linux-stable.git/fs, branch v4.19.37 Linux kernel stable tree coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping 2019-04-27T07:36:37+00:00 Andrea Arcangeli aarcange@redhat.com 2019-04-19T00:50:52+00:00 6ff17bc5936e5fab33de8064dc0690f6c8c789ca commit 04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a upstream. The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough. This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils "Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct" In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently. Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side effects in the core dumping code. Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats which is not suitable as a short term fix. For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped. Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code (which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other corner case. In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6" however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit. Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core dumping are frozen. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a upstream.

The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it.  Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier.  For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:

  https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils

  "Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
   to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
   without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
   misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"

In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.

Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.

Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.

For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs.  Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.

Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.

In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.

Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm().  The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cifs: fix handle leak in smb2_query_symlink() 2019-04-27T07:36:33+00:00 Ronnie Sahlberg lsahlber@redhat.com 2019-04-09T21:47:22+00:00 2fcee5eaae6ee1c2ccbe629ffd46c6674a98824c commit e6d0fb7b34f264f72c33053558a360a6a734905e upstream. If we enter smb2_query_symlink() for something that is not a symlink and where the SMB2_open() would succeed we would never end up closing this handle and would thus leak a handle on the server. Fix this by immediately calling SMB2_close() on successfull open. Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit e6d0fb7b34f264f72c33053558a360a6a734905e upstream.

If we enter smb2_query_symlink() for something that is not a symlink
and where the SMB2_open() would succeed we would never end up
closing this handle and would thus leak a handle on the server.

Fix this by immediately calling SMB2_close() on successfull open.

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read 2019-04-27T07:36:33+00:00 ZhangXiaoxu zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com 2019-04-06T07:47:39+00:00 c69330a855ab4342d304f67f8c1e7d1fa2686bec commit 088aaf17aa79300cab14dbee2569c58cfafd7d6e upstream. There is a KASAN use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009 Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace. Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging") Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+ Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 088aaf17aa79300cab14dbee2569c58cfafd7d6e upstream.

There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009

Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.

Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")

Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_write 2019-04-27T07:36:33+00:00 ZhangXiaoxu zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com 2019-04-06T07:47:38+00:00 8fb89b43b65fcd35f15d982712904b96fc64c68a commit 6a3eb3360667170988f8a6477f6686242061488a upstream. There is a KASAN use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_write+0x1342/0x1580 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b6a8e450 by task ln/4196 Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace. Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging") Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+ Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 6a3eb3360667170988f8a6477f6686242061488a upstream.

There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_write+0x1342/0x1580
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b6a8e450 by task ln/4196

Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.

Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")

Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CIFS: keep FileInfo handle live during oplock break 2019-04-27T07:36:33+00:00 Aurelien Aptel aaptel@suse.com 2019-03-29T09:49:12+00:00 8092ecc306d81186a64cda42411121f4d35aaff4 commit b98749cac4a695f084a5ff076f4510b23e353ecd upstream. In the oplock break handler, writing pending changes from pages puts the FileInfo handle. If the refcount reaches zero it closes the handle and waits for any oplock break handler to return, thus causing a deadlock. To prevent this situation: * We add a wait flag to cifsFileInfo_put() to decide whether we should wait for running/pending oplock break handlers * We keep an additionnal reference of the SMB FileInfo handle so that for the rest of the handler putting the handle won't close it. - The ref is bumped everytime we queue the handler via the cifs_queue_oplock_break() helper. - The ref is decremented at the end of the handler This bug was triggered by xfstest 464. Also important fix to address the various reports of oops in smb2_push_mandatory_locks Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit b98749cac4a695f084a5ff076f4510b23e353ecd upstream.

In the oplock break handler, writing pending changes from pages puts
the FileInfo handle. If the refcount reaches zero it closes the handle
and waits for any oplock break handler to return, thus causing a deadlock.

To prevent this situation:

* We add a wait flag to cifsFileInfo_put() to decide whether we should
  wait for running/pending oplock break handlers

* We keep an additionnal reference of the SMB FileInfo handle so that
  for the rest of the handler putting the handle won't close it.
  - The ref is bumped everytime we queue the handler via the
    cifs_queue_oplock_break() helper.
  - The ref is decremented at the end of the handler

This bug was triggered by xfstest 464.

Also important fix to address the various reports of
oops in smb2_push_mandatory_locks

Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
f2fs: fix to dirty inode for i_mode recovery 2019-04-20T07:16:05+00:00 Chao Yu yuchao0@huawei.com 2019-02-23T01:48:27+00:00 48b0309f85ae819da5bbe992b8769729f39c66c7 [ Upstream commit ca597bddedd94906cd761d8be6a3ad21292725de ] As Seulbae Kim reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202637 We didn't recover permission field correctly after sudden power-cut, the reason is in setattr we didn't add inode into global dirty list once i_mode is changed, so latter checkpoint triggered by fsync will not flush last i_mode into disk, result in this problem, fix it. Reported-by: Seulbae Kim <seulbae@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit ca597bddedd94906cd761d8be6a3ad21292725de ]

As Seulbae Kim reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202637

We didn't recover permission field correctly after sudden power-cut,
the reason is in setattr we didn't add inode into global dirty list
once i_mode is changed, so latter checkpoint triggered by fsync will
not flush last i_mode into disk, result in this problem, fix it.

Reported-by: Seulbae Kim <seulbae@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
cifs: fallback to older infolevels on findfirst queryinfo retry 2019-04-20T07:16:02+00:00 Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com 2018-10-19T06:58:22+00:00 e9603cffb1ca7699b22cec844d4092a7a2e0e416 [ Upstream commit 3b7960caceafdfc2cdfe2850487f8d091eb41144 ] In cases where queryinfo fails, we have cases in cifs (vers=1.0) where with backupuid mounts we retry the query info with findfirst. This doesn't work to some NetApp servers which don't support WindowsXP (and later) infolevel 261 (SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO) so in this case use other info levels (in this case it will usually be level 257, SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO). (Also fixes some indentation) See kernel bugzilla 201435 Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 3b7960caceafdfc2cdfe2850487f8d091eb41144 ]

In cases where queryinfo fails, we have cases in cifs (vers=1.0)
where with backupuid mounts we retry the query info with findfirst.
This doesn't work to some NetApp servers which don't support
WindowsXP (and later) infolevel 261 (SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO)
so in this case use other info levels (in this case it will usually
be level 257, SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO).

(Also fixes some indentation)

See kernel bugzilla 201435

Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
f2fs: cleanup dirty pages if recover failed 2019-04-20T07:16:02+00:00 Sheng Yong shengyong1@huawei.com 2018-10-12T10:49:26+00:00 8722566b7870e1a0d631001c66bc11d590317a38 [ Upstream commit 26b5a079197c8cb6725565968b7fd3299bd1877b ] During recover, we will try to create new dentries for inodes with dentry_mark. But if the parent is missing (e.g. killed by fsck), recover will break. But those recovered dirty pages are not cleanup. This will hit f2fs_bug_on: [ 53.519566] F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint [ 53.539354] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_inode: ino = 5, name = file, inline = 3 [ 53.539402] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_dentry: ino = 5, name = file, dir = 0, err = -2 [ 53.545760] F2FS-fs (loop0): Cannot recover all fsync data errno=-2 [ 53.546105] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:4294967295 [ 53.546171] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1798 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:163 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x26c/0x320 [ 53.546174] Modules linked in: [ 53.546183] CPU: 1 PID: 1798 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #1 [ 53.546186] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 53.546191] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x26c/0x320 [ 53.546195] Code: 85 bb 00 00 00 48 89 df 88 44 24 07 e8 ad a8 db ff 48 8b 3b 44 89 e1 48 c7 c2 40 03 72 a9 48 c7 c6 e0 01 72 a9 e8 84 3c ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 e9 8a 00 00 00 48 8d bf 38 01 00 00 e8 7c a8 [ 53.546201] RSP: 0018:ffff88006c067768 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 53.546208] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880068844200 RCX: ffffffffa83e1a33 [ 53.546211] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88006d51e590 [ 53.546215] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: ffffed000daa3cb3 R09: ffffed000daa3cb3 [ 53.546218] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed000daa3cb2 R12: 00000000ffffffff [ 53.546221] R13: ffff88006a1f8000 R14: 0000000000000200 R15: 0000000000000009 [ 53.546226] FS: 00007fb2f3646840(0000) GS:ffff88006d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 53.546229] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 53.546234] CR2: 00007f0fd77f0008 CR3: 00000000687e6002 CR4: 00000000000206e0 [ 53.546237] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 53.546240] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 53.546242] Call Trace: [ 53.546248] f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x95/0x740 [ 53.546253] read_node_page+0x161/0x1e0 [ 53.546271] ? truncate_node+0x650/0x650 [ 53.546283] ? add_to_page_cache_lru+0x12c/0x170 [ 53.546288] ? pagecache_get_page+0x262/0x2d0 [ 53.546292] __get_node_page+0x200/0x660 [ 53.546302] f2fs_update_inode_page+0x4a/0x160 [ 53.546306] f2fs_write_inode+0x86/0xb0 [ 53.546317] __writeback_single_inode+0x49c/0x620 [ 53.546322] writeback_single_inode+0xe4/0x1e0 [ 53.546326] sync_inode_metadata+0x93/0xd0 [ 53.546330] ? sync_inode+0x10/0x10 [ 53.546342] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xed/0x100 [ 53.546347] f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0xe0/0x130 [ 53.546351] f2fs_fill_super+0x287d/0x2d10 [ 53.546367] ? vsnprintf+0x742/0x7a0 [ 53.546372] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x180/0x180 [ 53.546379] ? up_write+0x20/0x40 [ 53.546385] ? set_blocksize+0x5f/0x140 [ 53.546391] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x180/0x180 [ 53.546402] mount_bdev+0x181/0x200 [ 53.546406] mount_fs+0x94/0x180 [ 53.546411] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0x1e0 [ 53.546415] do_mount+0xe5e/0x1510 [ 53.546420] ? fs_reclaim_release+0x9/0x30 [ 53.546424] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20 [ 53.546428] ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd/0x30 [ 53.546435] ? __might_sleep+0x2c/0xc0 [ 53.546440] ? ___might_sleep+0x53/0x170 [ 53.546453] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0x60 [ 53.546468] ? _copy_from_user+0x95/0xa0 [ 53.546474] ? memdup_user+0x39/0x60 [ 53.546478] ksys_mount+0x88/0xb0 [ 53.546482] __x64_sys_mount+0x5d/0x70 [ 53.546495] do_syscall_64+0x65/0x130 [ 53.546503] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.547639] ---[ end trace b804d1ea2fec893e ]--- So if recover fails, we need to drop all recovered data. Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 26b5a079197c8cb6725565968b7fd3299bd1877b ]

During recover, we will try to create new dentries for inodes with
dentry_mark. But if the parent is missing (e.g. killed by fsck),
recover will break. But those recovered dirty pages are not cleanup.
This will hit f2fs_bug_on:

[   53.519566] F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
[   53.539354] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_inode: ino = 5, name = file, inline = 3
[   53.539402] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_dentry: ino = 5, name = file, dir = 0, err = -2
[   53.545760] F2FS-fs (loop0): Cannot recover all fsync data errno=-2
[   53.546105] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:4294967295
[   53.546171] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1798 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:163 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x26c/0x320
[   53.546174] Modules linked in:
[   53.546183] CPU: 1 PID: 1798 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #1
[   53.546186] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[   53.546191] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x26c/0x320
[   53.546195] Code: 85 bb 00 00 00 48 89 df 88 44 24 07 e8 ad a8 db ff 48 8b 3b 44 89 e1 48 c7 c2 40 03 72 a9 48 c7 c6 e0 01 72 a9 e8 84 3c ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 e9 8a 00 00 00 48 8d bf 38 01 00 00 e8 7c a8
[   53.546201] RSP: 0018:ffff88006c067768 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   53.546208] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880068844200 RCX: ffffffffa83e1a33
[   53.546211] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88006d51e590
[   53.546215] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: ffffed000daa3cb3 R09: ffffed000daa3cb3
[   53.546218] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed000daa3cb2 R12: 00000000ffffffff
[   53.546221] R13: ffff88006a1f8000 R14: 0000000000000200 R15: 0000000000000009
[   53.546226] FS:  00007fb2f3646840(0000) GS:ffff88006d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   53.546229] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   53.546234] CR2: 00007f0fd77f0008 CR3: 00000000687e6002 CR4: 00000000000206e0
[   53.546237] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   53.546240] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   53.546242] Call Trace:
[   53.546248]  f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x95/0x740
[   53.546253]  read_node_page+0x161/0x1e0
[   53.546271]  ? truncate_node+0x650/0x650
[   53.546283]  ? add_to_page_cache_lru+0x12c/0x170
[   53.546288]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x262/0x2d0
[   53.546292]  __get_node_page+0x200/0x660
[   53.546302]  f2fs_update_inode_page+0x4a/0x160
[   53.546306]  f2fs_write_inode+0x86/0xb0
[   53.546317]  __writeback_single_inode+0x49c/0x620
[   53.546322]  writeback_single_inode+0xe4/0x1e0
[   53.546326]  sync_inode_metadata+0x93/0xd0
[   53.546330]  ? sync_inode+0x10/0x10
[   53.546342]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xed/0x100
[   53.546347]  f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0xe0/0x130
[   53.546351]  f2fs_fill_super+0x287d/0x2d10
[   53.546367]  ? vsnprintf+0x742/0x7a0
[   53.546372]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x180/0x180
[   53.546379]  ? up_write+0x20/0x40
[   53.546385]  ? set_blocksize+0x5f/0x140
[   53.546391]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x180/0x180
[   53.546402]  mount_bdev+0x181/0x200
[   53.546406]  mount_fs+0x94/0x180
[   53.546411]  vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0x1e0
[   53.546415]  do_mount+0xe5e/0x1510
[   53.546420]  ? fs_reclaim_release+0x9/0x30
[   53.546424]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[   53.546428]  ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd/0x30
[   53.546435]  ? __might_sleep+0x2c/0xc0
[   53.546440]  ? ___might_sleep+0x53/0x170
[   53.546453]  ? __might_fault+0x4c/0x60
[   53.546468]  ? _copy_from_user+0x95/0xa0
[   53.546474]  ? memdup_user+0x39/0x60
[   53.546478]  ksys_mount+0x88/0xb0
[   53.546482]  __x64_sys_mount+0x5d/0x70
[   53.546495]  do_syscall_64+0x65/0x130
[   53.546503]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   53.547639] ---[ end trace b804d1ea2fec893e ]---

So if recover fails, we need to drop all recovered data.

Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with current segment number 2019-04-20T07:16:00+00:00 Chao Yu yuchao0@huawei.com 2018-09-06T12:34:12+00:00 14b183214c08ba2dcd4fee8017879a1ad6f8f0e6 [ Upstream commit 042be0f849e5fc24116d0afecfaf926eed5cac63 ] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200219 Reproduction way: - mount image - run poc code - umount image F2FS-fs (loop1): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:15364 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/segment.c:2061! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 2 PID: 17686 Comm: umount Tainted: G W O 4.18.0-rc2+ #39 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 EIP: update_sit_entry+0x459/0x4e0 [f2fs] Code: e8 1c b5 fd ff 0f 0b 0f 0b 8b 45 e4 c7 44 24 08 9c 7a 6c f8 c7 44 24 04 bc 4a 6c f8 89 44 24 0c 8b 06 89 04 24 e8 f7 b4 fd ff <0f> 0b 8b 45 e4 0f b6 d2 89 54 24 10 c7 44 24 08 60 7a 6c f8 c7 44 EAX: 00000032 EBX: 000000f8 ECX: 00000002 EDX: 00000001 ESI: d7177000 EDI: f520fe68 EBP: d6477c6c ESP: d6477c34 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010282 CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7fbe000 CR3: 2a99b3c0 CR4: 000406f0 Call Trace: f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x124/0x580 [f2fs] do_write_page+0x78/0x150 [f2fs] f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x25/0xa0 [f2fs] __write_node_page+0x2bf/0x550 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x60e/0x6d0 [f2fs] ? sync_inode_metadata+0x2f/0x40 ? f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x28f/0x7d0 [f2fs] ? up_write+0x1e/0x80 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x2a9/0x7d0 [f2fs] ? mark_held_locks+0x5d/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x50 kill_f2fs_super+0x68/0x90 [f2fs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 task_work_run+0x81/0xa0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x59/0xa7 do_fast_syscall_32+0x1f5/0x22c entry_SYSENTER_32+0x53/0x86 EIP: 0xb7f95c51 Code: c1 1e f7 ff ff 89 e5 8b 55 08 85 d2 8b 81 64 cd ff ff 74 02 89 02 5d c3 8b 0c 24 c3 8b 1c 24 c3 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d 76 00 58 b8 77 00 00 00 cd 80 90 8d 76 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 0871ab90 ECX: bfb2cd00 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 0871ab90 EBP: 0871ab90 ESP: bfb2cd7c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000246 Modules linked in: f2fs(O) crc32_generic bnep rfcomm bluetooth ecdh_generic snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq pcbc joydev aesni_intel snd_seq_device aes_i586 snd_timer crypto_simd snd cryptd soundcore mac_hid serio_raw video i2c_piix4 parport_pc ppdev lp parport hid_generic psmouse usbhid hid e1000 [last unloaded: f2fs] ---[ end trace d423f83982cfcdc5 ]--- The reason is, different log headers using the same segment, once one log's next block address is used by another log, it will cause panic as above. Main area: 24 segs, 24 secs 24 zones - COLD data: 0, 0, 0 - WARM data: 1, 1, 1 - HOT data: 20, 20, 20 - Dir dnode: 22, 22, 22 - File dnode: 22, 22, 22 - Indir nodes: 21, 21, 21 So this patch adds sanity check to detect such condition to avoid this issue. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 042be0f849e5fc24116d0afecfaf926eed5cac63 ]

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200219

Reproduction way:
- mount image
- run poc code
- umount image

F2FS-fs (loop1): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:15364
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/segment.c:2061!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 17686 Comm: umount Tainted: G        W  O      4.18.0-rc2+ #39
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
EIP: update_sit_entry+0x459/0x4e0 [f2fs]
Code: e8 1c b5 fd ff 0f 0b 0f 0b 8b 45 e4 c7 44 24 08 9c 7a 6c f8 c7 44 24 04 bc 4a 6c f8 89 44 24 0c 8b 06 89 04 24 e8 f7 b4 fd ff <0f> 0b 8b 45 e4 0f b6 d2 89 54 24 10 c7 44 24 08 60 7a 6c f8 c7 44
EAX: 00000032 EBX: 000000f8 ECX: 00000002 EDX: 00000001
ESI: d7177000 EDI: f520fe68 EBP: d6477c6c ESP: d6477c34
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010282
CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7fbe000 CR3: 2a99b3c0 CR4: 000406f0
Call Trace:
 f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x124/0x580 [f2fs]
 do_write_page+0x78/0x150 [f2fs]
 f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x25/0xa0 [f2fs]
 __write_node_page+0x2bf/0x550 [f2fs]
 f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x60e/0x6d0 [f2fs]
 ? sync_inode_metadata+0x2f/0x40
 ? f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x28f/0x7d0 [f2fs]
 ? up_write+0x1e/0x80
 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x2a9/0x7d0 [f2fs]
 ? mark_held_locks+0x5d/0x80
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x50
 kill_f2fs_super+0x68/0x90 [f2fs]
 deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70
 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60
 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70
 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20
 task_work_run+0x81/0xa0
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x59/0xa7
 do_fast_syscall_32+0x1f5/0x22c
 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x53/0x86
EIP: 0xb7f95c51
Code: c1 1e f7 ff ff 89 e5 8b 55 08 85 d2 8b 81 64 cd ff ff 74 02 89 02 5d c3 8b 0c 24 c3 8b 1c 24 c3 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d 76 00 58 b8 77 00 00 00 cd 80 90 8d 76
EAX: 00000000 EBX: 0871ab90 ECX: bfb2cd00 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 0871ab90 EBP: 0871ab90 ESP: bfb2cd7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000246
Modules linked in: f2fs(O) crc32_generic bnep rfcomm bluetooth ecdh_generic snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq pcbc joydev aesni_intel snd_seq_device aes_i586 snd_timer crypto_simd snd cryptd soundcore mac_hid serio_raw video i2c_piix4 parport_pc ppdev lp parport hid_generic psmouse usbhid hid e1000 [last unloaded: f2fs]
---[ end trace d423f83982cfcdc5 ]---

The reason is, different log headers using the same segment, once
one log's next block address is used by another log, it will cause
panic as above.

Main area: 24 segs, 24 secs 24 zones
  - COLD  data: 0, 0, 0
  - WARM  data: 1, 1, 1
  - HOT   data: 20, 20, 20
  - Dir   dnode: 22, 22, 22
  - File   dnode: 22, 22, 22
  - Indir nodes: 21, 21, 21

So this patch adds sanity check to detect such condition to avoid
this issue.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
9p locks: add mount option for lock retry interval 2019-04-20T07:16:00+00:00 Dinu-Razvan Chis-Serban justcsdr@gmail.com 2018-09-05T07:44:12+00:00 4369f8a38085347d9cf78fe6261b1296f664132c [ Upstream commit 5e172f75e51e3de1b4274146d9b990f803cb5c2a ] The default P9_LOCK_TIMEOUT can be too long for some users exporting a local file system to a guest VM (30s), make this configurable at mount time. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536295827-3181-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195727 Signed-off-by: Dinu-Razvan Chis-Serban <justcsdr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 5e172f75e51e3de1b4274146d9b990f803cb5c2a ]

The default P9_LOCK_TIMEOUT can be too long for some users exporting
a local file system to a guest VM (30s), make this configurable at
mount time.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536295827-3181-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195727
Signed-off-by: Dinu-Razvan Chis-Serban <justcsdr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>