linux-stable.git/fs/proc, branch v4.4.63

thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs clear soft dirty race

2017-04-21T07:30:04+00:00

commit 5b7abeae3af8c08c577e599dd0578b9e3ee6687b upstream.

Yet another instance of the same race.

Fix is identical to change_huge_pmd().

See "thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs.  numa balancing race" for more details.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170302151034.27829-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Hillf Danton 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir

2017-01-19T19:17:21+00:00

commit 93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939 upstream.

Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.

The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:

[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265]  [] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817]  [] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346]  [] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256]  [] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972]  [] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804]  [] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227]  [] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648]  [] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654]  [] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657]  [] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344]  [] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447]  [] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844]  [] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336]  [] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373]  [] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186]  [] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899]  [] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420]  [] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234]  [] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049]  [] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571]  [] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207]  [] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736]  [] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461]  [] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697]  [] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426]  [] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991]  [] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041]  [] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230

One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex.  The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.

See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13

Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Reported-by: CAI Qian 
Tested-by: Yang Shukui 
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming 
Acked-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: introduce get_task_exe_file

2016-09-24T08:07:36+00:00

commit cd81a9170e69e018bbaba547c1fd85a585f5697a upstream.

For more convenient access if one has a pointer to the task.

As a minor nit take advantage of the fact that only task lock + rcu are
needed to safely grab ->exe_file. This saves mm refcount dance.

Use the helper in proc_exe_link.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik 
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: revert /proc//maps [stack:TID] annotation

2016-09-15T06:27:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit 65376df582174ffcec9e6471bf5b0dd79ba05e4a ]

Commit b76437579d13 ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in
proc//maps") added [stack:TID] annotation to /proc//maps.

Finding the task of a stack VMA requires walking the entire thread list,
turning this into quadratic behavior: a thousand threads means a
thousand stacks, so the rendering of /proc//maps needs to look at a
million combinations.

The cost is not in proportion to the usefulness as described in the
patch.

Drop the [stack:TID] annotation to make /proc//maps (and
/proc//numa_maps) usable again for higher thread counts.

The [stack] annotation inside /proc//task//maps is retained, as
identifying the stack VMA there is an O(1) operation.

Siddesh said:
 "The end users needed a way to identify thread stacks programmatically and
  there wasn't a way to do that.  I'm afraid I no longer remember (or have
  access to the resources that would aid my memory since I changed
  employers) the details of their requirement.  However, I did do this on my
  own time because I thought it was an interesting project for me and nobody
  really gave any feedback then as to its utility, so as far as I am
  concerned you could roll back the main thread maps information since the
  information is available in the thread-specific files"

Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Cc: Siddhesh Poyarekar 
Cc: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top

2016-06-24T17:18:20+00:00

commit e54ad7f1ee263ffa5a2de9c609d58dfa27b21cd9 upstream.

This prevents stacking filesystems (ecryptfs and overlayfs) from using
procfs as lower filesystem.  There is too much magic going on inside
procfs, and there is no good reason to stack stuff on top of procfs.

(For example, procfs does access checks in VFS open handlers, and
ecryptfs by design calls open handlers from a kernel thread that doesn't
drop privileges or so.)

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: prevent accessing /proc//environ until it's ready

2016-05-11T09:21:16+00:00

commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 upstream.

If /proc//environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.

Fix this as it is done for /proc//cmdline by testing env_end for
zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().

This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.

The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc//environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.

Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause 
Cc: Emese Revfy 
Cc: Pax Team 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Mateusz Guzik 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Cc: Jarod Wilson 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

numa: fix /proc//numa_maps for THP

2016-05-04T21:48:49+00:00

commit 28093f9f34cedeaea0f481c58446d9dac6dd620f upstream.

In gather_pte_stats() a THP pmd is cast into a pte, which is wrong
because the layouts may differ depending on the architecture.  On s390
this will lead to inaccurate numa_maps accounting in /proc because of
misguided pte_present() and pte_dirty() checks on the fake pte.

On other architectures pte_present() and pte_dirty() may work by chance,
but there may be an issue with direct-access (dax) mappings w/o
underlying struct pages when HAVE_PTE_SPECIAL is set and THP is
available.  In vm_normal_page() the fake pte will be checked with
pte_special() and because there is no "special" bit in a pmd, this will
always return false and the VM_PFNMAP | VM_MIXEDMAP checking will be
skipped.  On dax mappings w/o struct pages, an invalid struct page
pointer would then be returned that can crash the kernel.

This patch fixes the numa_maps THP handling by introducing new "_pmd"
variants of the can_gather_numa_stats() and vm_normal_page() functions.

Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer 
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi 
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: Jerome Marchand 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Dan Williams 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Michael Holzheu 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

numa: fix /proc//numa_maps for hugetlbfs on s390

2016-02-25T20:01:22+00:00

commit 5c2ff95e41c9290d16556cd02e35b25d81be8fe0 upstream.

When working with hugetlbfs ptes (which are actually pmds) is not valid to
directly use pte functions like pte_present() because the hardware bit
layout of pmds and ptes can be different.  This is the case on s390.
Therefore we have to convert the hugetlbfs ptes first into a valid pte
encoding with huge_ptep_get().

Currently the /proc//numa_maps code uses hugetlbfs ptes without
huge_ptep_get().  On s390 this leads to the following two problems:

1) The pte_present() function returns false (instead of true) for
   PROT_NONE hugetlb ptes. Therefore PROT_NONE vmas are missing
   completely in the "numa_maps" output.

2) The pte_dirty() function always returns false for all hugetlb ptes.
   Therefore these pages are reported as "mapped=xxx" instead of
   "dirty=xxx".

Therefore use huge_ptep_get() to correctly convert the hugetlb ptes.

Signed-off-by: Michael Holzheu 
Reviewed-by: Gerald Schaefer 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-02-25T20:01:16+00:00

commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: fix -ESRCH error when writing to /proc/$pid/coredump_filter

2015-12-18T22:25:40+00:00

Writing to /proc/$pid/coredump_filter always returns -ESRCH because commit
774636e19ed51 ("proc: convert to kstrto*()/kstrto*_from_user()") removed
the setting of ret after the get_proc_task call and incorrectly left it as
-ESRCH.  Instead, return 0 when successful.

Example breakage:

  echo 0 > /proc/self/coredump_filter
  bash: echo: write error: No such process

Fixes: 774636e19ed51 ("proc: convert to kstrto*()/kstrto*_from_user()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc:  [4.3+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds