linux-stable.git/fs, branch v5.10.260

virtiofs: fix UAF on submount umount

2026-07-04T11:38:41+00:00

[ Upstream commit 06b41351779e9289e8785694ade9042ae85e41ea ]

iput() called from fuse_release_end() can Oops if the super block has
already been destroyed.  Normally this is prevented by waiting for
num_waiting to go down to zero before commencing with super block shutdown.

This only works, however, for the last submount instance, as the wait
counter is per connection, not per superblock.

Revert to using synchronous release requests for the auto_submounts case,
which is virtiofs only at this time.

Reported-by: Aurélien Bombo 
Reported-by: Zhihao Cheng 
Cc: Greg Kurz 
Closes: https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/issues/12589
Fixes: 26e5c67deb2e ("fuse: fix livelock in synchronous file put from fuseblk workers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dlm: prevent NPD when writing a positive value to event_done

2026-07-04T11:38:41+00:00

commit 8e2bad543eca5c25cd02cbc63d72557934d45f13 upstream.

do_uevent returns the value written to event_done. In case it is a
positive value, new_lockspace would undo all the work, and lockspace
would not be set. __dlm_new_lockspace, however, would treat that
positive value as a success due to commit 8511a2728ab8 ("dlm: fix use
count with multiple joins").

Down the line, device_create_lockspace would pass that NULL lockspace to
dlm_find_lockspace_local, leading to a NULL pointer dereference.

Treating such positive values as successes prevents the problem. Given
this has been broken for so long, this is unlikely to break userspace
expectations.

Fixes: 8511a2728ab8 ("dlm: fix use count with multiple joins")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Signed-off-by: David Teigland 
Signed-off-by: Nazar Kalashnikov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen

2026-07-04T11:38:41+00:00

commit e186fa1c057f5eccb22afb1e83e34c0627085868 upstream.

In __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(), the get_user() that reads
princhashlen from the userspace cld_msg_v2 buffer does not check its
return value. A failing copy leaves princhashlen with uninitialised
stack contents, which are then used to drive memdup_user() and stored
as princhash.len on the resulting reclaim record. The other get_user()
calls in this function all check the return; only this one is missed,
which is most likely a copy-paste oversight from when v2 upcalls were
introduced.

Mirror the existing pattern used a few lines above for namelen.
namecopy is declared with __free(kfree) so the early return cleans up
the already-allocated buffer automatically.

Fixes: 6ee95d1c8991 ("nfsd: add support for upcall version 2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominik Woźniak 
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure

2026-07-04T11:38:41+00:00

commit 0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1 upstream.

nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each
call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for
NFS_DFACL.  Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly
allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default.  If
the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns
false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.

ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and
ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle.
Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on
argp.  The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside
nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process()
skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is
unreachable on decode failure:

    svc_process_common()
      pc_decode()                  /* decode_setaclargs: false */
      /* pc_func skipped */
      pc_release()                 /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */

The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.

Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(),
which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition
to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL
procedures.  pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after
decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are
removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one
place.  This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by
the sibling GETACL procedures.

Fixes: a257cdd0e217 ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup

2026-07-04T11:38:40+00:00

commit 9e18e83b8846a5c3fe13fc8a464b4865d33996c6 upstream.

nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after
decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns
nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized.

Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct
nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not
cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore
leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation.

The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(),
which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp.

Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching
nfsd4_decode_secinfo().

Fixes: 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guannan Wang 
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors

2026-07-04T11:38:40+00:00

commit 9bd541e09dffff27e5bec0f9f45b0228173a5375 upstream.

ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent
allocator's chain geometry.  A malicious descriptor can still claim a
bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in
the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run
past bg_bitmap.

Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent
allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that
capacity.  Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk
bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor
is used.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0
Read of size 8
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
  _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
  ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375)
  ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457)
  ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86)
  ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786)
  ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886)
  get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?)
  do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?)
  kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?)
  __bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?)
  get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?)
  ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96)
  sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?)
  check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?)
  __ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497)
  check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?)
  rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?)
  check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?)
  ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?)
  ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?)
  ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043)
  ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?)
  ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  __mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?)
  inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?)
  balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?)
  generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?)
  mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?)
  file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?)
  ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?)
  ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
  apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?)
  read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?)
  lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?)

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260524111248.1429884-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen 
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi 
Cc: Mark Fasheh 
Cc: Joel Becker 
Cc: Junxiao Bi 
Cc: Changwei Ge 
Cc: Jun Piao 
Cc: Heming Zhao 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()

2026-07-04T11:38:40+00:00

commit 13e198a90ca4050f4bee8a3f23680389a6563ccc upstream.

When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(),
the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds,
pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(),
which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the
tracepoint accesses lo's fields.

Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo).

Fixes: 2c8d5fc37fe2 ("pNFS: Stricter ordering of layoutget and layoutreturn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang 
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry()

2026-07-04T11:38:40+00:00

commit 3f5f8ee9917cc2b9076ac533492d8a200edcabb8 upstream.

In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from
exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through
TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points
into bh->b_data):

	brelse(bh);
	if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
		...
		len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
		...
	}

After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the
underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent
exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in
commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in
exfat_load_upcase_table()").

Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on
each branch.

Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
+ CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image
(long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path).
With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and
the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the
unpatched kernel faults:

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0

With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes
cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a
crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the
instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the
patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim.

Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito 
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()

2026-07-04T11:38:40+00:00

commit c4810ada31e80cbe4011467c4f3b1e93f94134f3 upstream.

f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A
malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only
contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk()
then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.

Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a
full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED from these new truncated-entry checks, while keeping the
pre-existing -EINVAL paths unchanged.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0
RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
  vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
  do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
  filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
  do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
  path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
  cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
  lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
  trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
  do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen 
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu 
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ext4: add bounds check for inline data length in ext4_read_inline_page

2026-07-04T11:38:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 356227096eb66e41b23caf7045e6304877322edf ]

ext4_read_inline_page() does not validate that the inline data length
fits within a page before copying data. If the inline size exceeds
PAGE_SIZE due to filesystem corruption, this could lead to a kernel
memory write beyond the page boundary.

Add a bounds check after computing len, returning -EFSCORRUPTED if the
value exceeds PAGE_SIZE.

The upstream commit replaced a BUG_ON(len > PAGE_SIZE) in
ext4_read_inline_folio(). In 6.1 and earlier, the function is still named
ext4_read_inline_page() and the BUG_ON was never present, so this patch
adds the bounds check directly.

Fixes: 46c7f254543d ("ext4: add read support for inline data")
Signed-off-by: Yuto Ohnuki 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin