<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/udf, branch v7.1.4</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:55:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bryam Vargas</name>
<email>hexlabsecurity@proton.me</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-12T06:40:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7f7774b9da0ef17b87bfa238cf966ad0b3376150'/>
<id>7f7774b9da0ef17b87bfa238cf966ad0b3376150</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3ec997bd5508e9b25210b5bbec89031629cdb093 upstream.

udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when

	sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st-&gt;reallocationTableLen) &gt; sb-&gt;s_blocksize

is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that
must fit in the block.  But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte
sparingEntry elements:

	for (i = 0; i &lt; le16_to_cpu(st-&gt;reallocationTableLen); i++) {
		struct sparingEntry *entry = &amp;st-&gt;mapEntry[i];
		... entry-&gt;origLocation ...
	}

in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks().  A
reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever
sizeof(*st) + N &lt;= blocksize, yet the consumers index
sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the
block.  On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in
udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the
same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the
block, and its memmove() through st-&gt;mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds
write.

Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with
struct_size().

Fixes: 1df2ae31c724 ("udf: Fortify loading of sparing table")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-91780c4e-v1-1-f15112ff6882@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3ec997bd5508e9b25210b5bbec89031629cdb093 upstream.

udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when

	sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st-&gt;reallocationTableLen) &gt; sb-&gt;s_blocksize

is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that
must fit in the block.  But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte
sparingEntry elements:

	for (i = 0; i &lt; le16_to_cpu(st-&gt;reallocationTableLen); i++) {
		struct sparingEntry *entry = &amp;st-&gt;mapEntry[i];
		... entry-&gt;origLocation ...
	}

in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks().  A
reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever
sizeof(*st) + N &lt;= blocksize, yet the consumers index
sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the
block.  On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in
udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the
same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the
block, and its memmove() through st-&gt;mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds
write.

Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with
struct_size().

Fixes: 1df2ae31c724 ("udf: Fortify loading of sparing table")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-91780c4e-v1-1-f15112ff6882@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:55:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bryam Vargas</name>
<email>hexlabsecurity@proton.me</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-12T07:53:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74580fdf022909e184223cacc364feb826982d96'/>
<id>74580fdf022909e184223cacc364feb826982d96</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d8202786b3d75125c84ebc4de6d946f92fde0ee8 upstream.

udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from
the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode
size:

	map-&gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
		le16_to_cpu(vat20-&gt;lengthHeader);
	map-&gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
		(sbi-&gt;s_vat_inode-&gt;i_size -
			map-&gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) &gt;&gt; 2;

lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value.  If it exceeds
the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge
count, which defeats the "block &gt; s_num_entries" bound in
udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads

	((__le32 *)(iinfo-&gt;i_data + s_start_offset))[block]

so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data.  Mounting
a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an
out-of-bounds read.

Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one
entry within the VAT inode.

Fixes: fa5e08156335 ("udf: Handle VAT packed inside inode properly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-9a2317ee-v1-1-fefef5736154@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d8202786b3d75125c84ebc4de6d946f92fde0ee8 upstream.

udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from
the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode
size:

	map-&gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
		le16_to_cpu(vat20-&gt;lengthHeader);
	map-&gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
		(sbi-&gt;s_vat_inode-&gt;i_size -
			map-&gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) &gt;&gt; 2;

lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value.  If it exceeds
the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge
count, which defeats the "block &gt; s_num_entries" bound in
udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads

	((__le32 *)(iinfo-&gt;i_data + s_start_offset))[block]

so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data.  Mounting
a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an
out-of-bounds read.

Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one
entry within the VAT inode.

Fixes: fa5e08156335 ("udf: Handle VAT packed inside inode properly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-9a2317ee-v1-1-fefef5736154@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: validate free block extents against the partition length</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:55:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-15T14:23:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=be87de7789a82a030a4896bc7683415ec9fa6f2b'/>
<id>be87de7789a82a030a4896bc7683415ec9fa6f2b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5f0419457f89dce1a3f1c8e62a3adf2f39ab8168 upstream.

udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the
partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound.  A
crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count
points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap
array.

A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably
panics the kernel.  This is a local availability issue.  On desktop
systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable
UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply
the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable
file on it.  Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the
image have a higher prerequisite.

No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced
primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by
a kernel panic.

Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the
partition length check.  Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an
out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted
callers cannot walk past the flexible array.

Fixes: 56e69e59751d ("udf: prevent integer overflow in udf_bitmap_free_blocks()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515142327.1120767-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5f0419457f89dce1a3f1c8e62a3adf2f39ab8168 upstream.

udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the
partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound.  A
crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count
points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap
array.

A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably
panics the kernel.  This is a local availability issue.  On desktop
systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable
UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply
the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable
file on it.  Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the
image have a higher prerequisite.

No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced
primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by
a kernel panic.

Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the
partition length check.  Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an
out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted
callers cannot walk past the flexible array.

Fixes: 56e69e59751d ("udf: prevent integer overflow in udf_bitmap_free_blocks()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515142327.1120767-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: reject descriptors with oversized CRC length</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T15:14:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-13T21:12:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=55d41b0a20128e86b9e960dd2e3f0a2d69a18df7'/>
<id>55d41b0a20128e86b9e960dd2e3f0a2d69a18df7</id>
<content type='text'>
udf_read_tagged() skips CRC verification when descCRCLength +
sizeof(struct tag) exceeds the block size.  A crafted UDF image can
set descCRCLength to an oversized value to bypass CRC validation
entirely; the descriptor is then accepted based solely on the 8-bit
tag checksum, which is trivially recomputable.

Reject such descriptors instead of silently accepting them.  A
legitimate single-block descriptor should never have a CRC length that
exceeds the block.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413211240.853662-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
udf_read_tagged() skips CRC verification when descCRCLength +
sizeof(struct tag) exceeds the block size.  A crafted UDF image can
set descCRCLength to an oversized value to bypass CRC validation
entirely; the descriptor is then accepted based solely on the 8-bit
tag checksum, which is trivially recomputable.

Reject such descriptors instead of silently accepting them.  A
legitimate single-block descriptor should never have a CRC length that
exceeds the block.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413211240.853662-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'fs_for_v7.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2026-04-16T02:22:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-16T02:22:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5414f3fd54b3a3f7f63f3edd276fb55281ecbe3b'/>
<id>5414f3fd54b3a3f7f63f3edd276fb55281ecbe3b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull ext2, udf, quota updates from Jan Kara:

 - A fix for a race in quota code that can expose ocfs2 to
   use-after-free issues

 - UDF fix to avoid memory corruption in face of corrupted format

 - Couple of ext2 fixes for better handling of fs corruption

 - Some more various code cleanups in UDF &amp; ext2

* tag 'fs_for_v7.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  ext2: reject inodes with zero i_nlink and valid mode in ext2_iget()
  ext2: use get_random_u32() where appropriate
  quota: Fix race of dquot_scan_active() with quota deactivation
  udf: fix partition descriptor append bookkeeping
  ext2: avoid drop_nlink() during unlink of zero-nlink inode in ext2_unlink()
  ext2: guard reservation window dump with EXT2FS_DEBUG
  ext2: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON_ONCE in ext2_get_blocks
  ext2: remove stale TODO about kmap
  fs: udf: avoid assignment in condition when selecting allocation goal
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull ext2, udf, quota updates from Jan Kara:

 - A fix for a race in quota code that can expose ocfs2 to
   use-after-free issues

 - UDF fix to avoid memory corruption in face of corrupted format

 - Couple of ext2 fixes for better handling of fs corruption

 - Some more various code cleanups in UDF &amp; ext2

* tag 'fs_for_v7.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  ext2: reject inodes with zero i_nlink and valid mode in ext2_iget()
  ext2: use get_random_u32() where appropriate
  quota: Fix race of dquot_scan_active() with quota deactivation
  udf: fix partition descriptor append bookkeeping
  ext2: avoid drop_nlink() during unlink of zero-nlink inode in ext2_unlink()
  ext2: guard reservation window dump with EXT2FS_DEBUG
  ext2: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON_ONCE in ext2_get_blocks
  ext2: remove stale TODO about kmap
  fs: udf: avoid assignment in condition when selecting allocation goal
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'vfs-7.1-rc1.bh.metadata' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
<updated>2026-04-13T19:46:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-13T19:46:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fc825e513cd494cfcbeb47acf5738fe64f3a9051'/>
<id>fc825e513cd494cfcbeb47acf5738fe64f3a9051</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs buffer_head updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This cleans up the mess that has accumulated over the years in
  metadata buffer_head tracking for inodes.

  It moves the tracking into dedicated structure in filesystem-private
  part of the inode (so that we don't use private_list, private_data,
  and private_lock in struct address_space), and also moves couple other
  users of private_data and private_list so these are removed from
  struct address_space saving 3 longs in struct inode for 99% of inodes"

* tag 'vfs-7.1-rc1.bh.metadata' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (42 commits)
  fs: Drop i_private_list from address_space
  fs: Drop mapping_metadata_bhs from address space
  ext4: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  minix: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  udf: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  fat: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  bfs: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  affs: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  ext2: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  fs: Provide functions for handling mapping_metadata_bhs directly
  fs: Switch inode_has_buffers() to take mapping_metadata_bhs
  fs: Make bhs point to mapping_metadata_bhs
  fs: Move metadata bhs tracking to a separate struct
  fs: Fold fsync_buffers_list() into sync_mapping_buffers()
  fs: Drop osync_buffers_list()
  kvm: Use private inode list instead of i_private_list
  fs: Remove i_private_data
  aio: Stop using i_private_data and i_private_lock
  hugetlbfs: Stop using i_private_data
  fs: Stop using i_private_data for metadata bh tracking
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs buffer_head updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This cleans up the mess that has accumulated over the years in
  metadata buffer_head tracking for inodes.

  It moves the tracking into dedicated structure in filesystem-private
  part of the inode (so that we don't use private_list, private_data,
  and private_lock in struct address_space), and also moves couple other
  users of private_data and private_list so these are removed from
  struct address_space saving 3 longs in struct inode for 99% of inodes"

* tag 'vfs-7.1-rc1.bh.metadata' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (42 commits)
  fs: Drop i_private_list from address_space
  fs: Drop mapping_metadata_bhs from address space
  ext4: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  minix: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  udf: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  fat: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  bfs: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  affs: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  ext2: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part
  fs: Provide functions for handling mapping_metadata_bhs directly
  fs: Switch inode_has_buffers() to take mapping_metadata_bhs
  fs: Make bhs point to mapping_metadata_bhs
  fs: Move metadata bhs tracking to a separate struct
  fs: Fold fsync_buffers_list() into sync_mapping_buffers()
  fs: Drop osync_buffers_list()
  kvm: Use private inode list instead of i_private_list
  fs: Remove i_private_data
  aio: Stop using i_private_data and i_private_lock
  hugetlbfs: Stop using i_private_data
  fs: Stop using i_private_data for metadata bh tracking
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'vfs-7.1-rc1.kino' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
<updated>2026-04-13T19:19:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-13T19:19:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b7d74ea0fdaa8d641fe6f18507c5f0d21b652d53'/>
<id>b7d74ea0fdaa8d641fe6f18507c5f0d21b652d53</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs i_ino updates from Christian Brauner:
 "For historical reasons, the inode-&gt;i_ino field is an unsigned long,
  which means that it's 32 bits on 32 bit architectures. This has caused
  a number of filesystems to implement hacks to hash a 64-bit identifier
  into a 32-bit field, and deprives us of a universal identifier field
  for an inode.

  This changes the inode-&gt;i_ino field from an unsigned long to a u64.
  This shouldn't make any material difference on 64-bit hosts, but
  32-bit hosts will see struct inode grow by at least 4 bytes. This
  could have effects on slabcache sizes and field alignment.

  The bulk of the changes are to format strings and tracepoints, since
  the kernel itself doesn't care that much about the i_ino field. The
  first patch changes some vfs function arguments, so check that one out
  carefully.

  With this change, we may be able to shrink some inode structures. For
  instance, struct nfs_inode has a fileid field that holds the 64-bit
  inode number. With this set of changes, that field could be
  eliminated. I'd rather leave that sort of cleanups for later just to
  keep this simple"

* tag 'vfs-7.1-rc1.kino' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  nilfs2: fix 64-bit division operations in nilfs_bmap_find_target_in_group()
  EVM: add comment describing why ino field is still unsigned long
  vfs: remove externs from fs.h on functions modified by i_ino widening
  treewide: fix missed i_ino format specifier conversions
  ext4: fix signed format specifier in ext4_load_inode trace event
  treewide: change inode-&gt;i_ino from unsigned long to u64
  nilfs2: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  f2fs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  ext4: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  zonefs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  hugetlbfs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  ext2: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  cachefiles: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  vfs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  net: change sock.sk_ino and sock_i_ino() to u64
  audit: widen ino fields to u64
  vfs: widen inode hash/lookup functions to u64
</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs i_ino updates from Christian Brauner:
 "For historical reasons, the inode-&gt;i_ino field is an unsigned long,
  which means that it's 32 bits on 32 bit architectures. This has caused
  a number of filesystems to implement hacks to hash a 64-bit identifier
  into a 32-bit field, and deprives us of a universal identifier field
  for an inode.

  This changes the inode-&gt;i_ino field from an unsigned long to a u64.
  This shouldn't make any material difference on 64-bit hosts, but
  32-bit hosts will see struct inode grow by at least 4 bytes. This
  could have effects on slabcache sizes and field alignment.

  The bulk of the changes are to format strings and tracepoints, since
  the kernel itself doesn't care that much about the i_ino field. The
  first patch changes some vfs function arguments, so check that one out
  carefully.

  With this change, we may be able to shrink some inode structures. For
  instance, struct nfs_inode has a fileid field that holds the 64-bit
  inode number. With this set of changes, that field could be
  eliminated. I'd rather leave that sort of cleanups for later just to
  keep this simple"

* tag 'vfs-7.1-rc1.kino' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  nilfs2: fix 64-bit division operations in nilfs_bmap_find_target_in_group()
  EVM: add comment describing why ino field is still unsigned long
  vfs: remove externs from fs.h on functions modified by i_ino widening
  treewide: fix missed i_ino format specifier conversions
  ext4: fix signed format specifier in ext4_load_inode trace event
  treewide: change inode-&gt;i_ino from unsigned long to u64
  nilfs2: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  f2fs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  ext4: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  zonefs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  hugetlbfs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  ext2: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  cachefiles: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  vfs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
  net: change sock.sk_ino and sock_i_ino() to u64
  audit: widen ino fields to u64
  vfs: widen inode hash/lookup functions to u64
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Fix race between file type conversion and writeback</title>
<updated>2026-03-27T16:01:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-26T14:06:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=102e57d56f81fa5c5ed78f576101d1bf1b3e6fe2'/>
<id>102e57d56f81fa5c5ed78f576101d1bf1b3e6fe2</id>
<content type='text'>
udf_setsize() can race with udf_writepages() as follows:

udf_setsize()			udf_writepages()
				  if (iinfo-&gt;i_alloc_type ==
						ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
  err = udf_expand_file_adinicb(inode);
  err = udf_extend_file(inode, newsize);
				    udf_adinicb_writepages()
				      memcpy_from_file_folio() - crash
					because inode size is too big.

Fix the problem by checking the file type under folio lock in
udf_handle_page_wb() handler called from __mpage_writepages() which
properly serializes with udf_expand_file_adinicb().

Reported-by: Jianzhou Zhao &lt;luckd0g@163.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/f622c01.67ac.19cdbdd777d.Coremail.luckd0g@163.com
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326140635.15895-4-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
udf_setsize() can race with udf_writepages() as follows:

udf_setsize()			udf_writepages()
				  if (iinfo-&gt;i_alloc_type ==
						ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
  err = udf_expand_file_adinicb(inode);
  err = udf_extend_file(inode, newsize);
				    udf_adinicb_writepages()
				      memcpy_from_file_folio() - crash
					because inode size is too big.

Fix the problem by checking the file type under folio lock in
udf_handle_page_wb() handler called from __mpage_writepages() which
properly serializes with udf_expand_file_adinicb().

Reported-by: Jianzhou Zhao &lt;luckd0g@163.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/f622c01.67ac.19cdbdd777d.Coremail.luckd0g@163.com
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326140635.15895-4-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Track metadata bhs in fs-private inode part</title>
<updated>2026-03-26T14:03:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-26T09:54:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d0874a580a4b6409b5a78edc9472732b2c1f4cda'/>
<id>d0874a580a4b6409b5a78edc9472732b2c1f4cda</id>
<content type='text'>
Track metadata bhs for an inode in fs-private part of the inode.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326095354.16340-80-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Track metadata bhs for an inode in fs-private part of the inode.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326095354.16340-80-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Sync and invalidate metadata buffers from udf_evict_inode()</title>
<updated>2026-03-26T14:03:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-26T09:54:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=153e5960450a4303ace8f01f5c77f2ff5f38ba32'/>
<id>153e5960450a4303ace8f01f5c77f2ff5f38ba32</id>
<content type='text'>
There are only very few filesystems using generic metadata buffer head
tracking and everybody is paying the overhead. When we remove this
tracking for inode reclaim code .evict will start to see inodes with
metadata buffers attached so write them out and prune them.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326095354.16340-58-jack@suse.cz
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are only very few filesystems using generic metadata buffer head
tracking and everybody is paying the overhead. When we remove this
tracking for inode reclaim code .evict will start to see inodes with
metadata buffers attached so write them out and prune them.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326095354.16340-58-jack@suse.cz
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
