<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/open.c, branch v3.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>vfs: make O_PATH file descriptors usable for 'fchdir()'</title>
<updated>2012-07-08T00:19:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-07T17:17:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=332a2e1244bd08b9e3ecd378028513396a004a24'/>
<id>332a2e1244bd08b9e3ecd378028513396a004a24</id>
<content type='text'>
We already use them for openat() and friends, but fchdir() also wants to
be able to use O_PATH file descriptors.  This should make it comparable
to the O_SEARCH of Solaris.  In particular, O_PATH allows you to access
(not-quite-open) a directory you don't have read persmission to, only
execute permission.

Noticed during development of multithread support for ksh93.

Reported-by: ольга крыжановская &lt;olga.kryzhanovska@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org    # O_PATH introduced in 3.0+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We already use them for openat() and friends, but fchdir() also wants to
be able to use O_PATH file descriptors.  This should make it comparable
to the O_SEARCH of Solaris.  In particular, O_PATH allows you to access
(not-quite-open) a directory you don't have read persmission to, only
execute permission.

Noticed during development of multithread support for ksh93.

Reported-by: ольга крыжановская &lt;olga.kryzhanovska@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org    # O_PATH introduced in 3.0+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): don't throw away file on error</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T16:12:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-21T15:30:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=50ee93afcaa970620d1fb5a9894109a2ab152868'/>
<id>50ee93afcaa970620d1fb5a9894109a2ab152868</id>
<content type='text'>
If open fails, don't put the file.  This allows it to be reused if open needs to
be retried.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If open fails, don't put the file.  This allows it to be reused if open needs to
be retried.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): inline __dentry_open()</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T16:12:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-21T15:30:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=91daee988db38b0207eec719a3160b163c077007'/>
<id>91daee988db38b0207eec719a3160b163c077007</id>
<content type='text'>
Copy __dentry_open() into nameidata_to_filp().

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Copy __dentry_open() into nameidata_to_filp().

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: do_dentry_open(): don't put filp</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T16:12:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-21T15:30:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=78f71eff3c274f3907f4aa1bbe3267281ba1c603'/>
<id>78f71eff3c274f3907f4aa1bbe3267281ba1c603</id>
<content type='text'>
Move put_filp() out to __dentry_open(), the only caller now.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move put_filp() out to __dentry_open(), the only caller now.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: split __dentry_open()</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T16:12:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-21T15:30:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=90ad1a8ecb9bfd5ff4503ac42cd049a97643ee51'/>
<id>90ad1a8ecb9bfd5ff4503ac42cd049a97643ee51</id>
<content type='text'>
Split __dentry_open() into two functions:

  do_dentry_open() - does most of the actual work, doesn't put file on failure
  open_check_o_direct() - after a successful open, checks direct_IO method

This will allow i_op-&gt;atomic_open to do just the file initialization and leave
the direct_IO checking to the VFS.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Split __dentry_open() into two functions:

  do_dentry_open() - does most of the actual work, doesn't put file on failure
  open_check_o_direct() - after a successful open, checks direct_IO method

This will allow i_op-&gt;atomic_open to do just the file initialization and leave
the direct_IO checking to the VFS.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2012-05-24T00:42:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-24T00:42:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=644473e9c60c1ff4f6351fed637a6e5551e3dce7'/>
<id>644473e9c60c1ff4f6351fed637a6e5551e3dce7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
  reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
  implementation.

  Highlights:
   - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
     code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.

   - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
     config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
     user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
     checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.

   - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
     user namespace before they are processed.  Removing the need to add
     an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
     uids remains the same.

   - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
     better than it is today.

   - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
     operationally with the user namespace enabled.

   - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
     billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
     enabled.  This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
     164ns per stat operation).

   - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
     Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
     anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
     entertaining failures in userspace.

   - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
     I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
     could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
     handle the case where setuid fails.

   - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
     we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid.  The LFS
     experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
     better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
     can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
     can't map.

   - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
     safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.

  My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
  kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."

Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
  userns:  Silence silly gcc warning.
  cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
  userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
  userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
  userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
  userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
  userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
  userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
  userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
  userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
  userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
  reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
  implementation.

  Highlights:
   - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
     code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.

   - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
     config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
     user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
     checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.

   - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
     user namespace before they are processed.  Removing the need to add
     an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
     uids remains the same.

   - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
     better than it is today.

   - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
     operationally with the user namespace enabled.

   - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
     billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
     enabled.  This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
     164ns per stat operation).

   - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
     Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
     anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
     entertaining failures in userspace.

   - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
     I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
     could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
     handle the case where setuid fails.

   - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
     we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid.  The LFS
     experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
     better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
     can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
     can't map.

   - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
     safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.

  My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
  kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."

Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
  userns:  Silence silly gcc warning.
  cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
  userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
  userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
  userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
  userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
  userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
  userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
  userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
  userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
  userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid</title>
<updated>2012-05-03T10:29:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-04T03:52:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=52137abe1820196d956bfd51edebc571b3427deb'/>
<id>52137abe1820196d956bfd51edebc571b3427deb</id>
<content type='text'>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Convert capabilities related permsion checks</title>
<updated>2012-05-03T10:28:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-08T00:45:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=18815a18085364d8514c0d0c4c986776cb74272c'/>
<id>18815a18085364d8514c0d0c4c986776cb74272c</id>
<content type='text'>
- Use uid_eq when comparing kuids
  Use gid_eq when comparing kgids
- Use make_kuid(user_ns, 0) to talk about the user_namespace root uid

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
- Use uid_eq when comparing kuids
  Use gid_eq when comparing kgids
- Use make_kuid(user_ns, 0) to talk about the user_namespace root uid

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_open</title>
<updated>2012-04-09T16:22:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T17:45:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=83d498569e9a7a4b92c4c5d3566f2d6a604f28c9'/>
<id>83d498569e9a7a4b92c4c5d3566f2d6a604f28c9</id>
<content type='text'>
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable</title>
<updated>2012-02-19T18:30:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-16T17:49:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1dce27c5aa6770e9d195f2bb7db1db3d4dde5591'/>
<id>1dce27c5aa6770e9d195f2bb7db1db3d4dde5591</id>
<content type='text'>
Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and
close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we
abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under
normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the
fd_sets.

The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted,
since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths.

This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing
close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags:

	void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);

Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because
they require the caller to hold a lock to use them.

Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the
the array.  Possibly that should exist too.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and
close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we
abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under
normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the
fd_sets.

The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted,
since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths.

This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing
close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags:

	void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);

Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because
they require the caller to hold a lock to use them.

Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the
the array.  Possibly that should exist too.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
