<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/f2fs/segment.c, branch linux-5.2.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: use generic EFSBADCRC/EFSCORRUPTED</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T07:01:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T03:36:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c704eb3aaffae0d6463b1773b37e69695b112ca4'/>
<id>c704eb3aaffae0d6463b1773b37e69695b112ca4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 10f966bbf521bb9b2e497bbca496a5141f4071d0 ]

f2fs uses EFAULT as error number to indicate filesystem is corrupted
all the time, but generic filesystems use EUCLEAN for such condition,
we need to change to follow others.

This patch adds two new macros as below to wrap more generic error
code macros, and spread them in code.

EFSBADCRC	EBADMSG		/* Bad CRC detected */
EFSCORRUPTED	EUCLEAN		/* Filesystem is corrupted */

Reported-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 10f966bbf521bb9b2e497bbca496a5141f4071d0 ]

f2fs uses EFAULT as error number to indicate filesystem is corrupted
all the time, but generic filesystems use EUCLEAN for such condition,
we need to change to follow others.

This patch adds two new macros as below to wrap more generic error
code macros, and spread them in code.

EFSBADCRC	EBADMSG		/* Bad CRC detected */
EFSCORRUPTED	EUCLEAN		/* Filesystem is corrupted */

Reported-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to do sanity check on segment bitmap of LFS curseg</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T07:01:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-25T15:07:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=453bcdd2432bf6923a535b38abf7a7c6ee77d94d'/>
<id>453bcdd2432bf6923a535b38abf7a7c6ee77d94d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c854f4d681365498f53ba07843a16423625aa7e9 ]

As Jungyeon Reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233

- Reproduces
gcc poc_13.c
./run.sh f2fs

- Kernel messages
 F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608
 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2133!
 RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x35d/0x3e0
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16c/0x5a0
  do_write_page+0x57/0x100
  f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0
  __write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0
  f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670
  f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x364/0x13a0
  f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130
  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810
  do_fsync+0x33/0x60
  __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The testcase fails because that, in fuzzed image, current segment was
allocated with LFS type, its .next_blkoff should point to an unused
block address, but actually, its bitmap shows it's not. So during
allocation, f2fs crash when setting bitmap.

Introducing sanity_check_curseg() to check such inconsistence of
current in-used segment.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c854f4d681365498f53ba07843a16423625aa7e9 ]

As Jungyeon Reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233

- Reproduces
gcc poc_13.c
./run.sh f2fs

- Kernel messages
 F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608
 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2133!
 RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x35d/0x3e0
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16c/0x5a0
  do_write_page+0x57/0x100
  f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0
  __write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0
  f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670
  f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x364/0x13a0
  f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130
  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810
  do_fsync+0x33/0x60
  __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The testcase fails because that, in fuzzed image, current segment was
allocated with LFS type, its .next_blkoff should point to an unused
block address, but actually, its bitmap shows it's not. So during
allocation, f2fs crash when setting bitmap.

Introducing sanity_check_curseg() to check such inconsistence of
current in-used segment.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access"</title>
<updated>2019-10-01T07:01:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-02T10:15:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bca9bfa41e3fffcf4ef5fb196e5ee2d4749c01e3'/>
<id>bca9bfa41e3fffcf4ef5fb196e5ee2d4749c01e3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a37d0862d17411edb67677a580a6f505ec2225f6 ]

As Pavel Machek reported:

"We normally use -EUCLEAN to signal filesystem corruption. Plus, it is
good idea to report it to the syslog and mark filesystem as "needing
fsck" if filesystem can do that."

Still we need improve the original patch with:
- use unlikely keyword
- add message print
- return EUCLEAN

However, after rethink this patch, I don't think we should add such
condition check here as below reasons:
- We have already checked the field in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(),
- If there is fs corrupt or security vulnerability, there is nothing
to guarantee the field is integrated after the check, unless we do
the check before each of its use, however no filesystem does that.
- We only have similar check for bitmap, which was added due to there
is bitmap corruption happened on f2fs' runtime in product.
- There are so many key fields in SB/CP/NAT did have such check
after f2fs_sanity_check_{sb,cp,..}.

So I propose to revert this unneeded check.

This reverts commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a37d0862d17411edb67677a580a6f505ec2225f6 ]

As Pavel Machek reported:

"We normally use -EUCLEAN to signal filesystem corruption. Plus, it is
good idea to report it to the syslog and mark filesystem as "needing
fsck" if filesystem can do that."

Still we need improve the original patch with:
- use unlikely keyword
- add message print
- return EUCLEAN

However, after rethink this patch, I don't think we should add such
condition check here as below reasons:
- We have already checked the field in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(),
- If there is fs corrupt or security vulnerability, there is nothing
to guarantee the field is integrated after the check, unless we do
the check before each of its use, however no filesystem does that.
- We only have similar check for bitmap, which was added due to there
is bitmap corruption happened on f2fs' runtime in product.
- There are so many key fields in SB/CP/NAT did have such check
after f2fs_sanity_check_{sb,cp,..}.

So I propose to revert this unneeded check.

This reverts commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:24:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ocean Chen</name>
<email>oceanchen@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-08T04:34:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=171fc85b0933cfe82576e3073e7773f66045e113'/>
<id>171fc85b0933cfe82576e3073e7773f66045e113</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a ]

blkoff_off might over 512 due to fs corrupt or security
vulnerability. That should be checked before being using.

Use ENTRIES_IN_SUM to protect invalid value in cur_data_blkoff.

Signed-off-by: Ocean Chen &lt;oceanchen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a ]

blkoff_off might over 512 due to fs corrupt or security
vulnerability. That should be checked before being using.

Use ENTRIES_IN_SUM to protect invalid value in cur_data_blkoff.

Signed-off-by: Ocean Chen &lt;oceanchen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to avoid long latency during umount</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:24:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Heng Xiao</name>
<email>heng.xiao@unisoc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-03T02:29:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=afa4990b08d0f4e1d7701ede5954dedaf6a63541'/>
<id>afa4990b08d0f4e1d7701ede5954dedaf6a63541</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6e0cd4a9dd4df1a0afcb454f1e654b5c80685913 ]

In umount, we give an constand time to handle pending discard, previously,
in __issue_discard_cmd() we missed to check timeout condition in loop,
result in delaying long time, fix it.

Signed-off-by: Heng Xiao &lt;heng.xiao@unisoc.com&gt;
[Chao Yu: add commit message]
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6e0cd4a9dd4df1a0afcb454f1e654b5c80685913 ]

In umount, we give an constand time to handle pending discard, previously,
in __issue_discard_cmd() we missed to check timeout condition in loop,
result in delaying long time, fix it.

Signed-off-by: Heng Xiao &lt;heng.xiao@unisoc.com&gt;
[Chao Yu: add commit message]
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: Lower threshold for disable_cp_again</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:24:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Rosenberg</name>
<email>drosen@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-30T00:49:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26ccec2dc7780be1b9f3e329935fc13ea46a6507'/>
<id>26ccec2dc7780be1b9f3e329935fc13ea46a6507</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ae4ad7ea09d32ff1b6fb908ff12f8c1bd5241b29 ]

The existing threshold for allowable holes at checkpoint=disable time is
too high. The OVP space contains reserved segments, which are always in
the form of free segments. These must be subtracted from the OVP value.

The current threshold is meant to be the maximum value of holes of a
single type we can have and still guarantee that we can fill the disk
without failing to find space for a block of a given type.

If the disk is full, ignoring current reserved, which only helps us,
the amount of unused blocks is equal to the OVP area. Of that, there
are reserved segments, which must be free segments, and the rest of the
ovp area, which can come from either free segments or holes. The maximum
possible amount of holes is OVP-reserved.

Now, consider the disk when mounting with checkpoint=disable.
We must be able to fill all available free space with either data or
node blocks. When we start with checkpoint=disable, holes are locked to
their current type. Say we have H of one type of hole, and H+X of the
other. We can fill H of that space with arbitrary typed blocks via SSR.
For the remaining H+X blocks, we may not have any of a given block type
left at all. For instance, if we were to fill the disk entirely with
blocks of the type with fewer holes, the H+X blocks of the opposite type
would not be used. If H+X &gt; OVP-reserved, there would be more holes than
could possibly exist, and we would have failed to find a suitable block
earlier on, leading to a crash in update_sit_entry.

If H+X &lt;= OVP-reserved, then the holes end up effectively masked by the OVP
region in this case.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg &lt;drosen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ae4ad7ea09d32ff1b6fb908ff12f8c1bd5241b29 ]

The existing threshold for allowable holes at checkpoint=disable time is
too high. The OVP space contains reserved segments, which are always in
the form of free segments. These must be subtracted from the OVP value.

The current threshold is meant to be the maximum value of holes of a
single type we can have and still guarantee that we can fill the disk
without failing to find space for a block of a given type.

If the disk is full, ignoring current reserved, which only helps us,
the amount of unused blocks is equal to the OVP area. Of that, there
are reserved segments, which must be free segments, and the rest of the
ovp area, which can come from either free segments or holes. The maximum
possible amount of holes is OVP-reserved.

Now, consider the disk when mounting with checkpoint=disable.
We must be able to fill all available free space with either data or
node blocks. When we start with checkpoint=disable, holes are locked to
their current type. Say we have H of one type of hole, and H+X of the
other. We can fill H of that space with arbitrary typed blocks via SSR.
For the remaining H+X blocks, we may not have any of a given block type
left at all. For instance, if we were to fill the disk entirely with
blocks of the type with fewer holes, the H+X blocks of the opposite type
would not be used. If H+X &gt; OVP-reserved, there would be more holes than
could possibly exist, and we would have failed to find a suitable block
earlier on, leading to a crash in update_sit_entry.

If H+X &lt;= OVP-reserved, then the holes end up effectively masked by the OVP
region in this case.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg &lt;drosen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to avoid deadloop if data_flush is on</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:24:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-20T09:36:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9fc3cc6cb0cf115d20196e4ec90d00f7a335dc2c'/>
<id>9fc3cc6cb0cf115d20196e4ec90d00f7a335dc2c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 040d2bb318d1aea4f28cc22504b44e446666c86e ]

As Hagbard Celine reported:

[  615.697824] INFO: task kworker/u16:5:344 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[  615.697825]       Not tainted 5.0.15-gentoo-f2fslog #4
[  615.697826] "echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs"
disables this message.
[  615.697827] kworker/u16:5   D    0   344      2 0x80000000
[  615.697831] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-259:0)
[  615.697832] Call Trace:
[  615.697836]  ? __schedule+0x2c5/0x8b0
[  615.697839]  schedule+0x32/0x80
[  615.697841]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20
[  615.697842]  __mutex_lock.isra.8+0x2ba/0x4d0
[  615.697845]  ? log_store+0xf5/0x260
[  615.697848]  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x133/0x320
[  615.697851]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2c/0xe0
[  615.697854]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0
[  615.697857]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x81/0xb0
[  615.697859]  f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes+0x1dd/0x200
[  615.697861]  f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0x2a7/0x2c0
[  615.697863]  ? up_read+0x5/0x20
[  615.697865]  ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2cb/0x940
[  615.697867]  f2fs_balance_fs+0xe5/0x2c0
[  615.697869]  __write_data_page+0x1c8/0x6e0
[  615.697873]  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x1e0/0x450
[  615.697878]  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x14b/0x320
[  615.697880]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2c/0xe0
[  615.697883]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0
[  615.697885]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x81/0xb0
[  615.697887]  f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes+0x1dd/0x200
[  615.697889]  f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0x2a7/0x2c0
[  615.697891]  f2fs_write_node_pages+0x51/0x220
[  615.697894]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0
[  615.697897]  __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x3d0
[  615.697899]  writeback_sb_inodes+0x1e8/0x410
[  615.697902]  __writeback_inodes_wb+0x5d/0xb0
[  615.697904]  wb_writeback+0x28f/0x340
[  615.697906]  ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20
[  615.697908]  wb_workfn+0x33e/0x420
[  615.697911]  process_one_work+0x1a1/0x3d0
[  615.697913]  worker_thread+0x30/0x380
[  615.697915]  ? process_one_work+0x3d0/0x3d0
[  615.697916]  kthread+0x116/0x130
[  615.697918]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[  615.697921]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

There is still deadloop in below condition:

d A
- do_writepages
 - f2fs_write_node_pages
  - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
   - f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
    - f2fs_write_cache_pages
     - mutex_lock(&amp;sbi-&gt;writepages)	-- lock once
     - __write_data_page
      - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
       - f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
        - f2fs_write_data_pages
         - mutex_lock(&amp;sbi-&gt;writepages)	-- lock again

Thread A			Thread B
- do_writepages
 - f2fs_write_node_pages
  - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
   - f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
    - .cp_task = current
				- f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
				 - .cp_task = current
				 - filemap_fdatawrite
				 - .cp_task = NULL
    - filemap_fdatawrite
     - f2fs_write_cache_pages
      - enter f2fs_balance_fs_bg since .cp_task is NULL
    - .cp_task = NULL

Change as below to avoid this:
- add condition to avoid holding .writepages mutex lock in path
of data flush
- introduce mutex lock sbi.flush_lock to exclude concurrent data
flush in background.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 040d2bb318d1aea4f28cc22504b44e446666c86e ]

As Hagbard Celine reported:

[  615.697824] INFO: task kworker/u16:5:344 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[  615.697825]       Not tainted 5.0.15-gentoo-f2fslog #4
[  615.697826] "echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs"
disables this message.
[  615.697827] kworker/u16:5   D    0   344      2 0x80000000
[  615.697831] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-259:0)
[  615.697832] Call Trace:
[  615.697836]  ? __schedule+0x2c5/0x8b0
[  615.697839]  schedule+0x32/0x80
[  615.697841]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20
[  615.697842]  __mutex_lock.isra.8+0x2ba/0x4d0
[  615.697845]  ? log_store+0xf5/0x260
[  615.697848]  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x133/0x320
[  615.697851]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2c/0xe0
[  615.697854]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0
[  615.697857]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x81/0xb0
[  615.697859]  f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes+0x1dd/0x200
[  615.697861]  f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0x2a7/0x2c0
[  615.697863]  ? up_read+0x5/0x20
[  615.697865]  ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2cb/0x940
[  615.697867]  f2fs_balance_fs+0xe5/0x2c0
[  615.697869]  __write_data_page+0x1c8/0x6e0
[  615.697873]  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x1e0/0x450
[  615.697878]  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x14b/0x320
[  615.697880]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2c/0xe0
[  615.697883]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0
[  615.697885]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x81/0xb0
[  615.697887]  f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes+0x1dd/0x200
[  615.697889]  f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0x2a7/0x2c0
[  615.697891]  f2fs_write_node_pages+0x51/0x220
[  615.697894]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0
[  615.697897]  __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x3d0
[  615.697899]  writeback_sb_inodes+0x1e8/0x410
[  615.697902]  __writeback_inodes_wb+0x5d/0xb0
[  615.697904]  wb_writeback+0x28f/0x340
[  615.697906]  ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20
[  615.697908]  wb_workfn+0x33e/0x420
[  615.697911]  process_one_work+0x1a1/0x3d0
[  615.697913]  worker_thread+0x30/0x380
[  615.697915]  ? process_one_work+0x3d0/0x3d0
[  615.697916]  kthread+0x116/0x130
[  615.697918]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[  615.697921]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

There is still deadloop in below condition:

d A
- do_writepages
 - f2fs_write_node_pages
  - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
   - f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
    - f2fs_write_cache_pages
     - mutex_lock(&amp;sbi-&gt;writepages)	-- lock once
     - __write_data_page
      - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
       - f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
        - f2fs_write_data_pages
         - mutex_lock(&amp;sbi-&gt;writepages)	-- lock again

Thread A			Thread B
- do_writepages
 - f2fs_write_node_pages
  - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
   - f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
    - .cp_task = current
				- f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
				 - .cp_task = current
				 - filemap_fdatawrite
				 - .cp_task = NULL
    - filemap_fdatawrite
     - f2fs_write_cache_pages
      - enter f2fs_balance_fs_bg since .cp_task is NULL
    - .cp_task = NULL

Change as below to avoid this:
- add condition to avoid holding .writepages mutex lock in path
of data flush
- introduce mutex lock sbi.flush_lock to exclude concurrent data
flush in background.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to avoid potential race on sbi-&gt;unusable_block_count access/update</title>
<updated>2019-05-09T04:23:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-05T03:40:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c9c8ed50d94c613fc3f4917c51e9c75d493a312e'/>
<id>c9c8ed50d94c613fc3f4917c51e9c75d493a312e</id>
<content type='text'>
Use sbi.stat_lock to protect sbi-&gt;unusable_block_count accesss/udpate, in
order to avoid potential race on it.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Use sbi.stat_lock to protect sbi-&gt;unusable_block_count accesss/udpate, in
order to avoid potential race on it.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: introduce DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE</title>
<updated>2019-05-09T04:23:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-15T07:26:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=93770ab7a6e963147a5dbca25278b69ba6c8f8c5'/>
<id>93770ab7a6e963147a5dbca25278b69ba6c8f8c5</id>
<content type='text'>
Previously, f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC) will check
whether @blkaddr locates in main area or not.

That check is weak, since the block address in range of main area can
point to the address which is not valid in segment info table, and we
can not detect such condition, we may suffer worse corruption as system
continues running.

So this patch introduce DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE to enhance the sanity check
which trigger SIT bitmap check rather than only range check.

This patch did below changes as wel:
- set SBI_NEED_FSCK in f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr().
- get rid of is_valid_data_blkaddr() to avoid panic if blkaddr is invalid.
- introduce verify_fio_blkaddr() to wrap fio {new,old}_blkaddr validation check.
- spread blkaddr check in:
 * f2fs_get_node_info()
 * __read_out_blkaddrs()
 * f2fs_submit_page_read()
 * ra_data_block()
 * do_recover_data()

This patch can fix bug reported from bugzilla below:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203215
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203223
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203231
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203235
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203241

= Update by Jaegeuk Kim =

DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE enhanced to validate block addresses on read/write paths.
But, xfstest/generic/446 compalins some generated kernel messages saying invalid
bitmap was detected when reading a block. The reaons is, when we get the
block addresses from extent_cache, there is no lock to synchronize it from
truncating the blocks in parallel.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Previously, f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC) will check
whether @blkaddr locates in main area or not.

That check is weak, since the block address in range of main area can
point to the address which is not valid in segment info table, and we
can not detect such condition, we may suffer worse corruption as system
continues running.

So this patch introduce DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE to enhance the sanity check
which trigger SIT bitmap check rather than only range check.

This patch did below changes as wel:
- set SBI_NEED_FSCK in f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr().
- get rid of is_valid_data_blkaddr() to avoid panic if blkaddr is invalid.
- introduce verify_fio_blkaddr() to wrap fio {new,old}_blkaddr validation check.
- spread blkaddr check in:
 * f2fs_get_node_info()
 * __read_out_blkaddrs()
 * f2fs_submit_page_read()
 * ra_data_block()
 * do_recover_data()

This patch can fix bug reported from bugzilla below:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203215
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203223
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203231
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203235
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203241

= Update by Jaegeuk Kim =

DATA_GENERIC_ENHANCE enhanced to validate block addresses on read/write paths.
But, xfstest/generic/446 compalins some generated kernel messages saying invalid
bitmap was detected when reading a block. The reaons is, when we get the
block addresses from extent_cache, there is no lock to synchronize it from
truncating the blocks in parallel.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: fix to avoid panic in f2fs_inplace_write_data()</title>
<updated>2019-05-09T04:23:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>yuchao0@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-15T07:30:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=05573d6ccf702df549a7bdeabef31e4753df1a90'/>
<id>05573d6ccf702df549a7bdeabef31e4753df1a90</id>
<content type='text'>
As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203239

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, following errors are reported.
Additionally, it hangs on sync after running program.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing.
Compile options for F2FS are as follows.
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y

- Reproduces
cc poc_15.c
./run.sh f2fs
sync

- Kernel messages
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:3162!
 RIP: 0010:f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x12d/0x160
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x3c1/0x820
  __write_data_page+0x156/0x720
  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x20d/0x460
  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1b4/0x300
  do_writepages+0x15/0x60
  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x7c/0xb0
  file_write_and_wait_range+0x2c/0x80
  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x102/0x810
  do_fsync+0x33/0x60
  __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The reason is f2fs_inplace_write_data() will trigger kernel panic due
to data block locates in node type segment.

To avoid panic, let's just return error code and set SBI_NEED_FSCK to
give a hint to fsck for latter repairing.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203239

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, following errors are reported.
Additionally, it hangs on sync after running program.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing.
Compile options for F2FS are as follows.
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y

- Reproduces
cc poc_15.c
./run.sh f2fs
sync

- Kernel messages
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:3162!
 RIP: 0010:f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x12d/0x160
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x3c1/0x820
  __write_data_page+0x156/0x720
  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x20d/0x460
  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1b4/0x300
  do_writepages+0x15/0x60
  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x7c/0xb0
  file_write_and_wait_range+0x2c/0x80
  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x102/0x810
  do_fsync+0x33/0x60
  __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The reason is f2fs_inplace_write_data() will trigger kernel panic due
to data block locates in node type segment.

To avoid panic, let's just return error code and set SBI_NEED_FSCK to
give a hint to fsck for latter repairing.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;yuchao0@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
