linux-stable.git/fs/f2fs, branch v4.9.78

fscrypt: use ENOKEY when file cannot be created w/o key

2017-11-30T08:39:11+00:00

[ Upstream commit 54475f531bb8d7078f63c159e5e0615d486c498c ]

As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
attempting to create a file in an encrypted directory that hasn't been
"unlocked" fail with ENOKEY.  Previously, several error codes were used
for this case, including ENOENT, EACCES, and EPERM, and they were not
consistent between and within filesystems.  ENOKEY is a better choice
because it expresses that the failure is due to lacking the encryption
key.  It also matches the error code returned when trying to open an
encrypted regular file without the key.

I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous
inconsistent error codes, which were never documented anywhere.

This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: do not wait for writeback in write_begin

2017-10-21T15:21:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit 86d54795c94532075d862aa0a79f0c981dab4bdd ]

Otherwise we can get livelock like below.

[79880.428136] dbench          D    0 18405  18404 0x00000000
[79880.428139] Call Trace:
[79880.428142]  __schedule+0x219/0x6b0
[79880.428144]  schedule+0x36/0x80
[79880.428147]  schedule_timeout+0x243/0x2e0
[79880.428152]  ? update_sd_lb_stats+0x16b/0x5f0
[79880.428155]  ? ktime_get+0x3c/0xb0
[79880.428157]  io_schedule_timeout+0xa6/0x110
[79880.428161]  __lock_page+0xf7/0x130
[79880.428164]  ? unlock_page+0x30/0x30
[79880.428167]  pagecache_get_page+0x16b/0x250
[79880.428171]  grab_cache_page_write_begin+0x20/0x40
[79880.428182]  f2fs_write_begin+0xa2/0xdb0 [f2fs]
[79880.428192]  ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x16/0x30 [f2fs]
[79880.428197]  ? kmem_cache_free+0x79/0x200
[79880.428203]  ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x17f/0x360
[79880.428206]  generic_perform_write+0xbb/0x190
[79880.428213]  ? file_update_time+0xa4/0xf0
[79880.428217]  __generic_file_write_iter+0x19b/0x1e0
[79880.428226]  f2fs_file_write_iter+0x9c/0x180 [f2fs]
[79880.428231]  __vfs_write+0xc5/0x140
[79880.428235]  vfs_write+0xb2/0x1b0
[79880.428238]  SyS_write+0x46/0xa0
[79880.428242]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad

Fixes: cae96a5c8ab6 ("f2fs: check io submission more precisely")
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu 
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: do SSR for data when there is enough free space

2017-10-21T15:21:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit 035e97adab26c1121cedaeb9bd04cf48a8e8cf51 ]

In allocate_segment_by_default(), need_SSR() already detected it's time to do
SSR. So, let's try to find victims for data segments more aggressively in time.

Signed-off-by: Yunlong Song 
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: don't allow encrypted operations without keys

2017-10-12T09:51:26+00:00

commit 363fa4e078cbdc97a172c19d19dc04b41b52ebc8 upstream.

This patch fixes the renaming bug on encrypted filenames, which was pointed by

 (ext4: don't allow encrypted operations without keys)

Cc: Theodore Ts'o 
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu 
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: check hot_data for roll-forward recovery

2017-09-20T06:19:56+00:00

commit 125c9fb1ccb53eb2ea9380df40f3c743f3fb2fed upstream.

We need to check HOT_DATA to truncate any previous data block when doing
roll-forward recovery.

Reviewed-by: Chao Yu 
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: let fill_super handle roll-forward errors

2017-09-20T06:19:56+00:00

commit afd2b4da40b3b567ef8d8e6881479345a2312a03 upstream.

If we set CP_ERROR_FLAG in roll-forward error, f2fs is no longer to proceed
any IOs due to f2fs_cp_error(). But, for example, if some stale data is involved
on roll-forward process, we're able to get -ENOENT, getting fs stuck.
If we get any error, let fill_super set SBI_NEED_FSCK and try to recover back
to stable point.

Reviewed-by: Chao Yu 
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff

2017-08-11T15:49:31+00:00

commit 15d3042a937c13f5d9244241c7a9c8416ff6e82a upstream.

Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian 
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
[AmitP: Found in Android Security bulletin for Aug'17, fixes CVE-2017-10663]
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: Don't clear SGID when inheriting ACLs

2017-07-27T22:08:03+00:00

commit c925dc162f770578ff4a65ec9b08270382dba9e6 upstream.

This patch copies commit b7f8a09f80:
"btrfs: Don't clear SGID when inheriting ACLs" written by Jan.

Fixes: 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu 
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: sanity check size of nat and sit cache

2017-07-27T22:08:03+00:00

commit 21d3f8e1c3b7996ce239ab6fa82e9f7a8c47d84d upstream.

Make sure number of entires doesn't exceed max journal size.

Signed-off-by: Jin Qian 
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu 
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: Work around deallocated stack frame reference gcc bug on sparc.

2017-06-24T05:11:17+00:00

commit d41519a69b35b10af7fda867fb9100df24fdf403 upstream.

On sparc, if we have an alloca() like situation, as is the case with
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(), we can end up referencing deallocated stack
memory.  The result can be that the value is clobbered if a trap
or interrupt arrives at just the right instruction.

It only occurs if the function ends returning a value from that
alloca() area and that value can be placed into the return value
register using a single instruction.

For example, in lib/libcrc32c.c:crc32c() we end up with a return
sequence like:

        return  %i7+8
         lduw   [%o5+16], %o0   ! MEM[(u32 *)__shash_desc.1_10 + 16B],

%o5 holds the base of the on-stack area allocated for the shash
descriptor.  But the return released the stack frame and the
register window.

So if an intererupt arrives between 'return' and 'lduw', then
the value read at %o5+16 can be corrupted.

Add a data compiler barrier to work around this problem.  This is
exactly what the gcc fix will end up doing as well, and it absolutely
should not change the code generated for other cpus (unless gcc
on them has the same bug :-)

With crucial insight from Eric Sandeen.

Reported-by: Anatoly Pugachev 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman