linux-stable.git/fs/overlayfs, branch linux-4.2.y

ovl: fix open in stacked overlay

2015-11-09T22:37:37+00:00

commit 1c8a47df36d72ace8cf78eb6c228aa0f8027d3c2 upstream.

If two overlayfs filesystems are stacked on top of each other, then we need
recursion in ovl_d_select_inode().

I guess d_backing_inode() is supposed to do that.  But currently it doesn't
and that functionality is open coded in vfs_open().  This is now copied
into ovl_d_select_inode() to fix this regression.

Reported-by: Alban Crequy 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay...")
Cc: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ovl: fix dentry reference leak

2015-11-09T22:37:37+00:00

commit ab79efab0a0ba01a74df782eb7fa44b044dae8b5 upstream.

In ovl_copy_up_locked(), newdentry is leaked if the function exits through
out_cleanup as this just to out after calling ovl_cleanup() - which doesn't
actually release the ref on newdentry.

The out_cleanup segment should instead exit through out2 as certainly
newdentry leaks - and possibly upper does also, though this isn't caught
given the catch of newdentry.

Without this fix, something like the following is seen:

	BUG: Dentry ffff880023e9eb20{i=f861,n=#ffff880023e82d90} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
	BUG: Dentry ffff880023ece640{i=0,n=bigfile}  still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]

when unmounting the upper layer after an error occurred in copyup.

An error can be induced by creating a big file in a lower layer with
something like:

	dd if=/dev/zero of=/lower/a/bigfile bs=65536 count=1 seek=$((0xf000))

to create a large file (4.1G).  Overlay an upper layer that is too small
(on tmpfs might do) and then induce a copy up by opening it writably.

Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ovl: use O_LARGEFILE in ovl_copy_up()

2015-11-09T22:37:37+00:00

commit 0480334fa60488d12ae101a02d7d9e1a3d03d7dd upstream.

Open the lower file with O_LARGEFILE in ovl_copy_up().

Pass O_LARGEFILE unconditionally in ovl_copy_up_data() as it's purely for
catching 32-bit userspace dealing with a file large enough that it'll be
mishandled if the application isn't aware that there might be an integer
overflow.  Inside the kernel, there shouldn't be any problems.

Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ovl: free lower_mnt array in ovl_put_super

2015-11-09T22:37:37+00:00

commit 5ffdbe8bf1e485026e1c7e4714d2841553cf0b40 upstream.

This fixes memory leak after umount.

Kmemleak report:

unreferenced object 0xffff8800ba791010 (size 8):
  comm "mount", pid 2394, jiffies 4294996294 (age 53.920s)
  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
    20 1c 13 02 00 88 ff ff                           .......
  backtrace:
    [] create_object+0x124/0x2c0
    [] kmemleak_alloc+0x7b/0xc0
    [] __kmalloc+0x106/0x340
    [] ovl_fill_super+0x55c/0x9b0 [overlay]
    [] mount_nodev+0x54/0xa0
    [] ovl_mount+0x18/0x20 [overlay]
    [] mount_fs+0x43/0x170
    [] vfs_kern_mount+0x74/0x170
    [] do_mount+0x22d/0xdf0
    [] SyS_mount+0x7b/0xc0
    [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
    [] 0xffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Fixes: dd662667e6d3 ("ovl: add mutli-layer infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ovl: free stack of paths in ovl_fill_super

2015-11-09T22:37:37+00:00

commit 0f95502ad84874b3c05fc7cdd9d4d9d5cddf7859 upstream.

This fixes small memory leak after mount.

Kmemleak report:

unreferenced object 0xffff88003683fe00 (size 16):
  comm "mount", pid 2029, jiffies 4294909563 (age 33.380s)
  hex dump (first 16 bytes):
    20 27 1f bb 00 88 ff ff 40 4b 0f 36 02 88 ff ff   '......@K.6....
  backtrace:
    [] create_object+0x124/0x2c0
    [] kmemleak_alloc+0x7b/0xc0
    [] __kmalloc+0x106/0x340
    [] ovl_fill_super+0x389/0x9a0 [overlay]
    [] mount_nodev+0x54/0xa0
    [] ovl_mount+0x18/0x20 [overlay]
    [] mount_fs+0x43/0x170
    [] vfs_kern_mount+0x74/0x170
    [] do_mount+0x22d/0xdf0
    [] SyS_mount+0x7b/0xc0
    [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
    [] 0xffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Fixes: a78d9f0d5d5c ("ovl: support multiple lower layers")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping

2015-09-21T17:10:59+00:00

commit a068acf2ee77693e0bf39d6e07139ba704f461c3 upstream.

Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly
escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g.  new
lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files.  This
could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like
systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what
else.  This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on
themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or
in other situations with delegated mount privileges.

Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the
contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink).  Imagine the use
of "sudo" is something more sneaky:

  $ BASE="ovl"
  $ MNT="$BASE/mnt"
  $ LOW="$BASE/lower"
  $ UP="$BASE/upper"
  $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0
  none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000"
  $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK"
  $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt
  $ cat /proc/mounts
  none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0
  none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0
  $ fusermount -u /proc
  $ cat /proc/mounts
  cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory

This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and
seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option
handlers to use them as needed.  Some, like SELinux, need to be open
coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees]
[keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Acked-by: Jan Kara 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Cc: J. R. Okajima 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fix a braino in ovl_d_select_inode()

2015-07-12T15:22:05+00:00

when opening a directory we want the overlayfs inode, not one from
the topmost layer.

Reported-By: Andrey Jr. Melnikov 
Tested-By: Andrey Jr. Melnikov 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2015-07-05T02:36:06+00:00

Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
  that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
  stuff).  UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle).  9P fixes.
  fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"

[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups".  The
  file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
  fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge.   - Linus ]

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
  9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
  p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
  9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
  dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
  block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
  dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
  dax: Add block size note to documentation
  fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
  fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()
  fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
  vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
  namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
  make simple_positive() public
  ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
  pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
  remove the pointless include of lglock.h
  fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
  xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
  fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate
  fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
  ...

Merge branch 'overlayfs-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs

2015-07-02T18:23:00+00:00

Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
 "This relaxes the requirements on the lower layer filesystem: now ones
  that implement .d_revalidate, such as NFS, can be used.

  Upper layer filesystems still has the "no .d_revalidate" requirement.

  Also a bad interaction with jffs2 locking has been fixed"

* 'overlayfs-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs:
  ovl: lookup whiteouts outside iterate_dir()
  ovl: allow distributed fs as lower layer
  ovl: don't traverse automount points

Merge branch 'for-linus-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2015-06-22T19:51:21+00:00

Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "In this pile: pathname resolution rewrite.

   - recursion in link_path_walk() is gone.

   - nesting limits on symlinks are gone (the only limit remaining is
     that the total amount of symlinks is no more than 40, no matter how
     nested).

   - "fast" (inline) symlinks are handled without leaving rcuwalk mode.

   - stack footprint (independent of the nesting) is below kilobyte now,
     about on par with what it used to be with one level of nested
     symlinks and ~2.8 times lower than it used to be in the worst case.

   - struct nameidata is entirely private to fs/namei.c now (not even
     opaque pointers are being passed around).

   - ->follow_link() and ->put_link() calling conventions had been
     changed; all in-tree filesystems converted, out-of-tree should be
     able to follow reasonably easily.

     For out-of-tree conversions, see Documentation/filesystems/porting
     for details (and in-tree filesystems for examples of conversion).

  That has sat in -next since mid-May, seems to survive all testing
  without regressions and merges clean with v4.1"

* 'for-linus-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (131 commits)
  turn user_{path_at,path,lpath,path_dir}() into static inlines
  namei: move saved_nd pointer into struct nameidata
  inline user_path_create()
  inline user_path_parent()
  namei: trim do_last() arguments
  namei: stash dfd and name into nameidata
  namei: fold path_cleanup() into terminate_walk()
  namei: saner calling conventions for filename_parentat()
  namei: saner calling conventions for filename_create()
  namei: shift nameidata down into filename_parentat()
  namei: make filename_lookup() reject ERR_PTR() passed as name
  namei: shift nameidata inside filename_lookup()
  namei: move putname() call into filename_lookup()
  namei: pass the struct path to store the result down into path_lookupat()
  namei: uninline set_root{,_rcu}()
  namei: be careful with mountpoint crossings in follow_dotdot_rcu()
  Documentation: remove outdated information from automount-support.txt
  get rid of assorted nameidata-related debris
  lustre: kill unused helper
  lustre: kill unused macro (LOOKUP_CONTINUE)
  ...