<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v3.16.48</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jann@thejh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-20T23:00:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=229aba441edeec20a66564ee7be8620a56f35bbc'/>
<id>229aba441edeec20a66564ee7be8620a56f35bbc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -&gt; /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Update mm_access() calls in fs/proc/task_{,no}mmu.c too
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -&gt; /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Update mm_access() calls in fs/proc/task_{,no}mmu.c too
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>autofs: sanity check status reported with AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_FAIL</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-23T22:08:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6a09fc112589dac33bef4dea19db71018439b974'/>
<id>6a09fc112589dac33bef4dea19db71018439b974</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9fa4eb8e490a28de40964b1b0e583d8db4c7e57c upstream.

If a positive status is passed with the AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_FAIL ioctl,
autofs4_d_automount() will return

   ERR_PTR(status)

with that status to follow_automount(), which will then dereference an
invalid pointer.

So treat a positive status the same as zero, and map to ENOENT.

See comment in systemd src/core/automount.c::automount_send_ready().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/871sqwczx5.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9fa4eb8e490a28de40964b1b0e583d8db4c7e57c upstream.

If a positive status is passed with the AUTOFS_DEV_IOCTL_FAIL ioctl,
autofs4_d_automount() will return

   ERR_PTR(status)

with that status to follow_automount(), which will then dereference an
invalid pointer.

So treat a positive status the same as zero, and map to ENOENT.

See comment in systemd src/core/automount.c::automount_send_ready().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/871sqwczx5.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CIFS: Improve readdir verbosity</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Shilovsky</name>
<email>pshilov@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-06T23:58:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6ed510ce0888417f3f30d0d9253119597e9460d1'/>
<id>6ed510ce0888417f3f30d0d9253119597e9460d1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dcd87838c06f05ab7650b249ebf0d5b57ae63e1e upstream.

Downgrade the loglevel for SMB2 to prevent filling the log
with messages if e.g. readdir was interrupted. Also make SMB2
and SMB1 codepaths do the same logging during readdir.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dcd87838c06f05ab7650b249ebf0d5b57ae63e1e upstream.

Downgrade the loglevel for SMB2 to prevent filling the log
with messages if e.g. readdir was interrupted. Also make SMB2
and SMB1 codepaths do the same logging during readdir.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;pshilov@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>configfs: Fix race between create_link and configfs_rmdir</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Bellinger</name>
<email>nab@linux-iscsi.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-08T04:51:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=535f293582b6222915f9f963b6ba6efdf0d9d2cc'/>
<id>535f293582b6222915f9f963b6ba6efdf0d9d2cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ba80aa909c99802c428682c352b0ee0baac0acd3 upstream.

This patch closes a long standing race in configfs between
the creation of a new symlink in create_link(), while the
symlink target's config_item is being concurrently removed
via configfs_rmdir().

This can happen because the symlink target's reference
is obtained by config_item_get() in create_link() before
the CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING bit set by configfs_detach_prep()
during configfs_rmdir() shutdown is actually checked..

This originally manifested itself on ppc64 on v4.8.y under
heavy load using ibmvscsi target ports with Novalink API:

[ 7877.289863] rpadlpar_io: slot U8247.22L.212A91A-V1-C8 added
[ 7879.893760] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 7879.893768] WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 17585 at ./include/linux/kref.h:46 config_item_get+0x7c/0x90 [configfs]
[ 7879.893811] CPU: 15 PID: 17585 Comm: targetcli Tainted: G           O 4.8.17-customv2.22 #12
[ 7879.893812] task: c00000018a0d3400 task.stack: c0000001f3b40000
[ 7879.893813] NIP: d000000002c664ec LR: d000000002c60980 CTR: c000000000b70870
[ 7879.893814] REGS: c0000001f3b43810 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G O     (4.8.17-customv2.22)
[ 7879.893815] MSR: 8000000000029033 &lt;SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE&gt;  CR: 28222242  XER: 00000000
[ 7879.893820] CFAR: d000000002c664bc SOFTE: 1
                GPR00: d000000002c60980 c0000001f3b43a90 d000000002c70908 c0000000fbc06820
                GPR04: c0000001ef1bd900 0000000000000004 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
                GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 d000000002c69560 d000000002c66d80
                GPR12: c000000000b70870 c00000000e798700 c0000001f3b43ca0 c0000001d4949d40
                GPR16: c00000014637e1c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000f2392940
                GPR20: c0000001f3b43b98 0000000000000041 0000000000600000 0000000000000000
                GPR24: fffffffffffff000 0000000000000000 d000000002c60be0 c0000001f1dac490
                GPR28: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 c0000001ef1bd900 c0000000f2392940
[ 7879.893839] NIP [d000000002c664ec] config_item_get+0x7c/0x90 [configfs]
[ 7879.893841] LR [d000000002c60980] check_perm+0x80/0x2e0 [configfs]
[ 7879.893842] Call Trace:
[ 7879.893844] [c0000001f3b43ac0] [d000000002c60980] check_perm+0x80/0x2e0 [configfs]
[ 7879.893847] [c0000001f3b43b10] [c000000000329770] do_dentry_open+0x2c0/0x460
[ 7879.893849] [c0000001f3b43b70] [c000000000344480] path_openat+0x210/0x1490
[ 7879.893851] [c0000001f3b43c80] [c00000000034708c] do_filp_open+0xfc/0x170
[ 7879.893853] [c0000001f3b43db0] [c00000000032b5bc] do_sys_open+0x1cc/0x390
[ 7879.893856] [c0000001f3b43e30] [c000000000009584] system_call+0x38/0xec
[ 7879.893856] Instruction dump:
[ 7879.893858] 409d0014 38210030 e8010010 7c0803a6 4e800020 3d220000 e94981e0 892a0000
[ 7879.893861] 2f890000 409effe0 39200001 992a0000 &lt;0fe00000&gt; 4bffffd0 60000000 60000000
[ 7879.893866] ---[ end trace 14078f0b3b5ad0aa ]---

To close this race, go ahead and obtain the symlink's target
config_item reference only after the existing CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING
check succeeds.

This way, if configfs_rmdir() wins create_link() will return -ENONET,
and if create_link() wins configfs_rmdir() will return -EBUSY.

Reported-by: Bryant G. Ly &lt;bryantly@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Bryant G. Ly &lt;bryantly@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger &lt;nab@linux-iscsi.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ba80aa909c99802c428682c352b0ee0baac0acd3 upstream.

This patch closes a long standing race in configfs between
the creation of a new symlink in create_link(), while the
symlink target's config_item is being concurrently removed
via configfs_rmdir().

This can happen because the symlink target's reference
is obtained by config_item_get() in create_link() before
the CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING bit set by configfs_detach_prep()
during configfs_rmdir() shutdown is actually checked..

This originally manifested itself on ppc64 on v4.8.y under
heavy load using ibmvscsi target ports with Novalink API:

[ 7877.289863] rpadlpar_io: slot U8247.22L.212A91A-V1-C8 added
[ 7879.893760] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 7879.893768] WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 17585 at ./include/linux/kref.h:46 config_item_get+0x7c/0x90 [configfs]
[ 7879.893811] CPU: 15 PID: 17585 Comm: targetcli Tainted: G           O 4.8.17-customv2.22 #12
[ 7879.893812] task: c00000018a0d3400 task.stack: c0000001f3b40000
[ 7879.893813] NIP: d000000002c664ec LR: d000000002c60980 CTR: c000000000b70870
[ 7879.893814] REGS: c0000001f3b43810 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G O     (4.8.17-customv2.22)
[ 7879.893815] MSR: 8000000000029033 &lt;SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE&gt;  CR: 28222242  XER: 00000000
[ 7879.893820] CFAR: d000000002c664bc SOFTE: 1
                GPR00: d000000002c60980 c0000001f3b43a90 d000000002c70908 c0000000fbc06820
                GPR04: c0000001ef1bd900 0000000000000004 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
                GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 d000000002c69560 d000000002c66d80
                GPR12: c000000000b70870 c00000000e798700 c0000001f3b43ca0 c0000001d4949d40
                GPR16: c00000014637e1c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000f2392940
                GPR20: c0000001f3b43b98 0000000000000041 0000000000600000 0000000000000000
                GPR24: fffffffffffff000 0000000000000000 d000000002c60be0 c0000001f1dac490
                GPR28: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 c0000001ef1bd900 c0000000f2392940
[ 7879.893839] NIP [d000000002c664ec] config_item_get+0x7c/0x90 [configfs]
[ 7879.893841] LR [d000000002c60980] check_perm+0x80/0x2e0 [configfs]
[ 7879.893842] Call Trace:
[ 7879.893844] [c0000001f3b43ac0] [d000000002c60980] check_perm+0x80/0x2e0 [configfs]
[ 7879.893847] [c0000001f3b43b10] [c000000000329770] do_dentry_open+0x2c0/0x460
[ 7879.893849] [c0000001f3b43b70] [c000000000344480] path_openat+0x210/0x1490
[ 7879.893851] [c0000001f3b43c80] [c00000000034708c] do_filp_open+0xfc/0x170
[ 7879.893853] [c0000001f3b43db0] [c00000000032b5bc] do_sys_open+0x1cc/0x390
[ 7879.893856] [c0000001f3b43e30] [c000000000009584] system_call+0x38/0xec
[ 7879.893856] Instruction dump:
[ 7879.893858] 409d0014 38210030 e8010010 7c0803a6 4e800020 3d220000 e94981e0 892a0000
[ 7879.893861] 2f890000 409effe0 39200001 992a0000 &lt;0fe00000&gt; 4bffffd0 60000000 60000000
[ 7879.893866] ---[ end trace 14078f0b3b5ad0aa ]---

To close this race, go ahead and obtain the symlink's target
config_item reference only after the existing CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING
check succeeds.

This way, if configfs_rmdir() wins create_link() will return -ENONET,
and if create_link() wins configfs_rmdir() will return -EBUSY.

Reported-by: Bryant G. Ly &lt;bryantly@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Bryant G. Ly &lt;bryantly@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger &lt;nab@linux-iscsi.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>excessive checks in ufs_write_failed() and ufs_evict_inode()</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-09T20:20:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f6cf89fcbad1d36bb8a44790ed6b1290d4e9d5dc'/>
<id>f6cf89fcbad1d36bb8a44790ed6b1290d4e9d5dc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit babef37dccbaa49249a22bae9150686815d7be71 upstream.

As it is, short copy in write() to append-only file will fail
to truncate the excessive allocated blocks.  As the matter of
fact, all checks in ufs_truncate_blocks() are either redundant
or wrong for that caller.  As for the only other caller
(ufs_evict_inode()), we only need the file type checks there.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - No functions need to be renamed
 - Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit babef37dccbaa49249a22bae9150686815d7be71 upstream.

As it is, short copy in write() to append-only file will fail
to truncate the excessive allocated blocks.  As the matter of
fact, all checks in ufs_truncate_blocks() are either redundant
or wrong for that caller.  As for the only other caller
(ufs_evict_inode()), we only need the file type checks there.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - No functions need to be renamed
 - Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ufs: set correct -&gt;s_maxsize</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-09T01:15:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bc5d4a865825e979fe71017aa912144dc22ec4a0'/>
<id>bc5d4a865825e979fe71017aa912144dc22ec4a0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6b0d144fa758869bdd652c50aa41aaf601232550 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6b0d144fa758869bdd652c50aa41aaf601232550 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ufs: restore maintaining -&gt;i_blocks</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-09T01:15:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d1dcdb0da3c0c7e58676cb17586de05dd34f86d8'/>
<id>d1dcdb0da3c0c7e58676cb17586de05dd34f86d8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eb315d2ae614493fd1ebb026c75a80573d84f7ad upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: open-code i_blocksize()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
commit eb315d2ae614493fd1ebb026c75a80573d84f7ad upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: open-code i_blocksize()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix ufs_isblockset()</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-08T22:15:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bc76f8cd2a57bf7e859689cbf0badf15f7bf4a9a'/>
<id>bc76f8cd2a57bf7e859689cbf0badf15f7bf4a9a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 414cf7186dbec29bd946c138d6b5c09da5955a08 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 414cf7186dbec29bd946c138d6b5c09da5955a08 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/ufs: Set UFS default maximum bytes per file</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:29:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Narron</name>
<email>comet.berkeley@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-04T23:23:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=679038c242e15c56f23dad6c4f25299a8fae1c29'/>
<id>679038c242e15c56f23dad6c4f25299a8fae1c29</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 239e250e4acbc0104d514307029c0839e834a51a upstream.

This fixes a problem with reading files larger than 2GB from a UFS-2
file system:

    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195721

The incorrect UFS s_maxsize limit became a problem as of commit
c2a9737f45e2 ("vfs,mm: fix a dead loop in truncate_inode_pages_range()")
which started using s_maxbytes to avoid a page index overflow in
do_generic_file_read().

That caused files to be truncated on UFS-2 file systems because the
default maximum file size is 2GB (MAX_NON_LFS) and UFS didn't update it.

Here I simply increase the default to a common value used by other file
systems.

Signed-off-by: Richard Narron &lt;comet.berkeley@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Will B &lt;will.brokenbourgh2877@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 239e250e4acbc0104d514307029c0839e834a51a upstream.

This fixes a problem with reading files larger than 2GB from a UFS-2
file system:

    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195721

The incorrect UFS s_maxsize limit became a problem as of commit
c2a9737f45e2 ("vfs,mm: fix a dead loop in truncate_inode_pages_range()")
which started using s_maxbytes to avoid a page index overflow in
do_generic_file_read().

That caused files to be truncated on UFS-2 file systems because the
default maximum file size is 2GB (MAX_NON_LFS) and UFS didn't update it.

Here I simply increase the default to a common value used by other file
systems.

Signed-off-by: Richard Narron &lt;comet.berkeley@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Will B &lt;will.brokenbourgh2877@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix memory leak in update_space_info failure path</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:29:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Mahoney</name>
<email>jeffm@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-17T13:49:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=77bbe50de0f0e41673aea90195b8e538ab128cd1'/>
<id>77bbe50de0f0e41673aea90195b8e538ab128cd1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 896533a7da929136d0432713f02a3edffece2826 upstream.

If we fail to add the space_info kobject, we'll leak the memory
for the percpu counter.

Fixes: 6ab0a2029c (btrfs: publish allocation data in sysfs)
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney &lt;jeffm@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo &lt;bo.li.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 896533a7da929136d0432713f02a3edffece2826 upstream.

If we fail to add the space_info kobject, we'll leak the memory
for the percpu counter.

Fixes: 6ab0a2029c (btrfs: publish allocation data in sysfs)
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney &lt;jeffm@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo &lt;bo.li.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
