linux-stable.git/fs/open.c, branch linux-2.6.33.y

Sanitize f_flags helpers

2009-12-22T17:27:34+00:00

* pull ACC_MODE to fs.h; we have several copies all over the place
* nightmarish expression calculating f_mode by f_flags deserves a helper
too (OPEN_FMODE(flags))

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

Fix f_flags/f_mode in case of lookup_instantiate_filp() from open(pathname, 3)

2009-12-22T17:27:34+00:00

Just set f_flags when shoving struct file into nameidata; don't
postpone that until __dentry_open().  do_filp_open() has correct
value; lookup_instantiate_filp() doesn't - we lose the difference
between O_RDWR and 3 by that point.

We still set .intent.open.flags, so no fs code needs to be changed.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters

2009-12-16T17:16:47+00:00

* do ima_get_count() in __dentry_open()
* stop doing that in followups
* move ima_path_check() to right after nameidata_to_filp()
* don't bump counters on it

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

fs: move get_empty_filp() deffinition to internal.h

2009-12-16T17:16:45+00:00

All users outside of fs/ of get_empty_filp() have been removed.  This patch
moves the definition from the include/ directory to internal.h so no new
users crop up and removes the EXPORT_SYMBOL.  I'd love to see open intents
stop using it too, but that's a problem for another day and a smarter
developer!

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

LSM: Move security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() to after mutex_lock().

2009-11-23T21:49:26+00:00

We should call security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() after mutex_lock()
in order to avoid races.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Acked-by: John Johansen 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

LSM: Add security_path_chroot().

2009-10-11T23:56:02+00:00

This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.

This hook is used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown().

2009-10-11T23:56:00+00:00

This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown()
operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *",
we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of
notify_change().

These hooks are used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

fs: change sys_truncate length parameter type

2009-09-23T16:21:05+00:00

For this system call user space passes a signed long length parameter,
while the kernel side takes an unsigned long parameter and converts it
later to signed long again.

This has led to bugs in compat wrappers see e.g.  dd90bbd5 "powerpc: Add
compat_sys_truncate".  The s390 compat wrapper for this functions is
broken as well since it also performs zero extension instead of sign
extension for the length parameter.

In addition if hpa comes up with an automated way of generating
compat wrappers it would generate a wrong one here.

So change the length parameter from unsigned long to long.

Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]

2009-09-02T11:29:01+00:00

Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management.  The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).

Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.

This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):

	http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

vfs: allow file truncations when both suid and write permissions set

2009-08-21T04:25:48+00:00

When suid is set and the non-owner user has write permission, any writing
into this file should be allowed and suid should be removed after that.

However, current kernel only allows writing without truncations, when we
do truncations on that file, we get EPERM.  This is a bug.

Steps to reproduce this bug:

% ls -l rootdir/file1
-rwsrwsrwx 1 root root 3 Jun 25 15:42 rootdir/file1
% echo h > rootdir/file1
zsh: operation not permitted: rootdir/file1
% ls -l rootdir/file1
-rwsrwsrwx 1 root root 3 Jun 25 15:42 rootdir/file1
% echo h >> rootdir/file1
% ls -l rootdir/file1
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 5 Jun 25 16:34 rootdir/file1

Signed-off-by: WANG Cong 
Cc: Eric Sandeen 
Acked-by: Eric Paris 
Cc: Eugene Teo 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: James Morris