<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/udf, branch v3.14.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>udf: Check output buffer length when converting name to CS0</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T19:58:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Gabbasov</name>
<email>andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-24T16:25:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e69363be78149c40df4b19f3c98c560886c070d6'/>
<id>e69363be78149c40df4b19f3c98c560886c070d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bb00c898ad1ce40c4bb422a8207ae562e9aea7ae upstream.

If a name contains at least some characters with Unicode values
exceeding single byte, the CS0 output should have 2 bytes per character.
And if other input characters have single byte Unicode values, then
the single input byte is converted to 2 output bytes, and the length
of output becomes larger than the length of input. And if the input
name is long enough, the output length may exceed the allocated buffer
length.

All this means that conversion from UTF8 or NLS to CS0 requires
checking of output length in order to stop when it exceeds the given
output buffer size.

[JK: Make code return -ENAMETOOLONG instead of silently truncating the
name]

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov &lt;andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bb00c898ad1ce40c4bb422a8207ae562e9aea7ae upstream.

If a name contains at least some characters with Unicode values
exceeding single byte, the CS0 output should have 2 bytes per character.
And if other input characters have single byte Unicode values, then
the single input byte is converted to 2 output bytes, and the length
of output becomes larger than the length of input. And if the input
name is long enough, the output length may exceed the allocated buffer
length.

All this means that conversion from UTF8 or NLS to CS0 requires
checking of output length in order to stop when it exceeds the given
output buffer size.

[JK: Make code return -ENAMETOOLONG instead of silently truncating the
name]

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov &lt;andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Prevent buffer overrun with multi-byte characters</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T19:58:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Gabbasov</name>
<email>andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-24T16:25:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5ef56b6e0e28a5c97d5b6e3eb4f991148cdf81fc'/>
<id>5ef56b6e0e28a5c97d5b6e3eb4f991148cdf81fc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ad402b265ecf6fa22d04043b41444cdfcdf4f52d upstream.

udf_CS0toUTF8 function stops the conversion when the output buffer
length reaches UDF_NAME_LEN-2, which is correct maximum name length,
but, when checking, it leaves the space for a single byte only,
while multi-bytes output characters can take more space, causing
buffer overflow.

Similar error exists in udf_CS0toNLS function, that restricts
the output length to UDF_NAME_LEN, while actual maximum allowed
length is UDF_NAME_LEN-2.

In these cases the output can override not only the current buffer
length field, causing corruption of the name buffer itself, but also
following allocation structures, causing kernel crash.

Adjust the output length checks in both functions to prevent buffer
overruns in case of multi-bytes UTF8 or NLS characters.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov &lt;andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ad402b265ecf6fa22d04043b41444cdfcdf4f52d upstream.

udf_CS0toUTF8 function stops the conversion when the output buffer
length reaches UDF_NAME_LEN-2, which is correct maximum name length,
but, when checking, it leaves the space for a single byte only,
while multi-bytes output characters can take more space, causing
buffer overflow.

Similar error exists in udf_CS0toNLS function, that restricts
the output length to UDF_NAME_LEN, while actual maximum allowed
length is UDF_NAME_LEN-2.

In these cases the output can override not only the current buffer
length field, causing corruption of the name buffer itself, but also
following allocation structures, causing kernel crash.

Adjust the output length checks in both functions to prevent buffer
overruns in case of multi-bytes UTF8 or NLS characters.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov &lt;andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: limit the maximum number of indirect extents in a row</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T19:58:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vegard Nossum</name>
<email>vegard.nossum@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-11T14:54:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1e84fcd856d1dbab34c5c6eda3b31c0bdd55d57b'/>
<id>1e84fcd856d1dbab34c5c6eda3b31c0bdd55d57b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b0918d9f476a8434b055e362b83fa4fd1d462c3f upstream.

udf_next_aext() just follows extent pointers while extents are marked as
indirect. This can loop forever for corrupted filesystem. Limit number
the of indirect extents we are willing to follow in a row.

[JK: Updated changelog, limit, style]

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b0918d9f476a8434b055e362b83fa4fd1d462c3f upstream.

udf_next_aext() just follows extent pointers while extents are marked as
indirect. This can loop forever for corrupted filesystem. Limit number
the of indirect extents we are willing to follow in a row.

[JK: Updated changelog, limit, style]

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors</title>
<updated>2015-10-01T09:36:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-07T12:49:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=34820fc89c5e635b7381e4060931ca30a63d110a'/>
<id>34820fc89c5e635b7381e4060931ca30a63d110a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0 upstream.

Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when
loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse
the code and make the kernel oops.

This fixes CVE-2015-4167.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@ping.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[Use make_bad_inode() instead of branching due to older implementation.]
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams &lt;3chas3@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0 upstream.

Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when
loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse
the code and make the kernel oops.

This fixes CVE-2015-4167.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@ping.uio.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
[Use make_bad_inode() instead of branching due to older implementation.]
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams &lt;3chas3@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Verify symlink size before loading it</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T18:00:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-19T11:21:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5c90d036281629fc55ea46d063d4a7c3c10b02d6'/>
<id>5c90d036281629fc55ea46d063d4a7c3c10b02d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a1d47b262952a45aae62bd49cfaf33dd76c11a2c upstream.

UDF specification allows arbitrarily large symlinks. However we support
only symlinks at most one block large. Check the length of the symlink
so that we don't access memory beyond end of the symlink block.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a1d47b262952a45aae62bd49cfaf33dd76c11a2c upstream.

UDF specification allows arbitrarily large symlinks. However we support
only symlinks at most one block large. Check the length of the symlink
so that we don't access memory beyond end of the symlink block.

Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde &lt;chlunde@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs</title>
<updated>2014-10-09T19:21:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-04T12:06:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82335226733fdf82ee3f231c08269a17fd62a3fc'/>
<id>82335226733fdf82ee3f231c08269a17fd62a3fc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c03aa9f6e1f938618e6db2e23afef0574efeeb65 upstream.

We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.

Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert.lkml@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c03aa9f6e1f938618e6db2e23afef0574efeeb65 upstream.

We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.

Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert.lkml@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Fix data corruption on file type conversion</title>
<updated>2014-02-20T20:56:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-18T11:00:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=09ebb17ab476b6ac1cc07b53d07e88f4d31ee4d3'/>
<id>09ebb17ab476b6ac1cc07b53d07e88f4d31ee4d3</id>
<content type='text'>
UDF has two types of files - files with data stored in inode (ICB in
UDF terminology) and files with data stored in external data blocks. We
convert file from in-inode format to external format in
udf_file_aio_write() when we find out data won't fit into inode any
longer. However the following race between two O_APPEND writes can happen:

CPU1					CPU2
udf_file_aio_write()			udf_file_aio_write()
  down_write(&amp;iinfo-&gt;i_data_sem);
  checks that i_size + count1 fits within inode
    =&gt; no need to convert
  up_write(&amp;iinfo-&gt;i_data_sem);
					  down_write(&amp;iinfo-&gt;i_data_sem);
					  checks that i_size + count2 fits
					    within inode =&gt; no need to convert
					  up_write(&amp;iinfo-&gt;i_data_sem);
  generic_file_aio_write()
    - extends file by count1 bytes
					  generic_file_aio_write()
					    - extends file by count2 bytes

Clearly if count1 + count2 doesn't fit into the inode, we overwrite
kernel buffers beyond inode, possibly corrupting the filesystem as well.

Fix the problem by acquiring i_mutex before checking whether write fits
into the inode and using __generic_file_aio_write() afterwards which
puts check and write into one critical section.

Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
UDF has two types of files - files with data stored in inode (ICB in
UDF terminology) and files with data stored in external data blocks. We
convert file from in-inode format to external format in
udf_file_aio_write() when we find out data won't fit into inode any
longer. However the following race between two O_APPEND writes can happen:

CPU1					CPU2
udf_file_aio_write()			udf_file_aio_write()
  down_write(&amp;iinfo-&gt;i_data_sem);
  checks that i_size + count1 fits within inode
    =&gt; no need to convert
  up_write(&amp;iinfo-&gt;i_data_sem);
					  down_write(&amp;iinfo-&gt;i_data_sem);
					  checks that i_size + count2 fits
					    within inode =&gt; no need to convert
					  up_write(&amp;iinfo-&gt;i_data_sem);
  generic_file_aio_write()
    - extends file by count1 bytes
					  generic_file_aio_write()
					    - extends file by count2 bytes

Clearly if count1 + count2 doesn't fit into the inode, we overwrite
kernel buffers beyond inode, possibly corrupting the filesystem as well.

Fix the problem by acquiring i_mutex before checking whether write fits
into the inode and using __generic_file_aio_write() afterwards which
puts check and write into one critical section.

Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Fix lockdep warning from udf_symlink()</title>
<updated>2013-12-23T21:02:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-23T21:02:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4ea7772f828a2f1cf6fbf96a3e6f99ae149d2724'/>
<id>4ea7772f828a2f1cf6fbf96a3e6f99ae149d2724</id>
<content type='text'>
Lockdep is complaining about UDF:
=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.12.0+ #16 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------
ln/7386 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&amp;ei-&gt;i_data_sem){+.+...}, at: [&lt;ffffffff8142f06d&gt;] udf_get_block+0x8d/0x130

but task is already holding lock:
 (&amp;ei-&gt;i_data_sem){+.+...}, at: [&lt;ffffffff81431a8d&gt;] udf_symlink+0x8d/0x690

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&amp;ei-&gt;i_data_sem);
  lock(&amp;ei-&gt;i_data_sem);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

This is because we hold i_data_sem of the symlink inode while calling
udf_add_entry() for the directory. I don't think this can ever lead to
deadlocks since we never hold i_data_sem for two inodes in any other
place.

The fix is simple - move unlock of i_data_sem for symlink inode up. We
don't need it for anything when linking symlink inode to directory.

Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Lockdep is complaining about UDF:
=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.12.0+ #16 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------
ln/7386 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&amp;ei-&gt;i_data_sem){+.+...}, at: [&lt;ffffffff8142f06d&gt;] udf_get_block+0x8d/0x130

but task is already holding lock:
 (&amp;ei-&gt;i_data_sem){+.+...}, at: [&lt;ffffffff81431a8d&gt;] udf_symlink+0x8d/0x690

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&amp;ei-&gt;i_data_sem);
  lock(&amp;ei-&gt;i_data_sem);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

This is because we hold i_data_sem of the symlink inode while calling
udf_add_entry() for the directory. I don't think this can ever lead to
deadlocks since we never hold i_data_sem for two inodes in any other
place.

The fix is simple - move unlock of i_data_sem for symlink inode up. We
don't need it for anything when linking symlink inode to directory.

Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: fix for pathetic mount times in case of invalid file system</title>
<updated>2013-10-18T20:39:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter A. Felvegi</name>
<email>petschy@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-18T18:07:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=444996027e80f96c9948d8d5b8f067a8aff9861d'/>
<id>444996027e80f96c9948d8d5b8f067a8aff9861d</id>
<content type='text'>
The UDF driver was not strict enough about checking the IDs in the
VSDs when mounting, which resulted in reading through all the sectors
of the block device in some unfortunate cases. Eg, trying to mount my
uninitialized 200G SSD partition (all 0xFF bytes) took ~350 minutes to
fail, because the code expected some of the valid IDs or a zero byte.
During this, the mount couldn't be killed, sync from the cmdline
blocked, and the machine froze into the shutdown. Valid filesystems
(extX, btrfs, ntfs) were rejected by the mere accident of having a
zero byte at just the right place in some of their sectors, close
enough to the beginning not to generate excess I/O. The fix adds a
hard limit on the VSD sector offset, adds the two missing VSD IDs, and
stops scanning when encountering an invalid ID. Also replaced the
magic number 32768 with a more meaningful #define, and supressed the
bogus message about failing to read the first sector if no UDF fs was
detected.

Signed-off-by: Peter A. Felvegi &lt;petschy@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The UDF driver was not strict enough about checking the IDs in the
VSDs when mounting, which resulted in reading through all the sectors
of the block device in some unfortunate cases. Eg, trying to mount my
uninitialized 200G SSD partition (all 0xFF bytes) took ~350 minutes to
fail, because the code expected some of the valid IDs or a zero byte.
During this, the mount couldn't be killed, sync from the cmdline
blocked, and the machine froze into the shutdown. Valid filesystems
(extX, btrfs, ntfs) were rejected by the mere accident of having a
zero byte at just the right place in some of their sectors, close
enough to the beginning not to generate excess I/O. The fix adds a
hard limit on the VSD sector offset, adds the two missing VSD IDs, and
stops scanning when encountering an invalid ID. Also replaced the
magic number 32768 with a more meaningful #define, and supressed the
bogus message about failing to read the first sector if no UDF fs was
detected.

Signed-off-by: Peter A. Felvegi &lt;petschy@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udf: Fortify LVID loading</title>
<updated>2013-09-24T09:23:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-12T20:00:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=69d75671d985ccdb291e4d19ddfdecd12440e857'/>
<id>69d75671d985ccdb291e4d19ddfdecd12440e857</id>
<content type='text'>
A user has reported an oops in udf_statfs() that was caused by
numOfPartitions entry in LVID structure being corrupted. Fix the problem
by verifying whether numOfPartitions makes sense at least to the extent
that LVID fits into a single block as it should.

Reported-by: Juergen Weigert &lt;jw@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A user has reported an oops in udf_statfs() that was caused by
numOfPartitions entry in LVID structure being corrupted. Fix the problem
by verifying whether numOfPartitions makes sense at least to the extent
that LVID fits into a single block as it should.

Reported-by: Juergen Weigert &lt;jw@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
