<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v5.2.18</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: use generic EFSBADCRC/EFSCORRUPTED</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T07:01:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T03:36:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c704eb3aaffae0d6463b1773b37e69695b112ca4'/>
<id>c704eb3aaffae0d6463b1773b37e69695b112ca4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 10f966bbf521bb9b2e497bbca496a5141f4071d0 ]

f2fs uses EFAULT as error number to indicate filesystem is corrupted
all the time, but generic filesystems use EUCLEAN for such condition,
we need to change to follow others.

This patch adds two new macros as below to wrap more generic error
code macros, and spread them in code.

EFSBADCRC	EBADMSG		/* Bad CRC detected */
EFSCORRUPTED	EUCLEAN		/* Filesystem is corrupted */

Reported-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 10f966bbf521bb9b2e497bbca496a5141f4071d0 ]

f2fs uses EFAULT as error number to indicate filesystem is corrupted
all the time, but generic filesystems use EUCLEAN for such condition,
we need to change to follow others.

This patch adds two new macros as below to wrap more generic error
code macros, and spread them in code.

EFSBADCRC	EBADMSG		/* Bad CRC detected */
EFSCORRUPTED	EUCLEAN		/* Filesystem is corrupted */

Reported-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: don't crash on null attr fork xfs_bmapi_read</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T07:01:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrick J. Wong</name>
<email>darrick.wong@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-11T22:52:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b442b6d3742b1838ae09416ad36204d7dd5c6aff'/>
<id>b442b6d3742b1838ae09416ad36204d7dd5c6aff</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8612de3f7ba6e900465e340516b8313806d27b2d ]

Zorro Lang reported a crash in generic/475 if we try to inactivate a
corrupt inode with a NULL attr fork (stack trace shortened somewhat):

RIP: 0010:xfs_bmapi_read+0x311/0xb00 [xfs]
RSP: 0018:ffff888047f9ed68 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888047f9f038 RCX: 1ffffffff5f99f51
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000012
RBP: ffff888002a41f00 R08: ffffed10005483f0 R09: ffffed10005483ef
R10: ffffed10005483ef R11: ffff888002a41f7f R12: 0000000000000004
R13: ffffe8fff53b5768 R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f11d44b5b80(0000) GS:ffff888114200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000ef6000 CR3: 000000002e176003 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
 xfs_dabuf_map.constprop.18+0x696/0xe50 [xfs]
 xfs_da_read_buf+0xf5/0x2c0 [xfs]
 xfs_da3_node_read+0x1d/0x230 [xfs]
 xfs_attr_inactive+0x3cc/0x5e0 [xfs]
 xfs_inactive+0x4c8/0x5b0 [xfs]
 xfs_fs_destroy_inode+0x31b/0x8e0 [xfs]
 destroy_inode+0xbc/0x190
 xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0xa8c/0x1200 [xfs]
 xfs_bulkstat_one+0x16/0x20 [xfs]
 xfs_bulkstat+0x6fa/0xf20 [xfs]
 xfs_ioc_bulkstat+0x182/0x2b0 [xfs]
 xfs_file_ioctl+0xee0/0x12a0 [xfs]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1000
 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6f/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x4d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f11d39a3e5b

The "obvious" cause is that the attr ifork is null despite the inode
claiming an attr fork having at least one extent, but it's not so
obvious why we ended up with an inode in that state.

Reported-by: Zorro Lang &lt;zlang@redhat.com&gt;
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204031
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bill O'Donnell &lt;billodo@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8612de3f7ba6e900465e340516b8313806d27b2d ]

Zorro Lang reported a crash in generic/475 if we try to inactivate a
corrupt inode with a NULL attr fork (stack trace shortened somewhat):

RIP: 0010:xfs_bmapi_read+0x311/0xb00 [xfs]
RSP: 0018:ffff888047f9ed68 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888047f9f038 RCX: 1ffffffff5f99f51
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000012
RBP: ffff888002a41f00 R08: ffffed10005483f0 R09: ffffed10005483ef
R10: ffffed10005483ef R11: ffff888002a41f7f R12: 0000000000000004
R13: ffffe8fff53b5768 R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f11d44b5b80(0000) GS:ffff888114200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000ef6000 CR3: 000000002e176003 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
 xfs_dabuf_map.constprop.18+0x696/0xe50 [xfs]
 xfs_da_read_buf+0xf5/0x2c0 [xfs]
 xfs_da3_node_read+0x1d/0x230 [xfs]
 xfs_attr_inactive+0x3cc/0x5e0 [xfs]
 xfs_inactive+0x4c8/0x5b0 [xfs]
 xfs_fs_destroy_inode+0x31b/0x8e0 [xfs]
 destroy_inode+0xbc/0x190
 xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0xa8c/0x1200 [xfs]
 xfs_bulkstat_one+0x16/0x20 [xfs]
 xfs_bulkstat+0x6fa/0xf20 [xfs]
 xfs_ioc_bulkstat+0x182/0x2b0 [xfs]
 xfs_file_ioctl+0xee0/0x12a0 [xfs]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1000
 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6f/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x4d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f11d39a3e5b

The "obvious" cause is that the attr ifork is null despite the inode
claiming an attr fork having at least one extent, but it's not so
obvious why we ended up with an inode in that state.

Reported-by: Zorro Lang &lt;zlang@redhat.com&gt;
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204031
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bill O'Donnell &lt;billodo@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to do sanity check on segment bitmap of LFS curseg</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T07:01:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-25T15:07:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=453bcdd2432bf6923a535b38abf7a7c6ee77d94d'/>
<id>453bcdd2432bf6923a535b38abf7a7c6ee77d94d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c854f4d681365498f53ba07843a16423625aa7e9 ]

As Jungyeon Reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233

- Reproduces
gcc poc_13.c
./run.sh f2fs

- Kernel messages
 F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608
 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2133!
 RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x35d/0x3e0
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16c/0x5a0
  do_write_page+0x57/0x100
  f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0
  __write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0
  f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670
  f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x364/0x13a0
  f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130
  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810
  do_fsync+0x33/0x60
  __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The testcase fails because that, in fuzzed image, current segment was
allocated with LFS type, its .next_blkoff should point to an unused
block address, but actually, its bitmap shows it's not. So during
allocation, f2fs crash when setting bitmap.

Introducing sanity_check_curseg() to check such inconsistence of
current in-used segment.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c854f4d681365498f53ba07843a16423625aa7e9 ]

As Jungyeon Reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233

- Reproduces
gcc poc_13.c
./run.sh f2fs

- Kernel messages
 F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608
 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2133!
 RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x35d/0x3e0
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16c/0x5a0
  do_write_page+0x57/0x100
  f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0
  __write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0
  f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670
  f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x364/0x13a0
  f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130
  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810
  do_fsync+0x33/0x60
  __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The testcase fails because that, in fuzzed image, current segment was
allocated with LFS type, its .next_blkoff should point to an unused
block address, but actually, its bitmap shows it's not. So during
allocation, f2fs crash when setting bitmap.

Introducing sanity_check_curseg() to check such inconsistence of
current in-used segment.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access"</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T07:01:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-02T10:15:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bca9bfa41e3fffcf4ef5fb196e5ee2d4749c01e3'/>
<id>bca9bfa41e3fffcf4ef5fb196e5ee2d4749c01e3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a37d0862d17411edb67677a580a6f505ec2225f6 ]

As Pavel Machek reported:

"We normally use -EUCLEAN to signal filesystem corruption. Plus, it is
good idea to report it to the syslog and mark filesystem as "needing
fsck" if filesystem can do that."

Still we need improve the original patch with:
- use unlikely keyword
- add message print
- return EUCLEAN

However, after rethink this patch, I don't think we should add such
condition check here as below reasons:
- We have already checked the field in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(),
- If there is fs corrupt or security vulnerability, there is nothing
to guarantee the field is integrated after the check, unless we do
the check before each of its use, however no filesystem does that.
- We only have similar check for bitmap, which was added due to there
is bitmap corruption happened on f2fs' runtime in product.
- There are so many key fields in SB/CP/NAT did have such check
after f2fs_sanity_check_{sb,cp,..}.

So I propose to revert this unneeded check.

This reverts commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a37d0862d17411edb67677a580a6f505ec2225f6 ]

As Pavel Machek reported:

"We normally use -EUCLEAN to signal filesystem corruption. Plus, it is
good idea to report it to the syslog and mark filesystem as "needing
fsck" if filesystem can do that."

Still we need improve the original patch with:
- use unlikely keyword
- add message print
- return EUCLEAN

However, after rethink this patch, I don't think we should add such
condition check here as below reasons:
- We have already checked the field in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(),
- If there is fs corrupt or security vulnerability, there is nothing
to guarantee the field is integrated after the check, unless we do
the check before each of its use, however no filesystem does that.
- We only have similar check for bitmap, which was added due to there
is bitmap corruption happened on f2fs' runtime in product.
- There are so many key fields in SB/CP/NAT did have such check
after f2fs_sanity_check_{sb,cp,..}.

So I propose to revert this unneeded check.

This reverts commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smb3: fix unmount hang in open_shroot</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T07:01:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve French</name>
<email>stfrench@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-12T22:52:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3da810f95b860d262d038b84ac9a10b48ed13da0'/>
<id>3da810f95b860d262d038b84ac9a10b48ed13da0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 96d9f7ed00b86104bf03adeffc8980897e9694ab ]

An earlier patch "CIFS: fix deadlock in cached root handling"
did not completely address the deadlock in open_shroot. This
patch addresses the deadlock.

In testing the recent patch:
  smb3: improve handling of share deleted (and share recreated)
we were able to reproduce the open_shroot deadlock to one
of the target servers in unmount in a delete share scenario.

Fixes: 7e5a70ad88b1e ("CIFS: fix deadlock in cached root handling")

This is version 2 of this patch. An earlier version of this
patch "smb3: fix unmount hang in open_shroot" had a problem
found by Dan.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;

Suggested-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
CC: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
CC: Stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 96d9f7ed00b86104bf03adeffc8980897e9694ab ]

An earlier patch "CIFS: fix deadlock in cached root handling"
did not completely address the deadlock in open_shroot. This
patch addresses the deadlock.

In testing the recent patch:
  smb3: improve handling of share deleted (and share recreated)
we were able to reproduce the open_shroot deadlock to one
of the target servers in unmount in a delete share scenario.

Fixes: 7e5a70ad88b1e ("CIFS: fix deadlock in cached root handling")

This is version 2 of this patch. An earlier version of this
patch "smb3: fix unmount hang in open_shroot" had a problem
found by Dan.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;

Suggested-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
CC: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
CC: Stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Fix refcounting of filenames in fs_parser</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:18:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-25T16:38:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=12434939ba58717e0259ffe7375f9aa7a5f1c0b8'/>
<id>12434939ba58717e0259ffe7375f9aa7a5f1c0b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7cdfa44227b0d8842d46a775cebe4311150cb8f2 upstream.

Fix an overput in which filename_lookup() unconditionally drops a ref to
the filename it was given, but this isn't taken account of in the caller,
fs_lookup_param().

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1443811 ("Use after free")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7cdfa44227b0d8842d46a775cebe4311150cb8f2 upstream.

Fix an overput in which filename_lookup() unconditionally drops a ref to
the filename it was given, but this isn't taken account of in the caller,
fs_lookup_param().

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1443811 ("Use after free")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: fix regression caused by overlapping layers detection</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:18:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-12T12:24:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d7aa8c546ab97b9011f805042b3647693fce107f'/>
<id>d7aa8c546ab97b9011f805042b3647693fce107f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0be0bfd2de9dfdd2098a9c5b14bdd8f739c9165d upstream.

Once upon a time, commit 2cac0c00a6cd ("ovl: get exclusive ownership on
upper/work dirs") in v4.13 added some sanity checks on overlayfs layers.
This change caused a docker regression. The root cause was mount leaks
by docker, which as far as I know, still exist.

To mitigate the regression, commit 85fdee1eef1a ("ovl: fix regression
caused by exclusive upper/work dir protection") in v4.14 turned the
mount errors into warnings for the default index=off configuration.

Recently, commit 146d62e5a586 ("ovl: detect overlapping layers") in
v5.2, re-introduced exclusive upper/work dir checks regardless of
index=off configuration.

This changes the status quo and mount leak related bug reports have
started to re-surface. Restore the status quo to fix the regressions.
To clarify, index=off does NOT relax overlapping layers check for this
ovelayfs mount. index=off only relaxes exclusive upper/work dir checks
with another overlayfs mount.

To cover the part of overlapping layers detection that used the
exclusive upper/work dir checks to detect overlap with self upper/work
dir, add a trap also on the work base dir.

Link: https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/34672
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20171006121405.GA32700@veci.piliscsaba.szeredi.hu/
Link: https://github.com/containers/libpod/issues/3540
Fixes: 146d62e5a586 ("ovl: detect overlapping layers")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Colin Walters &lt;walters@verbum.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0be0bfd2de9dfdd2098a9c5b14bdd8f739c9165d upstream.

Once upon a time, commit 2cac0c00a6cd ("ovl: get exclusive ownership on
upper/work dirs") in v4.13 added some sanity checks on overlayfs layers.
This change caused a docker regression. The root cause was mount leaks
by docker, which as far as I know, still exist.

To mitigate the regression, commit 85fdee1eef1a ("ovl: fix regression
caused by exclusive upper/work dir protection") in v4.14 turned the
mount errors into warnings for the default index=off configuration.

Recently, commit 146d62e5a586 ("ovl: detect overlapping layers") in
v5.2, re-introduced exclusive upper/work dir checks regardless of
index=off configuration.

This changes the status quo and mount leak related bug reports have
started to re-surface. Restore the status quo to fix the regressions.
To clarify, index=off does NOT relax overlapping layers check for this
ovelayfs mount. index=off only relaxes exclusive upper/work dir checks
with another overlayfs mount.

To cover the part of overlapping layers detection that used the
exclusive upper/work dir checks to detect overlap with self upper/work
dir, add a trap also on the work base dir.

Link: https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/34672
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20171006121405.GA32700@veci.piliscsaba.szeredi.hu/
Link: https://github.com/containers/libpod/issues/3540
Fixes: 146d62e5a586 ("ovl: detect overlapping layers")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Colin Walters &lt;walters@verbum.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs: Use kzfree() to zero out the password</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:18:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-27T10:59:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b8632186884a030da2cd83b2e02645e521ab2bbd'/>
<id>b8632186884a030da2cd83b2e02645e521ab2bbd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 478228e57f81f6cb60798d54fc02a74ea7dd267e ]

It's safer to zero out the password so that it can never be disclosed.

Fixes: 0c219f5799c7 ("cifs: set domainName when a domain-key is used in multiuser")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 478228e57f81f6cb60798d54fc02a74ea7dd267e ]

It's safer to zero out the password so that it can never be disclosed.

Fixes: 0c219f5799c7 ("cifs: set domainName when a domain-key is used in multiuser")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs: set domainName when a domain-key is used in multiuser</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:18:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ronnie Sahlberg</name>
<email>lsahlber@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-21T22:09:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8db988a982908b7bff76e095000adabf9c29698b'/>
<id>8db988a982908b7bff76e095000adabf9c29698b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f2aee329a68f5a907bcff11a109dfe17c0b41aeb ]

RHBZ: 1710429

When we use a domain-key to authenticate using multiuser we must also set
the domainnmame for the new volume as it will be used and passed to the server
in the NTLMSSP Domain-name.

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg &lt;lsahlber@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f2aee329a68f5a907bcff11a109dfe17c0b41aeb ]

RHBZ: 1710429

When we use a domain-key to authenticate using multiuser we must also set
the domainnmame for the new volume as it will be used and passed to the server
in the NTLMSSP Domain-name.

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg &lt;lsahlber@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: remove set but not used variable 'mapping'</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:18:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>YueHaibing</name>
<email>yuehaibing@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-27T07:16:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c1a4283b60675f95c1f97c743e75948de15fc70'/>
<id>7c1a4283b60675f95c1f97c743e75948de15fc70</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 99300a85260c2b7febd57082a617d1062532067e ]

Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:

fs/nfs/write.c: In function nfs_page_async_flush:
fs/nfs/write.c:609:24: warning: variable mapping set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]

It is not use since commit aefb623c422e ("NFS: Fix
writepage(s) error handling to not report errors twice")

Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 99300a85260c2b7febd57082a617d1062532067e ]

Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:

fs/nfs/write.c: In function nfs_page_async_flush:
fs/nfs/write.c:609:24: warning: variable mapping set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]

It is not use since commit aefb623c422e ("NFS: Fix
writepage(s) error handling to not report errors twice")

Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
