<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v4.4.19</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>block: add missing group association in bio-cloning functions</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Valente</name>
<email>paolo.valente@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-27T05:22:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=01daea925d04909561bf7c39c76e71d13ddcb2ec'/>
<id>01daea925d04909561bf7c39c76e71d13ddcb2ec</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 20bd723ec6a3261df5e02250cd3a1fbb09a343f2 upstream.

When a bio is cloned, the newly created bio must be associated with
the same blkcg as the original bio (if BLK_CGROUP is enabled). If
this operation is not performed, then the new bio is not associated
with any group, and the group of the current task is returned when
the group of the bio is requested.

Depending on the cloning frequency, this may cause a large
percentage of the bios belonging to a given group to be treated
as if belonging to other groups (in most cases as if belonging to
the root group). The expected group isolation may thereby be broken.

This commit adds the missing association in bio-cloning functions.

Fixes: da2f0f74cf7d ("Btrfs: add support for blkio controllers")

Signed-off-by: Paolo Valente &lt;paolo.valente@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;kernel@kyup.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 20bd723ec6a3261df5e02250cd3a1fbb09a343f2 upstream.

When a bio is cloned, the newly created bio must be associated with
the same blkcg as the original bio (if BLK_CGROUP is enabled). If
this operation is not performed, then the new bio is not associated
with any group, and the group of the current task is returned when
the group of the bio is requested.

Depending on the cloning frequency, this may cause a large
percentage of the bios belonging to a given group to be treated
as if belonging to other groups (in most cases as if belonging to
the root group). The expected group isolation may thereby be broken.

This commit adds the missing association in bio-cloning functions.

Fixes: da2f0f74cf7d ("Btrfs: add support for blkio controllers")

Signed-off-by: Paolo Valente &lt;paolo.valente@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;kernel@kyup.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: don't return an unhashed lock stateid after taking mutex</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-11T14:37:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=37cbe5b6d12580c6bb189dc3be418b681ce7d5a1'/>
<id>37cbe5b6d12580c6bb189dc3be418b681ce7d5a1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dd257933fa4b9fea66a1195f8a15111029810abc upstream.

nfsd4_lock will take the st_mutex before working with the stateid it
gets, but between the time when we drop the cl_lock and take the mutex,
the stateid could become unhashed (a'la FREE_STATEID). If that happens
the lock stateid returned to the client will be forgotten.

Fix this by first moving the st_mutex acquisition into
lookup_or_create_lock_state. Then, have it check to see if the lock
stateid is still hashed after taking the mutex. If it's not, then put
the stateid and try the find/create again.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dd257933fa4b9fea66a1195f8a15111029810abc upstream.

nfsd4_lock will take the st_mutex before working with the stateid it
gets, but between the time when we drop the cl_lock and take the mutex,
the stateid could become unhashed (a'la FREE_STATEID). If that happens
the lock stateid returned to the client will be forgotten.

Fix this by first moving the st_mutex acquisition into
lookup_or_create_lock_state. Then, have it check to see if the lock
stateid is still hashed after taking the mutex. If it's not, then put
the stateid and try the find/create again.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: Fix race between FREE_STATEID and LOCK</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chuck Lever</name>
<email>chuck.lever@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-11T14:37:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6dfc20babd386b8990c9ad99fa9e3afe875cba1f'/>
<id>6dfc20babd386b8990c9ad99fa9e3afe875cba1f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42691398be08bd1fe99326911a0aa31f2c041d53 upstream.

When running LTP's nfslock01 test, the Linux client can send a LOCK
and a FREE_STATEID request at the same time. The outcome is:

Frame 324    R OPEN stateid [2,O]

Frame 115004 C LOCK lockowner_is_new stateid [2,O] offset 672000 len 64
Frame 115008 R LOCK stateid [1,L]
Frame 115012 C WRITE stateid [0,L] offset 672000 len 64
Frame 115016 R WRITE NFS4_OK
Frame 115019 C LOCKU stateid [1,L] offset 672000 len 64
Frame 115022 R LOCKU NFS4_OK
Frame 115025 C FREE_STATEID stateid [2,L]
Frame 115026 C LOCK lockowner_is_new stateid [2,O] offset 672128 len 64
Frame 115029 R FREE_STATEID NFS4_OK
Frame 115030 R LOCK stateid [3,L]
Frame 115034 C WRITE stateid [0,L] offset 672128 len 64
Frame 115038 R WRITE NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID

In other words, the server returns stateid L in a successful LOCK
reply, but it has already released it. Subsequent uses of stateid L
fail.

To address this, protect the generation check in nfsd4_free_stateid
with the st_mutex. This should guarantee that only one of two
outcomes occurs: either LOCK returns a fresh valid stateid, or
FREE_STATEID returns NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD.

Reported-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Fix-suggested-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42691398be08bd1fe99326911a0aa31f2c041d53 upstream.

When running LTP's nfslock01 test, the Linux client can send a LOCK
and a FREE_STATEID request at the same time. The outcome is:

Frame 324    R OPEN stateid [2,O]

Frame 115004 C LOCK lockowner_is_new stateid [2,O] offset 672000 len 64
Frame 115008 R LOCK stateid [1,L]
Frame 115012 C WRITE stateid [0,L] offset 672000 len 64
Frame 115016 R WRITE NFS4_OK
Frame 115019 C LOCKU stateid [1,L] offset 672000 len 64
Frame 115022 R LOCKU NFS4_OK
Frame 115025 C FREE_STATEID stateid [2,L]
Frame 115026 C LOCK lockowner_is_new stateid [2,O] offset 672128 len 64
Frame 115029 R FREE_STATEID NFS4_OK
Frame 115030 R LOCK stateid [3,L]
Frame 115034 C WRITE stateid [0,L] offset 672128 len 64
Frame 115038 R WRITE NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID

In other words, the server returns stateid L in a successful LOCK
reply, but it has already released it. Subsequent uses of stateid L
fail.

To address this, protect the generation check in nfsd4_free_stateid
with the st_mutex. This should guarantee that only one of two
outcomes occurs: either LOCK returns a fresh valid stateid, or
FREE_STATEID returns NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD.

Reported-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Fix-suggested-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfs: don't create zero-length requests</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Coddington</name>
<email>bcodding@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-18T14:41:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3d6562fded3ce875b8a7fc30eeed73b16366d77e'/>
<id>3d6562fded3ce875b8a7fc30eeed73b16366d77e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 149a4fddd0a72d526abbeac0c8deaab03559836a upstream.

NFS doesn't expect requests with wb_bytes set to zero and may make
unexpected decisions about how to handle that request at the page IO layer.
Skip request creation if we won't have any wb_bytes in the request.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Weston Andros Adamson &lt;dros@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 149a4fddd0a72d526abbeac0c8deaab03559836a upstream.

NFS doesn't expect requests with wb_bytes set to zero and may make
unexpected decisions about how to handle that request at the page IO layer.
Skip request creation if we won't have any wb_bytes in the request.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Weston Andros Adamson &lt;dros@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CIFS: Fix a possible invalid memory access in smb2_query_symlink()</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Shilovsky</name>
<email>pshilovsky@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-24T07:37:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=adc58bfd4d75183a65f806b1b5354d1b65f832c6'/>
<id>adc58bfd4d75183a65f806b1b5354d1b65f832c6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7893242e2465aea6f2cbc2639da8fa5ce96e8cc2 upstream.

During following a symbolic link we received err_buf from SMB2_open().
While the validity of SMB2 error response is checked previously
in smb2_check_message() a symbolic link payload is not checked at all.
Fix it by adding such checks.

Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilovsky@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7893242e2465aea6f2cbc2639da8fa5ce96e8cc2 upstream.

During following a symbolic link we received err_buf from SMB2_open().
While the validity of SMB2 error response is checked previously
in smb2_check_message() a symbolic link payload is not checked at all.
Fix it by adding such checks.

Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilovsky@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rabin Vincent</name>
<email>rabinv@axis.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-19T07:26:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=047617448daecf05e57498d8697acd3dbd38672d'/>
<id>047617448daecf05e57498d8697acd3dbd38672d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bd975d1eead2558b76e1079e861eacf1f678b73b upstream.

The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info
struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions.  However, the
server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated
and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below:

mount.cifs(8) #1				mount.cifs(8) #2

Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
// false

						Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
						// false

secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash..
secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc..
sdeschmaccmd5-&gt;shash.tfm = &amp;secmec.hmacmd;

						secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc
						// sdeschmaccmd5-&gt;shash.tfm
						// not yet assigned

crypto_shash_update()
 deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5-&gt;shash.tfm

 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030
 epc   : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
 ra    : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
 Call Trace:
  crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
  setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
  build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c
  sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248
  CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178
  cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84
  cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314
  cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c
  cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440
  mount_fs+0x20/0xc0
  vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138
  do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc
  SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4
  syscall_common+0x30/0x54

Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these
hmac(md5) structures.  All the other secmech algos already have similar
locking.

Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires")
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent &lt;rabinv@axis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu &lt;sprabhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bd975d1eead2558b76e1079e861eacf1f678b73b upstream.

The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info
struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions.  However, the
server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated
and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below:

mount.cifs(8) #1				mount.cifs(8) #2

Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
// false

						Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
						// false

secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash..
secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc..
sdeschmaccmd5-&gt;shash.tfm = &amp;secmec.hmacmd;

						secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc
						// sdeschmaccmd5-&gt;shash.tfm
						// not yet assigned

crypto_shash_update()
 deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5-&gt;shash.tfm

 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030
 epc   : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
 ra    : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
 Call Trace:
  crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
  setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
  build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c
  sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248
  CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178
  cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84
  cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314
  cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c
  cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440
  mount_fs+0x20/0xc0
  vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138
  do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc
  SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4
  syscall_common+0x30/0x54

Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these
hmac(md5) structures.  All the other secmech algos already have similar
locking.

Fixes: 95dc8dd14e2e84cc ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires")
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent &lt;rabinv@axis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu &lt;sprabhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs: Check for existing directory when opening file with O_CREAT</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sachin Prabhu</name>
<email>sprabhu@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-07T20:28:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36e6321056ba24f004bfc16d4398e65a6651f843'/>
<id>36e6321056ba24f004bfc16d4398e65a6651f843</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8d9535b6efd86e6c07da59f97e68f44efb7fe080 upstream.

When opening a file with O_CREAT flag, check to see if the file opened
is an existing directory.

This prevents the directory from being opened which subsequently causes
a crash when the close function for directories cifs_closedir() is called
which frees up the file-&gt;private_data memory while the file is still
listed on the open file list for the tcon.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu &lt;sprabhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xiaoli Feng &lt;xifeng@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8d9535b6efd86e6c07da59f97e68f44efb7fe080 upstream.

When opening a file with O_CREAT flag, check to see if the file opened
is an existing directory.

This prevents the directory from being opened which subsequently causes
a crash when the close function for directories cifs_closedir() is called
which frees up the file-&gt;private_data memory while the file is still
listed on the open file list for the tcon.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu &lt;sprabhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xiaoli Feng &lt;xifeng@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/cifs: make share unaccessible at root level mountable</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aurelien Aptel</name>
<email>aaptel@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-25T17:59:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a636a9b1306587bbfab54b1e435461289a4c2c35'/>
<id>a636a9b1306587bbfab54b1e435461289a4c2c35</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a6b5058fafdf508904bbf16c29b24042cef3c496 upstream.

if, when mounting //HOST/share/sub/dir/foo we can query /sub/dir/foo but
not any of the path components above:

- store the /sub/dir/foo prefix in the cifs super_block info
- in the superblock, set root dentry to the subpath dentry (instead of
  the share root)
- set a flag in the superblock to remember it
- use prefixpath when building path from a dentry

fixes bso#8950

Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilovsky@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a6b5058fafdf508904bbf16c29b24042cef3c496 upstream.

if, when mounting //HOST/share/sub/dir/foo we can query /sub/dir/foo but
not any of the path components above:

- store the /sub/dir/foo prefix in the cifs super_block info
- in the superblock, set root dentry to the subpath dentry (instead of
  the share root)
- set a flag in the superblock to remember it
- use prefixpath when building path from a dentry

fixes bso#8950

Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilovsky@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jbd2: make journal y2038 safe</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-30T15:49:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=564e0f8b22814e1b811bbc77953c9554e2a08328'/>
<id>564e0f8b22814e1b811bbc77953c9554e2a08328</id>
<content type='text'>
commit abcfb5d979892fc8b12574551fc907c05fe1b11b upstream.

The jbd2 journal stores the commit time in 64-bit seconds and 32-bit
nanoseconds, which avoids an overflow in 2038, but it gets the numbers
from current_kernel_time(), which uses 'long' seconds on 32-bit
architectures.

This simply changes the code to call current_kernel_time64() so
we use 64-bit seconds consistently.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit abcfb5d979892fc8b12574551fc907c05fe1b11b upstream.

The jbd2 journal stores the commit time in 64-bit seconds and 32-bit
nanoseconds, which avoids an overflow in 2038, but it gets the numbers
from current_kernel_time(), which uses 'long' seconds on 32-bit
architectures.

This simply changes the code to call current_kernel_time64() so
we use 64-bit seconds consistently.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: disallow overlayfs as upperdir</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-29T10:05:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=54c4ddcbab7396c58e1fc745663417ad7e872137'/>
<id>54c4ddcbab7396c58e1fc745663417ad7e872137</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 76bc8e2843b66f8205026365966b49ec6da39ae7 upstream.

This does not work and does not make sense.  So instead of fixing it
(probably not hard) just disallow.

Reported-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 76bc8e2843b66f8205026365966b49ec6da39ae7 upstream.

This does not work and does not make sense.  So instead of fixing it
(probably not hard) just disallow.

Reported-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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