<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/namespace.c, branch v5.0</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Revert "x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses"</title>
<updated>2019-02-25T17:10:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-25T17:10:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=53a41cb7ed381edee91029cdcabe9b3250f43f4d'/>
<id>53a41cb7ed381edee91029cdcabe9b3250f43f4d</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b.

It was well-intentioned, but wrong.  Overriding the exception tables for
instructions for random reasons is just wrong, and that is what the new
code did.

It caused problems for tracing, and it caused problems for strncpy_from_user(),
because the new checks made perfectly valid use cases break, rather than
catch things that did bad things.

Unchecked user space accesses are a problem, but that's not a reason to
add invalid checks that then people have to work around with silly flags
(in this case, that 'kernel_uaccess_faults_ok' flag, which is just an
odd way to say "this commit was wrong" and was sprinked into random
places to hide the wrongness).

The real fix to unchecked user space accesses is to get rid of the
special "let's not check __get_user() and __put_user() at all" logic.
Make __{get|put}_user() be just aliases to the regular {get|put}_user()
functions, and make it impossible to access user space without having
the proper checks in places.

The raison d'être of the special double-underscore versions used to be
that the range check was expensive, and if you did multiple user
accesses, you'd do the range check up front (like the signal frame
handling code, for example).  But SMAP (on x86) and PAN (on ARM) have
made that optimization pointless, because the _real_ expense is the "set
CPU flag to allow user space access".

Do let's not break the valid cases to catch invalid cases that shouldn't
even exist.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Tobin C. Harding &lt;tobin@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b.

It was well-intentioned, but wrong.  Overriding the exception tables for
instructions for random reasons is just wrong, and that is what the new
code did.

It caused problems for tracing, and it caused problems for strncpy_from_user(),
because the new checks made perfectly valid use cases break, rather than
catch things that did bad things.

Unchecked user space accesses are a problem, but that's not a reason to
add invalid checks that then people have to work around with silly flags
(in this case, that 'kernel_uaccess_faults_ok' flag, which is just an
odd way to say "this commit was wrong" and was sprinked into random
places to hide the wrongness).

The real fix to unchecked user space accesses is to get rid of the
special "let's not check __get_user() and __put_user() at all" logic.
Make __{get|put}_user() be just aliases to the regular {get|put}_user()
functions, and make it impossible to access user space without having
the proper checks in places.

The raison d'être of the special double-underscore versions used to be
that the range check was expensive, and if you did multiple user
accesses, you'd do the range check up front (like the signal frame
handling code, for example).  But SMAP (on x86) and PAN (on ARM) have
made that optimization pointless, because the _real_ expense is the "set
CPU flag to allow user space access".

Do let's not break the valid cases to catch invalid cases that shouldn't
even exist.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Tobin C. Harding &lt;tobin@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2019-01-05T21:25:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-05T21:25:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=505b050fdf42097883b2d37b8e796e1f11dbef50'/>
<id>505b050fdf42097883b2d37b8e796e1f11dbef50</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro:
 "Mount API prereqs.

  Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor
  fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits,
  mostly)"

* 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits)
  mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT
  smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  smack: get rid of match_token()
  smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
  LSM: new method: -&gt;sb_add_mnt_opt()
  selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit
  selinux: switch away from match_token()
  selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()
  LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts
  smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
  selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts
  LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
  selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()
  LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
  nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly
  btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use
  selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()
  LSM: split -&gt;sb_set_mnt_opts() out of -&gt;sb_kern_mount()
  new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro:
 "Mount API prereqs.

  Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor
  fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits,
  mostly)"

* 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits)
  mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT
  smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  smack: get rid of match_token()
  smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
  LSM: new method: -&gt;sb_add_mnt_opt()
  selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit
  selinux: switch away from match_token()
  selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()
  LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts
  smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
  selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts
  LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
  selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()
  LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
  nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly
  btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use
  selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()
  LSM: split -&gt;sb_set_mnt_opts() out of -&gt;sb_kern_mount()
  new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2019-01-05T21:18:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-05T21:18:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9b286efeb5eb5aaa2712873fc1f928b2f879dbde'/>
<id>9b286efeb5eb5aaa2712873fc1f928b2f879dbde</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull trivial vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "A few cleanups + Neil's namespace_unlock() optimization"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  exec: make prepare_bprm_creds static
  genheaders: %-&lt;width&gt;s had been there since v6; %-*s - since v7
  VFS: use synchronize_rcu_expedited() in namespace_unlock()
  iov_iter: reduce code duplication
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull trivial vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "A few cleanups + Neil's namespace_unlock() optimization"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  exec: make prepare_bprm_creds static
  genheaders: %-&lt;width&gt;s had been there since v6; %-*s - since v7
  VFS: use synchronize_rcu_expedited() in namespace_unlock()
  iov_iter: reduce code duplication
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function</title>
<updated>2019-01-04T02:57:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-04T02:57:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693'/>
<id>96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693</id>
<content type='text'>
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.

It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access.  But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.

A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model.  And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.

This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.

There were a couple of notable cases:

 - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.

 - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
   values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
   really used it)

 - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout

but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.

I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something.  Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.

It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access.  But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.

A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model.  And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.

This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.

There were a couple of notable cases:

 - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.

 - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
   values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
   really used it)

 - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout

but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.

I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something.  Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code</title>
<updated>2018-12-21T16:48:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-13T18:41:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=204cc0ccf1d49c6292aeef4c8edd1b3d10ff933c'/>
<id>204cc0ccf1d49c6292aeef4c8edd1b3d10ff933c</id>
<content type='text'>
Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the
moment).  Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off
with private structures with several strings in those, rather than
this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays"
ugliness.  This commit allows to do that at leisure, without
disrupting anything outside of given module.

Changes:
	* instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer
initialized to NULL.
	* security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and
security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **);
call sites are unchanged.
	* security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take
it by value (i.e. as void *).
	* new method: -&gt;sb_free_mnt_opts().  Takes void *, does
whatever freeing that needs to be done.
	* -&gt;sb_set_mnt_opts() and -&gt;sb_remount() might get NULL as
mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty".

Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the
moment).  Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off
with private structures with several strings in those, rather than
this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays"
ugliness.  This commit allows to do that at leisure, without
disrupting anything outside of given module.

Changes:
	* instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer
initialized to NULL.
	* security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and
security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **);
call sites are unchanged.
	* security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take
it by value (i.e. as void *).
	* new method: -&gt;sb_free_mnt_opts().  Takes void *, does
whatever freeing that needs to be done.
	* -&gt;sb_set_mnt_opts() and -&gt;sb_remount() might get NULL as
mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty".

Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()</title>
<updated>2018-12-21T16:46:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-17T17:09:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f5c0c26d9008b355babb6d16f3d7c4de3bada0e7'/>
<id>f5c0c26d9008b355babb6d16f3d7c4de3bada0e7</id>
<content type='text'>
combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(),
security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata().

Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(),
security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata().

Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: lift extracting and parsing LSM options into the caller of -&gt;sb_remount()</title>
<updated>2018-12-21T16:45:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-02T04:06:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c039bc3c2498724946304a8f964244a9b6af1043'/>
<id>c039bc3c2498724946304a8f964244a9b6af1043</id>
<content type='text'>
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.

Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.

Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Separate changing mount flags full remount</title>
<updated>2018-12-20T16:32:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-01T23:07:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=43f5e655eff7e124d4e484515689cba374ab698e'/>
<id>43f5e655eff7e124d4e484515689cba374ab698e</id>
<content type='text'>
Separate just the changing of mount flags (MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND) from full
remount because the mount data will get parsed with the new fs_context
stuff prior to doing a remount - and this causes the syscall to fail under
some circumstances.

To quote Eric's explanation:

  [...] mount(..., MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, ...) now validates the mount options
  string, which breaks systemd unit files with ProtectControlGroups=yes
  (e.g.  systemd-networkd.service) when systemd does the following to
  change a cgroup (v1) mount to read-only:

    mount(NULL, "/run/systemd/unit-root/sys/fs/cgroup/systemd", NULL,
	  MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, NULL)

  ... when the kernel has CONFIG_CGROUPS=y but no cgroup subsystems
  enabled, since in that case the error "cgroup1: Need name or subsystem
  set" is hit when the mount options string is empty.

  Probably it doesn't make sense to validate the mount options string at
  all in the MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND case, though maybe you had something else
  in mind.

This is also worthwhile doing because we will need to add a mount_setattr()
syscall to take over the remount-bind function.

Reported-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Separate just the changing of mount flags (MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND) from full
remount because the mount data will get parsed with the new fs_context
stuff prior to doing a remount - and this causes the syscall to fail under
some circumstances.

To quote Eric's explanation:

  [...] mount(..., MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, ...) now validates the mount options
  string, which breaks systemd unit files with ProtectControlGroups=yes
  (e.g.  systemd-networkd.service) when systemd does the following to
  change a cgroup (v1) mount to read-only:

    mount(NULL, "/run/systemd/unit-root/sys/fs/cgroup/systemd", NULL,
	  MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, NULL)

  ... when the kernel has CONFIG_CGROUPS=y but no cgroup subsystems
  enabled, since in that case the error "cgroup1: Need name or subsystem
  set" is hit when the mount options string is empty.

  Probably it doesn't make sense to validate the mount options string at
  all in the MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND case, though maybe you had something else
  in mind.

This is also worthwhile doing because we will need to add a mount_setattr()
syscall to take over the remount-bind function.

Reported-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled</title>
<updated>2018-12-20T16:32:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-01T23:07:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e262e32d6bde0f77fb0c95d977482fc872c51996'/>
<id>e262e32d6bde0f77fb0c95d977482fc872c51996</id>
<content type='text'>
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags.  Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags.  Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VFS: use synchronize_rcu_expedited() in namespace_unlock()</title>
<updated>2018-11-29T23:55:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-29T23:33:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=22cb7405fada5305926d9bbcb476c1cd638d2dab'/>
<id>22cb7405fada5305926d9bbcb476c1cd638d2dab</id>
<content type='text'>
The synchronize_rcu() in namespace_unlock() is called every time
a filesystem is unmounted.  If a great many filesystems are mounted,
this can cause a noticable slow-down in, for example, system shutdown.

The sequence:
  mkdir -p /tmp/Mtest/{0..5000}
  time for i in /tmp/Mtest/*; do mount -t tmpfs tmpfs $i ; done
  time umount /tmp/Mtest/*

on a 4-cpu VM can report 8 seconds to mount the tmpfs filesystems, and
100 seconds to unmount them.

Boot the same VM with 1 CPU and it takes 18 seconds to mount the
tmpfs filesystems, but only 36 to unmount.

If we change the synchronize_rcu() to synchronize_rcu_expedited()
the umount time on a 4-cpu VM drop to 0.6 seconds

I think this 200-fold speed up is worth the slightly high system
impact of using synchronize_rcu_expedited().

Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt; (from general rcu perspective)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
The synchronize_rcu() in namespace_unlock() is called every time
a filesystem is unmounted.  If a great many filesystems are mounted,
this can cause a noticable slow-down in, for example, system shutdown.

The sequence:
  mkdir -p /tmp/Mtest/{0..5000}
  time for i in /tmp/Mtest/*; do mount -t tmpfs tmpfs $i ; done
  time umount /tmp/Mtest/*

on a 4-cpu VM can report 8 seconds to mount the tmpfs filesystems, and
100 seconds to unmount them.

Boot the same VM with 1 CPU and it takes 18 seconds to mount the
tmpfs filesystems, but only 36 to unmount.

If we change the synchronize_rcu() to synchronize_rcu_expedited()
the umount time on a 4-cpu VM drop to 0.6 seconds

I think this 200-fold speed up is worth the slightly high system
impact of using synchronize_rcu_expedited().

Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt; (from general rcu perspective)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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