaed of schedule_timeout_interruptible()</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Namjae Jeon</name>
<email>linkinjeon@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-25T09:07:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4f539d68bfdc416aa4ad97d87b5bf5dfab0fbea3'/>
<id>4f539d68bfdc416aa4ad97d87b5bf5dfab0fbea3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f75f8bdd4ff4830abe31a1b94892eb12b85b9535 ]

use msleep instaed of schedule_timeout_interruptible()
to guarantee the task delays as expected.

Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: def036ef87f8 ("ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f75f8bdd4ff4830abe31a1b94892eb12b85b9535 ]

use msleep instaed of schedule_timeout_interruptible()
to guarantee the task delays as expected.

Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: def036ef87f8 ("ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to do sanity check on dcc-&gt;discard_cmd_cnt conditionally</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>chao@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-25T10:35:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fafade22860a53255061eb537f1ca3b3469d18d9'/>
<id>fafade22860a53255061eb537f1ca3b3469d18d9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6af249c996f7d73a3435f9e577956fa259347d18 ]

Syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below:

------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:1900!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6527 Comm: syz.5.110 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
RIP: 0010:f2fs_issue_discard_timeout+0x59b/0x5a0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:1900
Code: d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c d6 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 a8 5e fa fd e9 c9 fe ff ff e8 4e 46 94 fd 90 0f 0b e8 46 46 94 fd 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000494f940 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff843009ca RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000
RDX: ffffc9001ca78000 RSI: 00000000000029f3 RDI: 00000000000029f4
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100893a431 R12: 1ffff1100893a430
R13: 1ffff1100c2b702c R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880449d2160
FS:  00007ffa35fed6c0(0000) GS:ffff88812643d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2b68634000 CR3: 0000000039f62000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __f2fs_remount fs/f2fs/super.c:2960 [inline]
 f2fs_reconfigure+0x108a/0x1710 fs/f2fs/super.c:5443
 reconfigure_super+0x227/0x8a0 fs/super.c:1080
 do_remount fs/namespace.c:3391 [inline]
 path_mount+0xdc5/0x10e0 fs/namespace.c:4151
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4172 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4361 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4338
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ffa37dbda0a

The root cause is there will be race condition in between f2fs_ioc_fitrim()
and f2fs_remount():

- f2fs_remount			- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
 - f2fs_issue_discard_timeout
  - __issue_discard_cmd
  - __drop_discard_cmd
  - __wait_all_discard_cmd
				 - f2fs_trim_fs
				  - f2fs_write_checkpoint
				   - f2fs_clear_prefree_segments
				    - f2fs_issue_discard
				     - __issue_discard_async
				      - __queue_discard_cmd
				       - __update_discard_tree_range
				        - __insert_discard_cmd
				         - __create_discard_cmd
				         : atomic_inc(&amp;dcc-&gt;discard_cmd_cnt);
  - sanity check on dcc-&gt;discard_cmd_cnt (expect discard_cmd_cnt to be zero)

This will only happen when fitrim races w/ remount rw, if we remount to
readonly filesystem, remount will wait until mnt_pcp.mnt_writers to zero,
that means fitrim is not in process at that time.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 2482c4325dfe ("f2fs: detect bug_on in f2fs_wait_discard_bios")
Reported-by: syzbot+62538b67389ee582837a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/69b07d7c.050a0220.8df7.09a1.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
[ dereferenced flags pointer (`*flags &amp; SB_RDONLY`) to match `int *flags` remount signature ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6af249c996f7d73a3435f9e577956fa259347d18 ]

Syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below:

------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:1900!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6527 Comm: syz.5.110 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
RIP: 0010:f2fs_issue_discard_timeout+0x59b/0x5a0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:1900
Code: d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c d6 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 a8 5e fa fd e9 c9 fe ff ff e8 4e 46 94 fd 90 0f 0b e8 46 46 94 fd 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000494f940 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff843009ca RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000
RDX: ffffc9001ca78000 RSI: 00000000000029f3 RDI: 00000000000029f4
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100893a431 R12: 1ffff1100893a430
R13: 1ffff1100c2b702c R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880449d2160
FS:  00007ffa35fed6c0(0000) GS:ffff88812643d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2b68634000 CR3: 0000000039f62000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __f2fs_remount fs/f2fs/super.c:2960 [inline]
 f2fs_reconfigure+0x108a/0x1710 fs/f2fs/super.c:5443
 reconfigure_super+0x227/0x8a0 fs/super.c:1080
 do_remount fs/namespace.c:3391 [inline]
 path_mount+0xdc5/0x10e0 fs/namespace.c:4151
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4172 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4361 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4338
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ffa37dbda0a

The root cause is there will be race condition in between f2fs_ioc_fitrim()
and f2fs_remount():

- f2fs_remount			- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
 - f2fs_issue_discard_timeout
  - __issue_discard_cmd
  - __drop_discard_cmd
  - __wait_all_discard_cmd
				 - f2fs_trim_fs
				  - f2fs_write_checkpoint
				   - f2fs_clear_prefree_segments
				    - f2fs_issue_discard
				     - __issue_discard_async
				      - __queue_discard_cmd
				       - __update_discard_tree_range
				        - __insert_discard_cmd
				         - __create_discard_cmd
				         : atomic_inc(&amp;dcc-&gt;discard_cmd_cnt);
  - sanity check on dcc-&gt;discard_cmd_cnt (expect discard_cmd_cnt to be zero)

This will only happen when fitrim races w/ remount rw, if we remount to
readonly filesystem, remount will wait until mnt_pcp.mnt_writers to zero,
that means fitrim is not in process at that time.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 2482c4325dfe ("f2fs: detect bug_on in f2fs_wait_discard_bios")
Reported-by: syzbot+62538b67389ee582837a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/69b07d7c.050a0220.8df7.09a1.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
[ dereferenced flags pointer (`*flags &amp; SB_RDONLY`) to match `int *flags` remount signature ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix UAF caused by decrementing sbi-&gt;nr_pages[] in f2fs_write_end_io()</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yongpeng Yang</name>
<email>yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-24T13:03:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7be222de96c0f9eee6e65eeb017ef855ee185cfa'/>
<id>7be222de96c0f9eee6e65eeb017ef855ee185cfa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d9c4a4ed4eef1f82c5b16b037aee8bad819fd53 ]

The xfstests case "generic/107" and syzbot have both reported a NULL
pointer dereference.

The concurrent scenario that triggers the panic is as follows:

F2FS_WB_CP_DATA write callback          umount
                                        - f2fs_write_checkpoint
                                         - f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
- blk_mq_end_request
 - bio_endio
  - f2fs_write_end_io
   : dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
   : wake_up(&amp;sbi-&gt;cp_wait)
                                        - kill_f2fs_super
                                         - kill_block_super
                                          - f2fs_put_super
                                           : iput(sbi-&gt;node_inode)
                                           : sbi-&gt;node_inode = NULL
   : f2fs_in_warm_node_list
    - is_node_folio // sbi-&gt;node_inode is NULL and panic

The root cause is that f2fs_put_super() calls iput(sbi-&gt;node_inode) and
sets sbi-&gt;node_inode to NULL after sbi-&gt;nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA] is
decremented to zero. As a result, f2fs_in_warm_node_list() may
dereference a NULL node_inode when checking whether a folio belongs to
the node inode, leading to a panic.

This patch fixes the issue by calling f2fs_in_warm_node_list() before
decrementing sbi-&gt;nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA], thus preventing the
use-after-free condition.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 50fa53eccf9f ("f2fs: fix to avoid broken of dnode block list")
Reported-by: syzbot+6e4cb1cac5efc96ea0ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang &lt;yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
[ folio =&gt; page ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2d9c4a4ed4eef1f82c5b16b037aee8bad819fd53 ]

The xfstests case "generic/107" and syzbot have both reported a NULL
pointer dereference.

The concurrent scenario that triggers the panic is as follows:

F2FS_WB_CP_DATA write callback          umount
                                        - f2fs_write_checkpoint
                                         - f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
- blk_mq_end_request
 - bio_endio
  - f2fs_write_end_io
   : dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
   : wake_up(&amp;sbi-&gt;cp_wait)
                                        - kill_f2fs_super
                                         - kill_block_super
                                          - f2fs_put_super
                                           : iput(sbi-&gt;node_inode)
                                           : sbi-&gt;node_inode = NULL
   : f2fs_in_warm_node_list
    - is_node_folio // sbi-&gt;node_inode is NULL and panic

The root cause is that f2fs_put_super() calls iput(sbi-&gt;node_inode) and
sets sbi-&gt;node_inode to NULL after sbi-&gt;nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA] is
decremented to zero. As a result, f2fs_in_warm_node_list() may
dereference a NULL node_inode when checking whether a folio belongs to
the node inode, leading to a panic.

This patch fixes the issue by calling f2fs_in_warm_node_list() before
decrementing sbi-&gt;nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA], thus preventing the
use-after-free condition.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 50fa53eccf9f ("f2fs: fix to avoid broken of dnode block list")
Reported-by: syzbot+6e4cb1cac5efc96ea0ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang &lt;yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
[ folio =&gt; page ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-24T14:46:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d92f3f0b22414e7515696a02224d0af55e3004a3'/>
<id>d92f3f0b22414e7515696a02224d0af55e3004a3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a ]

build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a
server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the
chmod/chown security descriptor.

The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before
reading dacl_ptr-&gt;size or dacl_ptr-&gt;num_aces.  That avoids the immediate
header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on
pdacl-&gt;num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.

A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a
header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated
extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.

Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to
validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator
before the chmod/chown rebuild paths.  parse_dacl() reuses the same
validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on
what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.

Fixes: bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
[ no kmalloc_objs ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a ]

build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a
server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the
chmod/chown security descriptor.

The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before
reading dacl_ptr-&gt;size or dacl_ptr-&gt;num_aces.  That avoids the immediate
header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on
pdacl-&gt;num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.

A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a
header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated
extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.

Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to
validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator
before the chmod/chown rebuild paths.  parse_dacl() reuses the same
validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on
what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.

Fixes: bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
[ no kmalloc_objs ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ntfs3: fix integer overflow in run_unpack() volume boundary check</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tobias Gaertner</name>
<email>tob.gaertner@me.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-29T11:17:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=60dab3e2931f3d792438a77a6cb0cb731c43300b'/>
<id>60dab3e2931f3d792438a77a6cb0cb731c43300b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 984a415f019536ea2d24de9010744e5302a9a948 upstream.

The volume boundary check `lcn + len &gt; sbi-&gt;used.bitmap.nbits` uses raw
addition which can wrap around for large lcn and len values, bypassing
the validation.  Use check_add_overflow() as is already done for the
adjacent prev_lcn + dlcn and vcn64 + len checks added by commit
3ac37e100385 ("ntfs3: Fix integer overflow in run_unpack()").

Found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness (LibAFL + QEMU).

Fixes: 82cae269cfa95 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tobias Gaertner &lt;tob.gaertner@me.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov &lt;almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 984a415f019536ea2d24de9010744e5302a9a948 upstream.

The volume boundary check `lcn + len &gt; sbi-&gt;used.bitmap.nbits` uses raw
addition which can wrap around for large lcn and len values, bypassing
the validation.  Use check_add_overflow() as is already done for the
adjacent prev_lcn + dlcn and vcn64 + len checks added by commit
3ac37e100385 ("ntfs3: Fix integer overflow in run_unpack()").

Found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness (LibAFL + QEMU).

Fixes: 82cae269cfa95 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tobias Gaertner &lt;tob.gaertner@me.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov &lt;almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tobias Gaertner</name>
<email>tob.gaertner@me.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-29T11:17:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e64f7dfcaff79e7dfff9121a382dd77f9b462f62'/>
<id>e64f7dfcaff79e7dfff9121a382dd77f9b462f62</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b62567bca47408e6739dee75f02a2113548af875 upstream.

run_unpack() checks `run_buf &lt; run_last` at the top of the while loop
but then reads size_size and offset_size bytes via run_unpack_s64()
without verifying they fit within the remaining buffer.  A crafted NTFS
image with truncated run data in an MFT attribute triggers an OOB heap
read of up to 15 bytes when the filesystem is mounted.

Add boundary checks before each run_unpack_s64() call to ensure the
declared field size does not exceed the remaining buffer.

Found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness (LibAFL + QEMU).

Fixes: 82cae269cfa95 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tobias Gaertner &lt;tob.gaertner@me.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov &lt;almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b62567bca47408e6739dee75f02a2113548af875 upstream.

run_unpack() checks `run_buf &lt; run_last` at the top of the while loop
but then reads size_size and offset_size bytes via run_unpack_s64()
without verifying they fit within the remaining buffer.  A crafted NTFS
image with truncated run data in an MFT attribute triggers an OOB heap
read of up to 15 bytes when the filesystem is mounted.

Add boundary checks before each run_unpack_s64() call to ensure the
declared field size does not exceed the remaining buffer.

Found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness (LibAFL + QEMU).

Fixes: 82cae269cfa95 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tobias Gaertner &lt;tob.gaertner@me.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov &lt;almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: only d_add() negative dentries when they are unhashed</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Max Kellermann</name>
<email>max.kellermann@ionos.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-27T16:23:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4179cc390dacebc87079419ec92f86f3dc46294d'/>
<id>4179cc390dacebc87079419ec92f86f3dc46294d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 803447f93d75ab6e40c85e6d12b5630d281d70d6 upstream.

Ceph can call d_add(dentry, NULL) on a negative dentry that is already
present in the primary dcache hash.

In the current VFS that is not safe.  d_add() goes through __d_add()
to __d_rehash(), which unconditionally reinserts dentry-&gt;d_hash into
the hlist_bl bucket.  If the dentry is already hashed, reinserting the
same node can corrupt the bucket, including creating a self-loop.
Once that happens, __d_lookup() can spin forever in the hlist_bl walk,
typically looping only on the d_name.hash mismatch check and
eventually triggering RCU stall reports like this one:

 rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
 rcu:         87-....: (2100 ticks this GP) idle=3a4c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=25003319/25003319 fqs=829
 rcu:         (t=2101 jiffies g=79058445 q=698988 ncpus=192)
 CPU: 87 UID: 2952868916 PID: 3933303 Comm: php-cgi8.3 Not tainted 6.18.17-i1-amd #950 NONE
 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.6 09/22/2023
 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup+0x46/0xb0
 Code: c1 e8 07 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 00 49 89 fc 49 89 f5 48 89 c3 48 83 e3 fe 48 83 f8 01 77 0f eb 2d 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 1b 48 85 db &lt;74&gt; 20 39 6b 18 75 f3 48 8d 7b 78 e8 ba 85 d0 00 4c 39 63 10 74 1f
 RSP: 0018:ff745a70c8253898 EFLAGS: 00000282
 RAX: ff26e470054cb208 RBX: ff26e470054cb208 RCX: 000000006e958966
 RDX: ff26e48267340000 RSI: ff745a70c82539b0 RDI: ff26e458f74655c0
 RBP: 000000006e958966 R08: 0000000000000180 R09: 9cd08d909b919a89
 R10: ff26e458f74655c0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff26e458f74655c0
 R13: ff745a70c82539b0 R14: d0d0d0d0d0d0d0d0 R15: 2f2f2f2f2f2f2f2f
 FS:  00007f5770896980(0000) GS:ff26e482c5d88000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f5764de50c0 CR3: 000000a72abb5001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  lookup_fast+0x9f/0x100
  walk_component+0x1f/0x150
  link_path_walk+0x20e/0x3d0
  path_lookupat+0x68/0x180
  filename_lookup+0xdc/0x1e0
  vfs_statx+0x6c/0x140
  vfs_fstatat+0x67/0xa0
  __do_sys_newfstatat+0x24/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x230
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

This is reachable with reused cached negative dentries.  A Ceph lookup
or atomic_open can be handed a negative dentry that is already hashed,
and fs/ceph/dir.c then hits one of two paths that incorrectly assume
"negative" also means "unhashed":

  - ceph_finish_lookup():
      MDS reply is -ENOENT with no trace
      -&gt; d_add(dentry, NULL)

  - ceph_lookup():
      local ENOENT fast path for a complete directory with shared caps
      -&gt; d_add(dentry, NULL)

Both paths can therefore re-add an already-hashed negative dentry.

Ceph already uses the correct pattern elsewhere: ceph_fill_trace() only
calls d_add(dn, NULL) for a negative null-dentry reply when d_unhashed(dn)
is true.

Fix both fs/ceph/dir.c sites the same way: only call d_add() for a
negative dentry when it is actually unhashed.  If the negative dentry
is already hashed, leave it in place and reuse it as-is.

This preserves the existing behavior for unhashed dentries while
avoiding d_hash list corruption for reused hashed negatives.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2817b000b02c ("ceph: directory operations")
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann &lt;max.kellermann@ionos.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 803447f93d75ab6e40c85e6d12b5630d281d70d6 upstream.

Ceph can call d_add(dentry, NULL) on a negative dentry that is already
present in the primary dcache hash.

In the current VFS that is not safe.  d_add() goes through __d_add()
to __d_rehash(), which unconditionally reinserts dentry-&gt;d_hash into
the hlist_bl bucket.  If the dentry is already hashed, reinserting the
same node can corrupt the bucket, including creating a self-loop.
Once that happens, __d_lookup() can spin forever in the hlist_bl walk,
typically looping only on the d_name.hash mismatch check and
eventually triggering RCU stall reports like this one:

 rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
 rcu:         87-....: (2100 ticks this GP) idle=3a4c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=25003319/25003319 fqs=829
 rcu:         (t=2101 jiffies g=79058445 q=698988 ncpus=192)
 CPU: 87 UID: 2952868916 PID: 3933303 Comm: php-cgi8.3 Not tainted 6.18.17-i1-amd #950 NONE
 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.6 09/22/2023
 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup+0x46/0xb0
 Code: c1 e8 07 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 00 49 89 fc 49 89 f5 48 89 c3 48 83 e3 fe 48 83 f8 01 77 0f eb 2d 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 1b 48 85 db &lt;74&gt; 20 39 6b 18 75 f3 48 8d 7b 78 e8 ba 85 d0 00 4c 39 63 10 74 1f
 RSP: 0018:ff745a70c8253898 EFLAGS: 00000282
 RAX: ff26e470054cb208 RBX: ff26e470054cb208 RCX: 000000006e958966
 RDX: ff26e48267340000 RSI: ff745a70c82539b0 RDI: ff26e458f74655c0
 RBP: 000000006e958966 R08: 0000000000000180 R09: 9cd08d909b919a89
 R10: ff26e458f74655c0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff26e458f74655c0
 R13: ff745a70c82539b0 R14: d0d0d0d0d0d0d0d0 R15: 2f2f2f2f2f2f2f2f
 FS:  00007f5770896980(0000) GS:ff26e482c5d88000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f5764de50c0 CR3: 000000a72abb5001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  lookup_fast+0x9f/0x100
  walk_component+0x1f/0x150
  link_path_walk+0x20e/0x3d0
  path_lookupat+0x68/0x180
  filename_lookup+0xdc/0x1e0
  vfs_statx+0x6c/0x140
  vfs_fstatat+0x67/0xa0
  __do_sys_newfstatat+0x24/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x230
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

This is reachable with reused cached negative dentries.  A Ceph lookup
or atomic_open can be handed a negative dentry that is already hashed,
and fs/ceph/dir.c then hits one of two paths that incorrectly assume
"negative" also means "unhashed":

  - ceph_finish_lookup():
      MDS reply is -ENOENT with no trace
      -&gt; d_add(dentry, NULL)

  - ceph_lookup():
      local ENOENT fast path for a complete directory with shared caps
      -&gt; d_add(dentry, NULL)

Both paths can therefore re-add an already-hashed negative dentry.

Ceph already uses the correct pattern elsewhere: ceph_fill_trace() only
calls d_add(dn, NULL) for a negative null-dentry reply when d_unhashed(dn)
is true.

Fix both fs/ceph/dir.c sites the same way: only call d_add() for a
negative dentry when it is actually unhashed.  If the negative dentry
is already hashed, leave it in place and reuse it as-is.

This preserves the existing behavior for unhashed dentries while
avoiding d_hash list corruption for reused hashed negatives.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2817b000b02c ("ceph: directory operations")
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann &lt;max.kellermann@ionos.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inotify: fix watch count leak when fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T04:09:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chia-Ming Chang</name>
<email>chiamingc@synology.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-24T09:34:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=73ddc8518a32baff6bc17afda4ee1ebae5b4ed12'/>
<id>73ddc8518a32baff6bc17afda4ee1ebae5b4ed12</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6a320935fa4293e9e599ec9f85dc9eb3be7029f8 upstream.

When fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails in inotify_new_watch(),
the error path calls inotify_remove_from_idr() but does not call
dec_inotify_watches() to undo the preceding inc_inotify_watches().
This leaks a watch count, and repeated failures can exhaust the
max_user_watches limit with -ENOSPC even when no watches are active.

Prior to commit 1cce1eea0aff ("inotify: Convert to using per-namespace
limits"), the watch count was incremented after fsnotify_add_mark_locked()
succeeded, so this path was not affected. The conversion moved
inc_inotify_watches() before the mark insertion without adding the
corresponding rollback.

Add the missing dec_inotify_watches() call in the error path.

Fixes: 1cce1eea0aff ("inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chia-Ming Chang &lt;chiamingc@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: robbieko &lt;robbieko@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224093442.3076294-1-chiamingc@synology.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6a320935fa4293e9e599ec9f85dc9eb3be7029f8 upstream.

When fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails in inotify_new_watch(),
the error path calls inotify_remove_from_idr() but does not call
dec_inotify_watches() to undo the preceding inc_inotify_watches().
This leaks a watch count, and repeated failures can exhaust the
max_user_watches limit with -ENOSPC even when no watches are active.

Prior to commit 1cce1eea0aff ("inotify: Convert to using per-namespace
limits"), the watch count was incremented after fsnotify_add_mark_locked()
succeeded, so this path was not affected. The conversion moved
inc_inotify_watches() before the mark insertion without adding the
corresponding rollback.

Add the missing dec_inotify_watches() call in the error path.

Fixes: 1cce1eea0aff ("inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chia-Ming Chang &lt;chiamingc@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: robbieko &lt;robbieko@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224093442.3076294-1-chiamingc@synology.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
