linux-stable.git/fs/proc/base.c, branch v3.18.76

proc: prevent accessing /proc//environ until it's ready

2016-07-12T12:48:04+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 ]

If /proc//environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.

Fix this as it is done for /proc//cmdline by testing env_end for
zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().

This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.

The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc//environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.

Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause 
Cc: Emese Revfy 
Cc: Pax Team 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Mateusz Guzik 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Cc: Jarod Wilson 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-04-12T21:06:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 ]

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis

2015-01-08T18:30:26+00:00

commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.

- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc//setgroups

  A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
  current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
  future in this user namespace.

  A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
  their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
  not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
  for the user namespace is set.

  This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
  level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
  from a process that already has that ability.

  A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
  creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
  setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
  Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
  is a noop.  Prodcess with privilege become processes without
  privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
  to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
  setgroups.  So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
  without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2014-10-13T09:28:42+00:00

Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "The big thing in this pile is Eric's unmount-on-rmdir series; we
  finally have everything we need for that.  The final piece of prereqs
  is delayed mntput() - now filesystem shutdown always happens on
  shallow stack.

  Other than that, we have several new primitives for iov_iter (Matt
  Wilcox, culled from his XIP-related series) pushing the conversion to
  ->read_iter()/ ->write_iter() a bit more, a bunch of fs/dcache.c
  cleanups and fixes (including the external name refcounting, which
  gives consistent behaviour of d_move() wrt procfs symlinks for long
  and short names alike) and assorted cleanups and fixes all over the
  place.

  This is just the first pile; there's a lot of stuff from various
  people that ought to go in this window.  Starting with
  unionmount/overlayfs mess...  ;-/"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (60 commits)
  fs/file_table.c: Update alloc_file() comment
  vfs: Deduplicate code shared by xattr system calls operating on paths
  reiserfs: remove pointless forward declaration of struct nameidata
  don't need that forward declaration of struct nameidata in dcache.h anymore
  take dname_external() into fs/dcache.c
  let path_init() failures treated the same way as subsequent link_path_walk()
  fix misuses of f_count() in ppp and netlink
  ncpfs: use list_for_each_entry() for d_subdirs walk
  vfs: move getname() from callers to do_mount()
  gfs2_atomic_open(): skip lookups on hashed dentry
  [infiniband] remove pointless assignments
  gadgetfs: saner API for gadgetfs_create_file()
  f_fs: saner API for ffs_sb_create_file()
  jfs: don't hash direct inode
  [s390] remove pointless assignment of ->f_op in vmlogrdr ->open()
  ecryptfs: ->f_op is never NULL
  android: ->f_op is never NULL
  nouveau: __iomem misannotations
  missing annotation in fs/file.c
  fs: namespace: suppress 'may be used uninitialized' warnings
  ...

Merge branch 'for-3.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup

2014-10-10T11:24:40+00:00

Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
 "Nothing too interesting.  Just a handful of cleanup patches"

* 'for-3.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  Revert "cgroup: remove redundant variable in cgroup_mount()"
  cgroup: remove redundant variable in cgroup_mount()
  cgroup: fix missing unlock in cgroup_release_agent()
  cgroup: remove CGRP_RELEASABLE flag
  perf/cgroup: Remove perf_put_cgroup()
  cgroup: remove redundant check in cgroup_ino()
  cpuset: simplify proc_cpuset_show()
  cgroup: simplify proc_cgroup_show()
  cgroup: use a per-cgroup work for release agent
  cgroup: remove bogus comments
  cgroup: remove redundant code in cgroup_rmdir()
  cgroup: remove some useless forward declarations
  cgroup: fix a typo in comment.

proc: introduce proc_mem_open()

2014-10-10T02:25:48+00:00

Extract the mm_access() code from __mem_open() into the new helper,
proc_mem_open(), the next patch will add another caller.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: Update proc_flush_task_mnt to use d_invalidate

2014-10-09T06:38:58+00:00

Now that d_invalidate always succeeds and flushes mount points use
it in stead of a combination of shrink_dcache_parent and d_drop
in proc_flush_task_mnt.  This removes the danger of a mount point
under /proc//... becoming unreachable after the d_drop.

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

vfs: Remove d_drop calls from d_revalidate implementations

2014-10-09T06:38:58+00:00

Now that d_invalidate always succeeds it is not longer necessary or
desirable to hard code d_drop calls into filesystem specific
d_revalidate implementations.

Remove the unnecessary d_drop calls and rely on d_invalidate
to drop the dentries.  Using d_invalidate ensures that paths
to mount points will not be dropped.

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

cpuset: simplify proc_cpuset_show()

2014-09-18T17:27:23+00:00

Use the ONE macro instead of REG, and we can simplify proc_cpuset_show().

Signed-off-by: Zefan Li 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo

cgroup: simplify proc_cgroup_show()

2014-09-18T17:27:23+00:00

Use the ONE macro instead of REG, and we can simplify proc_cgroup_show().

Signed-off-by: Zefan Li 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo