linux-stable.git/fs/proc, branch v5.4.201

proc: fix dentry/inode overinstantiating under /proc/${pid}/net

2022-06-14T16:11:41+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7055197705709c59b8ab77e6a5c7d46d61edd96e ]

When a process exits, /proc/${pid}, and /proc/${pid}/net dentries are
flushed.  However some leaf dentries like /proc/${pid}/net/arp_cache
aren't.  That's because respective PDEs have proc_misc_d_revalidate() hook
which returns 1 and leaves dentries/inodes in the LRU.

Force revalidation/lookup on everything under /proc/${pid}/net by
inheriting proc_net_dentry_ops.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YjdVHgildbWO7diJ@localhost.localdomain
Fixes: c6c75deda813 ("proc: fix lookup in /proc/net subdirectories after setns(2)")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan 
Reported-by: hui li 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

arm: remove CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL

2022-05-15T17:54:46+00:00

commit 5e545df3292fbd3d5963c68980f1527ead2a2b3f upstream.

ARM is the only architecture that defines CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL
which in turn enables memmap_valid_within() function that is intended to
verify existence  of struct page associated with a pfn when there are holes
in the memory map.

However, the ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL also enables HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
and arch-specific pfn_valid() implementation that also deals with the holes
in the memory map.

The only two users of memmap_valid_within() call this function after
a call to pfn_valid() so the memmap_valid_within() check becomes redundant.

Remove CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL and memmap_valid_within() and rely
entirely on ARM's implementation of pfn_valid() that is now enabled
unconditionally.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201101170454.9567-9-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Greg Ungerer 
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Meelis Roos 
Cc: Michael Schmitz 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Fixes: 8dd559d53b3b ("arm: ioremap: don't abuse pfn_valid() to check if pfn is in RAM")
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc/vmcore: fix clearing user buffer by properly using clear_user()

2021-12-01T08:23:31+00:00

commit c1e63117711977cc4295b2ce73de29dd17066c82 upstream.

To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use
clear_user().  With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and
has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block,
I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp":

  systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service...
  kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3).
  kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
  kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
  kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete
  kdump[467]: saving vmcore
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
  PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867
  Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86
  Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81
  RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212
  RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008
  RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50
  R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000
  R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8
  FS:  00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
  Call Trace:
   read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0
   proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0
   vfs_read+0x95/0x190
   ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access
Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel
to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on
wrong access.  In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly
handled via clac()+stac().

To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 997c136f518c ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: Baoquan He 
Cc: Vivek Goyal 
Cc: Philipp Rudo 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm, oom: make the calculation of oom badness more accurate

2021-09-03T08:08:12+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9066e5cfb73cdbcdbb49e87999482ab615e9fc76 ]

Recently we found an issue on our production environment that when memcg
oom is triggered the oom killer doesn't chose the process with largest
resident memory but chose the first scanned process.  Note that all
processes in this memcg have the same oom_score_adj, so the oom killer
should chose the process with largest resident memory.

Bellow is part of the oom info, which is enough to analyze this issue.
[7516987.983223] memory: usage 16777216kB, limit 16777216kB, failcnt 52843037
[7516987.983224] memory+swap: usage 16777216kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
[7516987.983225] kmem: usage 301464kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
[...]
[7516987.983293] [ pid ]   uid  tgid total_vm      rss pgtables_bytes swapents oom_score_adj name
[7516987.983510] [ 5740]     0  5740      257        1    32768        0          -998 pause
[7516987.983574] [58804]     0 58804     4594      771    81920        0          -998 entry_point.bas
[7516987.983577] [58908]     0 58908     7089      689    98304        0          -998 cron
[7516987.983580] [58910]     0 58910    16235     5576   163840        0          -998 supervisord
[7516987.983590] [59620]     0 59620    18074     1395   188416        0          -998 sshd
[7516987.983594] [59622]     0 59622    18680     6679   188416        0          -998 python
[7516987.983598] [59624]     0 59624  1859266     5161   548864        0          -998 odin-agent
[7516987.983600] [59625]     0 59625   707223     9248   983040        0          -998 filebeat
[7516987.983604] [59627]     0 59627   416433    64239   774144        0          -998 odin-log-agent
[7516987.983607] [59631]     0 59631   180671    15012   385024        0          -998 python3
[7516987.983612] [61396]     0 61396   791287     3189   352256        0          -998 client
[7516987.983615] [61641]     0 61641  1844642    29089   946176        0          -998 client
[7516987.983765] [ 9236]     0  9236     2642      467    53248        0          -998 php_scanner
[7516987.983911] [42898]     0 42898    15543      838   167936        0          -998 su
[7516987.983915] [42900]  1000 42900     3673      867    77824        0          -998 exec_script_vr2
[7516987.983918] [42925]  1000 42925    36475    19033   335872        0          -998 python
[7516987.983921] [57146]  1000 57146     3673      848    73728        0          -998 exec_script_J2p
[7516987.983925] [57195]  1000 57195   186359    22958   491520        0          -998 python2
[7516987.983928] [58376]  1000 58376   275764    14402   290816        0          -998 rosmaster
[7516987.983931] [58395]  1000 58395   155166     4449   245760        0          -998 rosout
[7516987.983935] [58406]  1000 58406 18285584  3967322 37101568        0          -998 data_sim
[7516987.984221] oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_MEMCG,nodemask=(null),cpuset=3aa16c9482ae3a6f6b78bda68a55d32c87c99b985e0f11331cddf05af6c4d753,mems_allowed=0-1,oom_memcg=/kubepods/podf1c273d3-9b36-11ea-b3df-246e9693c184,task_memcg=/kubepods/podf1c273d3-9b36-11ea-b3df-246e9693c184/1f246a3eeea8f70bf91141eeaf1805346a666e225f823906485ea0b6c37dfc3d,task=pause,pid=5740,uid=0
[7516987.984254] Memory cgroup out of memory: Killed process 5740 (pause) total-vm:1028kB, anon-rss:4kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
[7516988.092344] oom_reaper: reaped process 5740 (pause), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB

We can find that the first scanned process 5740 (pause) was killed, but
its rss is only one page.  That is because, when we calculate the oom
badness in oom_badness(), we always ignore the negtive point and convert
all of these negtive points to 1.  Now as oom_score_adj of all the
processes in this targeted memcg have the same value -998, the points of
these processes are all negtive value.  As a result, the first scanned
process will be killed.

The oom_socre_adj (-998) in this memcg is set by kubelet, because it is a
a Guaranteed pod, which has higher priority to prevent from being killed
by system oom.

To fix this issue, we should make the calculation of oom point more
accurate.  We can achieve it by convert the chosen_point from 'unsigned
long' to 'long'.

[cai@lca.pw: reported a issue in the previous version]
[mhocko@suse.com: fixed the issue reported by Cai]
[mhocko@suse.com: add the comment in proc_oom_score()]
[laoar.shao@gmail.com: v3]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1594396651-9931-1-git-send-email-laoar.shao@gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Qian Cai 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1594309987-9919-1-git-send-email-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

proc: Avoid mixing integer types in mem_rw()

2021-07-28T11:30:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit d238692b4b9f2c36e35af4c6e6f6da36184aeb3e ]

Use size_t when capping the count argument received by mem_rw(). Since
count is size_t, using min_t(int, ...) can lead to a negative value
that will later be passed to access_remote_vm(), which can cause
unexpected behavior.

Since we are capping the value to at maximum PAGE_SIZE, the conversion
from size_t to int when passing it to access_remote_vm() as "len"
shouldn't be a problem.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210512125215.3348316-1-marcelo.cerri@canonical.com
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp 
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Souza Cascardo 
Cc: Christian Brauner 
Cc: Michel Lespinasse 
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

proc: only require mm_struct for writing

2021-06-16T09:59:46+00:00

commit 94f0b2d4a1d0c52035aef425da5e022bd2cb1c71 upstream.

Commit 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") we
started using __mem_open() to track the mm_struct at open-time, so that
we could then check it for writes.

But that also ended up making the permission checks at open time much
stricter - and not just for writes, but for reads too.  And that in turn
caused a regression for at least Fedora 29, where NIC interfaces fail to
start when using NetworkManager.

Since only the write side wanted the mm_struct test, ignore any failures
by __mem_open() at open time, leaving reads unaffected.  The write()
time verification of the mm_struct pointer will then catch the failure
case because a NULL pointer will not match a valid 'current->mm'.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YMjTlp2FSJYvoyFa@unreal/
Fixes: 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct")
Reported-and-tested-by: Leon Romanovsky 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Christian Brauner 
Cc: Andrea Righi 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct

2021-06-16T09:59:32+00:00

commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream.

Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)

Reported-by: Christian Brauner 
Reported-by: Andrea Righi 
Tested-by: Andrea Righi 
Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener

2021-06-03T06:59:01+00:00

commit bfb819ea20ce8bbeeba17e1a6418bf8bda91fc28 upstream.

Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: fix lookup in /proc/net subdirectories after setns(2)

2021-01-12T19:16:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit c6c75deda81344c3a95d1d1f606d5cee109e5d54 ]

Commit 1fde6f21d90f ("proc: fix /proc/net/* after setns(2)") only forced
revalidation of regular files under /proc/net/

However, /proc/net/ is unusual in the sense of /proc/net/foo handlers
take netns pointer from parent directory which is old netns.

Steps to reproduce:

	(void)open("/proc/net/sctp/snmp", O_RDONLY);
	unshare(CLONE_NEWNET);

	int fd = open("/proc/net/sctp/snmp", O_RDONLY);
	read(fd, &c, 1);

Read will read wrong data from original netns.

Patch forces lookup on every directory under /proc/net .

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201205160916.GA109739@localhost.localdomain
Fixes: 1da4d377f943 ("proc: revalidate misc dentries")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan 
Reported-by: "Rantala, Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

proc: change ->nlink under proc_subdir_lock

2021-01-12T19:16:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit e06689bf57017ac022ccf0f2a5071f760821ce0f ]

Currently gluing PDE into global /proc tree is done under lock, but
changing ->nlink is not.  Additionally struct proc_dir_entry::nlink is
not atomic so updates can be lost.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190925202436.GA17388@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin