<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/tracefs, branch v4.9.321</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tracefs: Set the group ownership in apply_options() not parse_options()</title>
<updated>2022-03-02T10:32:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Google)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-25T20:34:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1f1cb7041e8a6c3f1f1418ec207842fa10c7ace8'/>
<id>1f1cb7041e8a6c3f1f1418ec207842fa10c7ace8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 851e99ebeec3f4a672bb5010cf1ece095acee447 upstream.

Al Viro brought it to my attention that the dentries may not be filled
when the parse_options() is called, causing the call to set_gid() to
possibly crash. It should only be called if parse_options() succeeds
totally anyway.

He suggested the logical place to do the update is in apply_options().

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220225165219.737025658@goodmis.org/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220225153426.1c4cab6b@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Fixes: 48b27b6b5191 ("tracefs: Set all files to the same group ownership as the mount option")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 851e99ebeec3f4a672bb5010cf1ece095acee447 upstream.

Al Viro brought it to my attention that the dentries may not be filled
when the parse_options() is called, causing the call to set_gid() to
possibly crash. It should only be called if parse_options() succeeds
totally anyway.

He suggested the logical place to do the update is in apply_options().

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220225165219.737025658@goodmis.org/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220225153426.1c4cab6b@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Fixes: 48b27b6b5191 ("tracefs: Set all files to the same group ownership as the mount option")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracefs: Set all files to the same group ownership as the mount option</title>
<updated>2021-12-14T09:04:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-07T22:17:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fc5e1b95f76b4adf8811396badbe6f0abfa39662'/>
<id>fc5e1b95f76b4adf8811396badbe6f0abfa39662</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 48b27b6b5191e2e1f2798cd80877b6e4ef47c351 upstream.

As people have been asking to allow non-root processes to have access to
the tracefs directory, it was considered best to only allow groups to have
access to the directory, where it is easier to just set the tracefs file
system to a specific group (as other would be too dangerous), and that way
the admins could pick which processes would have access to tracefs.

Unfortunately, this broke tooling on Android that expected the other bit
to be set. For some special cases, for non-root tools to trace the system,
tracefs would be mounted and change the permissions of the top level
directory which gave access to all running tasks permission to the
tracing directory. Even though this would be dangerous to do in a
production environment, for testing environments this can be useful.

Now with the new changes to not allow other (which is still the proper
thing to do), it breaks the testing tooling. Now more code needs to be
loaded on the system to change ownership of the tracing directory.

The real solution is to have tracefs honor the gid=xxx option when
mounting. That is,

(tracing group tracing has value 1003)

 mount -t tracefs -o gid=1003 tracefs /sys/kernel/tracing

should have it that all files in the tracing directory should be of the
given group.

Copy the logic from d_walk() from dcache.c and simplify it for the mount
case of tracefs if gid is set. All the files in tracefs will be walked and
their group will be set to the value passed in.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211207171729.2a54e1b3@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yabin Cui &lt;yabinc@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 49d67e445742 ("tracefs: Have tracefs directories not set OTH permission bits by default")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 48b27b6b5191e2e1f2798cd80877b6e4ef47c351 upstream.

As people have been asking to allow non-root processes to have access to
the tracefs directory, it was considered best to only allow groups to have
access to the directory, where it is easier to just set the tracefs file
system to a specific group (as other would be too dangerous), and that way
the admins could pick which processes would have access to tracefs.

Unfortunately, this broke tooling on Android that expected the other bit
to be set. For some special cases, for non-root tools to trace the system,
tracefs would be mounted and change the permissions of the top level
directory which gave access to all running tasks permission to the
tracing directory. Even though this would be dangerous to do in a
production environment, for testing environments this can be useful.

Now with the new changes to not allow other (which is still the proper
thing to do), it breaks the testing tooling. Now more code needs to be
loaded on the system to change ownership of the tracing directory.

The real solution is to have tracefs honor the gid=xxx option when
mounting. That is,

(tracing group tracing has value 1003)

 mount -t tracefs -o gid=1003 tracefs /sys/kernel/tracing

should have it that all files in the tracing directory should be of the
given group.

Copy the logic from d_walk() from dcache.c and simplify it for the mount
case of tracefs if gid is set. All the files in tracefs will be walked and
their group will be set to the value passed in.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211207171729.2a54e1b3@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yabin Cui &lt;yabinc@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 49d67e445742 ("tracefs: Have tracefs directories not set OTH permission bits by default")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracefs: Have new files inherit the ownership of their parent</title>
<updated>2021-12-14T09:04:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-08T12:57:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7dd4e048155070a454f21c7aa08ff3b84addd3fc'/>
<id>7dd4e048155070a454f21c7aa08ff3b84addd3fc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ee7f3666995d8537dec17b1d35425f28877671a9 upstream.

If directories in tracefs have their ownership changed, then any new files
and directories that are created under those directories should inherit
the ownership of the director they are created in.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211208075720.4855d180@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Yabin Cui &lt;yabinc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4282d60689d4f ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Reported: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAC_TJve8MMAv+H_NdLSJXZUSoxOEq2zB_pVaJ9p=7H6Bu3X76g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ee7f3666995d8537dec17b1d35425f28877671a9 upstream.

If directories in tracefs have their ownership changed, then any new files
and directories that are created under those directories should inherit
the ownership of the director they are created in.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211208075720.4855d180@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Yabin Cui &lt;yabinc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4282d60689d4f ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Reported-by: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Reported: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAC_TJve8MMAv+H_NdLSJXZUSoxOEq2zB_pVaJ9p=7H6Bu3X76g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracefs: Have tracefs directories not set OTH permission bits by default</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T10:48:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-18T15:24:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9c5e06386a8bf7b825cadef5325987a870eb2cd0'/>
<id>9c5e06386a8bf7b825cadef5325987a870eb2cd0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 49d67e445742bbcb03106b735b2ab39f6e5c56bc ]

The tracefs file system is by default mounted such that only root user can
access it. But there are legitimate reasons to create a group and allow
those added to the group to have access to tracing. By changing the
permissions of the tracefs mount point to allow access, it will allow
group access to the tracefs directory.

There should not be any real reason to allow all access to the tracefs
directory as it contains sensitive information. Have the default
permission of directories being created not have any OTH (other) bits set,
such that an admin that wants to give permission to a group has to first
disable all OTH bits in the file system.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210818153038.664127804@goodmis.org

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 49d67e445742bbcb03106b735b2ab39f6e5c56bc ]

The tracefs file system is by default mounted such that only root user can
access it. But there are legitimate reasons to create a group and allow
those added to the group to have access to tracing. By changing the
permissions of the tracefs mount point to allow access, it will allow
group access to the tracefs directory.

There should not be any real reason to allow all access to the tracefs
directory as it contains sensitive information. Have the default
permission of directories being created not have any OTH (other) bits set,
such that an admin that wants to give permission to a group has to first
disable all OTH bits in the file system.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210818153038.664127804@goodmis.org

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps</title>
<updated>2016-09-28T01:06:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Deepa Dinamani</name>
<email>deepa.kernel@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-14T14:48:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=078cd8279e659989b103359bb22373cc79445bde'/>
<id>078cd8279e659989b103359bb22373cc79445bde</id>
<content type='text'>
CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.

CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.

This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.

Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi &lt;balbi@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse &lt;swhiteho@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi &lt;konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp&gt;
Acked-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.

CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.

This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.

Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi &lt;balbi@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse &lt;swhiteho@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi &lt;konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp&gt;
Acked-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracefs: -&gt;d_parent is never NULL or negative...</title>
<updated>2016-05-29T20:22:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-29T18:57:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0ba3353c2218f5311a163944e8ce347d6503c188'/>
<id>0ba3353c2218f5311a163944e8ce347d6503c188</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wrappers for -&gt;i_mutex access</title>
<updated>2016-01-22T23:04:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-22T20:40:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5955102c9984fa081b2d570cfac75c97eecf8f3b'/>
<id>5955102c9984fa081b2d570cfac75c97eecf8f3b</id>
<content type='text'>
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&amp;inode-&gt;i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to -&gt;i_mutex; over the coming cycle
-&gt;i_mutex will become rwsem, with -&gt;lookup() done with it held
only shared.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&amp;inode-&gt;i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to -&gt;i_mutex; over the coming cycle
-&gt;i_mutex will become rwsem, with -&gt;lookup() done with it held
only shared.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracefs: Fix refcount imbalance in start_creating()</title>
<updated>2015-11-05T03:13:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-04T22:33:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d227c3ae4e94e5eb11dd780a811f59e1a7b74ccd'/>
<id>d227c3ae4e94e5eb11dd780a811f59e1a7b74ccd</id>
<content type='text'>
In tracefs' start_creating(), we pin the file system to safely access
its root. When we failed to create a file, we unpin the file system via
failed_creating() to release the mount count and eventually the reference
of the singleton vfsmount.

However, when we run into an error during lookup_one_len() when still
in start_creating(), we only release the parent's mutex but not so the
reference on the mount.

F.e., in securityfs_create_file(), after doing simple_pin_fs() when
lookup_one_len() fails there, we infact do simple_release_fs(). This
seems necessary here as well.

Same issue seen in debugfs due to 190afd81e4a5 ("debugfs: split the
beginning and the end of __create_file() off"), which seemed to got
carried over into tracefs, too. Noticed during code review.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/68efa86101b778cf7517ed7c6ad573bd69f60ec6.1446672850.git.daniel@iogearbox.net

Fixes: 4282d60689d4 ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In tracefs' start_creating(), we pin the file system to safely access
its root. When we failed to create a file, we unpin the file system via
failed_creating() to release the mount count and eventually the reference
of the singleton vfsmount.

However, when we run into an error during lookup_one_len() when still
in start_creating(), we only release the parent's mutex but not so the
reference on the mount.

F.e., in securityfs_create_file(), after doing simple_pin_fs() when
lookup_one_len() fails there, we infact do simple_release_fs(). This
seems necessary here as well.

Same issue seen in debugfs due to 190afd81e4a5 ("debugfs: split the
beginning and the end of __create_file() off"), which seemed to got
carried over into tracefs, too. Noticed during code review.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/68efa86101b778cf7517ed7c6ad573bd69f60ec6.1446672850.git.daniel@iogearbox.net

Fixes: 4282d60689d4 ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2015-07-05T02:36:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-05T02:36:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1dc51b8288007753ad7cd7d08bb8fa930fc8bb10'/>
<id>1dc51b8288007753ad7cd7d08bb8fa930fc8bb10</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
  that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
  stuff).  UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle).  9P fixes.
  fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"

[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups".  The
  file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
  fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge.   - Linus ]

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
  9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
  p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
  9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
  dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
  block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
  dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
  dax: Add block size note to documentation
  fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
  fs/file.c: don't acquire files-&gt;file_lock in fd_install()
  fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
  vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
  namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
  make simple_positive() public
  ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
  pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
  remove the pointless include of lglock.h
  fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
  xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
  fs: Call security_ops-&gt;inode_killpriv on truncate
  fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
  that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
  stuff).  UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle).  9P fixes.
  fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"

[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups".  The
  file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
  fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge.   - Linus ]

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
  9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
  p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
  9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
  dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
  block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
  dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
  dax: Add block size note to documentation
  fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
  fs/file.c: don't acquire files-&gt;file_lock in fd_install()
  fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
  vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
  namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
  make simple_positive() public
  ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
  pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
  remove the pointless include of lglock.h
  fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
  xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
  fs: Call security_ops-&gt;inode_killpriv on truncate
  fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point</title>
<updated>2015-07-01T15:36:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-13T22:35:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f9bb48825a6b5d02f4cabcc78967c75db903dcdc'/>
<id>f9bb48825a6b5d02f4cabcc78967c75db903dcdc</id>
<content type='text'>
This allows for better documentation in the code and
it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of
fs_fully_visible to be written.

The mount points converted and their filesystems are:
/sys/hypervisor/s390/       s390_hypfs
/sys/kernel/config/         configfs
/sys/kernel/debug/          debugfs
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/  efivarfs
/sys/fs/fuse/connections/   fusectl
/sys/fs/pstore/             pstore
/sys/kernel/tracing/        tracefs
/sys/fs/cgroup/             cgroup
/sys/kernel/security/       securityfs
/sys/fs/selinux/            selinuxfs
/sys/fs/smackfs/            smackfs

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This allows for better documentation in the code and
it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of
fs_fully_visible to be written.

The mount points converted and their filesystems are:
/sys/hypervisor/s390/       s390_hypfs
/sys/kernel/config/         configfs
/sys/kernel/debug/          debugfs
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/  efivarfs
/sys/fs/fuse/connections/   fusectl
/sys/fs/pstore/             pstore
/sys/kernel/tracing/        tracefs
/sys/fs/cgroup/             cgroup
/sys/kernel/security/       securityfs
/sys/fs/selinux/            selinuxfs
/sys/fs/smackfs/            smackfs

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
