<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/udf, branch v3.2.97</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>udf: Fix deadlock between writeback and udf_setsize()</title>
<updated>2017-10-12T14:27:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-13T14:20:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=af64015b4f713ad1d63761c3d5c0f1e486677a72'/>
<id>af64015b4f713ad1d63761c3d5c0f1e486677a72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f2e95355891153f66d4156bf3a142c6489cd78c6 upstream.

udf_setsize() called truncate_setsize() with i_data_sem held. Thus
truncate_pagecache() called from truncate_setsize() could lock a page
under i_data_sem which can deadlock as page lock ranks below
i_data_sem - e. g. writeback can hold page lock and try to acquire
i_data_sem to map a block.

Fix the problem by moving truncate_setsize() calls from under
i_data_sem. It is safe for us to change i_size without holding
i_data_sem as all the places that depend on i_size being stable already
hold inode_lock.

Fixes: 7e49b6f2480cb9a9e7322a91592e56a5c85361f5
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f2e95355891153f66d4156bf3a142c6489cd78c6 upstream.

udf_setsize() called truncate_setsize() with i_data_sem held. Thus
truncate_pagecache() called from truncate_setsize() could lock a page
under i_data_sem which can deadlock as page lock ranks below
i_data_sem - e. g. writeback can hold page lock and try to acquire
i_data_sem to map a block.

Fix the problem by moving truncate_setsize() calls from under
i_data_sem. It is safe for us to change i_size without holding
i_data_sem as all the places that depend on i_size being stable already
hold inode_lock.

Fixes: 7e49b6f2480cb9a9e7322a91592e56a5c85361f5
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Fix races with i_size changes during readpage</title>
<updated>2017-10-12T14:27:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-13T13:54:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d18777048c7596577023f9ff3ea5dd8e9ff81f7d'/>
<id>d18777048c7596577023f9ff3ea5dd8e9ff81f7d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9795e0e8ac0d6a3ee092f1b555b284b57feef99e upstream.

__udf_adinicb_readpage() uses i_size several times. When truncate
changes i_size while the function is running, it can observe several
different values and thus e.g. expose uninitialized parts of page to
userspace. Also use i_size_read() in the function since it does not hold
inode_lock. Since i_size is guaranteed to be small, this cannot really
cause any issues even on 32-bit archs but let's be careful.

Fixes: 9c2fc0de1a6e638fe58c354a463f544f42a90a09
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9795e0e8ac0d6a3ee092f1b555b284b57feef99e upstream.

__udf_adinicb_readpage() uses i_size several times. When truncate
changes i_size while the function is running, it can observe several
different values and thus e.g. expose uninitialized parts of page to
userspace. Also use i_size_read() in the function since it does not hold
inode_lock. Since i_size is guaranteed to be small, this cannot really
cause any issues even on 32-bit archs but let's be careful.

Fixes: 9c2fc0de1a6e638fe58c354a463f544f42a90a09
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inode</title>
<updated>2016-11-20T01:01:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-26T14:55:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=44b25c3e25af81daebf188ba1bc94b123ea40138'/>
<id>44b25c3e25af81daebf188ba1bc94b123ea40138</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 31051c85b5e2aaaf6315f74c72a732673632a905 upstream.

inode_change_ok() will be resposible for clearing capabilities and IMA
extended attributes and as such will need dentry. Give it as an argument
to inode_change_ok() instead of an inode. Also rename inode_change_ok()
to setattr_prepare() to better relect that it does also some
modifications in addition to checks.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Drop changes to f2fs, lustre, orangefs, overlayfs
 - Adjust filenames, context
 - In nfsd, pass dentry to nfsd_sanitize_attrs()
 - In xfs, pass dentry to xfs_change_file_space(), xfs_set_mode(),
   xfs_setattr_nonsize(), and xfs_setattr_size()
 - Update ext3 as well
 - Mark pohmelfs as BROKEN; it's long dead upstream]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 31051c85b5e2aaaf6315f74c72a732673632a905 upstream.

inode_change_ok() will be resposible for clearing capabilities and IMA
extended attributes and as such will need dentry. Give it as an argument
to inode_change_ok() instead of an inode. Also rename inode_change_ok()
to setattr_prepare() to better relect that it does also some
modifications in addition to checks.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Drop changes to f2fs, lustre, orangefs, overlayfs
 - Adjust filenames, context
 - In nfsd, pass dentry to nfsd_sanitize_attrs()
 - In xfs, pass dentry to xfs_change_file_space(), xfs_set_mode(),
   xfs_setattr_nonsize(), and xfs_setattr_size()
 - Update ext3 as well
 - Mark pohmelfs as BROKEN; it's long dead upstream]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Check output buffer length when converting name to CS0</title>
<updated>2016-02-13T10:34:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Gabbasov</name>
<email>andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-24T16:25:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=92d909411afd8783bd70ea910bad5cdc0110aac2'/>
<id>92d909411afd8783bd70ea910bad5cdc0110aac2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bb00c898ad1ce40c4bb422a8207ae562e9aea7ae upstream.

If a name contains at least some characters with Unicode values
exceeding single byte, the CS0 output should have 2 bytes per character.
And if other input characters have single byte Unicode values, then
the single input byte is converted to 2 output bytes, and the length
of output becomes larger than the length of input. And if the input
name is long enough, the output length may exceed the allocated buffer
length.

All this means that conversion from UTF8 or NLS to CS0 requires
checking of output length in order to stop when it exceeds the given
output buffer size.

[JK: Make code return -ENAMETOOLONG instead of silently truncating the
name]

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov &lt;andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bb00c898ad1ce40c4bb422a8207ae562e9aea7ae upstream.

If a name contains at least some characters with Unicode values
exceeding single byte, the CS0 output should have 2 bytes per character.
And if other input characters have single byte Unicode values, then
the single input byte is converted to 2 output bytes, and the length
of output becomes larger than the length of input. And if the input
name is long enough, the output length may exceed the allocated buffer
length.

All this means that conversion from UTF8 or NLS to CS0 requires
checking of output length in order to stop when it exceeds the given
output buffer size.

[JK: Make code return -ENAMETOOLONG instead of silently truncating the
name]

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov &lt;andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Prevent buffer overrun with multi-byte characters</title>
<updated>2016-02-13T10:34:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Gabbasov</name>
<email>andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-24T16:25:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dba4f816e8204bfc3de568ba386cb72178c55715'/>
<id>dba4f816e8204bfc3de568ba386cb72178c55715</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ad402b265ecf6fa22d04043b41444cdfcdf4f52d upstream.

udf_CS0toUTF8 function stops the conversion when the output buffer
length reaches UDF_NAME_LEN-2, which is correct maximum name length,
but, when checking, it leaves the space for a single byte only,
while multi-bytes output characters can take more space, causing
buffer overflow.

Similar error exists in udf_CS0toNLS function, that restricts
the output length to UDF_NAME_LEN, while actual maximum allowed
length is UDF_NAME_LEN-2.

In these cases the output can override not only the current buffer
length field, causing corruption of the name buffer itself, but also
following allocation structures, causing kernel crash.

Adjust the output length checks in both functions to prevent buffer
overruns in case of multi-bytes UTF8 or NLS characters.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov &lt;andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ad402b265ecf6fa22d04043b41444cdfcdf4f52d upstream.

udf_CS0toUTF8 function stops the conversion when the output buffer
length reaches UDF_NAME_LEN-2, which is correct maximum name length,
but, when checking, it leaves the space for a single byte only,
while multi-bytes output characters can take more space, causing
buffer overflow.

Similar error exists in udf_CS0toNLS function, that restricts
the output length to UDF_NAME_LEN, while actual maximum allowed
length is UDF_NAME_LEN-2.

In these cases the output can override not only the current buffer
length field, causing corruption of the name buffer itself, but also
following allocation structures, causing kernel crash.

Adjust the output length checks in both functions to prevent buffer
overruns in case of multi-bytes UTF8 or NLS characters.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov &lt;andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: limit the maximum number of indirect extents in a row</title>
<updated>2016-02-13T10:34:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vegard Nossum</name>
<email>vegard.nossum@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-11T14:54:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ef16fa90c41f032db95b7aae74e4a6ad21a283e9'/>
<id>ef16fa90c41f032db95b7aae74e4a6ad21a283e9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b0918d9f476a8434b055e362b83fa4fd1d462c3f upstream.

udf_next_aext() just follows extent pointers while extents are marked as
indirect. This can loop forever for corrupted filesystem. Limit number
the of indirect extents we are willing to follow in a row.

[JK: Updated changelog, limit, style]

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b0918d9f476a8434b055e362b83fa4fd1d462c3f upstream.

udf_next_aext() just follows extent pointers while extents are marked as
indirect. This can loop forever for corrupted filesystem. Limit number
the of indirect extents we are willing to follow in a row.

[JK: Updated changelog, limit, style]

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors</title>
<updated>2015-05-09T22:16:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-07T12:49:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=925cab7b6a683f791644dfde345f91e87017a023'/>
<id>925cab7b6a683f791644dfde345f91e87017a023</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0 upstream.

Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when
loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse
the code and make the kernel oops.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@ping.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: use make_bad_inode() instead of returning error]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0 upstream.

Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when
loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse
the code and make the kernel oops.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@ping.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: use make_bad_inode() instead of returning error]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Remove repeated loads blocksize</title>
<updated>2015-05-09T22:16:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-07T12:46:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a59b6bc4189afa74f2b69c83650241eb6caba569'/>
<id>a59b6bc4189afa74f2b69c83650241eb6caba569</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79144954278d4bb5989f8b903adcac7a20ff2a5a upstream.

Store blocksize in a local variable in udf_fill_inode() since it is used
a lot of times.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Needed for the following fix. Backported to 3.16: adjust context.]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 79144954278d4bb5989f8b903adcac7a20ff2a5a upstream.

Store blocksize in a local variable in udf_fill_inode() since it is used
a lot of times.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Needed for the following fix. Backported to 3.16: adjust context.]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Check component length before reading it</title>
<updated>2015-02-20T00:49:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-19T13:27:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1e21fa3ab68b261aa6086c49567963f6f3ad87b9'/>
<id>1e21fa3ab68b261aa6086c49567963f6f3ad87b9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e237ec37ec154564f8690c5bd1795339955eeef9 upstream.

Check that length specified in a component of a symlink fits in the
input buffer we are reading. Also properly ignore component length for
component types that do not use it. Otherwise we read memory after end
of buffer for corrupted udf image.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@ping.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e237ec37ec154564f8690c5bd1795339955eeef9 upstream.

Check that length specified in a component of a symlink fits in the
input buffer we are reading. Also properly ignore component length for
component types that do not use it. Otherwise we read memory after end
of buffer for corrupted udf image.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@ping.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Check path length when reading symlink</title>
<updated>2015-02-20T00:49:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-18T21:37:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fbdbac7bd9def21be7ac4e680c25d880661c10d9'/>
<id>fbdbac7bd9def21be7ac4e680c25d880661c10d9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0e5cc9a40ada6046e6bc3bdfcd0c0d7e4b706b14 upstream.

Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@ping.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0e5cc9a40ada6046e6bc3bdfcd0c0d7e4b706b14 upstream.

Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@ping.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
