<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/proc/internal.h, branch linux-3.18.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>procfs: fix race between symlink removals and traversals</title>
<updated>2015-03-14T19:37:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-22T03:16:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=208fb83dac2f4355d854222d2e9cb17a4123fd58'/>
<id>208fb83dac2f4355d854222d2e9cb17a4123fd58</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7e0e953bb0cf649f93277ac8fb67ecbb7f7b04a9 upstream.

use_pde()/unuse_pde() in -&gt;follow_link()/-&gt;put_link() resp.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7e0e953bb0cf649f93277ac8fb67ecbb7f7b04a9 upstream.

use_pde()/unuse_pde() in -&gt;follow_link()/-&gt;put_link() resp.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc/maps: replace proc_maps_private-&gt;pid with "struct inode *inode"</title>
<updated>2014-10-10T02:25:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-09T22:25:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2c03376d2db005869b1d4449097d51c96196529e'/>
<id>2c03376d2db005869b1d4449097d51c96196529e</id>
<content type='text'>
m_start() can use get_proc_task() instead, and "struct inode *"
provides more potentially useful info, see the next changes.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@uclinux.org&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
m_start() can use get_proc_task() instead, and "struct inode *"
provides more potentially useful info, see the next changes.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@uclinux.org&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/proc/task_mmu.c: shift mm_access() from m_start() to proc_maps_open()</title>
<updated>2014-10-10T02:25:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-09T22:25:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=29a40ace841cba9b661711f042d1821cdc4ad47c'/>
<id>29a40ace841cba9b661711f042d1821cdc4ad47c</id>
<content type='text'>
A simple test-case from Kirill Shutemov

	cat /proc/self/maps &gt;/dev/null
	chmod +x /proc/self/net/packet
	exec /proc/self/net/packet

makes lockdep unhappy, cat/exec take seq_file-&gt;lock + cred_guard_mutex in
the opposite order.

It's a false positive and probably we should not allow "chmod +x" on proc
files. Still I think that we should avoid mm_access() and cred_guard_mutex
in sys_read() paths, security checking should happen at open time. Besides,
this doesn't even look right if the task changes its -&gt;mm between m_stop()
and m_start().

Add the new "mm_struct *mm" member into struct proc_maps_private and change
proc_maps_open() to initialize it using proc_mem_open(). Change m_start() to
use priv-&gt;mm if atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_users) succeeds or return NULL (eof)
otherwise.

The only complication is that proc_maps_open() users should additionally do
mmdrop() in fop-&gt;release(), add the new proc_map_release() helper for that.

Note: this is the user-visible change, if the task execs after open("maps")
the new -&gt;mm won't be visible via this file. I hope this is fine, and this
matches /proc/pid/mem bahaviour.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A simple test-case from Kirill Shutemov

	cat /proc/self/maps &gt;/dev/null
	chmod +x /proc/self/net/packet
	exec /proc/self/net/packet

makes lockdep unhappy, cat/exec take seq_file-&gt;lock + cred_guard_mutex in
the opposite order.

It's a false positive and probably we should not allow "chmod +x" on proc
files. Still I think that we should avoid mm_access() and cred_guard_mutex
in sys_read() paths, security checking should happen at open time. Besides,
this doesn't even look right if the task changes its -&gt;mm between m_stop()
and m_start().

Add the new "mm_struct *mm" member into struct proc_maps_private and change
proc_maps_open() to initialize it using proc_mem_open(). Change m_start() to
use priv-&gt;mm if atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_users) succeeds or return NULL (eof)
otherwise.

The only complication is that proc_maps_open() users should additionally do
mmdrop() in fop-&gt;release(), add the new proc_map_release() helper for that.

Note: this is the user-visible change, if the task execs after open("maps")
the new -&gt;mm won't be visible via this file. I hope this is fine, and this
matches /proc/pid/mem bahaviour.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: introduce proc_mem_open()</title>
<updated>2014-10-10T02:25:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-09T22:25:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5381e169e78405bd54256860f151596f5a887617'/>
<id>5381e169e78405bd54256860f151596f5a887617</id>
<content type='text'>
Extract the mm_access() code from __mem_open() into the new helper,
proc_mem_open(), the next patch will add another caller.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Extract the mm_access() code from __mem_open() into the new helper,
proc_mem_open(), the next patch will add another caller.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2014-08-10T00:10:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-10T00:10:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=77e40aae766ccbbbb0324cb92ab22e6e998375d7'/>
<id>77e40aae766ccbbbb0324cb92ab22e6e998375d7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a bunch of small changes built against 3.16-rc6.  The most
  significant change for users is the first patch which makes setns
  drmatically faster by removing unneded rcu handling.

  The next chunk of changes are so that "mount -o remount,.." will not
  allow the user namespace root to drop flags on a mount set by the
  system wide root.  Aks this forces read-only mounts to stay read-only,
  no-dev mounts to stay no-dev, no-suid mounts to stay no-suid, no-exec
  mounts to stay no exec and it prevents unprivileged users from messing
  with a mounts atime settings.  I have included my test case as the
  last patch in this series so people performing backports can verify
  this change works correctly.

  The next change fixes a bug in NFS that was discovered while auditing
  nsproxy users for the first optimization.  Today you can oops the
  kernel by reading /proc/fs/nfsfs/{servers,volumes} if you are clever
  with pid namespaces.  I rebased and fixed the build of the
  !CONFIG_NFS_FS case yesterday when a build bot caught my typo.  Given
  that no one to my knowledge bases anything on my tree fixing the typo
  in place seems more responsible that requiring a typo-fix to be
  backported as well.

  The last change is a small semantic cleanup introducing
  /proc/thread-self and pointing /proc/mounts and /proc/net at it.  This
  prevents several kinds of problemantic corner cases.  It is a
  user-visible change so it has a minute chance of causing regressions
  so the change to /proc/mounts and /proc/net are individual one line
  commits that can be trivially reverted.  Unfortunately I lost and
  could not find the email of the original reporter so he is not
  credited.  From at least one perspective this change to /proc/net is a
  refgression fix to allow pthread /proc/net uses that were broken by
  the introduction of the network namespace"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc: Point /proc/mounts at /proc/thread-self/mounts instead of /proc/self/mounts
  proc: Point /proc/net at /proc/thread-self/net instead of /proc/self/net
  proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current thread
  proc: Have net show up under /proc/&lt;tgid&gt;/task/&lt;tid&gt;
  NFS: Fix /proc/fs/nfsfs/servers and /proc/fs/nfsfs/volumes
  mnt: Add tests for unprivileged remount cases that have found to be faulty
  mnt: Change the default remount atime from relatime to the existing value
  mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
  mnt: Move the test for MNT_LOCK_READONLY from change_mount_flags into do_remount
  mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
  namespaces: Use task_lock and not rcu to protect nsproxy
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a bunch of small changes built against 3.16-rc6.  The most
  significant change for users is the first patch which makes setns
  drmatically faster by removing unneded rcu handling.

  The next chunk of changes are so that "mount -o remount,.." will not
  allow the user namespace root to drop flags on a mount set by the
  system wide root.  Aks this forces read-only mounts to stay read-only,
  no-dev mounts to stay no-dev, no-suid mounts to stay no-suid, no-exec
  mounts to stay no exec and it prevents unprivileged users from messing
  with a mounts atime settings.  I have included my test case as the
  last patch in this series so people performing backports can verify
  this change works correctly.

  The next change fixes a bug in NFS that was discovered while auditing
  nsproxy users for the first optimization.  Today you can oops the
  kernel by reading /proc/fs/nfsfs/{servers,volumes} if you are clever
  with pid namespaces.  I rebased and fixed the build of the
  !CONFIG_NFS_FS case yesterday when a build bot caught my typo.  Given
  that no one to my knowledge bases anything on my tree fixing the typo
  in place seems more responsible that requiring a typo-fix to be
  backported as well.

  The last change is a small semantic cleanup introducing
  /proc/thread-self and pointing /proc/mounts and /proc/net at it.  This
  prevents several kinds of problemantic corner cases.  It is a
  user-visible change so it has a minute chance of causing regressions
  so the change to /proc/mounts and /proc/net are individual one line
  commits that can be trivially reverted.  Unfortunately I lost and
  could not find the email of the original reporter so he is not
  credited.  From at least one perspective this change to /proc/net is a
  refgression fix to allow pthread /proc/net uses that were broken by
  the introduction of the network namespace"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc: Point /proc/mounts at /proc/thread-self/mounts instead of /proc/self/mounts
  proc: Point /proc/net at /proc/thread-self/net instead of /proc/self/net
  proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current thread
  proc: Have net show up under /proc/&lt;tgid&gt;/task/&lt;tid&gt;
  NFS: Fix /proc/fs/nfsfs/servers and /proc/fs/nfsfs/volumes
  mnt: Add tests for unprivileged remount cases that have found to be faulty
  mnt: Change the default remount atime from relatime to the existing value
  mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
  mnt: Move the test for MNT_LOCK_READONLY from change_mount_flags into do_remount
  mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
  namespaces: Use task_lock and not rcu to protect nsproxy
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: remove INF macro</title>
<updated>2014-08-08T22:57:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-08T21:21:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8f053ac11f96cc6edcabcbb154c9cf06c5d63333'/>
<id>8f053ac11f96cc6edcabcbb154c9cf06c5d63333</id>
<content type='text'>
If you're applying this patch, all /proc/$PID/* files were converted
to seq_file interface and this code became unused.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If you're applying this patch, all /proc/$PID/* files were converted
to seq_file interface and this code became unused.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: make proc_subdir_lock static</title>
<updated>2014-08-08T22:57:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-08T21:21:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4dcc03fc4553943c8bae086aa826bb75171e82a1'/>
<id>4dcc03fc4553943c8bae086aa826bb75171e82a1</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: add and remove /proc entry create checks</title>
<updated>2014-08-08T22:57:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-08T21:21:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dbcdb504417ae108a20454ef89776a614b948571'/>
<id>dbcdb504417ae108a20454ef89776a614b948571</id>
<content type='text'>
* remove proc_create(NULL, ...) check, let it oops

* warn about proc_create("", ...) and proc_create("very very long name", ...)
  proc code keeps length as u8, no 256+ name length possible

* warn about proc_create("123", ...)
  /proc/$PID and /proc/misc namespaces are separate things,
  but dumb module might create funky a-la $PID entry.

* remove post mortem strchr('/') check
  Triggering it implies either strchr() is buggy or memory corruption.
  It should be VFS check anyway.

In reality, none of these checks will ever trigger,
it is preparation for the next patch.

Based on patch from Al Viro.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* remove proc_create(NULL, ...) check, let it oops

* warn about proc_create("", ...) and proc_create("very very long name", ...)
  proc code keeps length as u8, no 256+ name length possible

* warn about proc_create("123", ...)
  /proc/$PID and /proc/misc namespaces are separate things,
  but dumb module might create funky a-la $PID entry.

* remove post mortem strchr('/') check
  Triggering it implies either strchr() is buggy or memory corruption.
  It should be VFS check anyway.

In reality, none of these checks will ever trigger,
it is preparation for the next patch.

Based on patch from Al Viro.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current thread</title>
<updated>2014-08-04T17:07:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-31T10:10:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0097875bd41528922fb3bb5f348c53f17e00e2fd'/>
<id>0097875bd41528922fb3bb5f348c53f17e00e2fd</id>
<content type='text'>
/proc/thread-self is derived from /proc/self.  /proc/thread-self
points to the directory in proc containing information about the
current thread.

This funtionality has been missing for a long time, and is tricky to
implement in userspace as gettid() is not exported by glibc.  More
importantly this allows fixing defects in /proc/mounts and /proc/net
where in a threaded application today they wind up being empty files
when only the initial pthread has exited, causing problems for other
threads.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
/proc/thread-self is derived from /proc/self.  /proc/thread-self
points to the directory in proc containing information about the
current thread.

This funtionality has been missing for a long time, and is tricky to
implement in userspace as gettid() is not exported by glibc.  More
importantly this allows fixing defects in /proc/mounts and /proc/net
where in a threaded application today they wind up being empty files
when only the initial pthread has exited, causing problems for other
threads.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>of: remove /proc/device-tree</title>
<updated>2014-03-11T20:48:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Grant Likely</name>
<email>grant.likely@secretlab.ca</email>
</author>
<published>2012-11-06T21:03:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8357041a69b368991d1b04d9f1d297f8d71e1314'/>
<id>8357041a69b368991d1b04d9f1d297f8d71e1314</id>
<content type='text'>
The same data is now available in sysfs, so we can remove the code
that exports it in /proc and replace it with a symlink to the sysfs
version.

Tested on versatile qemu model and mpc5200 eval board. More testing
would be appreciated.

v5: Fixed up conflicts with mainline changes

Signed-off-by: Grant Likely &lt;grant.likely@secretlab.ca&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;rob.herring@calxeda.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Nathan Fontenot &lt;nfont@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Pantelis Antoniou &lt;panto@antoniou-consulting.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The same data is now available in sysfs, so we can remove the code
that exports it in /proc and replace it with a symlink to the sysfs
version.

Tested on versatile qemu model and mpc5200 eval board. More testing
would be appreciated.

v5: Fixed up conflicts with mainline changes

Signed-off-by: Grant Likely &lt;grant.likely@secretlab.ca&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;rob.herring@calxeda.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Nathan Fontenot &lt;nfont@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Pantelis Antoniou &lt;panto@antoniou-consulting.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
