<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v4.19.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>9p/cache.c: Fix memory leak in v9fs_cache_session_get_cookie</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bharath Vedartham</name>
<email>linux.bhar@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-22T19:45:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5b0446c8e0a85b97148c070f73e273bc3903af5c'/>
<id>5b0446c8e0a85b97148c070f73e273bc3903af5c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 962a991c5de18452d6c429d99f3039387cf5cbb0 upstream.

v9fs_cache_session_get_cookie assigns a random cachetag to v9ses-&gt;cachetag,
if the cachetag is not assigned previously.

v9fs_random_cachetag allocates memory to v9ses-&gt;cachetag with kmalloc and uses
scnprintf to fill it up with a cachetag.

But if scnprintf fails, v9ses-&gt;cachetag is not freed in the current
code causing a memory leak.

Fix this by freeing v9ses-&gt;cachetag it v9fs_random_cachetag fails.

This was reported by syzbot, the link to the report is below:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f012bdf297a7a4c860c38a88b44fbee43fd9bbf3

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522194519.GA5313@bharath12345-Inspiron-5559
Reported-by: syzbot+3a030a73b6c1e9833815@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Bharath Vedartham &lt;linux.bhar@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet &lt;dominique.martinet@cea.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 962a991c5de18452d6c429d99f3039387cf5cbb0 upstream.

v9fs_cache_session_get_cookie assigns a random cachetag to v9ses-&gt;cachetag,
if the cachetag is not assigned previously.

v9fs_random_cachetag allocates memory to v9ses-&gt;cachetag with kmalloc and uses
scnprintf to fill it up with a cachetag.

But if scnprintf fails, v9ses-&gt;cachetag is not freed in the current
code causing a memory leak.

Fix this by freeing v9ses-&gt;cachetag it v9fs_random_cachetag fails.

This was reported by syzbot, the link to the report is below:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f012bdf297a7a4c860c38a88b44fbee43fd9bbf3

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522194519.GA5313@bharath12345-Inspiron-5559
Reported-by: syzbot+3a030a73b6c1e9833815@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Bharath Vedartham &lt;linux.bhar@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet &lt;dominique.martinet@cea.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: wait for recovering done after direct unlock request</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Changwei Ge</name>
<email>gechangwei@live.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-23T22:33:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=52132ff52cadb32edf063c1b4d8a7a6c00d85e4d'/>
<id>52132ff52cadb32edf063c1b4d8a7a6c00d85e4d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0a3775e4f883912944481cf2ef36eb6383a9cc74 ]

There is a scenario causing ocfs2 umount hang when multiple hosts are
rebooting at the same time.

NODE1                           NODE2               NODE3
send unlock requset to NODE2
                                dies
                                                    become recovery master
                                                    recover NODE2
find NODE2 dead
mark resource RECOVERING
directly remove lock from grant list
calculate usage but RECOVERING marked
**miss the window of purging
clear RECOVERING

To reproduce this issue, crash a host and then umount ocfs2
from another node.

To solve this, just let unlock progress wait for recovery done.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1550124866-20367-1-git-send-email-gechangwei@live.cn
Signed-off-by: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0a3775e4f883912944481cf2ef36eb6383a9cc74 ]

There is a scenario causing ocfs2 umount hang when multiple hosts are
rebooting at the same time.

NODE1                           NODE2               NODE3
send unlock requset to NODE2
                                dies
                                                    become recovery master
                                                    recover NODE2
find NODE2 dead
mark resource RECOVERING
directly remove lock from grant list
calculate usage but RECOVERING marked
**miss the window of purging
clear RECOVERING

To reproduce this issue, crash a host and then umount ocfs2
from another node.

To solve this, just let unlock progress wait for recovery done.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1550124866-20367-1-git-send-email-gechangwei@live.cn
Signed-off-by: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fat: work around race with userspace's read via blockdev while mounting</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>OGAWA Hirofumi</name>
<email>hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-23T22:32:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0840daeea6cb14e6c7e93f805351b8845d1a6725'/>
<id>0840daeea6cb14e6c7e93f805351b8845d1a6725</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 07bfa4415ab607e459b69bd86aa7e7602ce10b4f ]

If userspace reads the buffer via blockdev while mounting,
sb_getblk()+modify can race with buffer read via blockdev.

For example,

            FS                               userspace
    bh = sb_getblk()
    modify bh-&gt;b_data
                                  read
				    ll_rw_block(bh)
				      fill bh-&gt;b_data by on-disk data
				      /* lost modified data by FS */
				      set_buffer_uptodate(bh)
    set_buffer_uptodate(bh)

Userspace should not use the blockdev while mounting though, the udev
seems to be already doing this.  Although I think the udev should try to
avoid this, workaround the race by small overhead.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pnk7l3sw.fsf_-_@mail.parknet.co.jp
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi &lt;hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp&gt;
Reported-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 07bfa4415ab607e459b69bd86aa7e7602ce10b4f ]

If userspace reads the buffer via blockdev while mounting,
sb_getblk()+modify can race with buffer read via blockdev.

For example,

            FS                               userspace
    bh = sb_getblk()
    modify bh-&gt;b_data
                                  read
				    ll_rw_block(bh)
				      fill bh-&gt;b_data by on-disk data
				      /* lost modified data by FS */
				      set_buffer_uptodate(bh)
    set_buffer_uptodate(bh)

Userspace should not use the blockdev while mounting though, the udev
seems to be already doing this.  Although I think the udev should try to
avoid this, workaround the race by small overhead.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pnk7l3sw.fsf_-_@mail.parknet.co.jp
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi &lt;hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp&gt;
Reported-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix potential use after free after remounting with noblock_validity</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:57:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>zhangyi (F)</name>
<email>yi.zhang@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-28T15:13:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5b400fed74dfb093d7a6aafd52d83f4eb071a776'/>
<id>5b400fed74dfb093d7a6aafd52d83f4eb071a776</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7727ae52975d4f4ef7ff69ed8e6e25f6a4168158 ]

Remount process will release system zone which was allocated before if
"noblock_validity" is specified. If we mount an ext4 file system to two
mountpoints with default mount options, and then remount one of them
with "noblock_validity", it may trigger a use after free problem when
someone accessing the other one.

 # mount /dev/sda foo
 # mount /dev/sda bar

User access mountpoint "foo"   |   Remount mountpoint "bar"
                               |
ext4_map_blocks()              |   ext4_remount()
check_block_validity()         |   ext4_setup_system_zone()
ext4_data_block_valid()        |   ext4_release_system_zone()
                               |   free system_blks rb nodes
access system_blks rb nodes    |
trigger use after free         |

This problem can also be reproduced by one mountpint, At the same time,
add_system_zone() can get called during remount as well so there can be
racing ext4_data_block_valid() reading the rbtree at the same time.

This patch add RCU to protect system zone from releasing or building
when doing a remount which inverse current "noblock_validity" mount
option. It assign the rbtree after the whole tree was complete and
do actual freeing after rcu grace period, avoid any intermediate state.

Reported-by: syzbot+1e470567330b7ad711d5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) &lt;yi.zhang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7727ae52975d4f4ef7ff69ed8e6e25f6a4168158 ]

Remount process will release system zone which was allocated before if
"noblock_validity" is specified. If we mount an ext4 file system to two
mountpoints with default mount options, and then remount one of them
with "noblock_validity", it may trigger a use after free problem when
someone accessing the other one.

 # mount /dev/sda foo
 # mount /dev/sda bar

User access mountpoint "foo"   |   Remount mountpoint "bar"
                               |
ext4_map_blocks()              |   ext4_remount()
check_block_validity()         |   ext4_setup_system_zone()
ext4_data_block_valid()        |   ext4_release_system_zone()
                               |   free system_blks rb nodes
access system_blks rb nodes    |
trigger use after free         |

This problem can also be reproduced by one mountpint, At the same time,
add_system_zone() can get called during remount as well so there can be
racing ext4_data_block_valid() reading the rbtree at the same time.

This patch add RCU to protect system zone from releasing or building
when doing a remount which inverse current "noblock_validity" mount
option. It assign the rbtree after the whole tree was complete and
do actual freeing after rcu grace period, avoid any intermediate state.

Reported-by: syzbot+1e470567330b7ad711d5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) &lt;yi.zhang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pstore: fs superblock limits</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:56:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Deepa Dinamani</name>
<email>deepa.kernel@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-23T23:00:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2c16f72135fb70aff833032f460886bd005747d4'/>
<id>2c16f72135fb70aff833032f460886bd005747d4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 83b8a3fbe3aa82ac3c253b698ae6a9be2dbdd5e0 ]

Leaving granularity at 1ns because it is dependent on the specific
attached backing pstore module. ramoops has microsecond resolution.

Fix the readback of ramoops fractional timestamp microseconds,
which has incorrectly been reporting the value as nanoseconds.

Fixes: 3f8f80f0cfeb ("pstore/ram: Read and write to the 'compressed' flag of pstore").

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: anton@enomsg.org
Cc: ccross@android.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 83b8a3fbe3aa82ac3c253b698ae6a9be2dbdd5e0 ]

Leaving granularity at 1ns because it is dependent on the specific
attached backing pstore module. ramoops has microsecond resolution.

Fix the readback of ramoops fractional timestamp microseconds,
which has incorrectly been reporting the value as nanoseconds.

Fixes: 3f8f80f0cfeb ("pstore/ram: Read and write to the 'compressed' flag of pstore").

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: anton@enomsg.org
Cc: ccross@android.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T11:10:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-09T03:15:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5bead06b3443c784637d454c5c64a3bd05752cf4'/>
<id>5bead06b3443c784637d454c5c64a3bd05752cf4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 76e43c8ccaa35c30d5df853013561145a0f750a5 ]

When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs
and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock.

This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one
of many places that take it with IRQs enabled.  Since the IRQ handler
may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible.

Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate
spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of
the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally.

Reproducer:

	#include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
	#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/mount.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/stat.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
	#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
	#include &lt;linux/aio_abi.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		char opts[128];
		int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR);
		aio_context_t ctx = 0;
		struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd };
		struct iocb *cbp = &amp;cb;

		sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd);
		mkdir("mnt", 0700);
		mount("foo",  "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts);
		syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &amp;ctx);
		syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &amp;cbp);
	}

Beginning of lockdep output:

	=====================================================
	WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -&gt; SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
	5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted
	-----------------------------------------------------
	syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
	000000003590ceda (&amp;fiq-&gt;waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
	000000003590ceda (&amp;fiq-&gt;waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline]
	000000003590ceda (&amp;fiq-&gt;waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825

	and this task is already holding:
	0000000075037284 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline]
	0000000075037284 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline]
	0000000075037284 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825
	which would create a new lock dependency:
	 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.} -&gt; (&amp;fiq-&gt;waitq){+.+.}

	but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
	 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.}

	[...]

Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.19+
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 76e43c8ccaa35c30d5df853013561145a0f750a5 ]

When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs
and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock.

This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one
of many places that take it with IRQs enabled.  Since the IRQ handler
may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible.

Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate
spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of
the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally.

Reproducer:

	#include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
	#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/mount.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/stat.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
	#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
	#include &lt;linux/aio_abi.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		char opts[128];
		int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR);
		aio_context_t ctx = 0;
		struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd };
		struct iocb *cbp = &amp;cb;

		sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd);
		mkdir("mnt", 0700);
		mount("foo",  "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts);
		syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &amp;ctx);
		syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &amp;cbp);
	}

Beginning of lockdep output:

	=====================================================
	WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -&gt; SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
	5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted
	-----------------------------------------------------
	syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
	000000003590ceda (&amp;fiq-&gt;waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
	000000003590ceda (&amp;fiq-&gt;waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline]
	000000003590ceda (&amp;fiq-&gt;waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825

	and this task is already holding:
	0000000075037284 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline]
	0000000075037284 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline]
	0000000075037284 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825
	which would create a new lock dependency:
	 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.} -&gt; (&amp;fiq-&gt;waitq){+.+.}

	but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
	 (&amp;(&amp;ctx-&gt;ctx_lock)-&gt;rlock){..-.}

	[...]

Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.19+
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CIFS: Fix oplock handling for SMB 2.1+ protocols</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T11:10:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Shilovsky</name>
<email>pshilov@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-26T19:31:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4290a9e593235e0e706a7762152758f57869541f'/>
<id>4290a9e593235e0e706a7762152758f57869541f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a016e2794fc3a245a91946038dd8f34d65e53cc3 upstream.

There may be situations when a server negotiates SMB 2.1
protocol version or higher but responds to a CREATE request
with an oplock rather than a lease.

Currently the client doesn't handle such a case correctly:
when another CREATE comes in the server sends an oplock
break to the initial CREATE and the client doesn't send
an ack back due to a wrong caching level being set (READ
instead of RWH). Missing an oplock break ack makes the
server wait until the break times out which dramatically
increases the latency of the second CREATE.

Fix this by properly detecting oplocks when using SMB 2.1
protocol version and higher.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg &lt;lsahlber@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a016e2794fc3a245a91946038dd8f34d65e53cc3 upstream.

There may be situations when a server negotiates SMB 2.1
protocol version or higher but responds to a CREATE request
with an oplock rather than a lease.

Currently the client doesn't handle such a case correctly:
when another CREATE comes in the server sends an oplock
break to the initial CREATE and the client doesn't send
an ack back due to a wrong caching level being set (READ
instead of RWH). Missing an oplock break ack makes the
server wait until the break times out which dramatically
increases the latency of the second CREATE.

Fix this by properly detecting oplocks when using SMB 2.1
protocol version and higher.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg &lt;lsahlber@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CIFS: fix max ea value size</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T11:10:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Murphy Zhou</name>
<email>jencce.kernel@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-21T11:26:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a3a150895b6f09896f3c3121b2e6cc927f21aba2'/>
<id>a3a150895b6f09896f3c3121b2e6cc927f21aba2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 63d37fb4ce5ae7bf1e58f906d1bf25f036fe79b2 upstream.

It should not be larger then the slab max buf size. If user
specifies a larger size, it passes this check and goes
straightly to SMB2_set_info_init performing an insecure memcpy.

Signed-off-by: Murphy Zhou &lt;jencce.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
CC: Stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 63d37fb4ce5ae7bf1e58f906d1bf25f036fe79b2 upstream.

It should not be larger then the slab max buf size. If user
specifies a larger size, it passes this check and goes
straightly to SMB2_set_info_init performing an insecure memcpy.

Signed-off-by: Murphy Zhou &lt;jencce.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel &lt;aaptel@suse.com&gt;
CC: Stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix punch hole for inline_data file systems</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T11:10:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-24T02:38:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=091c754d5ca943fd3bb0cadd20140184911b695d'/>
<id>091c754d5ca943fd3bb0cadd20140184911b695d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c1e8220bd316d8ae8e524df39534b8a412a45d5e upstream.

If a program attempts to punch a hole on an inline data file, we need
to convert it to a normal file first.

This was detected using ext4/032 using the adv configuration.  Simple
reproducer:

mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -O inline_data /dev/vdc
mount /vdc
echo "" &gt; /vdc/testfile
xfs_io -c 'truncate 33554432' /vdc/testfile
xfs_io -c 'fpunch 0 1048576' /vdc/testfile
umount /vdc
e2fsck -fy /dev/vdc

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c1e8220bd316d8ae8e524df39534b8a412a45d5e upstream.

If a program attempts to punch a hole on an inline data file, we need
to convert it to a normal file first.

This was detected using ext4/032 using the adv configuration.  Simple
reproducer:

mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -O inline_data /dev/vdc
mount /vdc
echo "" &gt; /vdc/testfile
xfs_io -c 'truncate 33554432' /vdc/testfile
xfs_io -c 'fpunch 0 1048576' /vdc/testfile
umount /vdc
e2fsck -fy /dev/vdc

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix warning inside ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T11:10:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rakesh Pandit</name>
<email>rakesh@tuxera.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-23T02:53:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=775e3e734bd35fa4d11bc0d9abb91a44815bacaa'/>
<id>775e3e734bd35fa4d11bc0d9abb91a44815bacaa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e3d550c2c4f2f3dba469bc3c4b83d9332b4e99e1 upstream.

Really enable warning when CONFIG_EXT4_DEBUG is set and fix missing
first argument.  This was introduced in commit ff95ec22cd7f ("ext4:
add warning to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio") and splitting
extents inside endio would trigger it.

Fixes: ff95ec22cd7f ("ext4: add warning to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio")
Signed-off-by: Rakesh Pandit &lt;rakesh@tuxera.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e3d550c2c4f2f3dba469bc3c4b83d9332b4e99e1 upstream.

Really enable warning when CONFIG_EXT4_DEBUG is set and fix missing
first argument.  This was introduced in commit ff95ec22cd7f ("ext4:
add warning to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio") and splitting
extents inside endio would trigger it.

Fixes: ff95ec22cd7f ("ext4: add warning to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio")
Signed-off-by: Rakesh Pandit &lt;rakesh@tuxera.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
