<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v4.9.296</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fuse: annotate lock in fuse_reverse_inval_entry()</title>
<updated>2021-12-22T08:05:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-22T15:03:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=464b7cda4695e516c9921353b7a066c26aadc612'/>
<id>464b7cda4695e516c9921353b7a066c26aadc612</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bda9a71980e083699a0360963c0135657b73f47a upstream.

Add missing inode lock annotatation; found by syzbot.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9f747458f5990eaa8d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bda9a71980e083699a0360963c0135657b73f47a upstream.

Add missing inode lock annotatation; found by syzbot.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9f747458f5990eaa8d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: fix use-after-free due to delegation race</title>
<updated>2021-12-22T08:05:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>J. Bruce Fields</name>
<email>bfields@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-29T20:08:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=348714018139c39533c55661a0c7c990671396b4'/>
<id>348714018139c39533c55661a0c7c990671396b4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 548ec0805c399c65ed66c6641be467f717833ab5 upstream.

A delegation break could arrive as soon as we've called vfs_setlease.  A
delegation break runs a callback which immediately (in
nfsd4_cb_recall_prepare) adds the delegation to del_recall_lru.  If we
then exit nfs4_set_delegation without hashing the delegation, it will be
freed as soon as the callback is done with it, without ever being
removed from del_recall_lru.

Symptoms show up later as use-after-free or list corruption warnings,
usually in the laundromat thread.

I suspect aba2072f4523 "nfsd: grant read delegations to clients holding
writes" made this bug easier to hit, but I looked as far back as v3.0
and it looks to me it already had the same problem.  So I'm not sure
where the bug was introduced; it may have been there from the beginning.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport for context changes to versions which do
not have 20b7d86f29d3 ("nfsd: use boottime for lease expiry calculation")]
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 548ec0805c399c65ed66c6641be467f717833ab5 upstream.

A delegation break could arrive as soon as we've called vfs_setlease.  A
delegation break runs a callback which immediately (in
nfsd4_cb_recall_prepare) adds the delegation to del_recall_lru.  If we
then exit nfs4_set_delegation without hashing the delegation, it will be
freed as soon as the callback is done with it, without ever being
removed from del_recall_lru.

Symptoms show up later as use-after-free or list corruption warnings,
usually in the laundromat thread.

I suspect aba2072f4523 "nfsd: grant read delegations to clients holding
writes" made this bug easier to hit, but I looked as far back as v3.0
and it looks to me it already had the same problem.  So I'm not sure
where the bug was introduced; it may have been there from the beginning.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport for context changes to versions which do
not have 20b7d86f29d3 ("nfsd: use boottime for lease expiry calculation")]
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracefs: Set all files to the same group ownership as the mount option</title>
<updated>2021-12-14T09:04:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-07T22:17:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fc5e1b95f76b4adf8811396badbe6f0abfa39662'/>
<id>fc5e1b95f76b4adf8811396badbe6f0abfa39662</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 48b27b6b5191e2e1f2798cd80877b6e4ef47c351 upstream.

As people have been asking to allow non-root processes to have access to
the tracefs directory, it was considered best to only allow groups to have
access to the directory, where it is easier to just set the tracefs file
system to a specific group (as other would be too dangerous), and that way
the admins could pick which processes would have access to tracefs.

Unfortunately, this broke tooling on Android that expected the other bit
to be set. For some special cases, for non-root tools to trace the system,
tracefs would be mounted and change the permissions of the top level
directory which gave access to all running tasks permission to the
tracing directory. Even though this would be dangerous to do in a
production environment, for testing environments this can be useful.

Now with the new changes to not allow other (which is still the proper
thing to do), it breaks the testing tooling. Now more code needs to be
loaded on the system to change ownership of the tracing directory.

The real solution is to have tracefs honor the gid=xxx option when
mounting. That is,

(tracing group tracing has value 1003)

 mount -t tracefs -o gid=1003 tracefs /sys/kernel/tracing

should have it that all files in the tracing directory should be of the
given group.

Copy the logic from d_walk() from dcache.c and simplify it for the mount
case of tracefs if gid is set. All the files in tracefs will be walked and
their group will be set to the value passed in.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211207171729.2a54e1b3@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yabin Cui &lt;yabinc@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 49d67e445742 ("tracefs: Have tracefs directories not set OTH permission bits by default")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 48b27b6b5191e2e1f2798cd80877b6e4ef47c351 upstream.

As people have been asking to allow non-root processes to have access to
the tracefs directory, it was considered best to only allow groups to have
access to the directory, where it is easier to just set the tracefs file
system to a specific group (as other would be too dangerous), and that way
the admins could pick which processes would have access to tracefs.

Unfortunately, this broke tooling on Android that expected the other bit
to be set. For some special cases, for non-root tools to trace the system,
tracefs would be mounted and change the permissions of the top level
directory which gave access to all running tasks permission to the
tracing directory. Even though this would be dangerous to do in a
production environment, for testing environments this can be useful.

Now with the new changes to not allow other (which is still the proper
thing to do), it breaks the testing tooling. Now more code needs to be
loaded on the system to change ownership of the tracing directory.

The real solution is to have tracefs honor the gid=xxx option when
mounting. That is,

(tracing group tracing has value 1003)

 mount -t tracefs -o gid=1003 tracefs /sys/kernel/tracing

should have it that all files in the tracing directory should be of the
given group.

Copy the logic from d_walk() from dcache.c and simplify it for the mount
case of tracefs if gid is set. All the files in tracefs will be walked and
their group will be set to the value passed in.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211207171729.2a54e1b3@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yabin Cui &lt;yabinc@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 49d67e445742 ("tracefs: Have tracefs directories not set OTH permission bits by default")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signalfd: use wake_up_pollfree()</title>
<updated>2021-12-14T09:04:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-11T00:28:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5ecb4e93d70a21f3b7094029986ef0c3e321f56c'/>
<id>5ecb4e93d70a21f3b7094029986ef0c3e321f56c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9537bae0da1f8d1e2361ab6d0479e8af7824e160 upstream.

wake_up_poll() uses nr_exclusive=1, so it's not guaranteed to wake up
all exclusive waiters.  Yet, POLLFREE *must* wake up all waiters.  epoll
and aio poll are fortunately not affected by this, but it's very
fragile.  Thus, the new function wake_up_pollfree() has been introduced.

Convert signalfd to use wake_up_pollfree().

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Fixes: d80e731ecab4 ("epoll: introduce POLLFREE to flush -&gt;signalfd_wqh before kfree()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209010455.42744-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9537bae0da1f8d1e2361ab6d0479e8af7824e160 upstream.

wake_up_poll() uses nr_exclusive=1, so it's not guaranteed to wake up
all exclusive waiters.  Yet, POLLFREE *must* wake up all waiters.  epoll
and aio poll are fortunately not affected by this, but it's very
fragile.  Thus, the new function wake_up_pollfree() has been introduced.

Convert signalfd to use wake_up_pollfree().

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Fixes: d80e731ecab4 ("epoll: introduce POLLFREE to flush -&gt;signalfd_wqh before kfree()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209010455.42744-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracefs: Have new files inherit the ownership of their parent</title>
<updated>2021-12-14T09:04:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-08T12:57:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7dd4e048155070a454f21c7aa08ff3b84addd3fc'/>
<id>7dd4e048155070a454f21c7aa08ff3b84addd3fc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ee7f3666995d8537dec17b1d35425f28877671a9 upstream.

If directories in tracefs have their ownership changed, then any new files
and directories that are created under those directories should inherit
the ownership of the director they are created in.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211208075720.4855d180@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Yabin Cui &lt;yabinc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4282d60689d4f ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Reported: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAC_TJve8MMAv+H_NdLSJXZUSoxOEq2zB_pVaJ9p=7H6Bu3X76g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ee7f3666995d8537dec17b1d35425f28877671a9 upstream.

If directories in tracefs have their ownership changed, then any new files
and directories that are created under those directories should inherit
the ownership of the director they are created in.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211208075720.4855d180@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Yabin Cui &lt;yabinc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4282d60689d4f ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Reported: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAC_TJve8MMAv+H_NdLSJXZUSoxOEq2zB_pVaJ9p=7H6Bu3X76g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fget: check that the fd still exists after getting a ref to it</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:45:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-01T18:06:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a043f5a600052dc93bc3d7a6a2c1592b6ee77482'/>
<id>a043f5a600052dc93bc3d7a6a2c1592b6ee77482</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 054aa8d439b9185d4f5eb9a90282d1ce74772969 upstream.

Jann Horn points out that there is another possible race wrt Unix domain
socket garbage collection, somewhat reminiscent of the one fixed in
commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").

See the extended comment about the garbage collection requirements added
to unix_peek_fds() by that commit for details.

The race comes from how we can locklessly look up a file descriptor just
as it is in the process of being closed, and with the right artificial
timing (Jann added a few strategic 'mdelay(500)' calls to do that), the
Unix domain socket garbage collector could see the reference count
decrement of the close() happen before fget() took its reference to the
file and the file was attached onto a new file descriptor.

This is all (intentionally) correct on the 'struct file *' side, with
RCU lookups and lockless reference counting very much part of the
design.  Getting that reference count out of order isn't a problem per
se.

But the garbage collector can get confused by seeing this situation of
having seen a file not having any remaining external references and then
seeing it being attached to an fd.

In commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK") the
fix was to serialize the file descriptor install with the garbage
collector by taking and releasing the unix_gc_lock.

That's not really an option here, but since this all happens when we are
in the process of looking up a file descriptor, we can instead simply
just re-check that the file hasn't been closed in the meantime, and just
re-do the lookup if we raced with a concurrent close() of the same file
descriptor.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 054aa8d439b9185d4f5eb9a90282d1ce74772969 upstream.

Jann Horn points out that there is another possible race wrt Unix domain
socket garbage collection, somewhat reminiscent of the one fixed in
commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").

See the extended comment about the garbage collection requirements added
to unix_peek_fds() by that commit for details.

The race comes from how we can locklessly look up a file descriptor just
as it is in the process of being closed, and with the right artificial
timing (Jann added a few strategic 'mdelay(500)' calls to do that), the
Unix domain socket garbage collector could see the reference count
decrement of the close() happen before fget() took its reference to the
file and the file was attached onto a new file descriptor.

This is all (intentionally) correct on the 'struct file *' side, with
RCU lookups and lockless reference counting very much part of the
design.  Getting that reference count out of order isn't a problem per
se.

But the garbage collector can get confused by seeing this situation of
having seen a file not having any remaining external references and then
seeing it being attached to an fd.

In commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK") the
fix was to serialize the file descriptor install with the garbage
collector by taking and releasing the unix_gc_lock.

That's not really an option here, but since this all happens when we are
in the process of looking up a file descriptor, we can instead simply
just re-check that the file hasn't been closed in the meantime, and just
re-do the lookup if we raced with a concurrent close() of the same file
descriptor.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: add fget_many() and fput_many()</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:45:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-21T17:32:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0917c0b01f27bf4101c5716884861e7bd94d26c8'/>
<id>0917c0b01f27bf4101c5716884861e7bd94d26c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 091141a42e15fe47ada737f3996b317072afcefb upstream.

Some uses cases repeatedly get and put references to the same file, but
the only exposed interface is doing these one at the time. As each of
these entail an atomic inc or dec on a shared structure, that cost can
add up.

Add fget_many(), which works just like fget(), except it takes an
argument for how many references to get on the file. Ditto fput_many(),
which can drop an arbitrary number of references to a file.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 091141a42e15fe47ada737f3996b317072afcefb upstream.

Some uses cases repeatedly get and put references to the same file, but
the only exposed interface is doing these one at the time. As each of
these entail an atomic inc or dec on a shared structure, that cost can
add up.

Add fget_many(), which works just like fget(), except it takes an
argument for how many references to get on the file. Ditto fput_many(),
which can drop an arbitrary number of references to a file.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFSv42: Fix pagecache invalidation after COPY/CLONE</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:45:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Coddington</name>
<email>bcodding@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-16T15:48:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d1a0928426afc11a82e33b3e80a6ac68fdcb4487'/>
<id>d1a0928426afc11a82e33b3e80a6ac68fdcb4487</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3f015d89a47cd8855cd92f71fff770095bd885a1 upstream.

The mechanism in use to allow the client to see the results of COPY/CLONE
is to drop those pages from the pagecache.  This forces the client to read
those pages once more from the server.  However, truncate_pagecache_range()
zeros out partial pages instead of dropping them.  Let us instead use
invalidate_inode_pages2_range() with full-page offsets to ensure the client
properly sees the results of COPY/CLONE operations.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.7+
Fixes: 2e72448b07dc ("NFS: Add COPY nfs operation")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3f015d89a47cd8855cd92f71fff770095bd885a1 upstream.

The mechanism in use to allow the client to see the results of COPY/CLONE
is to drop those pages from the pagecache.  This forces the client to read
those pages once more from the server.  However, truncate_pagecache_range()
zeros out partial pages instead of dropping them.  Let us instead use
invalidate_inode_pages2_range() with full-page offsets to ensure the client
properly sees the results of COPY/CLONE operations.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.7+
Fixes: 2e72448b07dc ("NFS: Add COPY nfs operation")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fuse: release pipe buf after last use</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:45:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-25T13:05:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b97f5af5b13a5c92055c460e8b4b9d1e47ac5a4a'/>
<id>b97f5af5b13a5c92055c460e8b4b9d1e47ac5a4a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 473441720c8616dfaf4451f9c7ea14f0eb5e5d65 upstream.

Checking buf-&gt;flags should be done before the pipe_buf_release() is called
on the pipe buffer, since releasing the buffer might modify the flags.

This is exactly what page_cache_pipe_buf_release() does, and which results
in the same VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageLRU(page)) that the original patch was
trying to fix.

Reported-by: Justin Forbes &lt;jmforbes@linuxtx.org&gt;
Fixes: 712a951025c0 ("fuse: fix page stealing")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v2.6.35
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 473441720c8616dfaf4451f9c7ea14f0eb5e5d65 upstream.

Checking buf-&gt;flags should be done before the pipe_buf_release() is called
on the pipe buffer, since releasing the buffer might modify the flags.

This is exactly what page_cache_pipe_buf_release() does, and which results
in the same VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageLRU(page)) that the original patch was
trying to fix.

Reported-by: Justin Forbes &lt;jmforbes@linuxtx.org&gt;
Fixes: 712a951025c0 ("fuse: fix page stealing")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v2.6.35
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc/vmcore: fix clearing user buffer by properly using clear_user()</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:45:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Hildenbrand</name>
<email>david@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-20T00:43:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=33a7d698f30fa0b99d50569e9909d3baa65d8f6a'/>
<id>33a7d698f30fa0b99d50569e9909d3baa65d8f6a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c1e63117711977cc4295b2ce73de29dd17066c82 upstream.

To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use
clear_user().  With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and
has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block,
I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp":

  systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service...
  kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3).
  kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
  kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
  kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete
  kdump[467]: saving vmcore
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
  PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867
  Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86
  Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 &lt;49&gt; c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81
  RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212
  RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008
  RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50
  R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000
  R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8
  FS:  00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
  Call Trace:
   read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0
   proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0
   vfs_read+0x95/0x190
   ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access
Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel
to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on
wrong access.  In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly
handled via clac()+stac().

To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 997c136f518c ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Philipp Rudo &lt;prudo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c1e63117711977cc4295b2ce73de29dd17066c82 upstream.

To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use
clear_user().  With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and
has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block,
I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp":

  systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service...
  kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3).
  kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
  kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
  kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete
  kdump[467]: saving vmcore
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
  PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867
  Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86
  Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 &lt;49&gt; c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81
  RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212
  RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008
  RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50
  R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000
  R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8
  FS:  00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
  Call Trace:
   read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0
   proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0
   vfs_read+0x95/0x190
   ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access
Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel
to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on
wrong access.  In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly
handled via clac()+stac().

To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 997c136f518c ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Philipp Rudo &lt;prudo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
