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<title>linux-stable.git/fs/namespace.c, branch v3.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>vfs, freeze: use ACCESS_ONCE() to guard access to -&gt;mnt_flags</title>
<updated>2012-12-20T18:36:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miao Xie</name>
<email>miaox@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-11-16T09:23:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1e75529e3c6c18dc535f38454173c4f2dfa99685'/>
<id>1e75529e3c6c18dc535f38454173c4f2dfa99685</id>
<content type='text'>
The compiler may optimize the while loop and make the check just be done once,
so we should use ACCESS_ONCE() to guard access to -&gt;mnt_flags

Signed-off-by: Miao Xie &lt;miaox@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
The compiler may optimize the while loop and make the check just be done once,
so we should use ACCESS_ONCE() to guard access to -&gt;mnt_flags

Signed-off-by: Miao Xie &lt;miaox@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.</title>
<updated>2012-12-15T00:12:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-14T15:55:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5e4a08476b50fa39210fca82e03325cc46b9c235'/>
<id>5e4a08476b50fa39210fca82e03325cc46b9c235</id>
<content type='text'>
Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt; found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns.  With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.

However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.

Which made the following nasty sequence possible.

pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
	system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
	char path[PATH_MAX];
	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	setns(fd, 0);
	system("su -");
}

Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt; found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns.  With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.

However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.

Which made the following nasty sequence possible.

pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
	system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
	char path[PATH_MAX];
	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	setns(fd, 0);
	system("su -");
}

Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.</title>
<updated>2012-11-20T12:19:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-15T17:21:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=98f842e675f96ffac96e6c50315790912b2812be'/>
<id>98f842e675f96ffac96e6c50315790912b2812be</id>
<content type='text'>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.

A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.

This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.

We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.

I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.

A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.

This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.

We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.

I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T13:59:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhao Hongjiang</name>
<email>zhaohongjiang@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-13T08:38:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ae11e0f18482bfe0cd83b9b61434ea7e0bd94e25'/>
<id>ae11e0f18482bfe0cd83b9b61434ea7e0bd94e25</id>
<content type='text'>
Change return value from -EINVAL to -EPERM when the permission check fails.

Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang &lt;zhaohongjiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Change return value from -EINVAL to -EPERM when the permission check fails.

Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang &lt;zhaohongjiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T13:59:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-27T04:42:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0c55cfc4166d9a0f38de779bd4d75a90afbe7734'/>
<id>0c55cfc4166d9a0f38de779bd4d75a90afbe7734</id>
<content type='text'>
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that are safe to mount as
  an unprivileged user.

- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that don't need MNT_NODEV
  when mounted by an unprivileged user.

- Relax the permission checks to allow unprivileged users that have
  CAP_SYS_ADMIN permissions in the user namespace referred to by the
  current mount namespace to be allowed to mount, unmount, and move
  filesystems.

Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that are safe to mount as
  an unprivileged user.

- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that don't need MNT_NODEV
  when mounted by an unprivileged user.

- Relax the permission checks to allow unprivileged users that have
  CAP_SYS_ADMIN permissions in the user namespace referred to by the
  current mount namespace to be allowed to mount, unmount, and move
  filesystems.

Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T13:59:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-31T20:13:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7a472ef4be8387bc05a42e16309b02c8ca943a40'/>
<id>7a472ef4be8387bc05a42e16309b02c8ca943a40</id>
<content type='text'>
Sharing mount subtress with mount namespaces created by unprivileged
users allows unprivileged mounts created by unprivileged users to
propagate to mount namespaces controlled by privileged users.

Prevent nasty consequences by changing shared subtrees to slave
subtress when an unprivileged users creates a new mount namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Sharing mount subtress with mount namespaces created by unprivileged
users allows unprivileged mounts created by unprivileged users to
propagate to mount namespaces controlled by privileged users.

Prevent nasty consequences by changing shared subtrees to slave
subtress when an unprivileged users creates a new mount namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T13:59:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-27T04:08:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=771b1371686e0a63e938ada28de020b9a0040f55'/>
<id>771b1371686e0a63e938ada28de020b9a0040f55</id>
<content type='text'>
This will allow for support for unprivileged mounts in a new user namespace.

Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This will allow for support for unprivileged mounts in a new user namespace.

Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Add setns support for the mount namespace</title>
<updated>2012-11-19T13:59:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-03-08T02:49:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8823c079ba7136dc1948d6f6dcb5f8022bde438e'/>
<id>8823c079ba7136dc1948d6f6dcb5f8022bde438e</id>
<content type='text'>
setns support for the mount namespace is a little tricky as an
arbitrary decision must be made about what to set fs-&gt;root and
fs-&gt;pwd to, as there is no expectation of a relationship between
the two mount namespaces.  Therefore I arbitrarily find the root
mount point, and follow every mount on top of it to find the top
of the mount stack.  Then I set fs-&gt;root and fs-&gt;pwd to that
location.  The topmost root of the mount stack seems like a
reasonable place to be.

Bind mount support for the mount namespace inodes has the
possibility of creating circular dependencies between mount
namespaces.  Circular dependencies can result in loops that
prevent mount namespaces from every being freed.  I avoid
creating those circular dependencies by adding a sequence number
to the mount namespace and require all bind mounts be of a
younger mount namespace into an older mount namespace.

Add a helper function proc_ns_inode so it is possible to
detect when we are attempting to bind mound a namespace inode.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
setns support for the mount namespace is a little tricky as an
arbitrary decision must be made about what to set fs-&gt;root and
fs-&gt;pwd to, as there is no expectation of a relationship between
the two mount namespaces.  Therefore I arbitrarily find the root
mount point, and follow every mount on top of it to find the top
of the mount stack.  Then I set fs-&gt;root and fs-&gt;pwd to that
location.  The topmost root of the mount stack seems like a
reasonable place to be.

Bind mount support for the mount namespace inodes has the
possibility of creating circular dependencies between mount
namespaces.  Circular dependencies can result in loops that
prevent mount namespaces from every being freed.  I avoid
creating those circular dependencies by adding a sequence number
to the mount namespace and require all bind mounts be of a
younger mount namespace into an older mount namespace.

Add a helper function proc_ns_inode so it is possible to
detect when we are attempting to bind mound a namespace inode.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return it</title>
<updated>2012-10-13T00:14:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-10T19:25:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=91a27b2a756784714e924e5e854b919273082d26'/>
<id>91a27b2a756784714e924e5e854b919273082d26</id>
<content type='text'>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>consitify do_mount() arguments</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T00:02:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-11T15:42:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09'/>
<id>808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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