linux-stable.git/fs/sysfs, branch v3.16.75

scsi: sysfs: Introduce sysfs_{un,}break_active_protection()

2018-12-16T22:08:33+00:00

commit 2afc9166f79b8f6da5f347f48515215ceee4ae37 upstream.

Introduce these two functions and export them such that the next patch
can add calls to these functions from the SCSI core.

Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche 
Acked-by: Tejun Heo 
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.

2017-04-04T21:21:56+00:00

commit 22f6b4d34fcf039c63a94e7670e0da24f8575a5a upstream.

Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files.  Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.

Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.

Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.

The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.

This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.

Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc.  Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: we don't have super_block::s_iflags; use
 file_system_type::fs_flags instead]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.

2015-07-15T09:01:07+00:00

commit 87d2846fcf88113fae2341da1ca9a71f0d916f2c upstream.

Add two functions sysfs_create_mount_point and
sysfs_remove_mount_point that hang a permanently empty directory off
of a kobject or remove a permanently emptpy directory hanging from a
kobject.  Export these new functions so modular filesystems can use
them.

Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace

2015-07-09T13:36:04+00:00

commit 1b852bceb0d111e510d1a15826ecc4a19358d512 upstream.

Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount.  Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags.  Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.

Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.

Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

kernfs: move the last knowledge of sysfs out from kernfs

2014-05-27T21:33:17+00:00

There is still one residue of sysfs remaining: the sb_magic
SYSFS_MAGIC. However this should be kernfs user specific,
so this patch moves it out. Kerrnfs user should specify their
magic number while mouting.

Signed-off-by: Jianyu Zhan 
Acked-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs: fix attribute_group bin file path on removal

2014-05-27T21:33:17+00:00

Cody Schafer already fixed binary file creation for attribute groups, see [1].
This patch makes the appropriate changes for binary file removal
of attribute groups.
[1]: http://lkml.org/lkml/2014/2/27/832

Signed-off-by: Robert ABEL 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs: make sure read buffer is zeroed

2014-05-20T01:15:53+00:00

13c589d5b0ac ("sysfs: use seq_file when reading regular files")
switched sysfs from custom read implementation to seq_file to enable
later transition to kernfs.  After the change, the buffer passed to
->show() is acquired through seq_get_buf(); unfortunately, this
introduces a subtle behavior change.  Before the commit, the buffer
passed to ->show() was always zero as it was allocated using
get_zeroed_page().  Because seq_file doesn't clear buffers on
allocation and neither does seq_get_buf(), after the commit, depending
on the behavior of ->show(), we may end up exposing uninitialized data
to userland thus possibly altering userland visible behavior and
leaking information.

Fix it by explicitly clearing the buffer.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Reported-by: Ron 
Fixes: 13c589d5b0ac ("sysfs: use seq_file when reading regular files")
Cc: stable  # 3.13+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernfs, sysfs, cgroup: restrict extra perm check on open to sysfs

2014-05-13T11:21:40+00:00

The kernfs open method - kernfs_fop_open() - inherited extra
permission checks from sysfs.  While the vfs layer allows ignoring the
read/write permissions checks if the issuer has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
sysfs explicitly denied open regardless of the cap if the file doesn't
have any of the UGO perms of the requested access or doesn't implement
the requested operation.  It can be debated whether this was a good
idea or not but the behavior is too subtle and dangerous to change at
this point.

After cgroup got converted to kernfs, this extra perm check also got
applied to cgroup breaking libcgroup which opens write-only files with
O_RDWR as root.  This patch gates the extra open permission check with
a new flag KERNFS_ROOT_EXTRA_OPEN_PERM_CHECK and enables it for sysfs.
For sysfs, nothing changes.  For cgroup, root now can perform any
operation regardless of the permissions as it was before kernfs
conversion.  Note that kernfs still fails unimplemented operations
with -EINVAL.

While at it, add comments explaining KERNFS_ROOT flags.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Reported-by: Andrey Wagin 
Tested-by: Andrey Wagin 
Cc: Li Zefan 
References: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CANaxB-xUm3rJ-Cbp72q-rQJO5mZe1qK6qXsQM=vh0U8upJ44+A@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 2bd59d48ebfb ("cgroup: convert to kernfs")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs, driver-core: remove unused {sysfs|device}_schedule_callback_owner()

2014-04-16T18:56:33+00:00

All device_schedule_callback_owner() users are converted to use
device_remove_file_self().  Remove now unused
{sysfs|device}_schedule_callback_owner().

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "sysfs, driver-core: remove unused {sysfs|device}_schedule_callback_owner()"

2014-03-26T03:54:57+00:00

This reverts commit d1ba277e79889085a2faec3b68b91ce89c63f888.

As reported by Stephen, this patch breaks linux-next as a ppc patch
suddenly (after 2 years) started using this old api call.  So revert it
for now, it will go away in 3.15-rc2 when we can change the PPC call to
the new api.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell 
Cc: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Stewart Smith 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman