linux-stable.git/fs/proc, branch v3.18.136

proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root

2018-10-13T07:09:31+00:00

commit f8a00cef17206ecd1b30d3d9f99e10d9fa707aa7 upstream.

Currently, you can use /proc/self/task/*/stack to cause a stack walk on
a task you control while it is running on another CPU.  That means that
the stack can change under the stack walker.  The stack walker does
have guards against going completely off the rails and into random
kernel memory, but it can interpret random data from your kernel stack
as instruction pointers and stack pointers.  This can cause exposure of
kernel stack contents to userspace.

Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding
to leak kernel task stack contents.  See the added comment for a longer
rationale.

There don't seem to be any users of this userspace API that can't
gracefully bail out if reading from the file fails.  Therefore, I believe
that this change is unlikely to break things.  In the case that this patch
does end up needing a revert, the next-best solution might be to fake a
single-entry stack based on wchan.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927153316.200286-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 2ec220e27f50 ("proc: add /proc/*/stack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Ken Chen 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Laura Abbott 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: fix potential page fault while unregistering sysctl table

2018-05-30T05:47:38+00:00

[ Upstream commit a0b0d1c345d0317efe594df268feb5ccc99f651e ]

proc_sys_link_fill_cache() does not take currently unregistering sysctl
tables into account, which might result into a page fault in
sysctl_follow_link() - add a check to fix it.

This bug has been present since v3.4.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180228013506.4915-1-danilokrummrich@dk-develop.de
Fixes: 0e47c99d7fe25 ("sysctl: Replace root_list with links between sysctl_table_sets")
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: fix /proc/*/map_files lookup

2018-05-30T05:47:32+00:00

[ Upstream commit ac7f1061c2c11bb8936b1b6a94cdb48de732f7a4 ]

Current code does:

	if (sscanf(dentry->d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2)

However sscanf() is broken garbage.

It silently accepts whitespace between format specifiers
(did you know that?).

It silently accepts valid strings which result in integer overflow.

Do not use sscanf() for any even remotely reliable parsing code.

	OK
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/               55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000    '
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	very broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/1000000000000000055a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

Andrei said:

: This patch breaks criu.  It was a bug in criu.  And this bug is on a minor
: path, which works when memfd_create() isn't available.  It is a reason why
: I ask to not backport this patch to stable kernels.
:
: In CRIU this bug can be triggered, only if this patch will be backported
: to a kernel which version is lower than v3.16.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171120212706.GA14325@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov 
Cc: Andrei Vagin 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/proc: Stop trying to report thread stacks

2018-04-08T09:49:48+00:00

commit b18cb64ead400c01bf1580eeba330ace51f8087d upstream.

This reverts more of:

  b76437579d13 ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc//maps")

... which was partially reverted by:

  65376df58217 ("proc: revert /proc//maps [stack:TID] annotation")

Originally, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps was the same as /proc/TID/maps.

In current kernels, /proc/PID/maps (or /proc/TID/maps even for
threads) shows "[stack]" for VMAs in the mm's stack address range.

In contrast, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps uses KSTK_ESP to guess the
target thread's stack's VMA.  This is racy, probably returns garbage
and, on arches with CONFIG_TASK_INFO_IN_THREAD=y, is also crash-prone:
KSTK_ESP is not safe to use on tasks that aren't known to be running
ordinary process-context kernel code.

This patch removes the difference and just shows "[stack]" for VMAs
in the mm's stack range.  This is IMO much more sensible -- the
actual "stack" address really is treated specially by the VM code,
and the current thread stack isn't even well-defined for programs
that frequently switch stacks on their own.

Reported-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Linux API 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Tycho Andersen 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3e678474ec14e0a0ec34c611016753eea2e1b8ba.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: revert /proc//maps [stack:TID] annotation

2018-04-08T09:49:48+00:00

commit 65376df582174ffcec9e6471bf5b0dd79ba05e4a upstream.

Commit b76437579d13 ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in
proc//maps") added [stack:TID] annotation to /proc//maps.

Finding the task of a stack VMA requires walking the entire thread list,
turning this into quadratic behavior: a thousand threads means a
thousand stacks, so the rendering of /proc//maps needs to look at a
million combinations.

The cost is not in proportion to the usefulness as described in the
patch.

Drop the [stack:TID] annotation to make /proc//maps (and
/proc//numa_maps) usable again for higher thread counts.

The [stack] annotation inside /proc//task//maps is retained, as
identifying the stack VMA there is an O(1) operation.

Siddesh said:
 "The end users needed a way to identify thread stacks programmatically and
  there wasn't a way to do that.  I'm afraid I no longer remember (or have
  access to the resources that would aid my memory since I changed
  employers) the details of their requirement.  However, I did do this on my
  own time because I thought it was an interesting project for me and nobody
  really gave any feedback then as to its utility, so as far as I am
  concerned you could roll back the main thread maps information since the
  information is available in the thread-specific files"

Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Cc: Siddhesh Poyarekar 
Cc: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tty fix oops when rmmod 8250

2017-12-20T09:01:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit c79dde629d2027ca80329c62854a7635e623d527 ]

After rmmod 8250.ko
tty_kref_put starts kwork (release_one_tty) to release proc interface
oops when accessing driver->driver_name in proc_tty_unregister_driver

Use jprobe, found driver->driver_name point to 8250.ko
static static struct uart_driver serial8250_reg
.driver_name= serial,

Use name in proc_dir_entry instead of driver->driver_name to fix oops

test on linux 4.1.12:

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffa01979de
IP: [] strchr+0x0/0x30
PGD 1a0d067 PUD 1a0e063 PMD 851c1f067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: ... ...  [last unloaded: 8250]
CPU: 7 PID: 116 Comm: kworker/7:1 Tainted: G           O    4.1.12 #1
Hardware name: Insyde RiverForest/Type2 - Board Product Name1, BIOS NE5KV904 12/21/2015
Workqueue: events release_one_tty
task: ffff88085b684960 ti: ffff880852884000 task.ti: ffff880852884000
RIP: 0010:[]  [] strchr+0x0/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880852887c90  EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffffffff81a5eca0 RBX: ffffffffa01979de RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: ffff880852887d10 RSI: 000000000000002f RDI: ffffffffa01979de
RBP: ffff880852887cd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88085f5d94d0
R10: 0000000000000195 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffa01979de
R13: ffff880852887d00 R14: ffffffffa01979de R15: ffff88085f02e840
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88085f5c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffa01979de CR3: 0000000001a0c000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Stack:
 ffffffff812349b1 ffff880852887cb8 ffff880852887d10 ffff88085f5cd6c2
 ffff880852800a80 ffffffffa01979de ffff880852800a84 0000000000000010
 ffff88085bb28bd8 ffff880852887d38 ffffffff812354f0 ffff880852887d08
Call Trace:
 [] ? __xlate_proc_name+0x71/0xd0
 [] remove_proc_entry+0x40/0x180
 [] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x41/0x60
 [] ? destruct_tty_driver+0x60/0xe0
 [] proc_tty_unregister_driver+0x28/0x40
 [] destruct_tty_driver+0x88/0xe0
 [] tty_driver_kref_put+0x1d/0x20
 [] release_one_tty+0x5a/0xd0
 [] process_one_work+0x139/0x420
 [] worker_thread+0x121/0x450
 [] ? process_scheduled_works+0x40/0x40
 [] kthread+0xec/0x110
 [] ? tg_rt_schedulable+0x210/0x220
 [] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x80/0x80
 [] ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70
 [] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x80/0x80

Signed-off-by: nixiaoming 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas

2017-06-26T05:10:54+00:00

commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Tested-by: Helge Deller  # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
[wt: backport to 3.18: adjust context ; no FOLL_POPULATE ;
     s390 uses generic arch_get_unmapped_area()]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau 
[gkh: minor build fixes for 3.18]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: prevent accessing /proc//environ until it's ready

2016-07-12T12:48:04+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 ]

If /proc//environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.

Fix this as it is done for /proc//cmdline by testing env_end for
zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().

This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.

The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc//environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.

Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause 
Cc: Emese Revfy 
Cc: Pax Team 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Mateusz Guzik 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Cc: Jarod Wilson 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top

2016-06-20T03:47:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit e54ad7f1ee263ffa5a2de9c609d58dfa27b21cd9 ]

This prevents stacking filesystems (ecryptfs and overlayfs) from using
procfs as lower filesystem.  There is too much magic going on inside
procfs, and there is no good reason to stack stuff on top of procfs.

(For example, procfs does access checks in VFS open handlers, and
ecryptfs by design calls open handlers from a kernel thread that doesn't
drop privileges or so.)

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

mm: fix huge zero page accounting in smaps report

2016-06-03T15:30:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit c164e038eee805147e95789dddb88ae3b3aca11c ]

As a small zero page, huge zero page should not be accounted in smaps
report as normal page.

For small pages we rely on vm_normal_page() to filter out zero page, but
vm_normal_page() is not designed to handle pmds.  We only get here due
hackish cast pmd to pte in smaps_pte_range() -- pte and pmd format is not
necessary compatible on each and every architecture.

Let's add separate codepath to handle pmds.  follow_trans_huge_pmd() will
detect huge zero page for us.

We would need pmd_dirty() helper to do this properly.  The patch adds it
to THP-enabled architectures which don't yet have one.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use do_div to fix 32-bit build]
Signed-off-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu 
Tested-by: Fengwei Yin 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin