<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v4.4.44</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>NFSv4.1: nfs4_fl_prepare_ds must be careful about reporting success.</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-19T00:19:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=33ebdfe913fd6dd3dc8522a6ab4bb5719df5efde'/>
<id>33ebdfe913fd6dd3dc8522a6ab4bb5719df5efde</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cfd278c280f997cf2fe4662e0acab0fe465f637b upstream.

Various places assume that if nfs4_fl_prepare_ds() turns a non-NULL 'ds',
then ds-&gt;ds_clp will also be non-NULL.

This is not necessasrily true in the case when the process received a fatal signal
while nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect is waiting in nfs4_wait_ds_connect().
In that case -&gt;ds_clp may not be set, and the devid may not recently have been marked
unavailable.

So add a test for ds_clp == NULL and return NULL in that case.

Fixes: c23266d532b4 ("NFS4.1 Fix data server connection race")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Olga Kornievskaia &lt;aglo@umich.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Adamson, Andy &lt;William.Adamson@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cfd278c280f997cf2fe4662e0acab0fe465f637b upstream.

Various places assume that if nfs4_fl_prepare_ds() turns a non-NULL 'ds',
then ds-&gt;ds_clp will also be non-NULL.

This is not necessasrily true in the case when the process received a fatal signal
while nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect is waiting in nfs4_wait_ds_connect().
In that case -&gt;ds_clp may not be set, and the devid may not recently have been marked
unavailable.

So add a test for ds_clp == NULL and return NULL in that case.

Fixes: c23266d532b4 ("NFS4.1 Fix data server connection race")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Olga Kornievskaia &lt;aglo@umich.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Adamson, Andy &lt;William.Adamson@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: Fix a performance regression in readdir</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@primarydata.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-19T15:54:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=11804232d1ad3405e0729217bcaa368b7a64b587'/>
<id>11804232d1ad3405e0729217bcaa368b7a64b587</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79f687a3de9e3ba2518b4ea33f38ca6cbe9133eb upstream.

Ben Coddington reports that commit 311324ad1713, by adding the function
nfs_dir_mapping_need_revalidate() that checks page cache validity on
each call to nfs_readdir() causes a performance regression when
the directory is being modified.

If the directory is changing while we're iterating through the directory,
POSIX does not require us to invalidate the page cache unless the user
calls rewinddir(). However, we still do want to ensure that we use
readdirplus in order to avoid a load of stat() calls when the user
is doing an 'ls -l' workload.

The fix should be to invalidate the page cache immediately when we're
setting the NFS_INO_ADVISE_RDPLUS bit.

Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 311324ad1713 ("NFS: Be more aggressive in using readdirplus...")
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 79f687a3de9e3ba2518b4ea33f38ca6cbe9133eb upstream.

Ben Coddington reports that commit 311324ad1713, by adding the function
nfs_dir_mapping_need_revalidate() that checks page cache validity on
each call to nfs_readdir() causes a performance regression when
the directory is being modified.

If the directory is changing while we're iterating through the directory,
POSIX does not require us to invalidate the page cache unless the user
calls rewinddir(). However, we still do want to ensure that we use
readdirplus in order to avoid a load of stat() calls when the user
is doing an 'ls -l' workload.

The fix should be to invalidate the page cache immediately when we're
setting the NFS_INO_ADVISE_RDPLUS bit.

Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 311324ad1713 ("NFS: Be more aggressive in using readdirplus...")
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pNFS: Fix race in pnfs_wait_on_layoutreturn</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@primarydata.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-18T20:21:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8ff851bf2240d877aaeec92795142535e07c3328'/>
<id>8ff851bf2240d877aaeec92795142535e07c3328</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ee284e35d8c71bf5d4d807eaff6f67a17134b359 upstream.

We must put the task to sleep while holding the inode-&gt;i_lock in order
to ensure atomicity with the test for NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN.

Fixes: 500d701f336b ("NFS41: make close wait for layoutreturn")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ee284e35d8c71bf5d4d807eaff6f67a17134b359 upstream.

We must put the task to sleep while holding the inode-&gt;i_lock in order
to ensure atomicity with the test for NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN.

Fixes: 500d701f336b ("NFS41: make close wait for layoutreturn")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix error handling when run_delayed_extent_op fails</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Mahoney</name>
<email>jeffm@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-20T18:28:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f0382c090a207f9beae1ab2e76883ea304031ae0'/>
<id>f0382c090a207f9beae1ab2e76883ea304031ae0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aa7c8da35d1905d80e840d075f07d26ec90144b5 upstream.

In __btrfs_run_delayed_refs, the error path when run_delayed_extent_op
fails sets locked_ref-&gt;processing = 0 but doesn't re-increment
delayed_refs-&gt;num_heads_ready.  As a result, we end up triggering
the WARN_ON in btrfs_select_ref_head.

Fixes: d7df2c796d7 (Btrfs: attach delayed ref updates to delayed ref heads)
Reported-by: Jon Nelson &lt;jnelson-suse@jamponi.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney &lt;jeffm@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo &lt;bo.li.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit aa7c8da35d1905d80e840d075f07d26ec90144b5 upstream.

In __btrfs_run_delayed_refs, the error path when run_delayed_extent_op
fails sets locked_ref-&gt;processing = 0 but doesn't re-increment
delayed_refs-&gt;num_heads_ready.  As a result, we end up triggering
the WARN_ON in btrfs_select_ref_head.

Fixes: d7df2c796d7 (Btrfs: attach delayed ref updates to delayed ref heads)
Reported-by: Jon Nelson &lt;jnelson-suse@jamponi.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney &lt;jeffm@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo &lt;bo.li.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix locking when we put back a delayed ref that's too new</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Mahoney</name>
<email>jeffm@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-20T18:28:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=205e997acde7546eae7d78a0618dd9ed10046987'/>
<id>205e997acde7546eae7d78a0618dd9ed10046987</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d0280996437081dd12ed1e982ac8aeaa62835ec4 upstream.

In __btrfs_run_delayed_refs, when we put back a delayed ref that's too
new, we have already dropped the lock on locked_ref when we set
-&gt;processing = 0.

This patch keeps the lock to cover that assignment.

Fixes: d7df2c796d7 (Btrfs: attach delayed ref updates to delayed ref heads)
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney &lt;jeffm@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo &lt;bo.li.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d0280996437081dd12ed1e982ac8aeaa62835ec4 upstream.

In __btrfs_run_delayed_refs, when we put back a delayed ref that's too
new, we have already dropped the lock on locked_ref when we set
-&gt;processing = 0.

This patch keeps the lock to cover that assignment.

Fixes: d7df2c796d7 (Btrfs: attach delayed ref updates to delayed ref heads)
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney &lt;jeffm@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo &lt;bo.li.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhou Chengming</name>
<email>zhouchengming1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-06T01:32:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b9d6631395a1e25b210ce112b1bc10f3c665ea20'/>
<id>b9d6631395a1e25b210ce112b1bc10f3c665ea20</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939 upstream.

Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.

The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:

[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265]  [&lt;ffffffff817cdaaf&gt;] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817]  [&lt;ffffffff817d33fb&gt;] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346]  [&lt;ffffffff817cf055&gt;] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256]  [&lt;ffffffff817cf0d3&gt;] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972]  [&lt;ffffffff810d1fd0&gt;] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804]  [&lt;ffffffff8130de64&gt;] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227]  [&lt;ffffffff8130de17&gt;] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648]  [&lt;ffffffff8130decd&gt;] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654]  [&lt;ffffffff8130deff&gt;] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657]  [&lt;ffffffff810f57f5&gt;] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344]  [&lt;ffffffff810d7704&gt;] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447]  [&lt;ffffffff817d0761&gt;] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844]  [&lt;ffffffff81167684&gt;] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336]  [&lt;ffffffff8116789d&gt;] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373]  [&lt;ffffffff817cf61f&gt;] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186]  [&lt;ffffffff81167acb&gt;] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899]  [&lt;ffffffff810fce3d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420]  [&lt;ffffffff817cf61f&gt;] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234]  [&lt;ffffffff8115a9f5&gt;] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049]  [&lt;ffffffff81167ae5&gt;] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571]  [&lt;ffffffff8115aa2c&gt;] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207]  [&lt;ffffffff810bc83f&gt;] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736]  [&lt;ffffffff810bc7c0&gt;] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461]  [&lt;ffffffff810bce9b&gt;] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697]  [&lt;ffffffff810bcd70&gt;] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426]  [&lt;ffffffff810c3f7e&gt;] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991]  [&lt;ffffffff817d4baf&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041]  [&lt;ffffffff810c3e80&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230

One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex.  The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.

See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13

Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Reported-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yang Shukui &lt;yangshukui@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming &lt;zhouchengming1@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939 upstream.

Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.

The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:

[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265]  [&lt;ffffffff817cdaaf&gt;] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817]  [&lt;ffffffff817d33fb&gt;] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346]  [&lt;ffffffff817cf055&gt;] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256]  [&lt;ffffffff817cf0d3&gt;] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972]  [&lt;ffffffff810d1fd0&gt;] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804]  [&lt;ffffffff8130de64&gt;] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227]  [&lt;ffffffff8130de17&gt;] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648]  [&lt;ffffffff8130decd&gt;] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654]  [&lt;ffffffff8130deff&gt;] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657]  [&lt;ffffffff810f57f5&gt;] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344]  [&lt;ffffffff810d7704&gt;] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447]  [&lt;ffffffff817d0761&gt;] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844]  [&lt;ffffffff81167684&gt;] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336]  [&lt;ffffffff8116789d&gt;] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373]  [&lt;ffffffff817cf61f&gt;] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186]  [&lt;ffffffff81167acb&gt;] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899]  [&lt;ffffffff810fce3d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420]  [&lt;ffffffff817cf61f&gt;] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234]  [&lt;ffffffff8115a9f5&gt;] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049]  [&lt;ffffffff81167ae5&gt;] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571]  [&lt;ffffffff8115aa2c&gt;] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207]  [&lt;ffffffff810bc83f&gt;] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736]  [&lt;ffffffff810bc7c0&gt;] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461]  [&lt;ffffffff810bce9b&gt;] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697]  [&lt;ffffffff810bcd70&gt;] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426]  [&lt;ffffffff810c3f7e&gt;] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991]  [&lt;ffffffff817d4baf&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041]  [&lt;ffffffff810c3e80&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230

One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex.  The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.

See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13

Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Reported-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yang Shukui &lt;yangshukui@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming &lt;zhouchengming1@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mnt: Protect the mountpoint hashtable with mount_lock</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-03T01:18:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4a6716f165179679ee418b79445aa4031118ecd1'/>
<id>4a6716f165179679ee418b79445aa4031118ecd1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3895dbf8985f656675b5bde610723a29cbce3fa7 upstream.

Protecting the mountpoint hashtable with namespace_sem was sufficient
until a call to umount_mnt was added to mntput_no_expire.  At which
point it became possible for multiple calls of put_mountpoint on
the same hash chain to happen on the same time.

Kristen Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt; reported:
&gt; This can cause a panic when simultaneous callers of put_mountpoint
&gt; attempt to free the same mountpoint.  This occurs because some callers
&gt; hold the mount_hash_lock, while others hold the namespace lock.  Some
&gt; even hold both.
&gt;
&gt; In this submitter's case, the panic manifested itself as a GP fault in
&gt; put_mountpoint() when it called hlist_del() and attempted to dereference
&gt; a m_hash.pprev that had been poisioned by another thread.

Al Viro observed that the simple fix is to switch from using the namespace_sem
to the mount_lock to protect the mountpoint hash table.

I have taken Al's suggested patch moved put_mountpoint in pivot_root
(instead of taking mount_lock an additional time), and have replaced
new_mountpoint with get_mountpoint a function that does the hash table
lookup and addition under the mount_lock.   The introduction of get_mounptoint
ensures that only the mount_lock is needed to manipulate the mountpoint
hashtable.

d_set_mounted is modified to only set DCACHE_MOUNTED if it is not
already set.  This allows get_mountpoint to use the setting of
DCACHE_MOUNTED to ensure adding a struct mountpoint for a dentry
happens exactly once.

Fixes: ce07d891a089 ("mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts")
Reported-by: Krister Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3895dbf8985f656675b5bde610723a29cbce3fa7 upstream.

Protecting the mountpoint hashtable with namespace_sem was sufficient
until a call to umount_mnt was added to mntput_no_expire.  At which
point it became possible for multiple calls of put_mountpoint on
the same hash chain to happen on the same time.

Kristen Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt; reported:
&gt; This can cause a panic when simultaneous callers of put_mountpoint
&gt; attempt to free the same mountpoint.  This occurs because some callers
&gt; hold the mount_hash_lock, while others hold the namespace lock.  Some
&gt; even hold both.
&gt;
&gt; In this submitter's case, the panic manifested itself as a GP fault in
&gt; put_mountpoint() when it called hlist_del() and attempted to dereference
&gt; a m_hash.pprev that had been poisioned by another thread.

Al Viro observed that the simple fix is to switch from using the namespace_sem
to the mount_lock to protect the mountpoint hash table.

I have taken Al's suggested patch moved put_mountpoint in pivot_root
(instead of taking mount_lock an additional time), and have replaced
new_mountpoint with get_mountpoint a function that does the hash table
lookup and addition under the mount_lock.   The introduction of get_mounptoint
ensures that only the mount_lock is needed to manipulate the mountpoint
hashtable.

d_set_mounted is modified to only set DCACHE_MOUNTED if it is not
already set.  This allows get_mountpoint to use the setting of
DCACHE_MOUNTED to ensure adding a struct mountpoint for a dentry
happens exactly once.

Fixes: ce07d891a089 ("mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts")
Reported-by: Krister Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix crash caused by stale lvb with fsdlm plugin</title>
<updated>2017-01-19T19:17:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Ren</name>
<email>zren@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-11T00:57:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6bbb8ff3b68e65cd2ad936b32ce01df2c4ec215b'/>
<id>6bbb8ff3b68e65cd2ad936b32ce01df2c4ec215b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e7ee2c089e94067d68475990bdeed211c8852917 upstream.

The crash happens rather often when we reset some cluster nodes while
nodes contend fiercely to do truncate and append.

The crash backtrace is below:

   dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover_grant 1 locks on 971 resources
   dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover 9 generation 5 done: 4 ms
   ocfs2: Begin replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18)
   ocfs2: End replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18)
   ocfs2: Beginning quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2
   ocfs2: Finishing quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2
   (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: bug expression: le64_to_cpu(fe-&gt;i_size) != i_size_read(inode)
   (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: Inode 290321, inode i_size = 732 != di i_size = 937, i_flags = 0x1
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at /usr/src/linux/fs/ocfs2/file.c:470!
   invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: ocfs2_stack_user(OEN) ocfs2(OEN) ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue(OEN) quota_tree dlm(OEN) configfs fuse sd_mod    iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs softdog xfs libcrc32c ppdev parport_pc pcspkr parport      joydev virtio_balloon virtio_net i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq button processor ext4 crc16 jbd2 mbcache ata_generic cirrus virtio_blk ata_piix               drm_kms_helper ahci syscopyarea libahci sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm floppy libata drm virtio_pci virtio_ring uhci_hcd virtio ehci_hcd       usbcore serio_raw usb_common sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4
   Supported: No, Unsupported modules are loaded
   CPU: 1 PID: 30154 Comm: truncate Tainted: G           OE   N  4.4.21-69-default #1
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20151112_172657-sheep25 04/01/2014
   task: ffff88004ff6d240 ti: ffff880074e68000 task.ti: ffff880074e68000
   RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2]
   RSP: 0018:ffff880074e6bd50  EFLAGS: 00010282
   RAX: 0000000000000074 RBX: 000000000000029e RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
   RBP: ffff880074e6bda8 R08: 000000003675dc7a R09: ffffffff82013414
   R10: 0000000000034c50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003aab3448
   R13: 00000000000002dc R14: 0000000000046e11 R15: 0000000000000020
   FS:  00007f839f965700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
   CR2: 00007f839f97e000 CR3: 0000000036723000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
   Call Trace:
     ocfs2_setattr+0x698/0xa90 [ocfs2]
     notify_change+0x1ae/0x380
     do_truncate+0x5e/0x90
     do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.11+0x108/0x160
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6d
   Code: 24 28 ba d6 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 30 43 62 a0 8b 41 2c 89 44 24 08 48 8b 41 20 48 c7 c1 78 a3 62 a0 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 a0 97 f9 ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 3d 00 fe ff ff 0f 84 ab fd ff ff 83 f8 fc 0f 84 a2 fd ff
   RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2]

It's because ocfs2_inode_lock() get us stale LVB in which the i_size is
not equal to the disk i_size.  We mistakenly trust the LVB because the
underlaying fsdlm dlm_lock() doesn't set lkb_sbflags with
DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID properly for us.  But, why?

The current code tries to downconvert lock without DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag
to tell o2cb don't update RSB's LVB if it's a PR-&gt;NULL conversion, even
if the lock resource type needs LVB.  This is not the right way for
fsdlm.

The fsdlm plugin behaves different on DLM_LKF_VALBLK, it depends on
DLM_LKF_VALBLK to decide if we care about the LVB in the LKB.  If
DLM_LKF_VALBLK is not set, fsdlm will skip recovering RSB's LVB from
this lkb and set the right DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID appropriately when node
failure happens.

The following diagram briefly illustrates how this crash happens:

RSB1 is inode metadata lock resource with LOCK_TYPE_USES_LVB;

The 1st round:

             Node1                                    Node2
RSB1: PR
                                                  RSB1(master): NULL-&gt;EX
ocfs2_downconvert_lock(PR-&gt;NULL, set_lvb==0)
  ocfs2_dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)
  convert_lock(overwrite lkb-&gt;lkb_exflags
               with no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)

RSB1: NULL                                        RSB1: EX
                                                  reset Node2
dlm_recover_rsbs()
  recover_lvb()

/* The LVB is not trustable if the node with EX fails and
 * no lock &gt;= PR is left. We should set RSB_VALNOTVALID for RSB1.
 */

 if(!(kb_exflags &amp; DLM_LKF_VALBLK)) /* This means we miss the chance to
           return;                   * to invalid the LVB here.
                                     */

The 2nd round:

         Node 1                                Node2
RSB1(become master from recovery)

ocfs2_setattr()
  ocfs2_inode_lock(NULL-&gt;EX)
    /* dlm_lock() return the stale lvb without setting DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID */
    ocfs2_meta_lvb_is_trustable() return 1 /* so we don't refresh inode from disk */
  ocfs2_truncate_file()
      mlog_bug_on_msg(disk isize != i_size_read(inode))  /* crash! */

The fix is quite straightforward.  We keep to set DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag
for dlm_lock() if the lock resource type needs LVB and the fsdlm plugin
is uesed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481275846-6604-1-git-send-email-zren@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Ren &lt;zren@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@versity.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e7ee2c089e94067d68475990bdeed211c8852917 upstream.

The crash happens rather often when we reset some cluster nodes while
nodes contend fiercely to do truncate and append.

The crash backtrace is below:

   dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover_grant 1 locks on 971 resources
   dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover 9 generation 5 done: 4 ms
   ocfs2: Begin replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18)
   ocfs2: End replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18)
   ocfs2: Beginning quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2
   ocfs2: Finishing quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2
   (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: bug expression: le64_to_cpu(fe-&gt;i_size) != i_size_read(inode)
   (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: Inode 290321, inode i_size = 732 != di i_size = 937, i_flags = 0x1
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at /usr/src/linux/fs/ocfs2/file.c:470!
   invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: ocfs2_stack_user(OEN) ocfs2(OEN) ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue(OEN) quota_tree dlm(OEN) configfs fuse sd_mod    iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs softdog xfs libcrc32c ppdev parport_pc pcspkr parport      joydev virtio_balloon virtio_net i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq button processor ext4 crc16 jbd2 mbcache ata_generic cirrus virtio_blk ata_piix               drm_kms_helper ahci syscopyarea libahci sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm floppy libata drm virtio_pci virtio_ring uhci_hcd virtio ehci_hcd       usbcore serio_raw usb_common sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4
   Supported: No, Unsupported modules are loaded
   CPU: 1 PID: 30154 Comm: truncate Tainted: G           OE   N  4.4.21-69-default #1
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20151112_172657-sheep25 04/01/2014
   task: ffff88004ff6d240 ti: ffff880074e68000 task.ti: ffff880074e68000
   RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2]
   RSP: 0018:ffff880074e6bd50  EFLAGS: 00010282
   RAX: 0000000000000074 RBX: 000000000000029e RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
   RBP: ffff880074e6bda8 R08: 000000003675dc7a R09: ffffffff82013414
   R10: 0000000000034c50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003aab3448
   R13: 00000000000002dc R14: 0000000000046e11 R15: 0000000000000020
   FS:  00007f839f965700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
   CR2: 00007f839f97e000 CR3: 0000000036723000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
   Call Trace:
     ocfs2_setattr+0x698/0xa90 [ocfs2]
     notify_change+0x1ae/0x380
     do_truncate+0x5e/0x90
     do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.11+0x108/0x160
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6d
   Code: 24 28 ba d6 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 30 43 62 a0 8b 41 2c 89 44 24 08 48 8b 41 20 48 c7 c1 78 a3 62 a0 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 a0 97 f9 ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 3d 00 fe ff ff 0f 84 ab fd ff ff 83 f8 fc 0f 84 a2 fd ff
   RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa05c8c30&gt;] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2]

It's because ocfs2_inode_lock() get us stale LVB in which the i_size is
not equal to the disk i_size.  We mistakenly trust the LVB because the
underlaying fsdlm dlm_lock() doesn't set lkb_sbflags with
DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID properly for us.  But, why?

The current code tries to downconvert lock without DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag
to tell o2cb don't update RSB's LVB if it's a PR-&gt;NULL conversion, even
if the lock resource type needs LVB.  This is not the right way for
fsdlm.

The fsdlm plugin behaves different on DLM_LKF_VALBLK, it depends on
DLM_LKF_VALBLK to decide if we care about the LVB in the LKB.  If
DLM_LKF_VALBLK is not set, fsdlm will skip recovering RSB's LVB from
this lkb and set the right DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID appropriately when node
failure happens.

The following diagram briefly illustrates how this crash happens:

RSB1 is inode metadata lock resource with LOCK_TYPE_USES_LVB;

The 1st round:

             Node1                                    Node2
RSB1: PR
                                                  RSB1(master): NULL-&gt;EX
ocfs2_downconvert_lock(PR-&gt;NULL, set_lvb==0)
  ocfs2_dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)
  convert_lock(overwrite lkb-&gt;lkb_exflags
               with no DLM_LKF_VALBLK)

RSB1: NULL                                        RSB1: EX
                                                  reset Node2
dlm_recover_rsbs()
  recover_lvb()

/* The LVB is not trustable if the node with EX fails and
 * no lock &gt;= PR is left. We should set RSB_VALNOTVALID for RSB1.
 */

 if(!(kb_exflags &amp; DLM_LKF_VALBLK)) /* This means we miss the chance to
           return;                   * to invalid the LVB here.
                                     */

The 2nd round:

         Node 1                                Node2
RSB1(become master from recovery)

ocfs2_setattr()
  ocfs2_inode_lock(NULL-&gt;EX)
    /* dlm_lock() return the stale lvb without setting DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID */
    ocfs2_meta_lvb_is_trustable() return 1 /* so we don't refresh inode from disk */
  ocfs2_truncate_file()
      mlog_bug_on_msg(disk isize != i_size_read(inode))  /* crash! */

The fix is quite straightforward.  We keep to set DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag
for dlm_lock() if the lock resource type needs LVB and the fsdlm plugin
is uesed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481275846-6604-1-git-send-email-zren@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Ren &lt;zren@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@versity.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfs_write_end(): fix handling of short copies</title>
<updated>2017-01-09T07:07:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-06T01:42:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8a2bcaae1bc7a33d51d668d0661e0636a4aa7bc8'/>
<id>8a2bcaae1bc7a33d51d668d0661e0636a4aa7bc8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c0cf3ef5e0f47e385920450b245d22bead93e7ad upstream.

What matters when deciding if we should make a page uptodate is
not how much we _wanted_ to copy, but how much we actually have
copied.  As it is, on architectures that do not zero tail on
short copy we can leave uninitialized data in page marked uptodate.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c0cf3ef5e0f47e385920450b245d22bead93e7ad upstream.

What matters when deciding if we should make a page uptodate is
not how much we _wanted_ to copy, but how much we actually have
copied.  As it is, on architectures that do not zero tail on
short copy we can leave uninitialized data in page marked uptodate.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: protect iterate_bdevs() against concurrent close</title>
<updated>2017-01-09T07:07:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rabin Vincent</name>
<email>rabinv@axis.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-01T08:18:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f4f02a856a92e1a2990a8d0f55d08a78a29c3cc0'/>
<id>f4f02a856a92e1a2990a8d0f55d08a78a29c3cc0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit af309226db916e2c6e08d3eba3fa5c34225200c4 upstream.

If a block device is closed while iterate_bdevs() is handling it, the
following NULL pointer dereference occurs because bdev-&gt;b_disk is NULL
in bdev_get_queue(), which is called from blk_get_backing_dev_info() (in
turn called by the mapping_cap_writeback_dirty() call in
__filemap_fdatawrite_range()):

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000508
 IP: [&lt;ffffffff81314790&gt;] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
 PGD 9e62067 PUD 9ee8067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 2422 Comm: sync Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7+ #400
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
 task: ffff880009f4d700 ti: ffff880009f5c000 task.ti: ffff880009f5c000
 RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff81314790&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff81314790&gt;] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
 RSP: 0018:ffff880009f5fe68  EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000ec17a38 RCX: ffffffff81a4e940
 RDX: 7fffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000ec176c0
 RBP: ffff880009f5fe68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88000ec17860
 R13: ffffffff811b25c0 R14: ffff88000ec178e0 R15: ffff88000ec17a38
 FS:  00007faee505d700(0000) GS:ffff88000fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
 CR2: 0000000000000508 CR3: 0000000009e8a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 Stack:
  ffff880009f5feb8 ffffffff8112e7f5 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff
  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000001
  ffff88000ec178e0 ffff88000ec17860 ffff880009f5fec8 ffffffff8112e81f
 Call Trace:
  [&lt;ffffffff8112e7f5&gt;] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x85/0x90
  [&lt;ffffffff8112e81f&gt;] filemap_fdatawrite+0x1f/0x30
  [&lt;ffffffff811b25d6&gt;] fdatawrite_one_bdev+0x16/0x20
  [&lt;ffffffff811bc402&gt;] iterate_bdevs+0xf2/0x130
  [&lt;ffffffff811b2763&gt;] sys_sync+0x63/0x90
  [&lt;ffffffff815d4272&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
 Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 f0 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 &lt;48&gt; 8b 80 08 05 00 00 5d
 RIP  [&lt;ffffffff81314790&gt;] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
  RSP &lt;ffff880009f5fe68&gt;
 CR2: 0000000000000508
 ---[ end trace 2487336ceb3de62d ]---

The crash is easily reproducible by running the following command, if an
msleep(100) is inserted before the call to func() in iterate_devs():

 while :; do head -c1 /dev/nullb0; done &gt; /dev/null &amp; while :; do sync; done

Fix it by holding the bd_mutex across the func() call and only calling
func() if the bdev is opened.

Fixes: 5c0d6b60a0ba ("vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices")
Reported-and-tested-by: Wei Fang &lt;fangwei1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent &lt;rabinv@axis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit af309226db916e2c6e08d3eba3fa5c34225200c4 upstream.

If a block device is closed while iterate_bdevs() is handling it, the
following NULL pointer dereference occurs because bdev-&gt;b_disk is NULL
in bdev_get_queue(), which is called from blk_get_backing_dev_info() (in
turn called by the mapping_cap_writeback_dirty() call in
__filemap_fdatawrite_range()):

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000508
 IP: [&lt;ffffffff81314790&gt;] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
 PGD 9e62067 PUD 9ee8067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 2422 Comm: sync Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7+ #400
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
 task: ffff880009f4d700 ti: ffff880009f5c000 task.ti: ffff880009f5c000
 RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff81314790&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff81314790&gt;] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
 RSP: 0018:ffff880009f5fe68  EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000ec17a38 RCX: ffffffff81a4e940
 RDX: 7fffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000ec176c0
 RBP: ffff880009f5fe68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88000ec17860
 R13: ffffffff811b25c0 R14: ffff88000ec178e0 R15: ffff88000ec17a38
 FS:  00007faee505d700(0000) GS:ffff88000fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
 CR2: 0000000000000508 CR3: 0000000009e8a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 Stack:
  ffff880009f5feb8 ffffffff8112e7f5 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff
  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000001
  ffff88000ec178e0 ffff88000ec17860 ffff880009f5fec8 ffffffff8112e81f
 Call Trace:
  [&lt;ffffffff8112e7f5&gt;] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x85/0x90
  [&lt;ffffffff8112e81f&gt;] filemap_fdatawrite+0x1f/0x30
  [&lt;ffffffff811b25d6&gt;] fdatawrite_one_bdev+0x16/0x20
  [&lt;ffffffff811bc402&gt;] iterate_bdevs+0xf2/0x130
  [&lt;ffffffff811b2763&gt;] sys_sync+0x63/0x90
  [&lt;ffffffff815d4272&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
 Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 f0 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 &lt;48&gt; 8b 80 08 05 00 00 5d
 RIP  [&lt;ffffffff81314790&gt;] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
  RSP &lt;ffff880009f5fe68&gt;
 CR2: 0000000000000508
 ---[ end trace 2487336ceb3de62d ]---

The crash is easily reproducible by running the following command, if an
msleep(100) is inserted before the call to func() in iterate_devs():

 while :; do head -c1 /dev/nullb0; done &gt; /dev/null &amp; while :; do sync; done

Fix it by holding the bd_mutex across the func() call and only calling
func() if the bdev is opened.

Fixes: 5c0d6b60a0ba ("vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices")
Reported-and-tested-by: Wei Fang &lt;fangwei1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent &lt;rabinv@axis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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