<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v4.4.63</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix inode checksum calculation problem if i_extra_size is small</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:30:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daeho Jeong</name>
<email>daeho.jeong@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-01T16:49:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=51f8d95c89b4aa74e591015d076d2775d9286704'/>
<id>51f8d95c89b4aa74e591015d076d2775d9286704</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 05ac5aa18abd7db341e54df4ae2b4c98ea0e43b7 upstream.

We've fixed the race condition problem in calculating ext4 checksum
value in commit b47820edd163 ("ext4: avoid modifying checksum fields
directly during checksum veficationon"). However, by this change,
when calculating the checksum value of inode whose i_extra_size is
less than 4, we couldn't calculate the checksum value in a proper way.
This problem was found and reported by Nix, Thank you.

Reported-by: Nix &lt;nix@esperi.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong &lt;daeho.jeong@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Youngjin Gil &lt;youngjin.gil@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 05ac5aa18abd7db341e54df4ae2b4c98ea0e43b7 upstream.

We've fixed the race condition problem in calculating ext4 checksum
value in commit b47820edd163 ("ext4: avoid modifying checksum fields
directly during checksum veficationon"). However, by this change,
when calculating the checksum value of inode whose i_extra_size is
less than 4, we couldn't calculate the checksum value in a proper way.
This problem was found and reported by Nix, Thank you.

Reported-by: Nix &lt;nix@esperi.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong &lt;daeho.jeong@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Youngjin Gil &lt;youngjin.gil@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CIFS: store results of cifs_reopen_file to avoid infinite wait</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:30:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Germano Percossi</name>
<email>germano.percossi@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-07T11:29:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f0899d0e1e9ea7b71a3b05889c047d74b729dbf6'/>
<id>f0899d0e1e9ea7b71a3b05889c047d74b729dbf6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1fa839b4986d648b907d117275869a0e46c324b9 upstream.

This fixes Continuous Availability when errors during
file reopen are encountered.

cifs_user_readv and cifs_user_writev would wait for ever if
results of cifs_reopen_file are not stored and for later inspection.

In fact, results are checked and, in case of errors, a chain
of function calls leading to reads and writes to be scheduled in
a separate thread is skipped.
These threads will wake up the corresponding waiters once reads
and writes are done.

However, given the return value is not stored, when rc is checked
for errors a previous one (always zero) is inspected instead.
This leads to pending reads/writes added to the list, making
cifs_user_readv and cifs_user_writev wait for ever.

Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi &lt;germano.percossi@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1fa839b4986d648b907d117275869a0e46c324b9 upstream.

This fixes Continuous Availability when errors during
file reopen are encountered.

cifs_user_readv and cifs_user_writev would wait for ever if
results of cifs_reopen_file are not stored and for later inspection.

In fact, results are checked and, in case of errors, a chain
of function calls leading to reads and writes to be scheduled in
a separate thread is skipped.
These threads will wake up the corresponding waiters once reads
and writes are done.

However, given the return value is not stored, when rc is checked
for errors a previous one (always zero) is inspected instead.
This leads to pending reads/writes added to the list, making
cifs_user_readv and cifs_user_writev wait for ever.

Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi &lt;germano.percossi@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs clear soft dirty race</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:30:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-13T21:56:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ef4c962825c08609d8077c00cf73f26fbdc638cc'/>
<id>ef4c962825c08609d8077c00cf73f26fbdc638cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5b7abeae3af8c08c577e599dd0578b9e3ee6687b upstream.

Yet another instance of the same race.

Fix is identical to change_huge_pmd().

See "thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs.  numa balancing race" for more details.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302151034.27829-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hillf Danton &lt;hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5b7abeae3af8c08c577e599dd0578b9e3ee6687b upstream.

Yet another instance of the same race.

Fix is identical to change_huge_pmd().

See "thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs.  numa balancing race" for more details.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302151034.27829-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hillf Danton &lt;hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Reset TreeId to zero on SMB2 TREE_CONNECT</title>
<updated>2017-04-12T10:38:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan-Marek Glogowski</name>
<email>glogow@fbihome.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-20T11:25:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5a69c2b268ed938d44011274e6bc87562542ef94'/>
<id>5a69c2b268ed938d44011274e6bc87562542ef94</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 806a28efe9b78ffae5e2757e1ee924b8e50c08ab upstream.

Currently the cifs module breaks the CIFS specs on reconnect as
described in http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246529.aspx:

"TreeId (4 bytes): Uniquely identifies the tree connect for the
command. This MUST be 0 for the SMB2 TREE_CONNECT Request."

Signed-off-by: Jan-Marek Glogowski &lt;glogow@fbihome.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 806a28efe9b78ffae5e2757e1ee924b8e50c08ab upstream.

Currently the cifs module breaks the CIFS specs on reconnect as
described in http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246529.aspx:

"TreeId (4 bytes): Uniquely identifies the tree connect for the
command. This MUST be 0 for the SMB2 TREE_CONNECT Request."

Signed-off-by: Jan-Marek Glogowski &lt;glogow@fbihome.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysfs: be careful of error returns from ops-&gt;show()</title>
<updated>2017-04-12T10:38:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-03T01:30:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=69d8d58bf50d9cd1bb6f000bbdf54026e74717a3'/>
<id>69d8d58bf50d9cd1bb6f000bbdf54026e74717a3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c8a139d001a1aab1ea8734db14b22dac9dd143b6 upstream.

ops-&gt;show() can return a negative error code.
Commit 65da3484d9be ("sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.")
(in v4.4) caused this to be stored in an unsigned 'size_t' variable, so errors
would look like large numbers.
As a result, if an error is returned, sysfs_kf_read() will return the
value of 'count', typically 4096.

Commit 17d0774f8068 ("sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs")
(in v4.8) extended this error to use the unsigned large 'len' as a size for
memmove().
Consequently, if -&gt;show returns an error, then the first read() on the
sysfs file will return 4096 and could return uninitialized memory to
user-space.
If the application performs a subsequent read, this will trigger a memmove()
with extremely large count, and is likely to crash the machine is bizarre ways.

This bug can currently only be triggered by reading from an md
sysfs attribute declared with __ATTR_PREALLOC() during the
brief period between when mddev_put() deletes an mddev from
the -&gt;all_mddevs list, and when mddev_delayed_delete() - which is
scheduled on a workqueue - completes.
Before this, an error won't be returned by the -&gt;show()
After this, the -&gt;show() won't be called.

I can reproduce it reliably only by putting delay like
	usleep_range(500000,700000);
early in mddev_delayed_delete(). Then after creating an
md device md0 run
  echo clear &gt; /sys/block/md0/md/array_state; cat /sys/block/md0/md/array_state

The bug can be triggered without the usleep.

Fixes: 65da3484d9be ("sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.")
Fixes: 17d0774f8068 ("sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c8a139d001a1aab1ea8734db14b22dac9dd143b6 upstream.

ops-&gt;show() can return a negative error code.
Commit 65da3484d9be ("sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.")
(in v4.4) caused this to be stored in an unsigned 'size_t' variable, so errors
would look like large numbers.
As a result, if an error is returned, sysfs_kf_read() will return the
value of 'count', typically 4096.

Commit 17d0774f8068 ("sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs")
(in v4.8) extended this error to use the unsigned large 'len' as a size for
memmove().
Consequently, if -&gt;show returns an error, then the first read() on the
sysfs file will return 4096 and could return uninitialized memory to
user-space.
If the application performs a subsequent read, this will trigger a memmove()
with extremely large count, and is likely to crash the machine is bizarre ways.

This bug can currently only be triggered by reading from an md
sysfs attribute declared with __ATTR_PREALLOC() during the
brief period between when mddev_put() deletes an mddev from
the -&gt;all_mddevs list, and when mddev_delayed_delete() - which is
scheduled on a workqueue - completes.
Before this, an error won't be returned by the -&gt;show()
After this, the -&gt;show() won't be called.

I can reproduce it reliably only by putting delay like
	usleep_range(500000,700000);
early in mddev_delayed_delete(). Then after creating an
md device md0 run
  echo clear &gt; /sys/block/md0/md/array_state; cat /sys/block/md0/md/array_state

The bug can be triggered without the usleep.

Fixes: 65da3484d9be ("sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.")
Fixes: 17d0774f8068 ("sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation</title>
<updated>2017-03-31T07:49:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-21T23:07:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7a5202190810dde1467718235c1f650fcf57592a'/>
<id>7a5202190810dde1467718235c1f650fcf57592a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.

Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again.  This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.

This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired.  Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory.  Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem.  In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.

In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches.  But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.

This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y).  Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.

Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.

Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again.  This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.

This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired.  Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory.  Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem.  In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.

In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches.  But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.

This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y).  Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.

Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: clear _XBF_PAGES from buffers when readahead page</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:35:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrick J. Wong</name>
<email>darrick.wong@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-26T04:24:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6d43e485e0067b682466eb4e3aff8ff9a6822966'/>
<id>6d43e485e0067b682466eb4e3aff8ff9a6822966</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2aa6ba7b5ad3189cc27f14540aa2f57f0ed8df4b upstream.

If we try to allocate memory pages to back an xfs_buf that we're trying
to read, it's possible that we'll be so short on memory that the page
allocation fails.  For a blocking read we'll just wait, but for
readahead we simply dump all the pages we've collected so far.

Unfortunately, after dumping the pages we neglect to clear the
_XBF_PAGES state, which means that the subsequent call to xfs_buf_free
thinks that b_pages still points to pages we own.  It then double-frees
the b_pages pages.

This results in screaming about negative page refcounts from the memory
manager, which xfs oughtn't be triggering.  To reproduce this case,
mount a filesystem where the size of the inodes far outweighs the
availalble memory (a ~500M inode filesystem on a VM with 300MB memory
did the trick here) and run bulkstat in parallel with other memory
eating processes to put a huge load on the system.  The "check summary"
phase of xfs_scrub also works for this purpose.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ivan Kozik &lt;ivan@ludios.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2aa6ba7b5ad3189cc27f14540aa2f57f0ed8df4b upstream.

If we try to allocate memory pages to back an xfs_buf that we're trying
to read, it's possible that we'll be so short on memory that the page
allocation fails.  For a blocking read we'll just wait, but for
readahead we simply dump all the pages we've collected so far.

Unfortunately, after dumping the pages we neglect to clear the
_XBF_PAGES state, which means that the subsequent call to xfs_buf_free
thinks that b_pages still points to pages we own.  It then double-frees
the b_pages pages.

This results in screaming about negative page refcounts from the memory
manager, which xfs oughtn't be triggering.  To reproduce this case,
mount a filesystem where the size of the inodes far outweighs the
availalble memory (a ~500M inode filesystem on a VM with 300MB memory
did the trick here) and run bulkstat in parallel with other memory
eating processes to put a huge load on the system.  The "check summary"
phase of xfs_scrub also works for this purpose.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ivan Kozik &lt;ivan@ludios.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: fix up xfs_swap_extent_forks inline extent handling</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:35:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Sandeen</name>
<email>sandeen@sandeen.net</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-08T01:55:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7922c1becb36b61827a24ee32ffe7c39cf444efb'/>
<id>7922c1becb36b61827a24ee32ffe7c39cf444efb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4dfce57db6354603641132fac3c887614e3ebe81 upstream.

There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer
dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes,
when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents
on the temporary inode, something like:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
PID: 29439  TASK: ffff880550584fa0  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "xfs_fsr"
    [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10]
 #9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs]
#10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs]
#11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs]
#12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs]
#13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs]
#14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67
#15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5
#16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8
#17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c
#18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b
#19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e
#20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27
#21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c
#22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d

As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along
with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros
when we tear down the extents during truncate.  When the in-core
inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally
set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents
to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents
generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes
instead.

This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in
xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing
it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent
because the two values in ifp-&gt;if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained
what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due
to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations
were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun.

Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number
of extents, not di_nextents.

Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the
root cause.

[nborisov: backported to 4.4]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
--
 fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4dfce57db6354603641132fac3c887614e3ebe81 upstream.

There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer
dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes,
when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents
on the temporary inode, something like:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
PID: 29439  TASK: ffff880550584fa0  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "xfs_fsr"
    [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10]
 #9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs]
#10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs]
#11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs]
#12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs]
#13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs]
#14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67
#15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5
#16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8
#17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c
#18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b
#19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e
#20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27
#21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c
#22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d

As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along
with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros
when we tear down the extents during truncate.  When the in-core
inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally
set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents
to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents
generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes
instead.

This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in
xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing
it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent
because the two values in ifp-&gt;if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained
what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due
to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations
were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun.

Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number
of extents, not di_nextents.

Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the
root cause.

[nborisov: backported to 4.4]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
--
 fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: don't allow di_size with high bit set</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:35:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrick J. Wong</name>
<email>darrick.wong@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-05T01:38:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c4cf86f69597d4547a736e3edd5b88ae61b68fa2'/>
<id>c4cf86f69597d4547a736e3edd5b88ae61b68fa2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ef388e2054feedaeb05399ed654bdb06f385d294 upstream.

The on-disk field di_size is used to set i_size, which is a signed
integer of loff_t.  If the high bit of di_size is set, we'll end up with
a negative i_size, which will cause all sorts of problems.  Since the
VFS won't let us create a file with such length, we should catch them
here in the verifier too.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner &lt;dchinner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Cc: Nikolay Borisov &lt;n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ef388e2054feedaeb05399ed654bdb06f385d294 upstream.

The on-disk field di_size is used to set i_size, which is a signed
integer of loff_t.  If the high bit of di_size is set, we'll end up with
a negative i_size, which will cause all sorts of problems.  Since the
VFS won't let us create a file with such length, we should catch them
here in the verifier too.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner &lt;dchinner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Cc: Nikolay Borisov &lt;n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: mark inode dirty after converting inline directory</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:35:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-15T18:52:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=27d9bf096406439ce406c82291cfe09c6653f94c'/>
<id>27d9bf096406439ce406c82291cfe09c6653f94c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b9cf625d6ecde0d372e23ae022feead72b4228a6 upstream.

If ext4_convert_inline_data() was called on a directory with inline
data, the filesystem was left in an inconsistent state (as considered by
e2fsck) because the file size was not increased to cover the new block.
This happened because the inode was not marked dirty after i_disksize
was updated.  Fix this by marking the inode dirty at the end of
ext4_finish_convert_inline_dir().

This bug was probably not noticed before because most users mark the
inode dirty afterwards for other reasons.  But if userspace executed
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY with invalid parameters, as exercised by
'kvm-xfstests -c adv generic/396', then the inode was never marked dirty
after updating i_disksize.

Fixes: 3c47d54170b6a678875566b1b8d6dcf57904e49b
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b9cf625d6ecde0d372e23ae022feead72b4228a6 upstream.

If ext4_convert_inline_data() was called on a directory with inline
data, the filesystem was left in an inconsistent state (as considered by
e2fsck) because the file size was not increased to cover the new block.
This happened because the inode was not marked dirty after i_disksize
was updated.  Fix this by marking the inode dirty at the end of
ext4_finish_convert_inline_dir().

This bug was probably not noticed before because most users mark the
inode dirty afterwards for other reasons.  But if userspace executed
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY with invalid parameters, as exercised by
'kvm-xfstests -c adv generic/396', then the inode was never marked dirty
after updating i_disksize.

Fixes: 3c47d54170b6a678875566b1b8d6dcf57904e49b
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
