linux-stable.git/fs, branch v3.2.99

nilfs2: fix race condition that causes file system corruption

2018-02-13T18:32:19+00:00

commit 31ccb1f7ba3cfe29631587d451cf5bb8ab593550 upstream.

There is a race condition between nilfs_dirty_inode() and
nilfs_set_file_dirty().

When a file is opened, nilfs_dirty_inode() is called to update the
access timestamp in the inode. It calls __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() in a
separate transaction. __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() caches the ifile
buffer_head in the i_bh field of the inode info structure and marks it
as dirty.

After some data was written to the file in another transaction, the
function nilfs_set_file_dirty() is called, which adds the inode to the
ns_dirty_files list.

Then the segment construction calls nilfs_segctor_collect_dirty_files(),
which goes through the ns_dirty_files list and checks the i_bh field.
If there is a cached buffer_head in i_bh it is not marked as dirty
again.

Since nilfs_dirty_inode() and nilfs_set_file_dirty() use separate
transactions, it is possible that a segment construction that writes out
the ifile occurs in-between the two. If this happens the inode is not
on the ns_dirty_files list, but its ifile block is still marked as dirty
and written out.

In the next segment construction, the data for the file is written out
and nilfs_bmap_propagate() updates the b-tree. Eventually the bmap root
is written into the i_bh block, which is not dirty, because it was
written out in another segment construction.

As a result the bmap update can be lost, which leads to file system
corruption. Either the virtual block address points to an unallocated
DAT block, or the DAT entry will be reused for something different.

The error can remain undetected for a long time. A typical error
message would be one of the "bad btree" errors or a warning that a DAT
entry could not be found.

This bug can be reproduced reliably by a simple benchmark that creates
and overwrites millions of 4k files.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509367935-3086-2-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rohner
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi
Tested-by: Andreas Rohner
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

autofs: fix careless error in recent commit

2018-02-13T18:32:19+00:00

commit 302ec300ef8a545a7fc7f667e5fd743b091c2eeb upstream.

Commit ecc0c469f277 ("autofs: don't fail mount for transient error") was
meant to replace an 'if' with a 'switch', but instead added the 'switch'
leaving the case in place.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87zi6wstmw.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name
Fixes: ecc0c469f277 ("autofs: don't fail mount for transient error")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown 
Cc: Ian Kent 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: autofs4_write() doesn't take an autofs_sb_info
 pointer]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

autofs: don't fail mount for transient error

2018-02-13T18:32:19+00:00

commit ecc0c469f27765ed1e2b967be0aa17cee1a60b76 upstream.

Currently if the autofs kernel module gets an error when writing to the
pipe which links to the daemon, then it marks the whole moutpoint as
catatonic, and it will stop working.

It is possible that the error is transient.  This can happen if the
daemon is slow and more than 16 requests queue up.  If a subsequent
process tries to queue a request, and is then signalled, the write to
the pipe will return -ERESTARTSYS and autofs will take that as total
failure.

So change the code to assess -ERESTARTSYS and -ENOMEM as transient
failures which only abort the current request, not the whole mountpoint.

It isn't a crash or a data corruption, but having autofs mountpoints
suddenly stop working is rather inconvenient.

Ian said:

: And given the problems with a half dozen (or so) user space applications
: consuming large amounts of CPU under heavy mount and umount activity this
: could happen more easily than we expect.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y3norvgp.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown 
Acked-by: Ian Kent 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: autofs4_write() doesn't take an autofs_sb_info
 pointer]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

autofs4: catatonic_mode vs. notify_daemon race

2018-02-13T18:32:18+00:00

commit 8753333266be67ff3a984ac1f6566d31c260bee4 upstream.

we need to hold ->wq_mutex while we are forming the packet to send,
lest we have autofs4_catatonic_mode() setting wq->name.name to NULL
just as autofs4_notify_daemon() decides to memcpy() from it...

We do have check for catatonic mode immediately after that (under
->wq_mutex, as it ought to be) and packet won't be actually sent,
but it'll be too late for us if we oops on that memcpy() from NULL...

Fix is obvious - just extend the area covered by ->wq_mutex over
that switch and check whether it's catatonic *before* doing anything
else.

Acked-by: Ian Kent 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

autofs4: autofs4_wait() vs. autofs4_catatonic_mode() race

2018-02-13T18:32:18+00:00

commit 4041bcdc7bef06a2fb29c57394c713a74bd13b08 upstream.

We need to recheck ->catatonic after autofs4_wait() got ->wq_mutex
for good, or we might end up with wq inserted into queue after
autofs4_catatonic_mode() had done its thing.  It will stick there
forever, since there won't be anything to clear its ->name.name.

A bit of a complication: validate_request() drops and regains ->wq_mutex.
It actually ends up the most convenient place to stick the check into...

Acked-by: Ian Kent 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

nfs: Fix ugly referral attributes

2018-02-13T18:32:18+00:00

commit c05cefcc72416a37eba5a2b35f0704ed758a9145 upstream.

Before traversing a referral and performing a mount, the mounted-on
directory looks strange:

dr-xr-xr-x. 2 4294967294 4294967294 0 Dec 31  1969 dir.0

nfs4_get_referral is wiping out any cached attributes with what was
returned via GETATTR(fs_locations), but the bit mask for that
operation does not request any file attributes.

Retrieve owner and timestamp information so that the memcpy in
nfs4_get_referral fills in more attributes.

Changes since v1:
- Don't request attributes that the client unconditionally replaces
- Request only MOUNTED_ON_FILEID or FILEID attribute, not both
- encode_fs_locations() doesn't use the third bitmask word

Fixes: 6b97fd3da1ea ("NFSv4: Follow a referral")
Suggested-by: Pradeep Thomas 
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

ocfs2: fix issue that ocfs2_setattr() does not deal with new_i_size==i_size

2018-02-13T18:32:16+00:00

commit d62e74be1270c89fbaf7aada8218bfdf62d00a58 upstream.

The issue scenario is as following:

- Create a small file and fallocate a large disk space for a file with
  FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE option.

- ftruncate the file back to the original size again.  but the disk free
  space is not changed back.  This is a real bug that be fixed in this
  patch.

In order to solve the issue above, we modified ocfs2_setattr(), if
attr->ia_size != i_size_read(inode), It calls ocfs2_truncate_file(), and
truncate disk space to attr->ia_size.

Signed-off-by: Younger Liu 
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu 
Tested-by: Jie Liu 
Cc: Joel Becker 
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh 
Cc: Sunil Mushran 
Reviewed-by: Jensen 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

eCryptfs: use after free in ecryptfs_release_messaging()

2018-02-13T18:32:13+00:00

commit db86be3a12d0b6e5c5b51c2ab2a48f06329cb590 upstream.

We're freeing the list iterator so we should be using the _safe()
version of hlist_for_each_entry().

Fixes: 88b4a07e6610 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter 
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

coda: fix 'kernel memory exposure attempt' in fsync

2018-02-13T18:32:13+00:00

commit d337b66a4c52c7b04eec661d86c2ef6e168965a2 upstream.

When an application called fsync on a file in Coda a small request with
just the file identifier was allocated, but the declared length was set
to the size of union of all possible upcall requests.

This bug has been around for a very long time and is now caught by the
extra checking in usercopy that was introduced in Linux-4.8.

The exposure happens when the Coda cache manager process reads the fsync
upcall request at which point it is killed. As a result there is nobody
servicing any further upcalls, trapping any processes that try to access
the mounted Coda filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

isofs: fix timestamps beyond 2027

2018-02-13T18:32:13+00:00

commit 34be4dbf87fc3e474a842305394534216d428f5d upstream.

isofs uses a 'char' variable to load the number of years since
1900 for an inode timestamp. On architectures that use a signed
char type by default, this results in an invalid date for
anything beyond 2027.

This changes the function argument to a 'u8' array, which
is defined the same way on all architectures, and unambiguously
lets us use years until 2155.

This should be backported to all kernels that might still be
in use by that date.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings