<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/open.c, branch v4.9.321</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>cifs_atomic_open(): fix double-put on late allocation failure</title>
<updated>2020-03-20T08:07:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-12T22:25:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ca9a513b01100a557f99fe69abcd3d664ff88b40'/>
<id>ca9a513b01100a557f99fe69abcd3d664ff88b40</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d9a9f4849fe0c9d560851ab22a85a666cddfdd24 upstream.

several iterations of -&gt;atomic_open() calling conventions ago, we
used to need fput() if -&gt;atomic_open() failed at some point after
successful finish_open().  Now (since 2016) it's not needed -
struct file carries enough state to make fput() work regardless
of the point in struct file lifecycle and discarding it on
failure exits in open() got unified.  Unfortunately, I'd missed
the fact that we had an instance of -&gt;atomic_open() (cifs one)
that used to need that fput(), as well as the stale comment in
finish_open() demanding such late failure handling.  Trivially
fixed...

Fixes: fe9ec8291fca "do_last(): take fput() on error after opening to out:"
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d9a9f4849fe0c9d560851ab22a85a666cddfdd24 upstream.

several iterations of -&gt;atomic_open() calling conventions ago, we
used to need fput() if -&gt;atomic_open() failed at some point after
successful finish_open().  Now (since 2016) it's not needed -
struct file carries enough state to make fput() work regardless
of the point in struct file lifecycle and discarding it on
failure exits in open() got unified.  Unfortunately, I'd missed
the fact that we had an instance of -&gt;atomic_open() (cifs one)
that used to need that fput(), as well as the stale comment in
finish_open() demanding such late failure handling.  Trivially
fixed...

Fixes: fe9ec8291fca "do_last(): take fput() on error after opening to out:"
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>access: avoid the RCU grace period for the temporary subjective credentials</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:33:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-11T16:54:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=50810015e027476591c275b8b8a9a433fc577c72'/>
<id>50810015e027476591c275b8b8a9a433fc577c72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d7852fbd0f0423937fa287a598bfde188bb68c22 upstream.

It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU
work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and
freed for each system call.

The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because
credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing
involves a RCU grace period.

Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access()
calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a
nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have
all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores,
the RCU overhead can end up being enormous.

But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary.  Exactly
because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local
subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need
to be RCU free'd at all.  Once we're done using it, we can just free it
synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead.

So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that
know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential
users for this).  We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head
that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage.

Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu
flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the
cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards.  It's not
entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics:
the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it
synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as
a generic cred if you want to.

It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for
-&gt;cred entirely.  Only -&gt;real_cred is really supposed to be accessed
through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to
explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have
get_current_cred() do it implicitly.

But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate
problem.

Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Glauber &lt;jglauber@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair &lt;jnair@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d7852fbd0f0423937fa287a598bfde188bb68c22 upstream.

It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU
work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and
freed for each system call.

The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because
credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing
involves a RCU grace period.

Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access()
calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a
nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have
all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores,
the RCU overhead can end up being enormous.

But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary.  Exactly
because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local
subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need
to be RCU free'd at all.  Once we're done using it, we can just free it
synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead.

So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that
know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential
users for this).  We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head
that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage.

Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu
flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the
cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards.  It's not
entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics:
the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it
synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as
a generic cred if you want to.

It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for
-&gt;cred entirely.  Only -&gt;real_cred is really supposed to be accessed
through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to
explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have
get_current_cred() do it implicitly.

But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate
problem.

Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Glauber &lt;jglauber@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair &lt;jnair@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock</title>
<updated>2019-06-11T10:22:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill Smelkov</name>
<email>kirr@nexedi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T22:20:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9c829b6e3fe2dfe25fccc6dc0477cf86661feeac'/>
<id>9c829b6e3fe2dfe25fccc6dc0477cf86661feeac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df upstream.

Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.

This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.

The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.

However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.

See

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180396

for historic context.

The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:

	kernel/power/user.c		snapshot_read
	fs/debugfs/file.c		u32_array_read
	fs/fuse/control.c		fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
	drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c	atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
	arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c		hypfs_read_iter
	...

Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -&gt; deadlock.

Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):

	drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()

In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.

FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:

See

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
    https://lwn.net/Articles/308445

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510

Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:

    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216

I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:

    https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169

Let's fix this regression. The plan is:

1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &amp;~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
   doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
   actually use ppos in read/write handlers.

2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
   descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
   nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
   write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
   could be running simultaneously.

3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
   nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
   depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
   which assume @offset access.

4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
   steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.

   It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
   instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
   grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
   and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
   write handlers

	https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481

   so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.

5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
   from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).

   This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
   provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
   in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
   versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
   flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
   kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
   that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be &lt; v3.14 where just
   FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
   write deadlock.

This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.

Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.

The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)

Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yongzhi Pan &lt;panyongzhi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Julia Lawall &lt;Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr&gt;
Cc: Nikolaus Rath &lt;Nikolaus@rath.org&gt;
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys &lt;hanwen@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov &lt;kirr@nexedi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df upstream.

Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.

This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.

The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.

However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.

See

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180396

for historic context.

The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:

	kernel/power/user.c		snapshot_read
	fs/debugfs/file.c		u32_array_read
	fs/fuse/control.c		fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
	drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c	atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
	arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c		hypfs_read_iter
	...

Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -&gt; deadlock.

Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):

	drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()

In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.

FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:

See

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
    https://lwn.net/Articles/308445

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510

Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:

    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216

I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:

    https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169

Let's fix this regression. The plan is:

1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &amp;~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
   doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
   actually use ppos in read/write handlers.

2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
   descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
   nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
   write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
   could be running simultaneously.

3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
   nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
   depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
   which assume @offset access.

4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
   steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.

   It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
   instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
   grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
   and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
   write handlers

	https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481

   so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.

5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
   from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).

   This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
   provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
   in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
   versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
   flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
   kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
   that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be &lt; v3.14 where just
   FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
   write deadlock.

This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.

Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.

The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)

Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yongzhi Pan &lt;panyongzhi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Julia Lawall &lt;Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr&gt;
Cc: Nikolaus Rath &lt;Nikolaus@rath.org&gt;
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys &lt;hanwen@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov &lt;kirr@nexedi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files during execve()</title>
<updated>2019-04-03T04:24:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-29T03:43:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7d7637dafc59595230ff6165ead072cd15154a61'/>
<id>7d7637dafc59595230ff6165ead072cd15154a61</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 73601ea5b7b18eb234219ae2adf77530f389da79 upstream.

syzbot is hitting lockdep warning [1] due to trying to open a fifo
during an execve() operation.  But we don't need to open non regular
files during an execve() operation, for all files which we will need are
the executable file itself and the interpreter programs like /bin/sh and
ld-linux.so.2 .

Since the manpage for execve(2) says that execve() returns EACCES when
the file or a script interpreter is not a regular file, and the manpage
for uselib(2) says that uselib() can return EACCES, and we use
FMODE_EXEC when opening for execve()/uselib(), we can bail out if a non
regular file is requested with FMODE_EXEC set.

Since this deadlock followed by khungtaskd warnings is trivially
reproducible by a local unprivileged user, and syzbot's frequent crash
due to this deadlock defers finding other bugs, let's workaround this
deadlock until we get a chance to find a better solution.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=b5095bfec44ec84213bac54742a82483aad578ce

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1552044017-7890-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+e93a80c1bb7c5c56e522461c149f8bf55eab1b2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 8924feff66f35fe2 ("splice: lift pipe_lock out of splice_to_pipe()")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[4.9+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 73601ea5b7b18eb234219ae2adf77530f389da79 upstream.

syzbot is hitting lockdep warning [1] due to trying to open a fifo
during an execve() operation.  But we don't need to open non regular
files during an execve() operation, for all files which we will need are
the executable file itself and the interpreter programs like /bin/sh and
ld-linux.so.2 .

Since the manpage for execve(2) says that execve() returns EACCES when
the file or a script interpreter is not a regular file, and the manpage
for uselib(2) says that uselib() can return EACCES, and we use
FMODE_EXEC when opening for execve()/uselib(), we can bail out if a non
regular file is requested with FMODE_EXEC set.

Since this deadlock followed by khungtaskd warnings is trivially
reproducible by a local unprivileged user, and syzbot's frequent crash
due to this deadlock defers finding other bugs, let's workaround this
deadlock until we get a chance to find a better solution.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=b5095bfec44ec84213bac54742a82483aad578ce

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1552044017-7890-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+e93a80c1bb7c5c56e522461c149f8bf55eab1b2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 8924feff66f35fe2 ("splice: lift pipe_lock out of splice_to_pipe()")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[4.9+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: completely ignore unknown open flags</title>
<updated>2017-07-12T13:01:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-27T07:42:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26ff065b8401efd17cabf094f82f611f98acf022'/>
<id>26ff065b8401efd17cabf094f82f611f98acf022</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 629e014bb8349fcf7c1e4df19a842652ece1c945 upstream.

Currently we just stash anything we got into file-&gt;f_flags, and the
report it in fcntl(F_GETFD).  This patch just clears out all unknown
flags so that we don't pass them to the fs or report them.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 629e014bb8349fcf7c1e4df19a842652ece1c945 upstream.

Currently we just stash anything we got into file-&gt;f_flags, and the
report it in fcntl(F_GETFD).  This patch just clears out all unknown
flags so that we don't pass them to the fs or report them.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'xfs-reflink-for-linus-4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dgc/linux-xfs</title>
<updated>2016-10-14T03:28:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-14T03:28:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=35a891be96f1f8e1227e6ad3ca827b8a08ce47ea'/>
<id>35a891be96f1f8e1227e6ad3ca827b8a08ce47ea</id>
<content type='text'>
    &lt; XFS has gained super CoW powers! &gt;
     ----------------------------------
            \   ^__^
             \  (oo)\_______
                (__)\       )\/\
                    ||----w |
                    ||     ||

Pull XFS support for shared data extents from Dave Chinner:
 "This is the second part of the XFS updates for this merge cycle.  This
  pullreq contains the new shared data extents feature for XFS.

  Given the complexity and size of this change I am expecting - like the
  addition of reverse mapping last cycle - that there will be some
  follow-up bug fixes and cleanups around the -rc3 stage for issues that
  I'm sure will show up once the code hits a wider userbase.

  What it is:

  At the most basic level we are simply adding shared data extents to
  XFS - i.e. a single extent on disk can now have multiple owners. To do
  this we have to add new on-disk features to both track the shared
  extents and the number of times they've been shared. This is done by
  the new "refcount" btree that sits in every allocation group. When we
  share or unshare an extent, this tree gets updated.

  Along with this new tree, the reverse mapping tree needs to be updated
  to track each owner or a shared extent. This also needs to be updated
  ever share/unshare operation. These interactions at extent allocation
  and freeing time have complex ordering and recovery constraints, so
  there's a significant amount of new intent-based transaction code to
  ensure that operations are performed atomically from both the runtime
  and integrity/crash recovery perspectives.

  We also need to break sharing when writes hit a shared extent - this
  is where the new copy-on-write implementation comes in. We allocate
  new storage and copy the original data along with the overwrite data
  into the new location. We only do this for data as we don't share
  metadata at all - each inode has it's own metadata that tracks the
  shared data extents, the extents undergoing CoW and it's own private
  extents.

  Of course, being XFS, nothing is simple - we use delayed allocation
  for CoW similar to how we use it for normal writes. ENOSPC is a
  significant issue here - we build on the reservation code added in
  4.8-rc1 with the reverse mapping feature to ensure we don't get
  spurious ENOSPC issues part way through a CoW operation. These
  mechanisms also help minimise fragmentation due to repeated CoW
  operations. To further reduce fragmentation overhead, we've also
  introduced a CoW extent size hint, which indicates how large a region
  we should allocate when we execute a CoW operation.

  With all this functionality in place, we can hook up .copy_file_range,
  .clone_file_range and .dedupe_file_range and we gain all the
  capabilities of reflink and other vfs provided functionality that
  enable manipulation to shared extents. We also added a fallocate mode
  that explicitly unshares a range of a file, which we implemented as an
  explicit CoW of all the shared extents in a file.

  As such, it's a huge chunk of new functionality with new on-disk
  format features and internal infrastructure. It warns at mount time as
  an experimental feature and that it may eat data (as we do with all
  new on-disk features until they stabilise). We have not released
  userspace suport for it yet - userspace support currently requires
  download from Darrick's xfsprogs repo and build from source, so the
  access to this feature is really developer/tester only at this point.
  Initial userspace support will be released at the same time the kernel
  with this code in it is released.

  The new code causes 5-6 new failures with xfstests - these aren't
  serious functional failures but things the output of tests changing
  slightly due to perturbations in layouts, space usage, etc. OTOH,
  we've added 150+ new tests to xfstests that specifically exercise this
  new functionality so it's got far better test coverage than any
  functionality we've previously added to XFS.

  Darrick has done a pretty amazing job getting us to this stage, and
  special mention also needs to go to Christoph (review, testing,
  improvements and bug fixes) and Brian (caught several intricate bugs
  during review) for the effort they've also put in.

  Summary:

   - unshare range (FALLOC_FL_UNSHARE) support for fallocate

   - copy-on-write extent size hints (FS_XFLAG_COWEXTSIZE) for fsxattr
     interface

   - shared extent support for XFS

   - copy-on-write support for shared extents

   - copy_file_range support

   - clone_file_range support (implements reflink)

   - dedupe_file_range support

   - defrag support for reverse mapping enabled filesystems"

* tag 'xfs-reflink-for-linus-4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dgc/linux-xfs: (71 commits)
  xfs: convert COW blocks to real blocks before unwritten extent conversion
  xfs: rework refcount cow recovery error handling
  xfs: clear reflink flag if setting realtime flag
  xfs: fix error initialization
  xfs: fix label inaccuracies
  xfs: remove isize check from unshare operation
  xfs: reduce stack usage of _reflink_clear_inode_flag
  xfs: check inode reflink flag before calling reflink functions
  xfs: implement swapext for rmap filesystems
  xfs: refactor swapext code
  xfs: various swapext cleanups
  xfs: recognize the reflink feature bit
  xfs: simulate per-AG reservations being critically low
  xfs: don't mix reflink and DAX mode for now
  xfs: check for invalid inode reflink flags
  xfs: set a default CoW extent size of 32 blocks
  xfs: convert unwritten status of reverse mappings for shared files
  xfs: use interval query for rmap alloc operations on shared files
  xfs: add shared rmap map/unmap/convert log item types
  xfs: increase log reservations for reflink
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
    &lt; XFS has gained super CoW powers! &gt;
     ----------------------------------
            \   ^__^
             \  (oo)\_______
                (__)\       )\/\
                    ||----w |
                    ||     ||

Pull XFS support for shared data extents from Dave Chinner:
 "This is the second part of the XFS updates for this merge cycle.  This
  pullreq contains the new shared data extents feature for XFS.

  Given the complexity and size of this change I am expecting - like the
  addition of reverse mapping last cycle - that there will be some
  follow-up bug fixes and cleanups around the -rc3 stage for issues that
  I'm sure will show up once the code hits a wider userbase.

  What it is:

  At the most basic level we are simply adding shared data extents to
  XFS - i.e. a single extent on disk can now have multiple owners. To do
  this we have to add new on-disk features to both track the shared
  extents and the number of times they've been shared. This is done by
  the new "refcount" btree that sits in every allocation group. When we
  share or unshare an extent, this tree gets updated.

  Along with this new tree, the reverse mapping tree needs to be updated
  to track each owner or a shared extent. This also needs to be updated
  ever share/unshare operation. These interactions at extent allocation
  and freeing time have complex ordering and recovery constraints, so
  there's a significant amount of new intent-based transaction code to
  ensure that operations are performed atomically from both the runtime
  and integrity/crash recovery perspectives.

  We also need to break sharing when writes hit a shared extent - this
  is where the new copy-on-write implementation comes in. We allocate
  new storage and copy the original data along with the overwrite data
  into the new location. We only do this for data as we don't share
  metadata at all - each inode has it's own metadata that tracks the
  shared data extents, the extents undergoing CoW and it's own private
  extents.

  Of course, being XFS, nothing is simple - we use delayed allocation
  for CoW similar to how we use it for normal writes. ENOSPC is a
  significant issue here - we build on the reservation code added in
  4.8-rc1 with the reverse mapping feature to ensure we don't get
  spurious ENOSPC issues part way through a CoW operation. These
  mechanisms also help minimise fragmentation due to repeated CoW
  operations. To further reduce fragmentation overhead, we've also
  introduced a CoW extent size hint, which indicates how large a region
  we should allocate when we execute a CoW operation.

  With all this functionality in place, we can hook up .copy_file_range,
  .clone_file_range and .dedupe_file_range and we gain all the
  capabilities of reflink and other vfs provided functionality that
  enable manipulation to shared extents. We also added a fallocate mode
  that explicitly unshares a range of a file, which we implemented as an
  explicit CoW of all the shared extents in a file.

  As such, it's a huge chunk of new functionality with new on-disk
  format features and internal infrastructure. It warns at mount time as
  an experimental feature and that it may eat data (as we do with all
  new on-disk features until they stabilise). We have not released
  userspace suport for it yet - userspace support currently requires
  download from Darrick's xfsprogs repo and build from source, so the
  access to this feature is really developer/tester only at this point.
  Initial userspace support will be released at the same time the kernel
  with this code in it is released.

  The new code causes 5-6 new failures with xfstests - these aren't
  serious functional failures but things the output of tests changing
  slightly due to perturbations in layouts, space usage, etc. OTOH,
  we've added 150+ new tests to xfstests that specifically exercise this
  new functionality so it's got far better test coverage than any
  functionality we've previously added to XFS.

  Darrick has done a pretty amazing job getting us to this stage, and
  special mention also needs to go to Christoph (review, testing,
  improvements and bug fixes) and Brian (caught several intricate bugs
  during review) for the effort they've also put in.

  Summary:

   - unshare range (FALLOC_FL_UNSHARE) support for fallocate

   - copy-on-write extent size hints (FS_XFLAG_COWEXTSIZE) for fsxattr
     interface

   - shared extent support for XFS

   - copy-on-write support for shared extents

   - copy_file_range support

   - clone_file_range support (implements reflink)

   - dedupe_file_range support

   - defrag support for reverse mapping enabled filesystems"

* tag 'xfs-reflink-for-linus-4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dgc/linux-xfs: (71 commits)
  xfs: convert COW blocks to real blocks before unwritten extent conversion
  xfs: rework refcount cow recovery error handling
  xfs: clear reflink flag if setting realtime flag
  xfs: fix error initialization
  xfs: fix label inaccuracies
  xfs: remove isize check from unshare operation
  xfs: reduce stack usage of _reflink_clear_inode_flag
  xfs: check inode reflink flag before calling reflink functions
  xfs: implement swapext for rmap filesystems
  xfs: refactor swapext code
  xfs: various swapext cleanups
  xfs: recognize the reflink feature bit
  xfs: simulate per-AG reservations being critically low
  xfs: don't mix reflink and DAX mode for now
  xfs: check for invalid inode reflink flags
  xfs: set a default CoW extent size of 32 blocks
  xfs: convert unwritten status of reverse mappings for shared files
  xfs: use interval query for rmap alloc operations on shared files
  xfs: add shared rmap map/unmap/convert log item types
  xfs: increase log reservations for reflink
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: implement (some of) fallocate for block devices</title>
<updated>2016-10-11T22:06:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrick J. Wong</name>
<email>darrick.wong@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-11T20:51:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=25f4c41415e513f0e9fb1f3fce2ce98fcba8d263'/>
<id>25f4c41415e513f0e9fb1f3fce2ce98fcba8d263</id>
<content type='text'>
After much discussion, it seems that the fallocate feature flag
FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE maps nicely to SCSI WRITE SAME; and the feature
FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE maps nicely to the devices that have been whitelisted
for zeroing SCSI UNMAP.  Punch still requires that FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE is
set.  A length that goes past the end of the device will be clamped to the
device size if KEEP_SIZE is set; or will return -EINVAL if not.  Both
start and length must be aligned to the device's logical block size.

Since the semantics of fallocate are fairly well established already, wire
up the two pieces.  The other fallocate variants (collapse range, insert
range, and allocate blocks) are not supported.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/147518379992.22791.8849838163218235007.stgit@birch.djwong.org
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bart.vanassche@sandisk.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt; # tweaked header
Cc: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
After much discussion, it seems that the fallocate feature flag
FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE maps nicely to SCSI WRITE SAME; and the feature
FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE maps nicely to the devices that have been whitelisted
for zeroing SCSI UNMAP.  Punch still requires that FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE is
set.  A length that goes past the end of the device will be clamped to the
device size if KEEP_SIZE is set; or will return -EINVAL if not.  Both
start and length must be aligned to the device's logical block size.

Since the semantics of fallocate are fairly well established already, wire
up the two pieces.  The other fallocate variants (collapse range, insert
range, and allocate blocks) are not supported.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/147518379992.22791.8849838163218235007.stgit@birch.djwong.org
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bart.vanassche@sandisk.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt; # tweaked header
Cc: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: add a FALLOC_FL_UNSHARE mode to fallocate to unshare a range of blocks</title>
<updated>2016-10-03T16:11:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrick J. Wong</name>
<email>darrick.wong@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-03T16:11:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=71be6b4942dd64bc17728f82f787be98fd8afed7'/>
<id>71be6b4942dd64bc17728f82f787be98fd8afed7</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a new fallocate mode flag that explicitly unshares blocks on
filesystems that support such features.  The new flag can only
be used with an allocate-mode fallocate call.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a new fallocate mode flag that explicitly unshares blocks on
filesystems that support such features.  The new flag can only
be used with an allocate-mode fallocate call.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;darrick.wong@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: do get_write_access() on upper layer of overlayfs</title>
<updated>2016-09-16T10:44:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-16T10:44:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4d0c5ba2ff79ef9f5188998b29fd28fcb05f3667'/>
<id>4d0c5ba2ff79ef9f5188998b29fd28fcb05f3667</id>
<content type='text'>
The problem with writecount is: we want consistent handling of it for
underlying filesystems as well as overlayfs.  Making sure i_writecount is
correct on all layers is difficult.  Instead this patch makes sure that
when write access is acquired, it's always done on the underlying writable
layer (called the upper layer).  We must also make sure to look at the
writecount on this layer when checking for conflicting leases.

Open for write already updates the upper layer's writecount.  Leaving only
truncate.

For truncate copy up must happen before get_write_access() so that the
writecount is updated on the upper layer.  Problem with this is if
something fails after that, then copy-up was done needlessly.  E.g. if
break_lease() was interrupted.  Probably not a big deal in practice.

Another interesting case is if there's a denywrite on a lower file that is
then opened for write or truncated.  With this patch these will succeed,
which is somewhat counterintuitive.  But I think it's still acceptable,
considering that the copy-up does actually create a different file, so the
old, denywrite mapping won't be touched.

On non-overlayfs d_real() is an identity function and d_real_inode() is
equivalent to d_inode() so this patch doesn't change behavior in that case.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@poochiereds.net&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The problem with writecount is: we want consistent handling of it for
underlying filesystems as well as overlayfs.  Making sure i_writecount is
correct on all layers is difficult.  Instead this patch makes sure that
when write access is acquired, it's always done on the underlying writable
layer (called the upper layer).  We must also make sure to look at the
writecount on this layer when checking for conflicting leases.

Open for write already updates the upper layer's writecount.  Leaving only
truncate.

For truncate copy up must happen before get_write_access() so that the
writecount is updated on the upper layer.  Problem with this is if
something fails after that, then copy-up was done needlessly.  E.g. if
break_lease() was interrupted.  Probably not a big deal in practice.

Another interesting case is if there's a denywrite on a lower file that is
then opened for write or truncated.  With this patch these will succeed,
which is somewhat counterintuitive.  But I think it's still acceptable,
considering that the copy-up does actually create a different file, so the
old, denywrite mapping won't be touched.

On non-overlayfs d_real() is an identity function and d_real_inode() is
equivalent to d_inode() so this patch doesn't change behavior in that case.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@poochiereds.net&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>locks: fix file locking on overlayfs</title>
<updated>2016-09-16T10:44:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-16T10:44:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c568d68341be7030f5647def68851e469b21ca11'/>
<id>c568d68341be7030f5647def68851e469b21ca11</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch allows flock, posix locks, ofd locks and leases to work
correctly on overlayfs.

Instead of using the underlying inode for storing lock context use the
overlay inode.  This allows locks to be persistent across copy-up.

This is done by introducing locks_inode() helper and using it instead of
file_inode() to get the inode in locking code.  For non-overlayfs the two
are equivalent, except for an extra pointer dereference in locks_inode().

Since lock operations are in "struct file_operations" we must also make
sure not to call underlying filesystem's lock operations.  Introcude a
super block flag MS_NOREMOTELOCK to this effect.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@poochiereds.net&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch allows flock, posix locks, ofd locks and leases to work
correctly on overlayfs.

Instead of using the underlying inode for storing lock context use the
overlay inode.  This allows locks to be persistent across copy-up.

This is done by introducing locks_inode() helper and using it instead of
file_inode() to get the inode in locking code.  For non-overlayfs the two
are equivalent, except for an extra pointer dereference in locks_inode().

Since lock operations are in "struct file_operations" we must also make
sure not to call underlying filesystem's lock operations.  Introcude a
super block flag MS_NOREMOTELOCK to this effect.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@poochiereds.net&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
