linux-stable.git/fs/proc/vmcore.c, branch v5.18

proc/vmcore: fix vmcore_alloc_buf() kernel-doc comment

2022-03-24T02:00:33+00:00

Fix a spelling problem to remove warnings found by running
scripts/kernel-doc, which is caused by using 'make W=1'.

  fs/proc/vmcore.c:492: warning: Function parameter or member 'size' not described in 'vmcore_alloc_buf'
  fs/proc/vmcore.c:492: warning: Excess function parameter 'sizez' description in 'vmcore_alloc_buf'

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220129011449.105278-1-yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Li 
Reported-by: Abaci Robot 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc/vmcore: fix possible deadlock on concurrent mmap and read

2022-03-24T02:00:33+00:00

Lockdep noticed that there is chance for a deadlock if we have concurrent
mmap, concurrent read, and the addition/removal of a callback.

As nicely explained by Boqun:
 "Lockdep warned about the above sequences because rw_semaphore is a
  fair read-write lock, and the following can cause a deadlock:

	TASK 1			TASK 2		TASK 3
	======			======		======
	down_write(mmap_lock);
				down_read(vmcore_cb_rwsem)
						down_write(vmcore_cb_rwsem); // blocked
	down_read(vmcore_cb_rwsem); // cannot get the lock because of the fairness
				down_read(mmap_lock); // blocked

  IOW, a reader can block another read if there is a writer queued by
  the second reader and the lock is fair"

To fix this, convert to srcu to make this deadlock impossible.  We need
srcu as our callbacks can sleep.  With this change, I cannot trigger any
lockdep warnings.

    ======================================================
    WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
    5.17.0-0.rc0.20220117git0c947b893d69.68.test.fc36.x86_64 #1 Not tainted
    ------------------------------------------------------
    makedumpfile/542 is trying to acquire lock:
    ffffffff832d2eb8 (vmcore_cb_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: mmap_vmcore+0x340/0x580

    but task is already holding lock:
    ffff8880af226438 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x84/0x150

    which lock already depends on the new lock.

    the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

    -> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}:
           lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1a0
           __might_fault+0x4e/0x70
           _copy_to_user+0x1f/0x90
           __copy_oldmem_page+0x72/0xc0
           read_from_oldmem+0x77/0x1e0
           read_vmcore+0x2c2/0x310
           proc_reg_read+0x47/0xa0
           vfs_read+0x101/0x340
           __x64_sys_pread64+0x5d/0xa0
           do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
           entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

    -> #0 (vmcore_cb_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3}:
           validate_chain+0x9f4/0x2670
           __lock_acquire+0x8f7/0xbc0
           lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1a0
           down_read+0x4a/0x140
           mmap_vmcore+0x340/0x580
           proc_reg_mmap+0x3e/0x90
           mmap_region+0x504/0x880
           do_mmap+0x38a/0x520
           vm_mmap_pgoff+0xc1/0x150
           ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x178/0x200
           do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
           entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

    other info that might help us debug this:

     Possible unsafe locking scenario:

           CPU0                    CPU1
           ----                    ----
      lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2);
                                   lock(vmcore_cb_rwsem);
                                   lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2);
      lock(vmcore_cb_rwsem);

     *** DEADLOCK ***

    1 lock held by makedumpfile/542:
     #0: ffff8880af226438 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x84/0x150

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 0 PID: 542 Comm: makedumpfile Not tainted 5.17.0-0.rc0.20220117git0c947b893d69.68.test.fc36.x86_64 #1
    Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     __lock_acquire+0x8f7/0xbc0
     lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1a0
     down_read+0x4a/0x140
     mmap_vmcore+0x340/0x580
     proc_reg_mmap+0x3e/0x90
     mmap_region+0x504/0x880
     do_mmap+0x38a/0x520
     vm_mmap_pgoff+0xc1/0x150
     ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x178/0x200
     do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220119193417.100385-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: cc5f2704c934 ("proc/vmcore: convert oldmem_pfn_is_ram callback to more generic vmcore callbacks")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand 
Reported-by: Baoquan He 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Cc: Vivek Goyal 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" 
Cc: Josh Triplett 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Boqun Feng 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc/vmcore: don't fake reading zeroes on surprise vmcore_cb unregistration

2022-01-20T06:52:52+00:00

In commit cc5f2704c934 ("proc/vmcore: convert oldmem_pfn_is_ram callback
to more generic vmcore callbacks"), we added detection of surprise
vmcore_cb unregistration after the vmcore was already opened.  Once
detected, we warn the user and simulate reading zeroes from that point
on when accessing the vmcore.

The basic reason was that unexpected unregistration, for example, by
manually unbinding a driver from a device after opening the vmcore, is
not supported and could result in reading oldmem the vmcore_cb would
have actually prohibited while registered.  However, something like that
can similarly be trigger by a user that's really looking for trouble
simply by unbinding the relevant driver before opening the vmcore -- or
by disallowing loading the driver in the first place.  So it's actually
of limited help.

Currently, unregistration can only be triggered via virtio-mem when
manually unbinding the driver from the device inside the VM; there is no
way to trigger it from the hypervisor, as hypervisors don't allow for
unplugging virtio-mem devices -- ripping out system RAM from a VM
without coordination with the guest is usually not a good idea.

The important part is that unbinding the driver and unregistering the
vmcore_cb while concurrently reading the vmcore won't crash the system,
and that is handled by the rwsem.

To make the mechanism more future proof, let's remove the "read zero"
part, but leave the warning in place.  For example, we could have a
future driver (like virtio-balloon) that will contact the hypervisor to
figure out if we already populated a page for a given PFN.
Hotunplugging such a device and consequently unregistering the vmcore_cb
could be triggered from the hypervisor without harming the system even
while kdump is running.  In that case, we don't want to silently end up
with a vmcore that contains wrong data, because the user inside the VM
might be unaware of the hypervisor action and might easily miss the
warning in the log.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211111192243.22002-1-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: Vivek Goyal 
Cc: Philipp Rudo 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc/vmcore: fix clearing user buffer by properly using clear_user()

2021-11-20T18:35:55+00:00

To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use
clear_user().  With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and
has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block,
I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp":

  systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service...
  kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3).
  kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
  kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
  kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete
  kdump[467]: saving vmcore
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
  PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867
  Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86
  Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81
  RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212
  RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008
  RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50
  R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000
  R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8
  FS:  00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
  Call Trace:
   read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0
   proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0
   vfs_read+0x95/0x190
   ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access
Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel
to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on
wrong access.  In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly
handled via clac()+stac().

To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 997c136f518c ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: Baoquan He 
Cc: Vivek Goyal 
Cc: Philipp Rudo 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)

2021-11-09T18:11:53+00:00

Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
 "87 patches.

  Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (pagecache and hugetlb),
  procfs, misc, MAINTAINERS, lib, checkpatch, binfmt, kallsyms, ramfs,
  init, codafs, nilfs2, hfs, crash_dump, signals, seq_file, fork,
  sysvfs, kcov, gdb, resource, selftests, and ipc"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton : (87 commits)
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c: remove fallback for !CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
  ipc: check checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() to modify C/R proc files
  selftests/kselftest/runner/run_one(): allow running non-executable files
  virtio-mem: disallow mapping virtio-mem memory via /dev/mem
  kernel/resource: disallow access to exclusive system RAM regions
  kernel/resource: clean up and optimize iomem_is_exclusive()
  scripts/gdb: handle split debug for vmlinux
  kcov: replace local_irq_save() with a local_lock_t
  kcov: avoid enable+disable interrupts if !in_task()
  kcov: allocate per-CPU memory on the relevant node
  Documentation/kcov: define `ip' in the example
  Documentation/kcov: include types.h in the example
  sysv: use BUILD_BUG_ON instead of runtime check
  kernel/fork.c: unshare(): use swap() to make code cleaner
  seq_file: fix passing wrong private data
  seq_file: move seq_escape() to a header
  signal: remove duplicate include in signal.h
  crash_dump: remove duplicate include in crash_dump.h
  crash_dump: fix boolreturn.cocci warning
  hfs/hfsplus: use WARN_ON for sanity check
  ...

proc/vmcore: convert oldmem_pfn_is_ram callback to more generic vmcore callbacks

2021-11-09T18:02:48+00:00

Let's support multiple registered callbacks, making sure that
registering vmcore callbacks cannot fail.  Make the callback return a
bool instead of an int, handling how to deal with errors internally.
Drop unused HAVE_OLDMEM_PFN_IS_RAM.

We soon want to make use of this infrastructure from other drivers:
virtio-mem, registering one callback for each virtio-mem device, to
prevent reading unplugged virtio-mem memory.

Handle it via a generic vmcore_cb structure, prepared for future
extensions: for example, once we support virtio-mem on s390x where the
vmcore is completely constructed in the second kernel, we want to detect
and add plugged virtio-mem memory ranges to the vmcore in order for them
to get dumped properly.

Handle corner cases that are unexpected and shouldn't happen in sane
setups: registering a callback after the vmcore has already been opened
(warn only) and unregistering a callback after the vmcore has already been
opened (warn and essentially read only zeroes from that point on).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211005121430.30136-6-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand 
Cc: Baoquan He 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jason Wang 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Oscar Salvador 
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" 
Cc: Stefano Stabellini 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vivek Goyal 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc/vmcore: let pfn_is_ram() return a bool

2021-11-09T18:02:48+00:00

The callback should deal with errors internally, it doesn't make sense
to expose these via pfn_is_ram().  We'll rework the callbacks next.
Right now we consider errors as if "it's RAM"; no functional change.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211005121430.30136-5-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand 
Cc: Baoquan He 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jason Wang 
Cc: Juergen Gross 
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Oscar Salvador 
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" 
Cc: Stefano Stabellini 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vivek Goyal 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with cc_platform_has()

2021-10-04T09:47:24+00:00

Replace uses of mem_encrypt_active() with calls to cc_platform_has() with
the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute.

Remove the implementation of mem_encrypt_active() across all arches.

For s390, since the default implementation of the cc_platform_has()
matches the s390 implementation of mem_encrypt_active(), cc_platform_has()
does not need to be implemented in s390 (the config option
ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM is not set).

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-9-bp@alien8.de

vmalloc: remove redundant NULL check

2021-02-24T21:38:30+00:00

Fix below warnings reported by coccicheck:

  fs/proc/vmcore.c:1503:2-7: WARNING: NULL check before some freeing functions is not needed.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1611216753-44598-1-git-send-email-abaci-bugfix@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Li 
Reported-by: Abaci Robot 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: Vivek Goyal 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: don't include asm/pgtable.h if linux/mm.h is already included

2020-06-09T16:39:13+00:00

Patch series "mm: consolidate definitions of page table accessors", v2.

The low level page table accessors (pXY_index(), pXY_offset()) are
duplicated across all architectures and sometimes more than once.  For
instance, we have 31 definition of pgd_offset() for 25 supported
architectures.

Most of these definitions are actually identical and typically it boils
down to, e.g.

static inline unsigned long pmd_index(unsigned long address)
{
        return (address >> PMD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PMD - 1);
}

static inline pmd_t *pmd_offset(pud_t *pud, unsigned long address)
{
        return (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(*pud) + pmd_index(address);
}

These definitions can be shared among 90% of the arches provided
XYZ_SHIFT, PTRS_PER_XYZ and xyz_page_vaddr() are defined.

For architectures that really need a custom version there is always
possibility to override the generic version with the usual ifdefs magic.

These patches introduce include/linux/pgtable.h that replaces
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h and add the definitions of the page table
accessors to the new header.

This patch (of 12):

The linux/mm.h header includes  to allow inlining of the
functions involving page table manipulations, e.g.  pte_alloc() and
pmd_alloc().  So, there is no point to explicitly include 
in the files that include .

The include statements in such cases are remove with a simple loop:

	for f in $(git grep -l "include ") ; do
		sed -i -e '/include / d' $f
	done

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Cain 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Chris Zankel 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Greentime Hu 
Cc: Greg Ungerer 
Cc: Guan Xuetao 
Cc: Guo Ren 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Ley Foon Tan 
Cc: Mark Salter 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Max Filippov 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Nick Hu 
Cc: Paul Walmsley 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Rich Felker 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Stafford Horne 
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: Vincent Chen 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Yoshinori Sato 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-1-rppt@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-2-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds