commit f4c2d372b89a1e504ebb7b7eb3e29b8306479366 upstream.
Commit 8fcc3a580651 ("ext4: rework reserved cluster accounting when
invalidating pages") moved freeing of delayed allocation reservations
from dirty page invalidation time to time when we evict corresponding
status extent from extent status tree. For inodes which don't have any
blocks allocated this may actually happen only in ext4_clear_blocks()
which is after we've dropped references to quota structures from the
inode. Thus reservation of quota leaked. Fix the problem by clearing
quota information from the inode only after evicting extent status tree
in ext4_clear_inode().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191108115420.GI20863@quack2.suse.cz
Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Fixes: 8fcc3a580651 ("ext4: rework reserved cluster accounting when invalidating pages")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 565333a1554d704789e74205989305c811fd9c7a upstream.
No need to wait for any commit once the page is fully truncated.
Besides, it may confuse e.g. concurrent ext4_writepage() with the page
still be dirty (will be cleared by truncate_pagecache() in
ext4_setattr()) but buffers has been freed; and then trigger a bug
show as below:
[ 26.057508] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 26.058531] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inode.c:2134!
...
[ 26.088130] Call trace:
[ 26.088695] ext4_writepage+0x914/0xb28
[ 26.089541] writeout.isra.4+0x1b4/0x2b8
[ 26.090409] move_to_new_page+0x3b0/0x568
[ 26.091338] __unmap_and_move+0x648/0x988
[ 26.092241] unmap_and_move+0x48c/0xbb8
[ 26.093096] migrate_pages+0x220/0xb28
[ 26.093945] kernel_mbind+0x828/0xa18
[ 26.094791] __arm64_sys_mbind+0xc8/0x138
[ 26.095716] el0_svc_common+0x190/0x490
[ 26.096571] el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0
[ 26.097423] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
Run the procedure (generate by syzkaller) parallel with ext3.
void main()
{
int fd, fd1, ret;
void *addr;
size_t length = 4096;
int flags;
off_t offset = 0;
char *str = "12345";
fd = open("a", O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
assert(fd >= 0);
/* Truncate to 4k */
ret = ftruncate(fd, length);
assert(ret == 0);
/* Journal data mode */
flags = 0xc00f;
ret = ioctl(fd, _IOW('f', 2, long), &flags);
assert(ret == 0);
/* Truncate to 0 */
fd1 = open("a", O_TRUNC | O_NOATIME);
assert(fd1 >= 0);
addr = mmap(NULL, length, PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ,
MAP_SHARED, fd, offset);
assert(addr != (void *)-1);
memcpy(addr, str, 5);
mbind(addr, length, 0, 0, 0, MPOL_MF_MOVE);
}
And the bug will be triggered once we seen the below order.
reproduce1 reproduce2
... | ...
truncate to 4k |
change to journal data mode |
| memcpy(set page dirty)
truncate to 0: |
ext4_setattr: |
... |
ext4_wait_for_tail_page_commit |
| mbind(trigger bug)
truncate_pagecache(clean dirty)| ...
... |
mbind will call ext4_writepage() since the page still be dirty, and then
report the bug since the buffers has been free. Fix it by return
directly once offset equals to 0 which means the page has been fully
truncated.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190919063508.1045-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c7df4a1ecb8579838ec8c56b2bb6a6716e974f37 upstream. If the file system is corrupted such that a file's i_links_count is too small, then it's possible that when unlinking that file, i_nlink will already be zero. Previously we were working around this kind of corruption by forcing i_nlink to one; but we were doing this before trying to delete the directory entry --- and if the file system is corrupted enough that ext4_delete_entry() fails, then we exit with i_nlink elevated, and this causes the orphan inode list handling to be FUBAR'ed, such that when we unmount the file system, the orphan inode list can get corrupted. A better way to fix this is to simply skip trying to call drop_nlink() if i_nlink is already zero, thus moving the check to the place where it makes the most sense. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205433 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112032903.8828-1-tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 65db869c754e7c271691dd5feabf884347e694f5 upstream.
Estimate for the number of credits needed for final freeing of inode in
ext4_evict_inode() was to small. We may modify 4 blocks (inode & sb for
orphan deletion, bitmap & group descriptor for inode freeing) and not
just 3.
[ Fixed minor whitespace nit. -- TYT ]
Fixes: e50e5129f384 ("ext4: xattr-in-inode support")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105164437.32602-6-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ea99936a1630f51fc3a2d61a58ec4a1c4b7d55a upstream. It's possible to specify a non-zero s_want_extra_isize via debugging option, and this can cause bad things(tm) to happen when using a file system with an inode size of 128 bytes. Add better checking when the file system is mounted, as well as when we are actually doing the trying to do the inode expansion. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191110121510.GH23325@mit.edu Reported-by: syzbot+f8d6f8386ceacdbfff57@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+33d7ea72e47de3bdf4e1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+44b6763edfc17144296f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Merge active entropy generation updates. This is admittedly partly "for discussion". We need to have a way forward for the boot time deadlocks where user space ends up waiting for more entropy, but no entropy is forthcoming because the system is entirely idle just waiting for something to happen. While this was triggered by what is arguably a user space bug with GDM/gnome-session asking for secure randomness during early boot, when they didn't even need any such truly secure thing, the issue ends up being that our "getrandom()" interface is prone to that kind of confusion, because people don't think very hard about whether they want to block for sufficient amounts of entropy. The approach here-in is to decide to not just passively wait for entropy to happen, but to start actively collecting it if it is missing. This is not necessarily always possible, but if the architecture has a CPU cycle counter, there is a fair amount of noise in the exact timings of reasonably complex loads. We may end up tweaking the load and the entropy estimates, but this should be at least a reasonable starting point. As part of this, we also revert the revert of the ext4 IO pattern improvement that ended up triggering the reported lack of external entropy. * getrandom() active entropy waiting: Revert "Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug"" random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it
This reverts commit 72dbcf72156641fde4d8ea401e977341bfd35a05. Instead of waiting forever for entropy that may just not happen, we now try to actively generate entropy when required, and are thus hopefully avoiding the problem that caused the nice ext4 IO pattern fix to be reverted. So revert the revert. Cc: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Alexander E. Patrakov <patrakov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull ext4 updates from Ted Ts'o: "Added new ext4 debugging ioctls to allow userspace to get information about the state of the extent status cache. Dropped workaround for pre-1970 dates which were encoded incorrectly in pre-4.4 kernels. Since both the kernel correctly generates, and e2fsck detects and fixes this issue for the past four years, it'e time to drop the workaround. (Also, it's not like files with dates in the distant past were all that common in the first place.) A lot of miscellaneous bug fixes and cleanups, including some ext4 Documentation fixes. Also included are two minor bug fixes in fs/unicode" * tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: (21 commits) unicode: make array 'token' static const, makes object smaller unicode: Move static keyword to the front of declarations ext4: add missing bigalloc documentation. ext4: fix kernel oops caused by spurious casefold flag ext4: fix integer overflow when calculating commit interval ext4: use percpu_counters for extent_status cache hits/misses ext4: fix potential use after free after remounting with noblock_validity jbd2: add missing tracepoint for reserved handle ext4: fix punch hole for inline_data file systems ext4: rework reserved cluster accounting when invalidating pages ext4: documentation fixes ext4: treat buffers with write errors as containing valid data ext4: fix warning inside ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio ext4: set error return correctly when ext4_htree_store_dirent fails ext4: drop legacy pre-1970 encoding workaround ext4: add new ioctl EXT4_IOC_GET_ES_CACHE ext4: add a new ioctl EXT4_IOC_GETSTATE ext4: add a new ioctl EXT4_IOC_CLEAR_ES_CACHE jbd2: flush_descriptor(): Do not decrease buffer head's ref count ext4: remove unnecessary error check ...
Pull y2038 vfs updates from Arnd Bergmann: "Add inode timestamp clamping. This series from Deepa Dinamani adds a per-superblock minimum/maximum timestamp limit for a file system, and clamps timestamps as they are written, to avoid random behavior from integer overflow as well as having different time stamps on disk vs in memory. At mount time, a warning is now printed for any file system that can represent current timestamps but not future timestamps more than 30 years into the future, similar to the arbitrary 30 year limit that was added to settimeofday(). This was picked as a compromise to warn users to migrate to other file systems (e.g. ext4 instead of ext3) when they need the file system to survive beyond 2038 (or similar limits in other file systems), but not get in the way of normal usage" * tag 'y2038-vfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: ext4: Reduce ext4 timestamp warnings isofs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges pstore: fs superblock limits fs: omfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: hpfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: ceph: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: sysv: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: affs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: fat: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: cifs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: nfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges ext4: Initialize timestamps limits 9p: Fill min and max timestamps in sb fs: Fill in max and min timestamps in superblock utimes: Clamp the timestamps before update mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp expiry timestamp_truncate: Replace users of timespec64_trunc vfs: Add timestamp_truncate() api vfs: Add file timestamp range support
Pull fs-verity support from Eric Biggers:
"fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides Merkle tree based
hashing (similar to dm-verity) for individual readonly files, mainly
for the purpose of efficient authenticity verification.
This pull request includes:
(a) The fs/verity/ support layer and documentation.
(b) fs-verity support for ext4 and f2fs.
Compared to the original fs-verity patchset from last year, the UAPI
to enable fs-verity on a file has been greatly simplified. Lots of
other things were cleaned up too.
fs-verity is planned to be used by two different projects on Android;
most of the userspace code is in place already. Another userspace tool
("fsverity-utils"), and xfstests, are also available. e2fsprogs and
f2fs-tools already have fs-verity support. Other people have shown
interest in using fs-verity too.
I've tested this on ext4 and f2fs with xfstests, both the existing
tests and the new fs-verity tests. This has also been in linux-next
since July 30 with no reported issues except a couple minor ones I
found myself and folded in fixes for.
Ted and I will be co-maintaining fs-verity"
* tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt:
f2fs: add fs-verity support
ext4: update on-disk format documentation for fs-verity
ext4: add fs-verity read support
ext4: add basic fs-verity support
fs-verity: support builtin file signatures
fs-verity: add SHA-512 support
fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl
fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl
fs-verity: add data verification hooks for ->readpages()
fs-verity: add the hook for file ->setattr()
fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()
fs-verity: add inode and superblock fields
fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions for hashing
fs: uapi: define verity bit for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
fs-verity: add UAPI header
fs-verity: add MAINTAINERS file entry
fs-verity: add a documentation file