linux-stable.git/fs/proc, branch v3.16.35

fs/proc, core/debug: Don't expose absolute kernel addresses via wchan

2015-12-13T17:49:51+00:00

commit b2f73922d119686323f14fbbe46587f863852328 upstream.

So the /proc/PID/stat 'wchan' field (the 30th field, which contains
the absolute kernel address of the kernel function a task is blocked in)
leaks absolute kernel addresses to unprivileged user-space:

        seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan);

The absolute address might also leak via /proc/PID/wchan as well, if
KALLSYMS is turned off or if the symbol lookup fails for some reason:

static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
                          struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
        unsigned long wchan;
        char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];

        wchan = get_wchan(task);

        if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0) {
                if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
                        return 0;
                seq_printf(m, "%lu", wchan);
        } else {
                seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
        }

        return 0;
}

This isn't ideal, because for example it trivially leaks the KASLR offset
to any local attacker:

  fomalhaut:~> printf "%016lx\n" $(cat /proc/$$/stat | cut -d' ' -f35)
  ffffffff8123b380

Most real-life uses of wchan are symbolic:

  ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm

and procps uses /proc/PID/wchan, not the absolute address in /proc/PID/stat:

  triton:~/tip> strace -f ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm 2>&1 | grep wchan | tail -1
  open("/proc/30833/wchan", O_RDONLY)     = 6

There's one compatibility quirk here: procps relies on whether the
absolute value is non-zero - and we can provide that functionality
by outputing "0" or "1" depending on whether the task is blocked
(whether there's a wchan address).

These days there appears to be very little legitimate reason
user-space would be interested in  the absolute address. The
absolute address is mostly historic: from the days when we
didn't have kallsyms and user-space procps had to do the
decoding itself via the System.map.

So this patch sets all numeric output to "0" or "1" and keeps only
symbolic output, in /proc/PID/wchan.

( The absolute sleep address can generally still be profiled via
  perf, by tasks with sufficient privileges. )

Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Kostya Serebryany 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Sasha Levin 
Cc: kasan-dev 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930135917.GA3285@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
[ kamal: backport to 3.16-stable: proc_pid_wchan context ]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

proc: actually make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly

2015-12-13T17:49:12+00:00

commit 54708d2858e79a2bdda10bf8a20c80eb96c20613 upstream.

The commit 96d0df79f264 ("proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly")
fixed the access to /proc/self/fd from sub-threads, but introduced another
problem: a sub-thread can't access /proc//fd/ or /proc/thread-self/fd
if generic_permission() fails.

Change proc_fd_permission() to check same_thread_group(pid_task(), current).

Fixes: 96d0df79f264 ("proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly")
Reported-by: "Jin, Yihua" 
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points

2015-07-15T09:01:06+00:00

commit eb6d38d5427b3ad42f5268da0f1dd31bb0af1264 upstream.

Add a new function proc_create_mount_point that when used to creates a
directory that can not be added to.

Add a new function is_empty_pde to test if a function is a mount
point.

Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting
a permanently empty directory to the vfs.

Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.

Update /proc/openprom and /proc/fs/nfsd to be permanently empty directories.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.

2015-07-15T09:01:06+00:00

commit f9bd6733d3f11e24f3949becf277507d422ee1eb upstream.

Add a magic sysctl table sysctl_mount_point that when used to
create a directory forces that directory to be permanently empty.

Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when accessing permanently
empty directories.

Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.

Update /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc to be a permanently empty directory.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace

2015-07-09T13:36:04+00:00

commit 1b852bceb0d111e510d1a15826ecc4a19358d512 upstream.

Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount.  Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags.  Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.

Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.

Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace

2015-03-30T10:11:38+00:00

commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce upstream.

As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Mark Seaborn 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

proc/pagemap: walk page tables under pte lock

2015-03-03T14:54:07+00:00

commit 05fbf357d94152171bc50f8a369390f1f16efd89 upstream.

Lockless access to pte in pagemap_pte_range() might race with page
migration and trigger BUG_ON(!PageLocked()) in migration_entry_to_page():

CPU A (pagemap)                           CPU B (migration)
                                          lock_page()
                                          try_to_unmap(page, TTU_MIGRATION...)
                                               make_migration_entry()
                                               set_pte_at()

pte_to_pagemap_entry()
                                          remove_migration_ptes()
                                          unlock_page()
    if(is_migration_entry())
        migration_entry_to_page()
            BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page))

Also lockless read might be non-atomic if pte is larger than wordsize.
Other pte walkers (smaps, numa_maps, clear_refs) already lock ptes.

Fixes: 052fb0d635df ("proc: report file/anon bit in /proc/pid/pagemap")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Reported-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi 
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

mm: softdirty: unmapped addresses between VMAs are clean

2015-03-03T14:52:26+00:00

commit 81d0fa623c5b8dbd5279d9713094b0f9b0a00fb4 upstream.

If a /proc/pid/pagemap read spans a [VMA, an unmapped region, then a
VM_SOFTDIRTY VMA], the virtual pages in the unmapped region are reported
as softdirty.  Here's a program to demonstrate the bug:

int main() {
	const uint64_t PAGEMAP_SOFTDIRTY = 1ul << 55;
	uint64_t pme[3];
	int fd = open("/proc/self/pagemap", O_RDONLY);;
	char *m = mmap(NULL, 3 * getpagesize(), PROT_READ,
	               MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_SHARED, -1, 0);
	munmap(m + getpagesize(), getpagesize());
	pread(fd, pme, 24, (unsigned long) m / getpagesize() * 8);
	assert(pme[0] & PAGEMAP_SOFTDIRTY);    /* passes */
	assert(!(pme[1] & PAGEMAP_SOFTDIRTY)); /* fails */
	assert(pme[2] & PAGEMAP_SOFTDIRTY);    /* passes */
	return 0;
}

(Note that all pages in new VMAs are softdirty until cleared).

Tested:
	Used the program given above. I'm going to include this code in
	a selftest in the future.

[n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com: prevent pagemap_pte_range() from overrunning]
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner 
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov 
Cc: Jamie Liu 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi 
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[ luis: 3.16-stable prereq for:
  05fbf357d941 "proc/pagemap: walk page tables under pte lock" ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

procfs: fix race between symlink removals and traversals

2015-03-02T15:04:37+00:00

commit 7e0e953bb0cf649f93277ac8fb67ecbb7f7b04a9 upstream.

use_pde()/unuse_pde() in ->follow_link()/->put_link() resp.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques

genirq: Prevent proc race against freeing of irq descriptors

2015-01-15T10:44:31+00:00

commit c291ee622165cb2c8d4e7af63fffd499354a23be upstream.

Since the rework of the sparse interrupt code to actually free the
unused interrupt descriptors there exists a race between the /proc
interfaces to the irq subsystem and the code which frees the interrupt
descriptor.

CPU0				CPU1
				show_interrupts()
				  desc = irq_to_desc(X);
free_desc(desc)
  remove_from_radix_tree();
  kfree(desc);
				  raw_spinlock_irq(&desc->lock);

/proc/interrupts is the only interface which can actively corrupt
kernel memory via the lock access. /proc/stat can only read from freed
memory. Extremly hard to trigger, but possible.

The interfaces in /proc/irq/N/ are not affected by this because the
removal of the proc file is serialized in procfs against concurrent
readers/writers. The removal happens before the descriptor is freed.

For architectures which have CONFIG_SPARSE_IRQ=n this is a non issue
as the descriptor is never freed. It's merely cleared out with the irq
descriptor lock held. So any concurrent proc access will either see
the old correct value or the cleared out ones.

Protect the lookup and access to the irq descriptor in
show_interrupts() with the sparse_irq_lock.

Provide kstat_irqs_usr() which is protecting the lookup and access
with sparse_irq_lock and switch /proc/stat to use it.

Document the existing kstat_irqs interfaces so it's clear that the
caller needs to take care about protection. The users of these
interfaces are either not affected due to SPARSE_IRQ=n or already
protected against removal.

Fixes: 1f5a5b87f78f "genirq: Implement a sane sparse_irq allocator"
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques