<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/ext4, branch v5.4.97</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>writeback: Drop I_DIRTY_TIME_EXPIRE</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-29T14:24:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5f8b8fccdfbc7d05fb146b00d812a777370de71a'/>
<id>5f8b8fccdfbc7d05fb146b00d812a777370de71a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5fcd57505c002efc5823a7355e21f48dd02d5a51 upstream.

The only use of I_DIRTY_TIME_EXPIRE is to detect in
__writeback_single_inode() that inode got there because flush worker
decided it's time to writeback the dirty inode time stamps (either
because we are syncing or because of age). However we can detect this
directly in __writeback_single_inode() and there's no need for the
strange propagation with I_DIRTY_TIME_EXPIRE flag.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5fcd57505c002efc5823a7355e21f48dd02d5a51 upstream.

The only use of I_DIRTY_TIME_EXPIRE is to detect in
__writeback_single_inode() that inode got there because flush worker
decided it's time to writeback the dirty inode time stamps (either
because we are syncing or because of age). However we can detect this
directly in __writeback_single_inode() and there's no need for the
strange propagation with I_DIRTY_TIME_EXPIRE flag.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix superblock checksum failure when setting password salt</title>
<updated>2021-01-19T17:26:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-16T10:18:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=986fdc7685fab266949e800e89a9212d32946083'/>
<id>986fdc7685fab266949e800e89a9212d32946083</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dfd56c2c0c0dbb11be939b804ddc8d5395ab3432 upstream.

When setting password salt in the superblock, we forget to recompute the
superblock checksum so it will not match until the next superblock
modification which recomputes the checksum. Fix it.

CC: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-8-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dfd56c2c0c0dbb11be939b804ddc8d5395ab3432 upstream.

When setting password salt in the superblock, we forget to recompute the
superblock checksum so it will not match until the next superblock
modification which recomputes the checksum. Fix it.

CC: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-8-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: don't leak old mountpoint samples</title>
<updated>2021-01-19T17:26:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-17T18:24:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=55a4dff288af5171310110f770d81d501af09faa'/>
<id>55a4dff288af5171310110f770d81d501af09faa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5a3b590d4b2db187faa6f06adc9a53d6199fb1f9 ]

When the first file is opened, ext4 samples the mountpoint of the
filesystem in 64 bytes of the super block.  It does so using
strlcpy(), this means that the remaining bytes in the super block
string buffer are untouched.  If the mount point before had a longer
path than the current one, it can be reconstructed.

Consider the case where the fs was mounted to "/media/johnjdeveloper"
and later to "/".  The super block buffer then contains
"/\x00edia/johnjdeveloper".

This case was seen in the wild and caused confusion how the name
of a developer ands up on the super block of a filesystem used
in production...

Fix this by using strncpy() instead of strlcpy().  The superblock
field is defined to be a fixed-size char array, and it is already
marked using __nonstring in fs/ext4/ext4.h.  The consumer of the field
in e2fsprogs already assumes that in the case of a 64+ byte mount
path, that s_last_mounted will not be NUL terminated.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X9ujIOJG/HqMr88R@mit.edu
Reported-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5a3b590d4b2db187faa6f06adc9a53d6199fb1f9 ]

When the first file is opened, ext4 samples the mountpoint of the
filesystem in 64 bytes of the super block.  It does so using
strlcpy(), this means that the remaining bytes in the super block
string buffer are untouched.  If the mount point before had a longer
path than the current one, it can be reconstructed.

Consider the case where the fs was mounted to "/media/johnjdeveloper"
and later to "/".  The super block buffer then contains
"/\x00edia/johnjdeveloper".

This case was seen in the wild and caused confusion how the name
of a developer ands up on the super block of a filesystem used
in production...

Fix this by using strncpy() instead of strlcpy().  The superblock
field is defined to be a fixed-size char array, and it is already
marked using __nonstring in fs/ext4/ext4.h.  The consumer of the field
in e2fsprogs already assumes that in the case of a 64+ byte mount
path, that s_last_mounted will not be NUL terminated.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X9ujIOJG/HqMr88R@mit.edu
Reported-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix bug for rename with RENAME_WHITEOUT</title>
<updated>2021-01-19T17:26:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>yangerkun</name>
<email>yangerkun@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-05T06:28:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2003c669df4cbac00ab00cd2cd655fcc8ee87532'/>
<id>2003c669df4cbac00ab00cd2cd655fcc8ee87532</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6b4b8e6b4ad8553660421d6360678b3811d5deb9 ]

We got a "deleted inode referenced" warning cross our fsstress test. The
bug can be reproduced easily with following steps:

  cd /dev/shm
  mkdir test/
  fallocate -l 128M img
  mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 img
  mount img test/
  dd if=/dev/zero of=test/foo bs=1M count=128
  mkdir test/dir/ &amp;&amp; cd test/dir/
  for ((i=0;i&lt;1000;i++)); do touch file$i; done # consume all block
  cd ~ &amp;&amp; renameat2(AT_FDCWD, /dev/shm/test/dir/file1, AT_FDCWD,
    /dev/shm/test/dir/dst_file, RENAME_WHITEOUT) # ext4_add_entry in
    ext4_rename will return ENOSPC!!
  cd /dev/shm/ &amp;&amp; umount test/ &amp;&amp; mount img test/ &amp;&amp; ls -li test/dir/file1
  We will get the output:
  "ls: cannot access 'test/dir/file1': Structure needs cleaning"
  and the dmesg show:
  "EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_lookup:1626: inode #2049: comm ls:
  deleted inode referenced: 139"

ext4_rename will create a special inode for whiteout and use this 'ino'
to replace the source file's dir entry 'ino'. Once error happens
latter(the error above was the ENOSPC return from ext4_add_entry in
ext4_rename since all space has been consumed), the cleanup do drop the
nlink for whiteout, but forget to restore 'ino' with source file. This
will trigger the bug describle as above.

Signed-off-by: yangerkun &lt;yangerkun@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cd808deced43 ("ext4: support RENAME_WHITEOUT")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105062857.3566-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6b4b8e6b4ad8553660421d6360678b3811d5deb9 ]

We got a "deleted inode referenced" warning cross our fsstress test. The
bug can be reproduced easily with following steps:

  cd /dev/shm
  mkdir test/
  fallocate -l 128M img
  mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 img
  mount img test/
  dd if=/dev/zero of=test/foo bs=1M count=128
  mkdir test/dir/ &amp;&amp; cd test/dir/
  for ((i=0;i&lt;1000;i++)); do touch file$i; done # consume all block
  cd ~ &amp;&amp; renameat2(AT_FDCWD, /dev/shm/test/dir/file1, AT_FDCWD,
    /dev/shm/test/dir/dst_file, RENAME_WHITEOUT) # ext4_add_entry in
    ext4_rename will return ENOSPC!!
  cd /dev/shm/ &amp;&amp; umount test/ &amp;&amp; mount img test/ &amp;&amp; ls -li test/dir/file1
  We will get the output:
  "ls: cannot access 'test/dir/file1': Structure needs cleaning"
  and the dmesg show:
  "EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_lookup:1626: inode #2049: comm ls:
  deleted inode referenced: 139"

ext4_rename will create a special inode for whiteout and use this 'ino'
to replace the source file's dir entry 'ino'. Once error happens
latter(the error above was the ENOSPC return from ext4_add_entry in
ext4_rename since all space has been consumed), the cleanup do drop the
nlink for whiteout, but forget to restore 'ino' with source file. This
will trigger the bug describle as above.

Signed-off-by: yangerkun &lt;yangerkun@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cd808deced43 ("ext4: support RENAME_WHITEOUT")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105062857.3566-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: don't remount read-only with errors=continue on reboot</title>
<updated>2021-01-06T13:48:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-27T11:33:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=11459136a107bd45fdf786a922ee03b7dbb65c87'/>
<id>11459136a107bd45fdf786a922ee03b7dbb65c87</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b08070eca9e247f60ab39d79b2c25d274750441f ]

ext4_handle_error() with errors=continue mount option can accidentally
remount the filesystem read-only when the system is rebooting. Fix that.

Fixes: 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127113405.26867-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b08070eca9e247f60ab39d79b2c25d274750441f ]

ext4_handle_error() with errors=continue mount option can accidentally
remount the filesystem read-only when the system is rebooting. Fix that.

Fixes: 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127113405.26867-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: prevent creating duplicate encrypted filenames</title>
<updated>2021-01-06T13:48:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-28T18:54:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3ebfed353afd3a7b2ccd4c858691fe35db50ba0f'/>
<id>3ebfed353afd3a7b2ccd4c858691fe35db50ba0f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 75d18cd1868c2aee43553723872c35d7908f240f upstream.

As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to
create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file
concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.

Fix this bug on ext4 by rejecting no-key dentries in ext4_add_entry().

Note that the duplicate check in ext4_find_dest_de() sometimes prevented
this bug.  However in many cases it didn't, since ext4_find_dest_de()
doesn't examine every dentry.

Fixes: 4461471107b7 ("ext4 crypto: enable filename encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 75d18cd1868c2aee43553723872c35d7908f240f upstream.

As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to
create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file
concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.

Fix this bug on ext4 by rejecting no-key dentries in ext4_add_entry().

Note that the duplicate check in ext4_find_dest_de() sometimes prevented
this bug.  However in many cases it didn't, since ext4_find_dest_de()
doesn't examine every dentry.

Fixes: 4461471107b7 ("ext4 crypto: enable filename encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix deadlock with fs freezing and EA inodes</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-27T11:06:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8635f0fe06c5ca76ab3fb69c4a89ae8e967abd80'/>
<id>8635f0fe06c5ca76ab3fb69c4a89ae8e967abd80</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46e294efc355c48d1dd4d58501aa56dac461792a upstream.

Xattr code using inodes with large xattr data can end up dropping last
inode reference (and thus deleting the inode) from places like
ext4_xattr_set_entry(). That function is called with transaction started
and so ext4_evict_inode() can deadlock against fs freezing like:

CPU1					CPU2

removexattr()				freeze_super()
  vfs_removexattr()
    ext4_xattr_set()
      handle = ext4_journal_start()
      ...
      ext4_xattr_set_entry()
        iput(old_ea_inode)
          ext4_evict_inode(old_ea_inode)
					  sb-&gt;s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_FS;
					  sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS);
					  ext4_freeze()
					    jbd2_journal_lock_updates()
					      -&gt; blocks waiting for all
					         handles to stop
            sb_start_intwrite()
	      -&gt; blocks as sb is already in SB_FREEZE_FS state

Generally it is advisable to delete inodes from a separate transaction
as it can consume quite some credits however in this case it would be
quite clumsy and furthermore the credits for inode deletion are quite
limited and already accounted for. So just tweak ext4_evict_inode() to
avoid freeze protection if we have transaction already started and thus
it is not really needed anyway.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dec214d00e0d ("ext4: xattr inode deduplication")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127110649.24730-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 46e294efc355c48d1dd4d58501aa56dac461792a upstream.

Xattr code using inodes with large xattr data can end up dropping last
inode reference (and thus deleting the inode) from places like
ext4_xattr_set_entry(). That function is called with transaction started
and so ext4_evict_inode() can deadlock against fs freezing like:

CPU1					CPU2

removexattr()				freeze_super()
  vfs_removexattr()
    ext4_xattr_set()
      handle = ext4_journal_start()
      ...
      ext4_xattr_set_entry()
        iput(old_ea_inode)
          ext4_evict_inode(old_ea_inode)
					  sb-&gt;s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_FS;
					  sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS);
					  ext4_freeze()
					    jbd2_journal_lock_updates()
					      -&gt; blocks waiting for all
					         handles to stop
            sb_start_intwrite()
	      -&gt; blocks as sb is already in SB_FREEZE_FS state

Generally it is advisable to delete inodes from a separate transaction
as it can consume quite some credits however in this case it would be
quite clumsy and furthermore the credits for inode deletion are quite
limited and already accounted for. So just tweak ext4_evict_inode() to
avoid freeze protection if we have transaction already started and thus
it is not really needed anyway.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dec214d00e0d ("ext4: xattr inode deduplication")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127110649.24730-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix a memory leak of ext4_free_data</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:51:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chunguang Xu</name>
<email>brookxu@tencent.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-07T15:58:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c90a5f4851a81194b2906b5451456a4cc0faf7b7'/>
<id>c90a5f4851a81194b2906b5451456a4cc0faf7b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cca415537244f6102cbb09b5b90db6ae2c953bdd upstream.

When freeing metadata, we will create an ext4_free_data and
insert it into the pending free list.  After the current
transaction is committed, the object will be freed.

ext4_mb_free_metadata() will check whether the area to be freed
overlaps with the pending free list. If true, return directly. At this
time, ext4_free_data is leaked.  Fortunately, the probability of this
problem is small, since it only occurs if the file system is corrupted
such that a block is claimed by more one inode and those inodes are
deleted within a single jbd2 transaction.

Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu &lt;brookxu@tencent.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604764698-4269-8-git-send-email-brookxu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cca415537244f6102cbb09b5b90db6ae2c953bdd upstream.

When freeing metadata, we will create an ext4_free_data and
insert it into the pending free list.  After the current
transaction is committed, the object will be freed.

ext4_mb_free_metadata() will check whether the area to be freed
overlaps with the pending free list. If true, return directly. At this
time, ext4_free_data is leaked.  Fortunately, the probability of this
problem is small, since it only occurs if the file system is corrupted
such that a block is claimed by more one inode and those inodes are
deleted within a single jbd2 transaction.

Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu &lt;brookxu@tencent.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604764698-4269-8-git-send-email-brookxu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix bogus warning in ext4_update_dx_flag()</title>
<updated>2020-11-24T12:29:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-18T15:30:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=308a06ac9fb8f0010a350b42739afbcaf8399fef'/>
<id>308a06ac9fb8f0010a350b42739afbcaf8399fef</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f902b216501094495ff75834035656e8119c537f upstream.

The idea of the warning in ext4_update_dx_flag() is that we should warn
when we are clearing EXT4_INODE_INDEX on a filesystem with metadata
checksums enabled since after clearing the flag, checksums for internal
htree nodes will become invalid. So there's no need to warn (or actually
do anything) when EXT4_INODE_INDEX is not set.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118153032.17281-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: 48a34311953d ("ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs")
Reported-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f902b216501094495ff75834035656e8119c537f upstream.

The idea of the warning in ext4_update_dx_flag() is that we should warn
when we are clearing EXT4_INODE_INDEX on a filesystem with metadata
checksums enabled since after clearing the flag, checksums for internal
htree nodes will become invalid. So there's no need to warn (or actually
do anything) when EXT4_INODE_INDEX is not set.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118153032.17281-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: 48a34311953d ("ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs")
Reported-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: unlock xattr_sem properly in ext4_inline_data_truncate()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joseph Qi</name>
<email>joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-03T02:29:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=062c9b04f6ebc27ffb84684792ae3b029b8d0b9a'/>
<id>062c9b04f6ebc27ffb84684792ae3b029b8d0b9a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7067b2619017d51e71686ca9756b454de0e5826a upstream.

It takes xattr_sem to check inline data again but without unlock it
in case not have. So unlock it before return.

Fixes: aef1c8513c1f ("ext4: let ext4_truncate handle inline data correctly")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Tao Ma &lt;boyu.mt@taobao.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604370542-124630-1-git-send-email-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7067b2619017d51e71686ca9756b454de0e5826a upstream.

It takes xattr_sem to check inline data again but without unlock it
in case not have. So unlock it before return.

Fixes: aef1c8513c1f ("ext4: let ext4_truncate handle inline data correctly")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Tao Ma &lt;boyu.mt@taobao.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604370542-124630-1-git-send-email-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
