linux-stable.git/fs, branch v5.3.7 Linux kernel stable tree io_uring: only flush workqueues on fileset removal 2019-10-17T20:47:33+00:00 Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk 2019-10-09T20:40:13+00:00 9392e3a7beef809bf244470ddffc4ef24c43c40f commit 8a99734081775c012a4a6c442fdef0379fe52bdf upstream. We should not remove the workqueue, we just need to ensure that the workqueues are synced. The workqueues are torn down on ctx removal. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6b06314c47e1 ("io_uring: add file set registration") Reported-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 8a99734081775c012a4a6c442fdef0379fe52bdf upstream.

We should not remove the workqueue, we just need to ensure that the
workqueues are synced. The workqueues are torn down on ctx removal.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6b06314c47e1 ("io_uring: add file set registration")
Reported-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fix the locking in dcache_readdir() and friends 2019-10-17T20:47:29+00:00 Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk 2019-09-15T16:12:39+00:00 86163760e2a59434cf4f45c21462d75a734c1c85 commit d4f4de5e5ef8efde85febb6876cd3c8ab1631999 upstream. There are two problems in dcache_readdir() - one is that lockless traversal of the list needs non-trivial cooperation of d_alloc() (at least a switch to list_add_rcu(), and probably more than just that) and another is that it assumes that no removal will happen without the directory locked exclusive. Said assumption had always been there, never had been stated explicitly and is violated by several places in the kernel (devpts and selinuxfs). * replacement of next_positive() with different calling conventions: it returns struct list_head * instead of struct dentry *; the latter is passed in and out by reference, grabbing the result and dropping the original value. * scan is under ->d_lock. If we run out of timeslice, cursor is moved after the last position we'd reached and we reschedule; then the scan continues from that place. To avoid livelocks between multiple lseek() (with cursors getting moved past each other, never reaching the real entries) we always skip the cursors, need_resched() or not. * returned list_head * is either ->d_child of dentry we'd found or ->d_subdirs of parent (if we got to the end of the list). * dcache_readdir() and dcache_dir_lseek() switched to new helper. dcache_readdir() always holds a reference to dentry passed to dir_emit() now. Cursor is moved to just before the entry where dir_emit() has failed or into the very end of the list, if we'd run out. * move_cursor() eliminated - it had sucky calling conventions and after fixing that it became simply list_move() (in lseek and scan_positives) or list_move_tail() (in readdir). All operations with the list are under ->d_lock now, and we do not depend upon having all file removals done with parent locked exclusive anymore. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: "zhengbin (A)" <zhengbin13@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit d4f4de5e5ef8efde85febb6876cd3c8ab1631999 upstream.

There are two problems in dcache_readdir() - one is that lockless traversal
of the list needs non-trivial cooperation of d_alloc() (at least a switch
to list_add_rcu(), and probably more than just that) and another is that
it assumes that no removal will happen without the directory locked exclusive.
Said assumption had always been there, never had been stated explicitly and
is violated by several places in the kernel (devpts and selinuxfs).

        * replacement of next_positive() with different calling conventions:
it returns struct list_head * instead of struct dentry *; the latter is
passed in and out by reference, grabbing the result and dropping the original
value.
        * scan is under ->d_lock.  If we run out of timeslice, cursor is moved
after the last position we'd reached and we reschedule; then the scan continues
from that place.  To avoid livelocks between multiple lseek() (with cursors
getting moved past each other, never reaching the real entries) we always
skip the cursors, need_resched() or not.
        * returned list_head * is either ->d_child of dentry we'd found or
->d_subdirs of parent (if we got to the end of the list).
        * dcache_readdir() and dcache_dir_lseek() switched to new helper.
dcache_readdir() always holds a reference to dentry passed to dir_emit() now.
Cursor is moved to just before the entry where dir_emit() has failed or into
the very end of the list, if we'd run out.
        * move_cursor() eliminated - it had sucky calling conventions and
after fixing that it became simply list_move() (in lseek and scan_positives)
or list_move_tail() (in readdir).

        All operations with the list are under ->d_lock now, and we do not
depend upon having all file removals done with parent locked exclusive
anymore.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: "zhengbin (A)" <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
NFS: Fix O_DIRECT accounting of number of bytes read/written 2019-10-17T20:47:26+00:00 Trond Myklebust trondmy@gmail.com 2019-09-30T18:02:56+00:00 5ee51346c7cef7817cd91f91a7e04c04066db3c0 commit 031d73ed768a40684f3ca21992265ffdb6a270bf upstream. When a series of O_DIRECT reads or writes are truncated, either due to eof or due to an error, then we should return the number of contiguous bytes that were received/sent starting at the offset specified by the application. Currently, we are failing to correctly check contiguity, and so we're failing the generic/465 in xfstests when the race between the read and write RPCs causes the file to get extended while the 2 reads are outstanding. If the first read RPC call wins the race and returns with eof set, we should treat the second read RPC as being truncated. Reported-by: Su Yanjun <suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Fixes: 1ccbad9f9f9bd ("nfs: fix DIO good bytes calculation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+ Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 031d73ed768a40684f3ca21992265ffdb6a270bf upstream.

When a series of O_DIRECT reads or writes are truncated, either due to
eof or due to an error, then we should return the number of contiguous
bytes that were received/sent starting at the offset specified by the
application.

Currently, we are failing to correctly check contiguity, and so we're
failing the generic/465 in xfstests when the race between the read
and write RPCs causes the file to get extended while the 2 reads are
outstanding. If the first read RPC call wins the race and returns with
eof set, we should treat the second read RPC as being truncated.

Reported-by: Su Yanjun <suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Fixes: 1ccbad9f9f9bd ("nfs: fix DIO good bytes calculation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
btrfs: fix uninitialized ret in ref-verify 2019-10-17T20:47:26+00:00 Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com 2019-10-02T14:03:36+00:00 c5cec182bdf97e14aef08f8a4163f62f2f74d17c commit c5f4987e86f6692fdb12533ea1fc7a7bb98e555a upstream. Coverity caught a case where we could return with a uninitialized value in ret in process_leaf. This is actually pretty likely because we could very easily run into a block group item key and have a garbage value in ret and think there was an errror. Fix this by initializing ret to 0. Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Fixes: fd708b81d972 ("Btrfs: add a extent ref verify tool") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c5f4987e86f6692fdb12533ea1fc7a7bb98e555a upstream.

Coverity caught a case where we could return with a uninitialized value
in ret in process_leaf.  This is actually pretty likely because we could
very easily run into a block group item key and have a garbage value in
ret and think there was an errror.  Fix this by initializing ret to 0.

Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Fixes: fd708b81d972 ("Btrfs: add a extent ref verify tool")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
btrfs: fix incorrect updating of log root tree 2019-10-17T20:47:25+00:00 Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com 2019-09-30T20:27:25+00:00 aad4c2725c0a2475e764394d231f6cdd9f0bd731 commit 4203e968947071586a98b5314fd7ffdea3b4f971 upstream. We've historically had reports of being unable to mount file systems because the tree log root couldn't be read. Usually this is the "parent transid failure", but could be any of the related errors, including "fsid mismatch" or "bad tree block", depending on which block got allocated. The modification of the individual log root items are serialized on the per-log root root_mutex. This means that any modification to the per-subvol log root_item is completely protected. However we update the root item in the log root tree outside of the log root tree log_mutex. We do this in order to allow multiple subvolumes to be updated in each log transaction. This is problematic however because when we are writing the log root tree out we update the super block with the _current_ log root node information. Since these two operations happen independently of each other, you can end up updating the log root tree in between writing out the dirty blocks and setting the super block to point at the current root. This means we'll point at the new root node that hasn't been written out, instead of the one we should be pointing at. Thus whatever garbage or old block we end up pointing at complains when we mount the file system later and try to replay the log. Fix this by copying the log's root item into a local root item copy. Then once we're safely under the log_root_tree->log_mutex we update the root item in the log_root_tree. This way we do not modify the log_root_tree while we're committing it, fixing the problem. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 4203e968947071586a98b5314fd7ffdea3b4f971 upstream.

We've historically had reports of being unable to mount file systems
because the tree log root couldn't be read.  Usually this is the "parent
transid failure", but could be any of the related errors, including
"fsid mismatch" or "bad tree block", depending on which block got
allocated.

The modification of the individual log root items are serialized on the
per-log root root_mutex.  This means that any modification to the
per-subvol log root_item is completely protected.

However we update the root item in the log root tree outside of the log
root tree log_mutex.  We do this in order to allow multiple subvolumes
to be updated in each log transaction.

This is problematic however because when we are writing the log root
tree out we update the super block with the _current_ log root node
information.  Since these two operations happen independently of each
other, you can end up updating the log root tree in between writing out
the dirty blocks and setting the super block to point at the current
root.

This means we'll point at the new root node that hasn't been written
out, instead of the one we should be pointing at.  Thus whatever garbage
or old block we end up pointing at complains when we mount the file
system later and try to replay the log.

Fix this by copying the log's root item into a local root item copy.
Then once we're safely under the log_root_tree->log_mutex we update the
root item in the log_root_tree.  This way we do not modify the
log_root_tree while we're committing it, fixing the problem.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Btrfs: fix memory leak due to concurrent append writes with fiemap 2019-10-17T20:47:25+00:00 Filipe Manana fdmanana@suse.com 2019-09-30T09:20:25+00:00 8d2c28f617888ec0cf13a4f68ab256f07585d2ee commit c67d970f0ea8dcc423e112137d34334fa0abb8ec upstream. When we have a buffered write that starts at an offset greater than or equals to the file's size happening concurrently with a full ranged fiemap, we can end up leaking an extent state structure. Suppose we have a file with a size of 1Mb, and before the buffered write and fiemap are performed, it has a single extent state in its io tree representing the range from 0 to 1Mb, with the EXTENT_DELALLOC bit set. The following sequence diagram shows how the memory leak happens if a fiemap a buffered write, starting at offset 1Mb and with a length of 4Kb, are performed concurrently. CPU 1 CPU 2 extent_fiemap() --> it's a full ranged fiemap range from 0 to LLONG_MAX - 1 (9223372036854775807) --> locks range in the inode's io tree --> after this we have 2 extent states in the io tree: --> 1 for range [0, 1Mb[ with the bits EXTENT_LOCKED and EXTENT_DELALLOC_BITS set --> 1 for the range [1Mb, LLONG_MAX[ with the EXTENT_LOCKED bit set --> start buffered write at offset 1Mb with a length of 4Kb btrfs_file_write_iter() btrfs_buffered_write() --> cached_state is NULL lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() --> returns 0 and does not lock range because it starts at current i_size / eof --> cached_state remains NULL btrfs_dirty_pages() btrfs_set_extent_delalloc() (...) __set_extent_bit() --> splits extent state for range [1Mb, LLONG_MAX[ and now we have 2 extent states: --> one for the range [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[ with EXTENT_LOCKED set --> another one for the range [1Mb + 4Kb, LLONG_MAX[ with EXTENT_LOCKED set as well --> sets EXTENT_DELALLOC on the extent state for the range [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[ --> caches extent state [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[ into @cached_state because it has the bit EXTENT_LOCKED set --> btrfs_buffered_write() ends up with a non-NULL cached_state and never calls anything to release its reference on it, resulting in a memory leak Fix this by calling free_extent_state() on cached_state if the range was not locked by lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need(). The same issue can happen if anything else other than fiemap locks a range that covers eof and beyond. This could be triggered, sporadically, by test case generic/561 from the fstests suite, which makes duperemove run concurrently with fsstress, and duperemove does plenty of calls to fiemap. When CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is set the leak is reported in dmesg/syslog when removing the btrfs module with a message like the following: [77100.039461] BTRFS: state leak: start 6574080 end 6582271 state 16402 in tree 0 refs 1 Otherwise (CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG not set) detectable with kmemleak. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c67d970f0ea8dcc423e112137d34334fa0abb8ec upstream.

When we have a buffered write that starts at an offset greater than or
equals to the file's size happening concurrently with a full ranged
fiemap, we can end up leaking an extent state structure.

Suppose we have a file with a size of 1Mb, and before the buffered write
and fiemap are performed, it has a single extent state in its io tree
representing the range from 0 to 1Mb, with the EXTENT_DELALLOC bit set.

The following sequence diagram shows how the memory leak happens if a
fiemap a buffered write, starting at offset 1Mb and with a length of
4Kb, are performed concurrently.

          CPU 1                                                  CPU 2

  extent_fiemap()
    --> it's a full ranged fiemap
        range from 0 to LLONG_MAX - 1
        (9223372036854775807)

    --> locks range in the inode's
        io tree
      --> after this we have 2 extent
          states in the io tree:
          --> 1 for range [0, 1Mb[ with
              the bits EXTENT_LOCKED and
              EXTENT_DELALLOC_BITS set
          --> 1 for the range
              [1Mb, LLONG_MAX[ with
              the EXTENT_LOCKED bit set

                                                  --> start buffered write at offset
                                                      1Mb with a length of 4Kb

                                                  btrfs_file_write_iter()

                                                    btrfs_buffered_write()
                                                      --> cached_state is NULL

                                                      lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need()
                                                        --> returns 0 and does not lock
                                                            range because it starts
                                                            at current i_size / eof

                                                      --> cached_state remains NULL

                                                      btrfs_dirty_pages()
                                                        btrfs_set_extent_delalloc()
                                                          (...)
                                                          __set_extent_bit()

                                                            --> splits extent state for range
                                                                [1Mb, LLONG_MAX[ and now we
                                                                have 2 extent states:

                                                                --> one for the range
                                                                    [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[ with
                                                                    EXTENT_LOCKED set
                                                                --> another one for the range
                                                                    [1Mb + 4Kb, LLONG_MAX[ with
                                                                    EXTENT_LOCKED set as well

                                                            --> sets EXTENT_DELALLOC on the
                                                                extent state for the range
                                                                [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[
                                                            --> caches extent state
                                                                [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[ into
                                                                @cached_state because it has
                                                                the bit EXTENT_LOCKED set

                                                    --> btrfs_buffered_write() ends up
                                                        with a non-NULL cached_state and
                                                        never calls anything to release its
                                                        reference on it, resulting in a
                                                        memory leak

Fix this by calling free_extent_state() on cached_state if the range was
not locked by lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need().

The same issue can happen if anything else other than fiemap locks a range
that covers eof and beyond.

This could be triggered, sporadically, by test case generic/561 from the
fstests suite, which makes duperemove run concurrently with fsstress, and
duperemove does plenty of calls to fiemap. When CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is set
the leak is reported in dmesg/syslog when removing the btrfs module with
a message like the following:

  [77100.039461] BTRFS: state leak: start 6574080 end 6582271 state 16402 in tree 0 refs 1

Otherwise (CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG not set) detectable with kmemleak.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
btrfs: fix balance convert to single on 32-bit host CPUs 2019-10-17T20:47:24+00:00 Zygo Blaxell ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org 2019-09-12T23:55:01+00:00 8daddd6c332ada05b2bc5fb2ffb506769e7151b8 commit 7a54789074a54f64addf5b49bf1994f478337a83 upstream. Currently, the command: btrfs balance start -dconvert=single,soft . on a Raspberry Pi produces the following kernel message: BTRFS error (device mmcblk0p2): balance: invalid convert data profile single This fails because we use is_power_of_2(unsigned long) to validate the new data profile, the constant for 'single' profile uses bit 48, and there are only 32 bits in a long on ARM. Fix by open-coding the check using u64 variables. Tested by completing the original balance command on several Raspberry Pis. Fixes: 818255feece6 ("btrfs: use common helper instead of open coding a bit test") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20+ Signed-off-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 7a54789074a54f64addf5b49bf1994f478337a83 upstream.

Currently, the command:

	btrfs balance start -dconvert=single,soft .

on a Raspberry Pi produces the following kernel message:

	BTRFS error (device mmcblk0p2): balance: invalid convert data profile single

This fails because we use is_power_of_2(unsigned long) to validate
the new data profile, the constant for 'single' profile uses bit 48,
and there are only 32 bits in a long on ARM.

Fix by open-coding the check using u64 variables.

Tested by completing the original balance command on several Raspberry
Pis.

Fixes: 818255feece6 ("btrfs: use common helper instead of open coding a bit test")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20+
Signed-off-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
btrfs: allocate new inode in NOFS context 2019-10-17T20:47:24+00:00 Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com 2019-09-09T14:12:04+00:00 03fc8cdc5b99a16e0bde44515139efe8053c6772 commit 11a19a90870ea5496a8ded69b86f5b476b6d3355 upstream. A user reported a lockdep splat ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.2.11-gentoo #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/711 is trying to acquire lock: 000000007777a663 (sb_internal){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500 but task is already holding lock: 000000000ba86300 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x0/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}: kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f/0x1c0 btrfs_alloc_inode+0x1f/0x260 alloc_inode+0x16/0xa0 new_inode+0xe/0xb0 btrfs_new_inode+0x70/0x610 btrfs_symlink+0xd0/0x420 vfs_symlink+0x9c/0x100 do_symlinkat+0x66/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (sb_internal){.+.+}: __sb_start_write+0xf6/0x150 start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x59/0x110 btrfs_evict_inode+0x19e/0x4c0 evict+0xbc/0x1f0 inode_lru_isolate+0x113/0x190 __list_lru_walk_one.isra.4+0x5c/0x100 list_lru_walk_one+0x32/0x50 prune_icache_sb+0x36/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x14a/0x1d0 do_shrink_slab+0x131/0x320 shrink_node+0xf7/0x380 balance_pgdat+0x2d5/0x640 kswapd+0x2ba/0x5e0 kthread+0x147/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal); 
commit 11a19a90870ea5496a8ded69b86f5b476b6d3355 upstream.

A user reported a lockdep splat

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 5.2.11-gentoo #2 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 kswapd0/711 is trying to acquire lock:
 000000007777a663 (sb_internal){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500

but task is already holding lock:
 000000000ba86300 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x0/0x30

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}:
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f/0x1c0
 btrfs_alloc_inode+0x1f/0x260
 alloc_inode+0x16/0xa0
 new_inode+0xe/0xb0
 btrfs_new_inode+0x70/0x610
 btrfs_symlink+0xd0/0x420
 vfs_symlink+0x9c/0x100
 do_symlinkat+0x66/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

-> #0 (sb_internal){.+.+}:
 __sb_start_write+0xf6/0x150
 start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500
 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x59/0x110
 btrfs_evict_inode+0x19e/0x4c0
 evict+0xbc/0x1f0
 inode_lru_isolate+0x113/0x190
 __list_lru_walk_one.isra.4+0x5c/0x100
 list_lru_walk_one+0x32/0x50
 prune_icache_sb+0x36/0x80
 super_cache_scan+0x14a/0x1d0
 do_shrink_slab+0x131/0x320
 shrink_node+0xf7/0x380
 balance_pgdat+0x2d5/0x640
 kswapd+0x2ba/0x5e0
 kthread+0x147/0x160
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

 CPU0 CPU1
 ---- ----
 lock(fs_reclaim);
 lock(sb_internal);
 lock(fs_reclaim);
 lock(sb_internal);
btrfs: relocation: fix use-after-free on dead relocation roots 2019-10-17T20:47:23+00:00 Qu Wenruo wqu@suse.com 2019-09-23T06:56:14+00:00 aed6d5d61352563e5802425549f87a24607bb01e commit 1fac4a54374f7ef385938f3c6cf7649c0fe4f6cd upstream. [BUG] One user reported a reproducible KASAN report about use-after-free: BTRFS info (device sdi1): balance: start -dvrange=1256811659264..1256811659265 BTRFS info (device sdi1): relocating block group 1256811659264 flags data|raid0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88856f671710 by task kworker/u24:10/261579 CPU: 2 PID: 261579 Comm: kworker/u24:10 Tainted: P OE 5.2.11-arch1-1-kasan #4 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./X99 Extreme4, BIOS P3.80 04/06/2018 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_endio_write_helper [btrfs] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x7b/0xba print_address_description+0x6c/0x22e ? btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs] __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x3b ? btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs] kasan_report+0x12/0x17 __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x17/0x20 btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs] record_root_in_trans+0x2a0/0x370 [btrfs] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0xf4/0x140 [btrfs] start_transaction+0x1ab/0xe90 [btrfs] btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x7bf/0x18a0 [btrfs] ? lock_repin_lock+0x400/0x400 ? __kmem_cache_shutdown.cold+0x140/0x1ad ? btrfs_unlink_subvol+0x9b0/0x9b0 [btrfs] finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] normal_work_helper+0x1bd/0xca0 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x819/0x1720 ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 btrfs_endio_write_helper+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x8c9/0x1720 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2f0/0x2f0 ? worker_thread+0x1d9/0x1030 worker_thread+0x98/0x1030 kthread+0x2bb/0x3b0 ? process_one_work+0x1720/0x1720 ? kthread_park+0x120/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Allocated by task 369692: __kasan_kmalloc.part.0+0x44/0xc0 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xba/0xc0 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x138/0x260 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x92/0x360 [btrfs] btrfs_read_fs_root+0x10/0xb0 [btrfs] create_reloc_root+0x47d/0xa10 [btrfs] btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x1e2/0x340 [btrfs] record_root_in_trans+0x2a0/0x370 [btrfs] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0xf4/0x140 [btrfs] start_transaction+0x1ab/0xe90 [btrfs] btrfs_start_transaction+0x1e/0x20 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1c2/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x13/0x20 [btrfs] prealloc_file_extent_cluster+0x29f/0x570 [btrfs] relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x193/0xc30 [btrfs] relocate_data_extent+0x1f8/0x490 [btrfs] relocate_block_group+0x600/0x1060 [btrfs] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x3a0/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x9e/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_balance+0x14e4/0x2fc0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x47f/0x640 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x119d/0x8380 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f5/0x1060 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x370 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 369692: __kasan_slab_free+0x14f/0x210 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 kfree+0xd8/0x270 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x154c/0x1eb0 [btrfs] clean_dirty_subvols+0x227/0x340 [btrfs] relocate_block_group+0x972/0x1060 [btrfs] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x3a0/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x9e/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_balance+0x14e4/0x2fc0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x47f/0x640 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x119d/0x8380 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f5/0x1060 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x370 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88856f671100 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 The buggy address is located 1552 bytes inside of 4096-byte region [ffff88856f671100, ffff88856f672100) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0015bd9c00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88864400e600 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x2ffff0000010200(slab|head) raw: 02ffff0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88864400e600 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88856f671600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88856f671680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88856f671700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88856f671780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88856f671800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== BTRFS info (device sdi1): 1 enospc errors during balance BTRFS info (device sdi1): balance: ended with status: -28 [CAUSE] The problem happens when finish_ordered_io() get called with balance still running, while the reloc root of that subvolume is already dead. (Tree is swap already done, but tree not yet deleted for possible qgroup usage.) That means root->reloc_root still exists, but that reloc_root can be under btrfs_drop_snapshot(), thus we shouldn't access it. The following race could cause the use-after-free problem: CPU1 | CPU2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | relocate_block_group() | |- unset_reloc_control(rc) | |- btrfs_commit_transaction() btrfs_finish_ordered_io() | |- clean_dirty_subvols() |- btrfs_join_transaction() | | |- record_root_in_trans() | | |- btrfs_init_reloc_root() | | |- if (root->reloc_root) | | | | |- root->reloc_root = NULL | | |- btrfs_drop_snapshot(reloc_root); |- reloc_root->last_trans| = trans->transid | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Use after free [FIX] Fix it by the following modifications: - Test if the root has dead reloc tree before accessing root->reloc_root If the root has BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE, then we don't need to create or update root->reloc_tree - Clear the BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE flag until we have fully dropped reloc tree To co-operate with above modification, so as long as BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE is still set, we won't try to re-create reloc tree at record_root_in_trans(). Reported-by: Cebtenzzre <cebtenzzre@gmail.com> Fixes: d2311e698578 ("btrfs: relocation: Delay reloc tree deletion after merge_reloc_roots") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 1fac4a54374f7ef385938f3c6cf7649c0fe4f6cd upstream.

[BUG]
One user reported a reproducible KASAN report about use-after-free:

  BTRFS info (device sdi1): balance: start -dvrange=1256811659264..1256811659265
  BTRFS info (device sdi1): relocating block group 1256811659264 flags data|raid0
  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs]
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff88856f671710 by task kworker/u24:10/261579

  CPU: 2 PID: 261579 Comm: kworker/u24:10 Tainted: P           OE     5.2.11-arch1-1-kasan #4
  Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./X99 Extreme4, BIOS P3.80 04/06/2018
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_endio_write_helper [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x7b/0xba
   print_address_description+0x6c/0x22e
   ? btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs]
   __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x3b
   ? btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs]
   kasan_report+0x12/0x17
   __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x17/0x20
   btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs]
   record_root_in_trans+0x2a0/0x370 [btrfs]
   btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0xf4/0x140 [btrfs]
   start_transaction+0x1ab/0xe90 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x7bf/0x18a0 [btrfs]
   ? lock_repin_lock+0x400/0x400
   ? __kmem_cache_shutdown.cold+0x140/0x1ad
   ? btrfs_unlink_subvol+0x9b0/0x9b0 [btrfs]
   finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs]
   normal_work_helper+0x1bd/0xca0 [btrfs]
   ? process_one_work+0x819/0x1720
   ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
   btrfs_endio_write_helper+0x12/0x20 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x8c9/0x1720
   ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2f0/0x2f0
   ? worker_thread+0x1d9/0x1030
   worker_thread+0x98/0x1030
   kthread+0x2bb/0x3b0
   ? process_one_work+0x1720/0x1720
   ? kthread_park+0x120/0x120
   ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

  Allocated by task 369692:
   __kasan_kmalloc.part.0+0x44/0xc0
   __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xba/0xc0
   kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10
   kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x138/0x260
   btrfs_read_tree_root+0x92/0x360 [btrfs]
   btrfs_read_fs_root+0x10/0xb0 [btrfs]
   create_reloc_root+0x47d/0xa10 [btrfs]
   btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x1e2/0x340 [btrfs]
   record_root_in_trans+0x2a0/0x370 [btrfs]
   btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0xf4/0x140 [btrfs]
   start_transaction+0x1ab/0xe90 [btrfs]
   btrfs_start_transaction+0x1e/0x20 [btrfs]
   __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1c2/0xa00 [btrfs]
   btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x13/0x20 [btrfs]
   prealloc_file_extent_cluster+0x29f/0x570 [btrfs]
   relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x193/0xc30 [btrfs]
   relocate_data_extent+0x1f8/0x490 [btrfs]
   relocate_block_group+0x600/0x1060 [btrfs]
   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x3a0/0xa00 [btrfs]
   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x9e/0x180 [btrfs]
   btrfs_balance+0x14e4/0x2fc0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x47f/0x640 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x119d/0x8380 [btrfs]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f5/0x1060
   ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x370
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  Freed by task 369692:
   __kasan_slab_free+0x14f/0x210
   kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
   kfree+0xd8/0x270
   btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x154c/0x1eb0 [btrfs]
   clean_dirty_subvols+0x227/0x340 [btrfs]
   relocate_block_group+0x972/0x1060 [btrfs]
   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x3a0/0xa00 [btrfs]
   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x9e/0x180 [btrfs]
   btrfs_balance+0x14e4/0x2fc0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x47f/0x640 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x119d/0x8380 [btrfs]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f5/0x1060
   ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x370
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88856f671100
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
  The buggy address is located 1552 bytes inside of
   4096-byte region [ffff88856f671100, ffff88856f672100)
  The buggy address belongs to the page:
  page:ffffea0015bd9c00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88864400e600 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
  flags: 0x2ffff0000010200(slab|head)
  raw: 02ffff0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88864400e600
  raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff88856f671600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
   ffff88856f671680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  >ffff88856f671700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                           ^
   ffff88856f671780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
   ffff88856f671800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ==================================================================
  BTRFS info (device sdi1): 1 enospc errors during balance
  BTRFS info (device sdi1): balance: ended with status: -28

[CAUSE]
The problem happens when finish_ordered_io() get called with balance
still running, while the reloc root of that subvolume is already dead.
(Tree is swap already done, but tree not yet deleted for possible qgroup
usage.)

That means root->reloc_root still exists, but that reloc_root can be
under btrfs_drop_snapshot(), thus we shouldn't access it.

The following race could cause the use-after-free problem:

                CPU1              |                CPU2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  | relocate_block_group()
                                  | |- unset_reloc_control(rc)
                                  | |- btrfs_commit_transaction()
btrfs_finish_ordered_io()         | |- clean_dirty_subvols()
|- btrfs_join_transaction()       |    |
   |- record_root_in_trans()      |    |
      |- btrfs_init_reloc_root()  |    |
         |- if (root->reloc_root) |    |
         |                        |    |- root->reloc_root = NULL
         |                        |    |- btrfs_drop_snapshot(reloc_root);
         |- reloc_root->last_trans|
                 = trans->transid |
	    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
            Use after free

[FIX]
Fix it by the following modifications:

- Test if the root has dead reloc tree before accessing root->reloc_root
  If the root has BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE, then we don't need to
  create or update root->reloc_tree

- Clear the BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE flag until we have fully dropped
  reloc tree
  To co-operate with above modification, so as long as
  BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE is still set, we won't try to re-create
  reloc tree at record_root_in_trans().

Reported-by: Cebtenzzre <cebtenzzre@gmail.com>
Fixes: d2311e698578 ("btrfs: relocation: Delay reloc tree deletion after merge_reloc_roots")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cifs: use cifsInodeInfo->open_file_lock while iterating to avoid a panic 2019-10-17T20:47:18+00:00 Dave Wysochanski dwysocha@redhat.com 2019-10-03T05:16:27+00:00 327fd2d6ee070a9e68831b04a15817148cfcdd0f commit cb248819d209d113e45fed459773991518e8e80b upstream. Commit 487317c99477 ("cifs: add spinlock for the openFileList to cifsInodeInfo") added cifsInodeInfo->open_file_lock spin_lock to protect the openFileList, but missed a few places where cifs_inode->openFileList was enumerated. Change these remaining tcon->open_file_lock to cifsInodeInfo->open_file_lock to avoid panic in is_size_safe_to_change. [17313.245641] RIP: 0010:is_size_safe_to_change+0x57/0xb0 [cifs] [17313.245645] Code: 68 40 48 89 ef e8 19 67 b7 f1 48 8b 43 40 48 8d 4b 40 48 8d 50 f0 48 39 c1 75 0f eb 47 48 8b 42 10 48 8d 50 f0 48 39 c1 74 3a <8b> 80 88 00 00 00 83 c0 01 a8 02 74 e6 48 89 ef c6 07 00 0f 1f 40 [17313.245649] RSP: 0018:ffff94ae1baefa30 EFLAGS: 00010202 [17313.245654] RAX: dead000000000100 RBX: ffff88dc72243300 RCX: ffff88dc72243340 [17313.245657] RDX: dead0000000000f0 RSI: 00000000098f7940 RDI: ffff88dd3102f040 [17313.245659] RBP: ffff88dd3102f040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff94ae1baefc40 [17313.245661] R10: ffffcdc8bb1c4e80 R11: ffffcdc8b50adb08 R12: 00000000098f7940 [17313.245663] R13: ffff88dc72243300 R14: ffff88dbc8f19600 R15: ffff88dc72243428 [17313.245667] FS: 00007fb145485700(0000) GS:ffff88dd3e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [17313.245670] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [17313.245672] CR2: 0000026bb46c6000 CR3: 0000004edb110003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 [17313.245753] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [17313.245756] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [17313.245759] PKRU: 55555554 [17313.245761] Call Trace: [17313.245803] cifs_fattr_to_inode+0x16b/0x580 [cifs] [17313.245838] cifs_get_inode_info+0x35c/0xa60 [cifs] [17313.245852] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x1d0 [17313.245885] cifs_open+0x38f/0x990 [cifs] [17313.245921] ? cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x3e/0x350 [cifs] [17313.245953] ? cifsFileInfo_get+0x30/0x30 [cifs] [17313.245960] ? do_dentry_open+0x132/0x330 [17313.245963] do_dentry_open+0x132/0x330 [17313.245969] path_openat+0x573/0x14d0 [17313.245974] do_filp_open+0x93/0x100 [17313.245979] ? __check_object_size+0xa3/0x181 [17313.245986] ? audit_alloc_name+0x7e/0xd0 [17313.245992] do_sys_open+0x184/0x220 [17313.245999] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0 Fixes: 487317c99477 ("cifs: add spinlock for the openFileList to cifsInodeInfo") CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit cb248819d209d113e45fed459773991518e8e80b upstream.

Commit 487317c99477 ("cifs: add spinlock for the openFileList to
cifsInodeInfo") added cifsInodeInfo->open_file_lock spin_lock to protect
the openFileList, but missed a few places where cifs_inode->openFileList
was enumerated.  Change these remaining tcon->open_file_lock to
cifsInodeInfo->open_file_lock to avoid panic in is_size_safe_to_change.

[17313.245641] RIP: 0010:is_size_safe_to_change+0x57/0xb0 [cifs]
[17313.245645] Code: 68 40 48 89 ef e8 19 67 b7 f1 48 8b 43 40 48 8d 4b 40 48 8d 50 f0 48 39 c1 75 0f eb 47 48 8b 42 10 48 8d 50 f0 48 39 c1 74 3a <8b> 80 88 00 00 00 83 c0 01 a8 02 74 e6 48 89 ef c6 07 00 0f 1f 40
[17313.245649] RSP: 0018:ffff94ae1baefa30 EFLAGS: 00010202
[17313.245654] RAX: dead000000000100 RBX: ffff88dc72243300 RCX: ffff88dc72243340
[17313.245657] RDX: dead0000000000f0 RSI: 00000000098f7940 RDI: ffff88dd3102f040
[17313.245659] RBP: ffff88dd3102f040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff94ae1baefc40
[17313.245661] R10: ffffcdc8bb1c4e80 R11: ffffcdc8b50adb08 R12: 00000000098f7940
[17313.245663] R13: ffff88dc72243300 R14: ffff88dbc8f19600 R15: ffff88dc72243428
[17313.245667] FS:  00007fb145485700(0000) GS:ffff88dd3e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[17313.245670] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[17313.245672] CR2: 0000026bb46c6000 CR3: 0000004edb110003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[17313.245753] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[17313.245756] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[17313.245759] PKRU: 55555554
[17313.245761] Call Trace:
[17313.245803]  cifs_fattr_to_inode+0x16b/0x580 [cifs]
[17313.245838]  cifs_get_inode_info+0x35c/0xa60 [cifs]
[17313.245852]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x1d0
[17313.245885]  cifs_open+0x38f/0x990 [cifs]
[17313.245921]  ? cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x3e/0x350 [cifs]
[17313.245953]  ? cifsFileInfo_get+0x30/0x30 [cifs]
[17313.245960]  ? do_dentry_open+0x132/0x330
[17313.245963]  do_dentry_open+0x132/0x330
[17313.245969]  path_openat+0x573/0x14d0
[17313.245974]  do_filp_open+0x93/0x100
[17313.245979]  ? __check_object_size+0xa3/0x181
[17313.245986]  ? audit_alloc_name+0x7e/0xd0
[17313.245992]  do_sys_open+0x184/0x220
[17313.245999]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0

Fixes: 487317c99477 ("cifs: add spinlock for the openFileList to cifsInodeInfo")

CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>