linux-stable.git/fs/f2fs, branch v5.4.232 Linux kernel stable tree f2fs: fix to do sanity check on i_extra_isize in is_alive() 2023-02-22T11:50:29+00:00 Chao Yu chao@kernel.org 2022-11-14T16:08:47+00:00 e5142a4935c1f15841d06047b8130078fc4d7b8f commit d3b7b4afd6b2c344eabf9cc26b8bfa903c164c7c upstream. syzbot found a f2fs bug: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2891 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in is_alive fs/f2fs/gc.c:1117 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in gc_data_segment fs/f2fs/gc.c:1520 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_garbage_collect+0x386a/0x3df0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1734 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888076557568 by task kworker/u4:3/52 CPU: 1 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-syzkaller-00362-gfef7fd48922d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x15e/0x45d mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2891 [inline] is_alive fs/f2fs/gc.c:1117 [inline] gc_data_segment fs/f2fs/gc.c:1520 [inline] do_garbage_collect+0x386a/0x3df0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1734 f2fs_gc+0x88c/0x20a0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1831 f2fs_balance_fs+0x544/0x6b0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:410 f2fs_write_inode+0x57e/0xe20 fs/f2fs/inode.c:753 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0xcfc/0x1440 fs/fs-writeback.c:1652 writeback_sb_inodes+0x54d/0xf90 fs/fs-writeback.c:1870 wb_writeback+0x2c5/0xd70 fs/fs-writeback.c:2044 wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2187 [inline] wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x12f0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2227 process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306 The root cause is that we forgot to do sanity check on .i_extra_isize in below path, result in accessing invalid address later, fix it. - gc_data_segment - is_alive - data_blkaddr - offset_in_addr Reported-by: syzbot+f8f3dfa4abc489e768a1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/0000000000003cb3c405ed5c17f9@google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit d3b7b4afd6b2c344eabf9cc26b8bfa903c164c7c upstream.

syzbot found a f2fs bug:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2891 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in is_alive fs/f2fs/gc.c:1117 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in gc_data_segment fs/f2fs/gc.c:1520 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_garbage_collect+0x386a/0x3df0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1734
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888076557568 by task kworker/u4:3/52

CPU: 1 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-syzkaller-00362-gfef7fd48922d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
print_report+0x15e/0x45d mm/kasan/report.c:395
kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495
data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2891 [inline]
is_alive fs/f2fs/gc.c:1117 [inline]
gc_data_segment fs/f2fs/gc.c:1520 [inline]
do_garbage_collect+0x386a/0x3df0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1734
f2fs_gc+0x88c/0x20a0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1831
f2fs_balance_fs+0x544/0x6b0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:410
f2fs_write_inode+0x57e/0xe20 fs/f2fs/inode.c:753
write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]
__writeback_single_inode+0xcfc/0x1440 fs/fs-writeback.c:1652
writeback_sb_inodes+0x54d/0xf90 fs/fs-writeback.c:1870
wb_writeback+0x2c5/0xd70 fs/fs-writeback.c:2044
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2187 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x12f0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2227
process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306

The root cause is that we forgot to do sanity check on .i_extra_isize
in below path, result in accessing invalid address later, fix it.
- gc_data_segment
 - is_alive
  - data_blkaddr
   - offset_in_addr

Reported-by: syzbot+f8f3dfa4abc489e768a1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/0000000000003cb3c405ed5c17f9@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
f2fs: let's avoid panic if extent_tree is not created 2023-01-24T06:17:58+00:00 Jaegeuk Kim jaegeuk@kernel.org 2022-12-22T00:14:10+00:00 557e85ff9afef6d45020b6f09357111d38033c31 [ Upstream commit df9d44b645b83fffccfb4e28c1f93376585fdec8 ] This patch avoids the below panic. pc : __lookup_extent_tree+0xd8/0x760 lr : f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x104/0x87c sp : ffffffc010cbb3c0 x29: ffffffc010cbb3e0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff8803e7f020 x26: ffffff8803e7ed40 x25: ffffff8803e7f020 x24: ffffffc010cbb460 x23: ffffffc010cbb480 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffffff22e90900 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffc010c5d080 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffffffdb1acdbb88 x14: ffffff888759e2b0 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffff802da49000 x11: 000000000a001200 x10: ffffff8803e7ed40 x9 : ffffff8023195800 x8 : ffffff802da49078 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000006 x4 : ffffffc010cbba28 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffc010cbb480 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8803e7ed40 Call trace: __lookup_extent_tree+0xd8/0x760 f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x104/0x87c f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x420/0xb60 f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x418/0xb1c __f2fs_write_data_pages+0x428/0x58c f2fs_write_data_pages+0x30/0x40 do_writepages+0x88/0x190 __writeback_single_inode+0x48/0x448 writeback_sb_inodes+0x468/0x9e8 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xb8/0x2a4 wb_writeback+0x33c/0x740 wb_do_writeback+0x2b4/0x400 wb_workfn+0xe4/0x34c process_one_work+0x24c/0x5bc worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa50 kthread+0x150/0x1b4 Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit df9d44b645b83fffccfb4e28c1f93376585fdec8 ]

This patch avoids the below panic.

pc : __lookup_extent_tree+0xd8/0x760
lr : f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x104/0x87c
sp : ffffffc010cbb3c0
x29: ffffffc010cbb3e0 x28: 0000000000000000
x27: ffffff8803e7f020 x26: ffffff8803e7ed40
x25: ffffff8803e7f020 x24: ffffffc010cbb460
x23: ffffffc010cbb480 x22: 0000000000000000
x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffffff22e90900
x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffc010c5d080
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020
x15: ffffffdb1acdbb88 x14: ffffff888759e2b0
x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffff802da49000
x11: 000000000a001200 x10: ffffff8803e7ed40
x9 : ffffff8023195800 x8 : ffffff802da49078
x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000006 x4 : ffffffc010cbba28
x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffc010cbb480
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8803e7ed40
Call trace:
 __lookup_extent_tree+0xd8/0x760
 f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x104/0x87c
 f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x420/0xb60
 f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x418/0xb1c
 __f2fs_write_data_pages+0x428/0x58c
 f2fs_write_data_pages+0x30/0x40
 do_writepages+0x88/0x190
 __writeback_single_inode+0x48/0x448
 writeback_sb_inodes+0x468/0x9e8
 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xb8/0x2a4
 wb_writeback+0x33c/0x740
 wb_do_writeback+0x2b4/0x400
 wb_workfn+0xe4/0x34c
 process_one_work+0x24c/0x5bc
 worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa50
 kthread+0x150/0x1b4

Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
f2fs: should put a page when checking the summary info 2023-01-18T10:41:44+00:00 Pavel Machek pavel@denx.de 2022-10-24T17:30:12+00:00 f4b5a27f56c5e12d9f880eb5c20b43a004b2f5e6 commit c3db3c2fd9992c08f49aa93752d3c103c3a4f6aa upstream. The commit introduces another bug. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c6ad7fd16657e ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on summary info") Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c3db3c2fd9992c08f49aa93752d3c103c3a4f6aa upstream.

The commit introduces another bug.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c6ad7fd16657e ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on summary info")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
f2fs: avoid victim selection from previous victim section 2023-01-18T10:41:20+00:00 Yonggil Song yonggil.song@samsung.com 2022-11-22T09:03:20+00:00 c21a09ed1e08dee46f7e01cdde9f319e366b1c01 [ Upstream commit e219aecfd4b766c4e878a3769057e9809f7fcadc ] When f2fs chooses GC victim in large section & LFS mode, next_victim_seg[gc_type] is referenced first. After segment is freed, next_victim_seg[gc_type] has the next segment number. However, next_victim_seg[gc_type] still has the last segment number even after the last segment of section is freed. In this case, when f2fs chooses a victim for the next GC round, the last segment of previous victim section is chosen as a victim. Initialize next_victim_seg[gc_type] to NULL_SEGNO for the last segment in large section. Fixes: e3080b0120a1 ("f2fs: support subsectional garbage collection") Signed-off-by: Yonggil Song <yonggil.song@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit e219aecfd4b766c4e878a3769057e9809f7fcadc ]

When f2fs chooses GC victim in large section & LFS mode,
next_victim_seg[gc_type] is referenced first. After segment is freed,
next_victim_seg[gc_type] has the next segment number.
However, next_victim_seg[gc_type] still has the last segment number
even after the last segment of section is freed. In this case, when f2fs
chooses a victim for the next GC round, the last segment of previous victim
section is chosen as a victim.

Initialize next_victim_seg[gc_type] to NULL_SEGNO for the last segment in
large section.

Fixes: e3080b0120a1 ("f2fs: support subsectional garbage collection")
Signed-off-by: Yonggil Song <yonggil.song@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
f2fs: fix normal discard process 2023-01-18T10:41:17+00:00 Dongdong Zhang zhangdongdong1@oppo.com 2022-10-25T09:40:36+00:00 ef6079d98f4982a2339397db8d9c091ff2eb2cbf [ Upstream commit b5f1a218ae5e4339130d6e733f0e63d623e09a2c ] In the DPOLICY_BG mode, there is a conflict between the two conditions "i + 1 < dpolicy->granularity" and "i < DEFAULT_DISCARD_GRANULARITY". If i = 15, the first condition is false, it will enter the second condition and dispatch all small granularity discards in function __issue_discard_cmd_orderly. The restrictive effect of the first condition to small discards will be invalidated. These two conditions should align. Fixes: 20ee4382322c ("f2fs: issue small discard by LBA order") Signed-off-by: Dongdong Zhang <zhangdongdong1@oppo.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit b5f1a218ae5e4339130d6e733f0e63d623e09a2c ]

In the DPOLICY_BG mode, there is a conflict between
the two conditions "i + 1 < dpolicy->granularity" and
"i < DEFAULT_DISCARD_GRANULARITY". If i = 15, the first
condition is false, it will enter the second condition
and dispatch all small granularity discards in function
 __issue_discard_cmd_orderly. The restrictive effect
of the first condition to small discards will be
invalidated. These two conditions should align.

Fixes: 20ee4382322c ("f2fs: issue small discard by LBA order")
Signed-off-by: Dongdong Zhang <zhangdongdong1@oppo.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
f2fs: fix race condition on setting FI_NO_EXTENT flag 2022-10-26T11:22:46+00:00 Zhang Qilong zhangqilong3@huawei.com 2022-09-05T04:59:17+00:00 c5ed3a378978feb5e96242f882b993dcde63ecd3 [ Upstream commit 07725adc55c0a414c10acb5c8c86cea34b95ddef ] The following scenarios exist. process A: process B: ->f2fs_drop_extent_tree ->f2fs_update_extent_cache_range ->f2fs_update_extent_tree_range ->write_lock ->set_inode_flag ->is_inode_flag_set ->__free_extent_tree // Shouldn't // have been // cleaned up // here ->write_lock In this case, the "FI_NO_EXTENT" flag is set between f2fs_update_extent_tree_range and is_inode_flag_set by other process. it leads to clearing the whole exten tree which should not have happened. And we fix it by move the setting it to the range of write_lock. Fixes:5f281fab9b9a3 ("f2fs: disable extent_cache for fcollapse/finsert inodes") Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 07725adc55c0a414c10acb5c8c86cea34b95ddef ]

The following scenarios exist.
process A:               process B:
->f2fs_drop_extent_tree  ->f2fs_update_extent_cache_range
                          ->f2fs_update_extent_tree_range
                           ->write_lock
 ->set_inode_flag
                           ->is_inode_flag_set
                           ->__free_extent_tree // Shouldn't
                                                // have been
                                                // cleaned up
                                                // here
  ->write_lock

In this case, the "FI_NO_EXTENT" flag is set between
f2fs_update_extent_tree_range and is_inode_flag_set
by other process. it leads to clearing the whole exten
tree which should not have happened. And we fix it by
move the setting it to the range of write_lock.

Fixes:5f281fab9b9a3 ("f2fs: disable extent_cache for fcollapse/finsert inodes")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on summary info 2022-10-26T11:22:17+00:00 Chao Yu chao@kernel.org 2022-09-14T11:51:51+00:00 c99860f9a75079f339ed7670425b1ac58f26e2ff commit c6ad7fd16657ebd34a87a97d9588195aae87597d upstream. As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216456 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in recover_data+0x63ae/0x6ae0 [f2fs] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881464dcd80 by task mount/1013 CPU: 3 PID: 1013 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc4 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5e print_report.cold+0xf3/0x68d kasan_report+0xa8/0x130 recover_data+0x63ae/0x6ae0 [f2fs] f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x120d/0x1fc0 [f2fs] f2fs_fill_super+0x4665/0x61e0 [f2fs] mount_bdev+0x2cf/0x3b0 legacy_get_tree+0xed/0x1d0 vfs_get_tree+0x81/0x2b0 path_mount+0x47e/0x19d0 do_mount+0xce/0xf0 __x64_sys_mount+0x12c/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The root cause is: in fuzzed image, SSA table is corrupted: ofs_in_node is larger than ADDRS_PER_PAGE(), result in out-of-range access on 4k-size page. - recover_data - do_recover_data - check_index_in_prev_nodes - f2fs_data_blkaddr This patch adds sanity check on summary info in recovery and GC flow in where the flows rely on them. After patch: [ 29.310883] F2FS-fs (loop0): Inconsistent ofs_in_node:65286 in summary, ino:0, nid:6, max:1018 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c6ad7fd16657ebd34a87a97d9588195aae87597d upstream.

As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216456

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in recover_data+0x63ae/0x6ae0 [f2fs]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881464dcd80 by task mount/1013

CPU: 3 PID: 1013 Comm: mount Tainted: G        W          6.0.0-rc4 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5e
 print_report.cold+0xf3/0x68d
 kasan_report+0xa8/0x130
 recover_data+0x63ae/0x6ae0 [f2fs]
 f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x120d/0x1fc0 [f2fs]
 f2fs_fill_super+0x4665/0x61e0 [f2fs]
 mount_bdev+0x2cf/0x3b0
 legacy_get_tree+0xed/0x1d0
 vfs_get_tree+0x81/0x2b0
 path_mount+0x47e/0x19d0
 do_mount+0xce/0xf0
 __x64_sys_mount+0x12c/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The root cause is: in fuzzed image, SSA table is corrupted: ofs_in_node
is larger than ADDRS_PER_PAGE(), result in out-of-range access on 4k-size
page.

- recover_data
 - do_recover_data
  - check_index_in_prev_nodes
   - f2fs_data_blkaddr

This patch adds sanity check on summary info in recovery and GC flow
in where the flows rely on them.

After patch:
[   29.310883] F2FS-fs (loop0): Inconsistent ofs_in_node:65286 in summary, ino:0, nid:6, max:1018

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on destination blkaddr during recovery 2022-10-26T11:22:17+00:00 Chao Yu chao@kernel.org 2022-09-13T02:08:41+00:00 68b1e607559d3dc85f94b0d738d7c4e8029b0cfa commit 0ef4ca04a3f9223ff8bc440041c524b2123e09a3 upstream. As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216456 loop5: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072 F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_inode: ino = 6, name = hln, inline = 1 F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_data: ino = 6 (i_size: recover) err = 0 F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_inode: ino = 6, name = hln, inline = 1 F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_data: ino = 6 (i_size: recover) err = 0 F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_inode: ino = 6, name = hln, inline = 1 F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_data: ino = 6 (i_size: recover) err = 0 F2FS-fs (loop5): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:5634 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1013 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2198 RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0xa55/0x10b0 [f2fs] Call Trace: <TASK> f2fs_do_replace_block+0xa98/0x1890 [f2fs] f2fs_replace_block+0xeb/0x180 [f2fs] recover_data+0x1a69/0x6ae0 [f2fs] f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x120d/0x1fc0 [f2fs] f2fs_fill_super+0x4665/0x61e0 [f2fs] mount_bdev+0x2cf/0x3b0 legacy_get_tree+0xed/0x1d0 vfs_get_tree+0x81/0x2b0 path_mount+0x47e/0x19d0 do_mount+0xce/0xf0 __x64_sys_mount+0x12c/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd If we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, it will trigger a kernel panic instead of warning. The root cause is: in fuzzed image, SIT table is inconsistent with inode mapping table, result in triggering such warning during SIT table update. This patch introduces a new flag DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE_UPDATE, w/ this flag, data block recovery flow can check destination blkaddr's validation in SIT table, and skip f2fs_replace_block() to avoid inconsistent status. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0ef4ca04a3f9223ff8bc440041c524b2123e09a3 upstream.

As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216456

loop5: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_inode: ino = 6, name = hln, inline = 1
F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_data: ino = 6 (i_size: recover) err = 0
F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_inode: ino = 6, name = hln, inline = 1
F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_data: ino = 6 (i_size: recover) err = 0
F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_inode: ino = 6, name = hln, inline = 1
F2FS-fs (loop5): recover_data: ino = 6 (i_size: recover) err = 0
F2FS-fs (loop5): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:5634
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1013 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2198
RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0xa55/0x10b0 [f2fs]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 f2fs_do_replace_block+0xa98/0x1890 [f2fs]
 f2fs_replace_block+0xeb/0x180 [f2fs]
 recover_data+0x1a69/0x6ae0 [f2fs]
 f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x120d/0x1fc0 [f2fs]
 f2fs_fill_super+0x4665/0x61e0 [f2fs]
 mount_bdev+0x2cf/0x3b0
 legacy_get_tree+0xed/0x1d0
 vfs_get_tree+0x81/0x2b0
 path_mount+0x47e/0x19d0
 do_mount+0xce/0xf0
 __x64_sys_mount+0x12c/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

If we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, it will trigger a kernel panic
instead of warning.

The root cause is: in fuzzed image, SIT table is inconsistent with inode
mapping table, result in triggering such warning during SIT table update.

This patch introduces a new flag DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE_UPDATE, w/ this
flag, data block recovery flow can check destination blkaddr's validation
in SIT table, and skip f2fs_replace_block() to avoid inconsistent status.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
f2fs: increase the limit for reserve_root 2022-10-26T11:22:17+00:00 Jaegeuk Kim jaegeuk@kernel.org 2022-08-23T17:18:42+00:00 c5d8198ce863555dc0125e847b915cec532ae032 commit da35fe96d12d15779f3cb74929b7ed03941cf983 upstream. This patch increases the threshold that limits the reserved root space from 0.2% to 12.5% by using simple shift operation. Typically Android sets 128MB, but if the storage capacity is 32GB, 0.2% which is around 64MB becomes too small. Let's relax it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Aran Dalton <arda@allwinnertech.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit da35fe96d12d15779f3cb74929b7ed03941cf983 upstream.

This patch increases the threshold that limits the reserved root space from 0.2%
to 12.5% by using simple shift operation.

Typically Android sets 128MB, but if the storage capacity is 32GB, 0.2% which is
around 64MB becomes too small. Let's relax it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Aran Dalton <arda@allwinnertech.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
f2fs: fix to avoid use f2fs_bug_on() in f2fs_new_node_page() 2022-08-25T09:18:38+00:00 Chao Yu chao.yu@oppo.com 2022-07-24T16:03:23+00:00 29e734ec33ae4bd7de4018fb0fb0eec808c36b92 [ Upstream commit 141170b759e03958f296033bb7001be62d1d363b ] As Dipanjan Das <mail.dipanjan.das@gmail.com> reported, syzkaller found a f2fs bug as below: RIP: 0010:f2fs_new_node_page+0x19ac/0x1fc0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1295 Call Trace: write_all_xattrs fs/f2fs/xattr.c:487 [inline] __f2fs_setxattr+0xe76/0x2e10 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:743 f2fs_setxattr+0x233/0xab0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:790 f2fs_xattr_generic_set+0x133/0x170 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:86 __vfs_setxattr+0x115/0x180 fs/xattr.c:182 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x125/0x5f0 fs/xattr.c:216 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1cf/0x260 fs/xattr.c:277 vfs_setxattr+0x13f/0x330 fs/xattr.c:303 setxattr+0x146/0x160 fs/xattr.c:611 path_setxattr+0x1a7/0x1d0 fs/xattr.c:630 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:653 [inline] __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:649 [inline] __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xbd/0x150 fs/xattr.c:649 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 NAT entry and nat bitmap can be inconsistent, e.g. one nid is free in nat bitmap, and blkaddr in its NAT entry is not NULL_ADDR, it may trigger BUG_ON() in f2fs_new_node_page(), fix it. Reported-by: Dipanjan Das <mail.dipanjan.das@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao.yu@oppo.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 141170b759e03958f296033bb7001be62d1d363b ]

As Dipanjan Das <mail.dipanjan.das@gmail.com> reported, syzkaller
found a f2fs bug as below:

RIP: 0010:f2fs_new_node_page+0x19ac/0x1fc0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1295
Call Trace:
 write_all_xattrs fs/f2fs/xattr.c:487 [inline]
 __f2fs_setxattr+0xe76/0x2e10 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:743
 f2fs_setxattr+0x233/0xab0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:790
 f2fs_xattr_generic_set+0x133/0x170 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:86
 __vfs_setxattr+0x115/0x180 fs/xattr.c:182
 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x125/0x5f0 fs/xattr.c:216
 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1cf/0x260 fs/xattr.c:277
 vfs_setxattr+0x13f/0x330 fs/xattr.c:303
 setxattr+0x146/0x160 fs/xattr.c:611
 path_setxattr+0x1a7/0x1d0 fs/xattr.c:630
 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:653 [inline]
 __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:649 [inline]
 __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xbd/0x150 fs/xattr.c:649
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

NAT entry and nat bitmap can be inconsistent, e.g. one nid is free
in nat bitmap, and blkaddr in its NAT entry is not NULL_ADDR, it
may trigger BUG_ON() in f2fs_new_node_page(), fix it.

Reported-by: Dipanjan Das <mail.dipanjan.das@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao.yu@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>