<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v4.9.67</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>NFS: revalidate "." etc correctly on "open".</title>
<updated>2017-12-05T10:24:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-25T07:34:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=daf3a68d52826e697eb20c1f290aa198d43dfad5'/>
<id>daf3a68d52826e697eb20c1f290aa198d43dfad5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b688741cb06695312f18b730653d6611e1bad28d upstream.

For correct close-to-open semantics, NFS must validate
the change attribute of a directory (or file) on open.

Since commit ecf3d1f1aa74 ("vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a
d_weak_revalidate dentry op"), open() of "." or a path ending ".." is
not revalidated reliably (except when that direct is a mount point).

Prior to that commit, "." was revalidated using nfs_lookup_revalidate()
which checks the LOOKUP_OPEN flag and forces revalidation if the flag is
set.
Since that commit, nfs_weak_revalidate() is used for NFSv3 (which
ignores the flags) and nothing is used for NFSv4.

This is fixed by using nfs_lookup_verify_inode() in
nfs_weak_revalidate().  This does the revalidation exactly when needed.
Also, add a definition of .d_weak_revalidate for NFSv4.

The incorrect behavior is easily demonstrated by running "echo *" in
some non-mountpoint NFS directory while watching network traffic.
Without this patch, "echo *" sometimes doesn't produce any traffic.
With the patch it always does.

Fixes: ecf3d1f1aa74 ("vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op")
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.9+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b688741cb06695312f18b730653d6611e1bad28d upstream.

For correct close-to-open semantics, NFS must validate
the change attribute of a directory (or file) on open.

Since commit ecf3d1f1aa74 ("vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a
d_weak_revalidate dentry op"), open() of "." or a path ending ".." is
not revalidated reliably (except when that direct is a mount point).

Prior to that commit, "." was revalidated using nfs_lookup_revalidate()
which checks the LOOKUP_OPEN flag and forces revalidation if the flag is
set.
Since that commit, nfs_weak_revalidate() is used for NFSv3 (which
ignores the flags) and nothing is used for NFSv4.

This is fixed by using nfs_lookup_verify_inode() in
nfs_weak_revalidate().  This does the revalidation exactly when needed.
Also, add a definition of .d_weak_revalidate for NFSv4.

The incorrect behavior is easily demonstrated by running "echo *" in
some non-mountpoint NFS directory while watching network traffic.
Without this patch, "echo *" sometimes doesn't produce any traffic.
With the patch it always does.

Fixes: ecf3d1f1aa74 ("vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op")
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.9+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: fix panic in posix_unblock_lock called from nfs4_laundromat</title>
<updated>2017-12-05T10:24:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Naofumi Honda</name>
<email>honda@math.sci.hokudai.ac.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-09T15:57:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aa1a6cf1586bb0aa7c6585ebaffd7b5e3ae4f040'/>
<id>aa1a6cf1586bb0aa7c6585ebaffd7b5e3ae4f040</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 64ebe12494fd5d193f014ce38e1fd83cc57883c8 upstream.

From kernel 4.9, my two nfsv4 servers sometimes suffer from
    "panic: unable to handle kernel page request"
in posix_unblock_lock() called from nfs4_laundromat().

These panics diseappear if we revert the commit "nfsd: add a LRU list
for blocked locks".

The cause appears to be a typo in nfs4_laundromat(), which is also
present in nfs4_state_shutdown_net().

Fixes: 7919d0a27f1e "nfsd: add a LRU list for blocked locks"
Cc: jlayton@redhat.com
Reveiwed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 64ebe12494fd5d193f014ce38e1fd83cc57883c8 upstream.

From kernel 4.9, my two nfsv4 servers sometimes suffer from
    "panic: unable to handle kernel page request"
in posix_unblock_lock() called from nfs4_laundromat().

These panics diseappear if we revert the commit "nfsd: add a LRU list
for blocked locks".

The cause appears to be a typo in nfs4_laundromat(), which is also
present in nfs4_state_shutdown_net().

Fixes: 7919d0a27f1e "nfsd: add a LRU list for blocked locks"
Cc: jlayton@redhat.com
Reveiwed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: Fix another OPEN stateid race</title>
<updated>2017-12-05T10:24:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@primarydata.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-03T12:00:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1c404259164405f9a61379285f6e1fcb57ea43aa'/>
<id>1c404259164405f9a61379285f6e1fcb57ea43aa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d8a1a000555ecd1b824ac1ed6df8fe364dfbbbb0 upstream.

If nfsd4_process_open2() is initialising a new stateid, and yet the
call to nfs4_get_vfs_file() fails for some reason, then we must
declare the stateid closed, and unhash it before dropping the mutex.

Right now, we unhash the stateid after dropping the mutex, and without
changing the stateid type, meaning that another OPEN could theoretically
look it up and attempt to use it.

Reported-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d8a1a000555ecd1b824ac1ed6df8fe364dfbbbb0 upstream.

If nfsd4_process_open2() is initialising a new stateid, and yet the
call to nfs4_get_vfs_file() fails for some reason, then we must
declare the stateid closed, and unhash it before dropping the mutex.

Right now, we unhash the stateid after dropping the mutex, and without
changing the stateid type, meaning that another OPEN could theoretically
look it up and attempt to use it.

Reported-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: Fix stateid races between OPEN and CLOSE</title>
<updated>2017-12-05T10:24:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@primarydata.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-03T12:00:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1c8ea4145097f8a69a8230b0e40c083ffc1b53e4'/>
<id>1c8ea4145097f8a69a8230b0e40c083ffc1b53e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 15ca08d3299682dc49bad73251677b2c5017ef08 upstream.

Open file stateids can linger on the nfs4_file list of stateids even
after they have been closed. In order to avoid reusing such a
stateid, and confusing the client, we need to recheck the
nfs4_stid's type after taking the mutex.
Otherwise, we risk reusing an old stateid that was already closed,
which will confuse clients that expect new stateids to conform to
RFC7530 Sections 9.1.4.2 and 16.2.5 or RFC5661 Sections 8.2.2 and 18.2.4.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 15ca08d3299682dc49bad73251677b2c5017ef08 upstream.

Open file stateids can linger on the nfs4_file list of stateids even
after they have been closed. In order to avoid reusing such a
stateid, and confusing the client, we need to recheck the
nfs4_stid's type after taking the mutex.
Otherwise, we risk reusing an old stateid that was already closed,
which will confuse clients that expect new stateids to conform to
RFC7530 Sections 9.1.4.2 and 16.2.5 or RFC5661 Sections 8.2.2 and 18.2.4.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: clear space cache inode generation always</title>
<updated>2017-12-05T10:24:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>jbacik@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-17T19:50:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c251267c8826027af32fe7195650d29797539847'/>
<id>c251267c8826027af32fe7195650d29797539847</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8e138e0d92c6c9d3d481674fb14e3439b495be37 upstream.

We discovered a box that had double allocations, and suspected the space
cache may be to blame.  While auditing the write out path I noticed that
if we've already setup the space cache we will just carry on.  This
means that any error we hit after cache_save_setup before we go to
actually write the cache out we won't reset the inode generation, so
whatever was already written will be considered correct, except it'll be
stale.  Fix this by _always_ resetting the generation on the block group
inode, this way we only ever have valid or invalid cache.

With this patch I was no longer able to reproduce cache corruption with
dm-log-writes and my bpf error injection tool.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;jbacik@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8e138e0d92c6c9d3d481674fb14e3439b495be37 upstream.

We discovered a box that had double allocations, and suspected the space
cache may be to blame.  While auditing the write out path I noticed that
if we've already setup the space cache we will just carry on.  This
means that any error we hit after cache_save_setup before we go to
actually write the cache out we won't reset the inode generation, so
whatever was already written will be considered correct, except it'll be
stale.  Fix this by _always_ resetting the generation on the block group
inode, this way we only ever have valid or invalid cache.

With this patch I was no longer able to reproduce cache corruption with
dm-log-writes and my bpf error injection tool.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;jbacik@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: return the actual error value from from btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate</title>
<updated>2017-11-30T08:39:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pan Bian</name>
<email>bianpan2016@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-04T04:51:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=79dec0116f8ba872f7d40530c36f3c71d2a839ec'/>
<id>79dec0116f8ba872f7d40530c36f3c71d2a839ec</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 73ba39ab9307340dc98ec3622891314bbc09cc2e ]

In function btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate(), errno is assigned to variable ret
on errors. However, it directly returns 0. It may be better to return
ret. This patch also removes the warning, because the caller already
prints a warning.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188731
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian &lt;bianpan2016@163.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval &lt;osandov@fb.com&gt;
[ edited subject ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 73ba39ab9307340dc98ec3622891314bbc09cc2e ]

In function btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate(), errno is assigned to variable ret
on errors. However, it directly returns 0. It may be better to return
ret. This patch also removes the warning, because the caller already
prints a warning.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188731
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian &lt;bianpan2016@163.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval &lt;osandov@fb.com&gt;
[ edited subject ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: use ENOTDIR when setting encryption policy on nondirectory</title>
<updated>2017-11-30T08:39:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-05T19:12:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d3d5e69b5e45370db9dcbc3bdde3787debcbc5bf'/>
<id>d3d5e69b5e45370db9dcbc3bdde3787debcbc5bf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dffd0cfa06d4ed83bb3ae8eb067989ceec5d18e1 ]

As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY fail with ENOTDIR when the file descriptor
does not refer to a directory.  This is more descriptive than EINVAL,
which was ambiguous with some of the other error cases.

I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous error
code of EINVAL, which was never documented anywhere, and in some buggy
kernels did not exist at all as the S_ISDIR() check was missing.

This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit dffd0cfa06d4ed83bb3ae8eb067989ceec5d18e1 ]

As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY fail with ENOTDIR when the file descriptor
does not refer to a directory.  This is more descriptive than EINVAL,
which was ambiguous with some of the other error cases.

I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous error
code of EINVAL, which was never documented anywhere, and in some buggy
kernels did not exist at all as the S_ISDIR() check was missing.

This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: use ENOKEY when file cannot be created w/o key</title>
<updated>2017-11-30T08:39:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-05T19:12:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d612bee05b031e6cac5606aff6e95ce7cd8104e4'/>
<id>d612bee05b031e6cac5606aff6e95ce7cd8104e4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 54475f531bb8d7078f63c159e5e0615d486c498c ]

As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
attempting to create a file in an encrypted directory that hasn't been
"unlocked" fail with ENOKEY.  Previously, several error codes were used
for this case, including ENOENT, EACCES, and EPERM, and they were not
consistent between and within filesystems.  ENOKEY is a better choice
because it expresses that the failure is due to lacking the encryption
key.  It also matches the error code returned when trying to open an
encrypted regular file without the key.

I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous
inconsistent error codes, which were never documented anywhere.

This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 54475f531bb8d7078f63c159e5e0615d486c498c ]

As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
attempting to create a file in an encrypted directory that hasn't been
"unlocked" fail with ENOKEY.  Previously, several error codes were used
for this case, including ENOENT, EACCES, and EPERM, and they were not
consistent between and within filesystems.  ENOKEY is a better choice
because it expresses that the failure is due to lacking the encryption
key.  It also matches the error code returned when trying to open an
encrypted regular file without the key.

I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous
inconsistent error codes, which were never documented anywhere.

This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: lock mutex before checking for bounce page pool</title>
<updated>2017-11-30T08:39:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-29T10:30:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dc5f76e4e21dcb18fdf47a61eff91806308e49bd'/>
<id>dc5f76e4e21dcb18fdf47a61eff91806308e49bd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a0b3bc855374c50b5ea85273553485af48caf2f7 upstream.

fscrypt_initialize(), which allocates the global bounce page pool when
an encrypted file is first accessed, uses "double-checked locking" to
try to avoid locking fscrypt_init_mutex.  However, it doesn't use any
memory barriers, so it's theoretically possible for a thread to observe
a bounce page pool which has not been fully initialized.  This is a
classic bug with "double-checked locking".

While "only a theoretical issue" in the latest kernel, in pre-4.8
kernels the pointer that was checked was not even the last to be
initialized, so it was easily possible for a crash (NULL pointer
dereference) to happen.  This was changed only incidentally by the large
refactor to use fs/crypto/.

Solve both problems in a trivial way that can easily be backported: just
always take the mutex.  It's theoretically less efficient, but it
shouldn't be noticeable in practice as the mutex is only acquired very
briefly once per encrypted file.

Later I'd like to make this use a helper macro like DO_ONCE().  However,
DO_ONCE() runs in atomic context, so we'd need to add a new macro that
allows blocking.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a0b3bc855374c50b5ea85273553485af48caf2f7 upstream.

fscrypt_initialize(), which allocates the global bounce page pool when
an encrypted file is first accessed, uses "double-checked locking" to
try to avoid locking fscrypt_init_mutex.  However, it doesn't use any
memory barriers, so it's theoretically possible for a thread to observe
a bounce page pool which has not been fully initialized.  This is a
classic bug with "double-checked locking".

While "only a theoretical issue" in the latest kernel, in pre-4.8
kernels the pointer that was checked was not even the last to be
initialized, so it was easily possible for a crash (NULL pointer
dereference) to happen.  This was changed only incidentally by the large
refactor to use fs/crypto/.

Solve both problems in a trivial way that can easily be backported: just
always take the mutex.  It's theoretically less efficient, but it
shouldn't be noticeable in practice as the mutex is only acquired very
briefly once per encrypted file.

Later I'd like to make this use a helper macro like DO_ONCE().  However,
DO_ONCE() runs in atomic context, so we'd need to add a new macro that
allows blocking.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lockd: double unregister of inetaddr notifiers</title>
<updated>2017-11-30T08:39:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Averin</name>
<email>vvs@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-20T14:33:18+00:00</published>
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commit dc3033e16c59a2c4e62b31341258a5786cbcee56 upstream.

lockd_up() can call lockd_unregister_notifiers twice:
inside lockd_start_svc() when it calls lockd_svc_exit_thread()
and then in error path of lockd_up()

Patch forces lockd_start_svc() to unregister notifiers in all error cases
and removes extra unregister in error path of lockd_up().

Fixes: cb7d224f82e4 "lockd: unregister notifier blocks if the service ..."
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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commit dc3033e16c59a2c4e62b31341258a5786cbcee56 upstream.

lockd_up() can call lockd_unregister_notifiers twice:
inside lockd_start_svc() when it calls lockd_svc_exit_thread()
and then in error path of lockd_up()

Patch forces lockd_start_svc() to unregister notifiers in all error cases
and removes extra unregister in error path of lockd_up().

Fixes: cb7d224f82e4 "lockd: unregister notifier blocks if the service ..."
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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