<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/nfsd, branch linux-4.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: eliminate sending duplicate and repeated delegations</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T05:41:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Elble</name>
<email>aweits@rit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-15T16:07:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4e9f452926507ecabd3030efda61413a7cd9bef2'/>
<id>4e9f452926507ecabd3030efda61413a7cd9bef2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 34ed9872e745fa56f10e9bef2cf3d2336c6c8816 upstream.

We've observed the nfsd server in a state where there are
multiple delegations on the same nfs4_file for the same client.
The nfs client does attempt to DELEGRETURN these when they are presented to
it - but apparently under some (unknown) circumstances the client does not
manage to return all of them. This leads to the eventual
attempt to CB_RECALL more than one delegation with the same nfs
filehandle to the same client. The first recall will succeed, but the
next recall will fail with NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE. This leads to the server
having delegations on cl_revoked that the client has no way to FREE
or DELEGRETURN, with resulting inability to recover. The state manager
on the server will continually assert SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED,
and the state manager on the client will be looping unable to satisfy
the server.

List discussion also reports a race between OPEN and DELEGRETURN that
will be avoided by only sending the delegation once to the
client. This is also logically in accordance with RFC5561 9.1.1 and 10.2.

So, let's:

1.) Not hand out duplicate delegations.
2.) Only send them to the client once.

RFC 5561:

9.1.1:
"Delegations and layouts, on the other hand, are not associated with a
specific owner but are associated with the client as a whole
(identified by a client ID)."

10.2:
"...the stateid for a delegation is associated with a client ID and may be
used on behalf of all the open-owners for the given client.  A
delegation is made to the client as a whole and not to any specific
process or thread of control within it."

Reported-by: Eric Meddaugh &lt;etmsys@rit.edu&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Cc: Olga Kornievskaia &lt;aglo@umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 34ed9872e745fa56f10e9bef2cf3d2336c6c8816 upstream.

We've observed the nfsd server in a state where there are
multiple delegations on the same nfs4_file for the same client.
The nfs client does attempt to DELEGRETURN these when they are presented to
it - but apparently under some (unknown) circumstances the client does not
manage to return all of them. This leads to the eventual
attempt to CB_RECALL more than one delegation with the same nfs
filehandle to the same client. The first recall will succeed, but the
next recall will fail with NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE. This leads to the server
having delegations on cl_revoked that the client has no way to FREE
or DELEGRETURN, with resulting inability to recover. The state manager
on the server will continually assert SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED,
and the state manager on the client will be looping unable to satisfy
the server.

List discussion also reports a race between OPEN and DELEGRETURN that
will be avoided by only sending the delegation once to the
client. This is also logically in accordance with RFC5561 9.1.1 and 10.2.

So, let's:

1.) Not hand out duplicate delegations.
2.) Only send them to the client once.

RFC 5561:

9.1.1:
"Delegations and layouts, on the other hand, are not associated with a
specific owner but are associated with the client as a whole
(identified by a client ID)."

10.2:
"...the stateid for a delegation is associated with a client ID and may be
used on behalf of all the open-owners for the given client.  A
delegation is made to the client as a whole and not to any specific
process or thread of control within it."

Reported-by: Eric Meddaugh &lt;etmsys@rit.edu&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Cc: Olga Kornievskaia &lt;aglo@umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: serialize state seqid morphing operations</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T05:41:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@poochiereds.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-17T11:47:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9a4a72786164f9aa3ca99189ef2948e020d31068'/>
<id>9a4a72786164f9aa3ca99189ef2948e020d31068</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 35a92fe8770ce54c5eb275cd76128645bea2d200 upstream.

Andrew was seeing a race occur when an OPEN and OPEN_DOWNGRADE were
running in parallel. The server would receive the OPEN_DOWNGRADE first
and check its seqid, but then an OPEN would race in and bump it. The
OPEN_DOWNGRADE would then complete and bump the seqid again.  The result
was that the OPEN_DOWNGRADE would be applied after the OPEN, even though
it should have been rejected since the seqid changed.

The only recourse we have here I think is to serialize operations that
bump the seqid in a stateid, particularly when we're given a seqid in
the call. To address this, we add a new rw_semaphore to the
nfs4_ol_stateid struct. We do a down_write prior to checking the seqid
after looking up the stateid to ensure that nothing else is going to
bump it while we're operating on it.

In the case of OPEN, we do a down_read, as the call doesn't contain a
seqid. Those can run in parallel -- we just need to serialize them when
there is a concurrent OPEN_DOWNGRADE or CLOSE.

LOCK and LOCKU however always take the write lock as there is no
opportunity for parallelizing those.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jeff.layton@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 35a92fe8770ce54c5eb275cd76128645bea2d200 upstream.

Andrew was seeing a race occur when an OPEN and OPEN_DOWNGRADE were
running in parallel. The server would receive the OPEN_DOWNGRADE first
and check its seqid, but then an OPEN would race in and bump it. The
OPEN_DOWNGRADE would then complete and bump the seqid again.  The result
was that the OPEN_DOWNGRADE would be applied after the OPEN, even though
it should have been rejected since the seqid changed.

The only recourse we have here I think is to serialize operations that
bump the seqid in a stateid, particularly when we're given a seqid in
the call. To address this, we add a new rw_semaphore to the
nfs4_ol_stateid struct. We do a down_write prior to checking the seqid
after looking up the stateid to ensure that nothing else is going to
bump it while we're operating on it.

In the case of OPEN, we do a down_read, as the call doesn't contain a
seqid. Those can run in parallel -- we just need to serialize them when
there is a concurrent OPEN_DOWNGRADE or CLOSE.

LOCK and LOCKU however always take the write lock as there is no
opportunity for parallelizing those.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jeff.layton@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd/blocklayout: accept any minlength</title>
<updated>2015-10-09T20:11:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-09T13:03:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8c3ad9cb7343dc5f61b8cf3cdbe1016c5e7c2c8b'/>
<id>8c3ad9cb7343dc5f61b8cf3cdbe1016c5e7c2c8b</id>
<content type='text'>
Recent Linux clients have started to send GETLAYOUT requests with
minlength less than blocksize.

Servers aren't really allowed to impose this kind of restriction on
layouts; see RFC 5661 section 18.43.3 for details.

This has been observed to cause indefinite hangs on fsx runs on some
clients.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Recent Linux clients have started to send GETLAYOUT requests with
minlength less than blocksize.

Servers aren't really allowed to impose this kind of restriction on
layouts; see RFC 5661 section 18.43.3 for details.

This has been observed to cause indefinite hangs on fsx runs on some
clients.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'nfs-for-4.3-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs</title>
<updated>2015-09-07T21:02:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-07T21:02:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4e4adb2f462889b9eac736dd06d60658beb091b6'/>
<id>4e4adb2f462889b9eac736dd06d60658beb091b6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull NFS client updates from Trond Myklebust:
 "Highlights include:

  Stable patches:
   - Fix atomicity of pNFS commit list updates
   - Fix NFSv4 handling of open(O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDONLY)
   - nfs_set_pgio_error sometimes misses errors
   - Fix a thinko in xs_connect()
   - Fix borkage in _same_data_server_addrs_locked()
   - Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2
     client
   - Don't let the ctime override attribute barriers.
   - Revert "NFSv4: Remove incorrect check in can_open_delegated()"
   - Ensure flexfiles pNFS driver updates the inode after write finishes
   - flexfiles must not pollute the attribute cache with attrbutes from
     the DS
   - Fix a protocol error in layoutreturn
   - Fix a protocol issue with NFSv4.1 CLOSE stateids

  Bugfixes + cleanups
   - pNFS blocks bugfixes from Christoph
   - Various cleanups from Anna
   - More fixes for delegation corner cases
   - Don't fsync twice for O_SYNC/IS_SYNC files
   - Fix pNFS and flexfiles layoutstats bugs
   - pnfs/flexfiles: avoid duplicate tracking of mirror data
   - pnfs: Fix layoutget/layoutreturn/return-on-close serialisation
     issues
   - pnfs/flexfiles: error handling retries a layoutget before fallback
     to MDS

  Features:
   - Full support for the OPEN NFS4_CREATE_EXCLUSIVE4_1 mode from
     Kinglong
   - More RDMA client transport improvements from Chuck
   - Removal of the deprecated ib_reg_phys_mr() and ib_rereg_phys_mr()
     verbs from the SUNRPC, Lustre and core infiniband tree.
   - Optimise away the close-to-open getattr if there is no cached data"

* tag 'nfs-for-4.3-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (108 commits)
  NFSv4: Respect the server imposed limit on how many changes we may cache
  NFSv4: Express delegation limit in units of pages
  Revert "NFS: Make close(2) asynchronous when closing NFS O_DIRECT files"
  NFS: Optimise away the close-to-open getattr if there is no cached data
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Clean up ff_layout_write_done_cb/ff_layout_commit_done_cb
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Mark the layout for return in ff_layout_io_track_ds_error()
  nfs: Remove unneeded checking of the return value from scnprintf
  nfs: Fix truncated client owner id without proto type
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Mark layout for return if the mirrors are invalid
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: RW layouts are valid only if all mirrors are valid
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Fix incorrect usage of pnfs_generic_mark_devid_invalid()
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Fix freeing of mirrors
  NFSv4.1/pNFS: Don't request a minimal read layout beyond the end of file
  NFSv4.1/pnfs: Handle LAYOUTGET return values correctly
  NFSv4.1/pnfs: Don't ask for a read layout for an empty file.
  NFSv4.1: Fix a protocol issue with CLOSE stateids
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Don't mark the entire deviceid as bad for file errors
  SUNRPC: Prevent SYN+SYNACK+RST storms
  SUNRPC: xs_reset_transport must mark the connection as disconnected
  NFSv4.1/pnfs: Ensure layoutreturn reserves space for the opaque payload
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull NFS client updates from Trond Myklebust:
 "Highlights include:

  Stable patches:
   - Fix atomicity of pNFS commit list updates
   - Fix NFSv4 handling of open(O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDONLY)
   - nfs_set_pgio_error sometimes misses errors
   - Fix a thinko in xs_connect()
   - Fix borkage in _same_data_server_addrs_locked()
   - Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2
     client
   - Don't let the ctime override attribute barriers.
   - Revert "NFSv4: Remove incorrect check in can_open_delegated()"
   - Ensure flexfiles pNFS driver updates the inode after write finishes
   - flexfiles must not pollute the attribute cache with attrbutes from
     the DS
   - Fix a protocol error in layoutreturn
   - Fix a protocol issue with NFSv4.1 CLOSE stateids

  Bugfixes + cleanups
   - pNFS blocks bugfixes from Christoph
   - Various cleanups from Anna
   - More fixes for delegation corner cases
   - Don't fsync twice for O_SYNC/IS_SYNC files
   - Fix pNFS and flexfiles layoutstats bugs
   - pnfs/flexfiles: avoid duplicate tracking of mirror data
   - pnfs: Fix layoutget/layoutreturn/return-on-close serialisation
     issues
   - pnfs/flexfiles: error handling retries a layoutget before fallback
     to MDS

  Features:
   - Full support for the OPEN NFS4_CREATE_EXCLUSIVE4_1 mode from
     Kinglong
   - More RDMA client transport improvements from Chuck
   - Removal of the deprecated ib_reg_phys_mr() and ib_rereg_phys_mr()
     verbs from the SUNRPC, Lustre and core infiniband tree.
   - Optimise away the close-to-open getattr if there is no cached data"

* tag 'nfs-for-4.3-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (108 commits)
  NFSv4: Respect the server imposed limit on how many changes we may cache
  NFSv4: Express delegation limit in units of pages
  Revert "NFS: Make close(2) asynchronous when closing NFS O_DIRECT files"
  NFS: Optimise away the close-to-open getattr if there is no cached data
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Clean up ff_layout_write_done_cb/ff_layout_commit_done_cb
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Mark the layout for return in ff_layout_io_track_ds_error()
  nfs: Remove unneeded checking of the return value from scnprintf
  nfs: Fix truncated client owner id without proto type
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Mark layout for return if the mirrors are invalid
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: RW layouts are valid only if all mirrors are valid
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Fix incorrect usage of pnfs_generic_mark_devid_invalid()
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Fix freeing of mirrors
  NFSv4.1/pNFS: Don't request a minimal read layout beyond the end of file
  NFSv4.1/pnfs: Handle LAYOUTGET return values correctly
  NFSv4.1/pnfs: Don't ask for a read layout for an empty file.
  NFSv4.1: Fix a protocol issue with CLOSE stateids
  NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Don't mark the entire deviceid as bad for file errors
  SUNRPC: Prevent SYN+SYNACK+RST storms
  SUNRPC: xs_reset_transport must mark the connection as disconnected
  NFSv4.1/pnfs: Ensure layoutreturn reserves space for the opaque payload
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: deal with DELEGRETURN racing with CB_RECALL</title>
<updated>2015-09-02T14:05:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Elble</name>
<email>aweits@rit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-31T16:06:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a457974f1b9524a6e7d0a0be10df760e7802d32f'/>
<id>a457974f1b9524a6e7d0a0be10df760e7802d32f</id>
<content type='text'>
We have observed the server sending recalls for delegation stateids
that have already been successfully returned. Change
nfsd4_cb_recall_done() to return success if the client has returned
the delegation. While this does not completely eliminate the sending
of recalls for delegations that have already been returned, this
does prevent unnecessarily declaring the callback path to be down.

Reported-by: Eric Meddaugh &lt;etmsys@rit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@poochiereds.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We have observed the server sending recalls for delegation stateids
that have already been successfully returned. Change
nfsd4_cb_recall_done() to return success if the client has returned
the delegation. While this does not completely eliminate the sending
of recalls for delegations that have already been returned, this
does prevent unnecessarily declaring the callback path to be down.

Reported-by: Eric Meddaugh &lt;etmsys@rit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@poochiereds.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: return CLID_INUSE for unexpected SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM case</title>
<updated>2015-09-01T17:53:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>J. Bruce Fields</name>
<email>bfields@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-01T17:40:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f984a7ce58ea9a12eca7f960bdf68124c8589b60'/>
<id>f984a7ce58ea9a12eca7f960bdf68124c8589b60</id>
<content type='text'>
Somebody with a Solaris client was hitting this case.  We haven't
figured out why yet, and don't have a reproducer.  Meanwhile Frank
noticed that RFC 7530 actually recommends CLID_INUSE for this case.
Unlikely to help the original reporter, but may as well fix it.

Reported-by: Frank Filz &lt;ffilzlnx@mindspring.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Somebody with a Solaris client was hitting this case.  We haven't
figured out why yet, and don't have a reproducer.  Meanwhile Frank
noticed that RFC 7530 actually recommends CLID_INUSE for this case.
Unlikely to help the original reporter, but may as well fix it.

Reported-by: Frank Filz &lt;ffilzlnx@mindspring.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: ensure that delegation stateid hash references are only put once</title>
<updated>2015-08-31T20:32:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@poochiereds.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-24T16:41:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3fcbbd244ed1d20dc0eb7d48d729503992fa9b7d'/>
<id>3fcbbd244ed1d20dc0eb7d48d729503992fa9b7d</id>
<content type='text'>
It's possible that a DELEGRETURN could race with (e.g.) client expiry,
in which case we could end up putting the delegation hash reference more
than once.

Have unhash_delegation_locked return a bool that indicates whether it
was already unhashed. In the case of destroy_delegation we only
conditionally put the hash reference if that returns true.

The other callers of unhash_delegation_locked call it while walking
list_heads that shouldn't yet be detached. If we find that it doesn't
return true in those cases, then throw a WARN_ON as that indicates that
we have a partially hashed delegation, and that something is likely very
wrong.

Tested-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jeff.layton@primarydata.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It's possible that a DELEGRETURN could race with (e.g.) client expiry,
in which case we could end up putting the delegation hash reference more
than once.

Have unhash_delegation_locked return a bool that indicates whether it
was already unhashed. In the case of destroy_delegation we only
conditionally put the hash reference if that returns true.

The other callers of unhash_delegation_locked call it while walking
list_heads that shouldn't yet be detached. If we find that it doesn't
return true in those cases, then throw a WARN_ON as that indicates that
we have a partially hashed delegation, and that something is likely very
wrong.

Tested-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jeff.layton@primarydata.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: ensure that the ol stateid hash reference is only put once</title>
<updated>2015-08-31T20:32:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@poochiereds.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-24T16:41:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e85687393f3ee0a77ccca016f903d1558bb69258'/>
<id>e85687393f3ee0a77ccca016f903d1558bb69258</id>
<content type='text'>
When an open or lock stateid is hashed, we take an extra reference to
it. When we unhash it, we drop that reference. The code however does
not properly account for the case where we have two callers concurrently
trying to unhash the stateid. This can lead to list corruption and the
hash reference being put more than once.

Fix this by having unhash_ol_stateid use list_del_init on the st_perfile
list_head, and then testing to see if that list_head is empty before
releasing the hash reference. This means that some of the unhashing
wrappers now become bool return functions so we can test to see whether
the stateid was unhashed before we put the reference.

Reported-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jeff.layton@primarydata.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When an open or lock stateid is hashed, we take an extra reference to
it. When we unhash it, we drop that reference. The code however does
not properly account for the case where we have two callers concurrently
trying to unhash the stateid. This can lead to list corruption and the
hash reference being put more than once.

Fix this by having unhash_ol_stateid use list_del_init on the st_perfile
list_head, and then testing to see if that list_head is empty before
releasing the hash reference. This means that some of the unhashing
wrappers now become bool return functions so we can test to see whether
the stateid was unhashed before we put the reference.

Reported-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Andrew W Elble &lt;aweits@rit.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jeff.layton@primarydata.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: allow more than one laundry job to run at a time</title>
<updated>2015-08-31T20:32:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@poochiereds.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-20T11:17:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=51a545685905c934237e640083bc3aa40b36dc14'/>
<id>51a545685905c934237e640083bc3aa40b36dc14</id>
<content type='text'>
We can potentially have several nfs4_laundromat jobs running if there
are multiple namespaces running nfsd on the box. Those are effectively
separated from one another though, so I don't see any reason to
serialize them.

Also, create_singlethread_workqueue automatically adds the
WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag. Since we run this job on a timer, it's not really
involved in any reclaim paths. I see no need for a rescuer thread.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jeff.layton@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We can potentially have several nfs4_laundromat jobs running if there
are multiple namespaces running nfsd on the box. Those are effectively
separated from one another though, so I don't see any reason to
serialize them.

Also, create_singlethread_workqueue automatically adds the
WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag. Since we run this job on a timer, it's not really
involved in any reclaim paths. I see no need for a rescuer thread.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jeff.layton@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: don't WARN/backtrace for invalid container deployment.</title>
<updated>2015-08-31T20:32:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
<email>paul.gortmaker@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-25T20:59:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=46cc8ba30445025f0ed3ed9f429aea573b301122'/>
<id>46cc8ba30445025f0ed3ed9f429aea573b301122</id>
<content type='text'>
These messages, combined with the backtrace they trigger, makes it seem
like a serious problem, though a quick search shows distros marking
it as a "won't fix" non-issue when the problem is reported by users.

The backtrace is overkill, and only really manages to show that if
you follow the code path, you can't really avoid it with bootargs
or configuration settings in the container.

Given that, lets tone it down a bit and get rid of the WARN severity,
and the associated backtrace, so people aren't needlessly alarmed.

Also, lets drop the split printk line, since they are grep unfriendly.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
These messages, combined with the backtrace they trigger, makes it seem
like a serious problem, though a quick search shows distros marking
it as a "won't fix" non-issue when the problem is reported by users.

The backtrace is overkill, and only really manages to show that if
you follow the code path, you can't really avoid it with bootargs
or configuration settings in the container.

Given that, lets tone it down a bit and get rid of the WARN severity,
and the associated backtrace, so people aren't needlessly alarmed.

Also, lets drop the split printk line, since they are grep unfriendly.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
