<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/ext4, branch v5.4.294</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ext4: reorder capability check last</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:32:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Göttsche</name>
<email>cgzones@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-02T16:06:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3fc269dcc0dedefe00094c24b3420b35d3531ec5'/>
<id>3fc269dcc0dedefe00094c24b3420b35d3531ec5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1b419c889c0767a5b66d0a6c566cae491f1cb0f7 ]

capable() calls refer to enabled LSMs whether to permit or deny the
request.  This is relevant in connection with SELinux, where a
capability check results in a policy decision and by default a denial
message on insufficient permission is issued.
It can lead to three undesired cases:
  1. A denial message is generated, even in case the operation was an
     unprivileged one and thus the syscall succeeded, creating noise.
  2. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to ignore
     those denial messages, hiding future syscalls, where the task
     performs an actual privileged operation, leading to hidden limited
     functionality of that task.
  3. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to permit
     the task the requested capability, while it does not need it,
     violating the principle of least privilege.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250302160657.127253-2-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1b419c889c0767a5b66d0a6c566cae491f1cb0f7 ]

capable() calls refer to enabled LSMs whether to permit or deny the
request.  This is relevant in connection with SELinux, where a
capability check results in a policy decision and by default a denial
message on insufficient permission is issued.
It can lead to three undesired cases:
  1. A denial message is generated, even in case the operation was an
     unprivileged one and thus the syscall succeeded, creating noise.
  2. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to ignore
     those denial messages, hiding future syscalls, where the task
     performs an actual privileged operation, leading to hidden limited
     functionality of that task.
  3. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to permit
     the task the requested capability, while it does not need it,
     violating the principle of least privilege.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250302160657.127253-2-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix OOB read when checking dotdot dir</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Acs, Jakub</name>
<email>acsjakub@amazon.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T15:46:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=14da7dbecb430e35b5889da8dae7bef33173b351'/>
<id>14da7dbecb430e35b5889da8dae7bef33173b351</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d5e206778e96e8667d3bde695ad372c296dc9353 ]

Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir
entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later
on, when the corrupted directory is removed).

ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.'
and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads
the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry()
and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir
entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the
same data block.

If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the
sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data
block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the
memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to
ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer
which results in out-of-bounds mem access.

Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir
entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony
dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero).

Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another
structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is
really an OOB read.

This issue was found by syzkaller tool.

Call Trace:
[   38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375
[   38.595158]
[   38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1
[   38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   38.595304] Call Trace:
[   38.595308]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   38.595311]  dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0
[   38.595325]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0
[   38.595339]  ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.595349]  print_report+0xaa/0x250
[   38.595359]  ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.595368]  ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90
[   38.595378]  kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
[   38.595389]  ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.595400]  __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.595410]  ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990
[   38.595421]  ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10
[   38.595432]  ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10
[   38.595441]  ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0
[   38.595455]  ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10
[   38.595464]  ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10
[   38.595478]  ? down_write+0xdb/0x140
[   38.595487]  ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
[   38.595497]  ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140
[   38.595506]  vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670
[   38.595517]  ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190
[   38.595529]  do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0
[   38.595537]  ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10
[   38.595544]  ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0
[   38.595561]  __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130
[   38.595570]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[   38.595583]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Fixes: ac27a0ec112a0 ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs &lt;acsjakub@amazon.de&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger.kernel@dilger.ca&gt;
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mahmoud Adam &lt;mngyadam@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b3ae36a6794c4a01944c7d70b403db5b@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d5e206778e96e8667d3bde695ad372c296dc9353 ]

Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir
entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later
on, when the corrupted directory is removed).

ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.'
and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads
the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry()
and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir
entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the
same data block.

If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the
sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data
block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the
memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to
ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer
which results in out-of-bounds mem access.

Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir
entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony
dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero).

Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another
structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is
really an OOB read.

This issue was found by syzkaller tool.

Call Trace:
[   38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375
[   38.595158]
[   38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1
[   38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   38.595304] Call Trace:
[   38.595308]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   38.595311]  dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0
[   38.595325]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0
[   38.595339]  ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.595349]  print_report+0xaa/0x250
[   38.595359]  ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.595368]  ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90
[   38.595378]  kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
[   38.595389]  ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.595400]  __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[   38.595410]  ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990
[   38.595421]  ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10
[   38.595432]  ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10
[   38.595441]  ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0
[   38.595455]  ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10
[   38.595464]  ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10
[   38.595478]  ? down_write+0xdb/0x140
[   38.595487]  ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
[   38.595497]  ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140
[   38.595506]  vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670
[   38.595517]  ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190
[   38.595529]  do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0
[   38.595537]  ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10
[   38.595544]  ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0
[   38.595561]  __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130
[   38.595570]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[   38.595583]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Fixes: ac27a0ec112a0 ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs &lt;acsjakub@amazon.de&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger.kernel@dilger.ca&gt;
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mahmoud Adam &lt;mngyadam@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b3ae36a6794c4a01944c7d70b403db5b@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: optimize __ext4_check_dir_entry()</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-09T00:43:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=890684675d8e12ebc40f0304ccb8e95366169b52'/>
<id>890684675d8e12ebc40f0304ccb8e95366169b52</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 707d1a2f601bea6110a5633054253c0cb71b44c1 ]

Make __ext4_check_dir_entry() a bit easier to understand, and reduce
the object size of the function by over 11%.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209004346.38526-1-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Stable-dep-of: d5e206778e96 ("ext4: fix OOB read when checking dotdot dir")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 707d1a2f601bea6110a5633054253c0cb71b44c1 ]

Make __ext4_check_dir_entry() a bit easier to understand, and reduce
the object size of the function by over 11%.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209004346.38526-1-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Stable-dep-of: d5e206778e96 ("ext4: fix OOB read when checking dotdot dir")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-14T04:38:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=abf164b4a788d69a62db5562a68f13d81ea269c3'/>
<id>abf164b4a788d69a62db5562a68f13d81ea269c3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f87d3af7419307ae26e705a2b2db36140db367a2 ]

This fixes an analogus bug that was fixed in xfs in commit
4b8d867ca6e2 ("xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in
statvfs") where statfs can report misleading / incorrect information
where project quota is enabled, and the free space is less than the
remaining quota.

This commit will resolve a test failure in generic/762 which tests for
this bug.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 689c958cbe6b ("ext4: add project quota support")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f87d3af7419307ae26e705a2b2db36140db367a2 ]

This fixes an analogus bug that was fixed in xfs in commit
4b8d867ca6e2 ("xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in
statvfs") where statfs can report misleading / incorrect information
where project quota is enabled, and the free space is less than the
remaining quota.

This commit will resolve a test failure in generic/762 which tests for
this bug.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 689c958cbe6b ("ext4: add project quota support")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: code cleanup for ext4_statfs_project()</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chengguang Xu</name>
<email>cgxu519@mykernel.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-10T08:24:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f1da8176d340c682d0f3f6a434aa0885c8b77d3e'/>
<id>f1da8176d340c682d0f3f6a434aa0885c8b77d3e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a08fe66e4a0e12a3df982b28059f3a90e0f1b31e ]

Calling min_not_zero() to simplify complicated prjquota
limit comparison in ext4_statfs_project().

Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu &lt;cgxu519@mykernel.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210082445.2379-1-cgxu519@mykernel.net
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f87d3af74193 ("ext4: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a08fe66e4a0e12a3df982b28059f3a90e0f1b31e ]

Calling min_not_zero() to simplify complicated prjquota
limit comparison in ext4_statfs_project().

Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu &lt;cgxu519@mykernel.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210082445.2379-1-cgxu519@mykernel.net
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f87d3af74193 ("ext4: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: simplify checking quota limits in ext4_statfs()</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-30T11:11:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4d49bd1b751dc367fe3970b02e23837ce720deda'/>
<id>4d49bd1b751dc367fe3970b02e23837ce720deda</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 46d36880d1c6f9b9a0cbaf90235355ea1f4cab96 ]

Coverity reports that conditions checking quota limits in ext4_statfs()
contain dead code. Indeed it is right and current conditions can be
simplified.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200130111148.10766-1-jack@suse.cz
Reported-by: Coverity &lt;scan-admin@coverity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: f87d3af74193 ("ext4: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 46d36880d1c6f9b9a0cbaf90235355ea1f4cab96 ]

Coverity reports that conditions checking quota limits in ext4_statfs()
contain dead code. Indeed it is right and current conditions can be
simplified.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200130111148.10766-1-jack@suse.cz
Reported-by: Coverity &lt;scan-admin@coverity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: f87d3af74193 ("ext4: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix off-by-one error in do_split</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Artem Sadovnikov</name>
<email>a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-04T08:28:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b96bd2c3db26ad0daec5b78c85c098b53900e2e1'/>
<id>b96bd2c3db26ad0daec5b78c85c098b53900e2e1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 94824ac9a8aaf2fb3c54b4bdde842db80ffa555d upstream.

Syzkaller detected a use-after-free issue in ext4_insert_dentry that was
caused by out-of-bounds access due to incorrect splitting in do_split.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
Write of size 251 at addr ffff888074572f14 by task syz-executor335/5847

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5847 Comm: syz-executor335 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00318-ga9cda7c0ffed #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
 print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
 kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:106
 ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
 add_dirent_to_buf+0x3d9/0x750 fs/ext4/namei.c:2154
 make_indexed_dir+0xf98/0x1600 fs/ext4/namei.c:2351
 ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2455
 ext4_add_nondir+0x8d/0x290 fs/ext4/namei.c:2796
 ext4_symlink+0x920/0xb50 fs/ext4/namei.c:3431
 vfs_symlink+0x137/0x2e0 fs/namei.c:4615
 do_symlinkat+0x222/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4641
 __do_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4662 [inline]
 __se_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4660 [inline]
 __x64_sys_symlink+0x7a/0x90 fs/namei.c:4660
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The following loop is located right above 'if' statement.

for (i = count-1; i &gt;= 0; i--) {
	/* is more than half of this entry in 2nd half of the block? */
	if (size + map[i].size/2 &gt; blocksize/2)
		break;
	size += map[i].size;
	move++;
}

'i' in this case could go down to -1, in which case sum of active entries
wouldn't exceed half the block size, but previous behaviour would also do
split in half if sum would exceed at the very last block, which in case of
having too many long name files in a single block could lead to
out-of-bounds access and following use-after-free.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5872331b3d91 ("ext4: fix potential negative array index in do_split()")
Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov &lt;a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404082804.2567-3-a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 94824ac9a8aaf2fb3c54b4bdde842db80ffa555d upstream.

Syzkaller detected a use-after-free issue in ext4_insert_dentry that was
caused by out-of-bounds access due to incorrect splitting in do_split.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
Write of size 251 at addr ffff888074572f14 by task syz-executor335/5847

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5847 Comm: syz-executor335 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00318-ga9cda7c0ffed #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
 print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
 kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:106
 ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
 add_dirent_to_buf+0x3d9/0x750 fs/ext4/namei.c:2154
 make_indexed_dir+0xf98/0x1600 fs/ext4/namei.c:2351
 ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2455
 ext4_add_nondir+0x8d/0x290 fs/ext4/namei.c:2796
 ext4_symlink+0x920/0xb50 fs/ext4/namei.c:3431
 vfs_symlink+0x137/0x2e0 fs/namei.c:4615
 do_symlinkat+0x222/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4641
 __do_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4662 [inline]
 __se_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4660 [inline]
 __x64_sys_symlink+0x7a/0x90 fs/namei.c:4660
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The following loop is located right above 'if' statement.

for (i = count-1; i &gt;= 0; i--) {
	/* is more than half of this entry in 2nd half of the block? */
	if (size + map[i].size/2 &gt; blocksize/2)
		break;
	size += map[i].size;
	move++;
}

'i' in this case could go down to -1, in which case sum of active entries
wouldn't exceed half the block size, but previous behaviour would also do
split in half if sum would exceed at the very last block, which in case of
having too many long name files in a single block could lead to
out-of-bounds access and following use-after-free.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5872331b3d91 ("ext4: fix potential negative array index in do_split()")
Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov &lt;a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404082804.2567-3-a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: don't treat fhandle lookup of ea_inode as FS corruption</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-29T20:20:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5871166a1c706d98e9976e2e09cef9413c5db982'/>
<id>5871166a1c706d98e9976e2e09cef9413c5db982</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 642335f3ea2b3fd6dba03e57e01fa9587843a497 ]

A file handle that userspace provides to open_by_handle_at() can
legitimately contain an outdated inode number that has since been reused
for another purpose - that's why the file handle also contains a generation
number.

But if the inode number has been reused for an ea_inode, check_igot_inode()
will notice, __ext4_iget() will go through ext4_error_inode(), and if the
inode was newly created, it will also be marked as bad by iget_failed().
This all happens before the point where the inode generation is checked.

ext4_error_inode() is supposed to only be used on filesystem corruption; it
should not be used when userspace just got unlucky with a stale file
handle. So when this happens, let __ext4_iget() just return an error.

Fixes: b3e6bcb94590 ("ext4: add EA_INODE checking to ext4_iget()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241129-ext4-ignore-ea-fhandle-v1-1-e532c0d1cee0@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 642335f3ea2b3fd6dba03e57e01fa9587843a497 ]

A file handle that userspace provides to open_by_handle_at() can
legitimately contain an outdated inode number that has since been reused
for another purpose - that's why the file handle also contains a generation
number.

But if the inode number has been reused for an ea_inode, check_igot_inode()
will notice, __ext4_iget() will go through ext4_error_inode(), and if the
inode was newly created, it will also be marked as bad by iget_failed().
This all happens before the point where the inode generation is checked.

ext4_error_inode() is supposed to only be used on filesystem corruption; it
should not be used when userspace just got unlucky with a stale file
handle. So when this happens, let __ext4_iget() just return an error.

Fixes: b3e6bcb94590 ("ext4: add EA_INODE checking to ext4_iget()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241129-ext4-ignore-ea-fhandle-v1-1-e532c0d1cee0@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: reject casefold inode flag without casefold feature</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-14T18:29:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=84554e9848f4c047ea320b77301193faef796b8c'/>
<id>84554e9848f4c047ea320b77301193faef796b8c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8216776ccff6fcd40e3fdaa109aa4150ebe760b3 ]

It is invalid for the casefold inode flag to be set without the casefold
superblock feature flag also being set.  e2fsck already considers this
case to be invalid and handles it by offering to clear the casefold flag
on the inode.  __ext4_iget() also already considered this to be invalid,
sort of, but it only got so far as logging an error message; it didn't
actually reject the inode.  Make it reject the inode so that other code
doesn't have to handle this case.  This matches what f2fs does.

Note: we could check 's_encoding != NULL' instead of
ext4_has_feature_casefold().  This would make the check robust against
the casefold feature being enabled by userspace writing to the page
cache of the mounted block device.  However, it's unsolvable in general
for filesystems to be robust against concurrent writes to the page cache
of the mounted block device.  Though this very particular scenario
involving the casefold feature is solvable, we should not pretend that
we can support this model, so let's just check the casefold feature.
tune2fs already forbids enabling casefold on a mounted filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814182903.37267-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 642335f3ea2b ("ext4: don't treat fhandle lookup of ea_inode as FS corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8216776ccff6fcd40e3fdaa109aa4150ebe760b3 ]

It is invalid for the casefold inode flag to be set without the casefold
superblock feature flag also being set.  e2fsck already considers this
case to be invalid and handles it by offering to clear the casefold flag
on the inode.  __ext4_iget() also already considered this to be invalid,
sort of, but it only got so far as logging an error message; it didn't
actually reject the inode.  Make it reject the inode so that other code
doesn't have to handle this case.  This matches what f2fs does.

Note: we could check 's_encoding != NULL' instead of
ext4_has_feature_casefold().  This would make the check robust against
the casefold feature being enabled by userspace writing to the page
cache of the mounted block device.  However, it's unsolvable in general
for filesystems to be robust against concurrent writes to the page cache
of the mounted block device.  Though this very particular scenario
involving the casefold feature is solvable, we should not pretend that
we can support this model, so let's just check the casefold feature.
tune2fs already forbids enabling casefold on a mounted filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814182903.37267-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 642335f3ea2b ("ext4: don't treat fhandle lookup of ea_inode as FS corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: ignore xattrs past end</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:39:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bhupesh</name>
<email>bhupesh@igalia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-28T08:27:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6aff941cb0f7d0c897c3698ad2e30672709135e3'/>
<id>6aff941cb0f7d0c897c3698ad2e30672709135e3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c8e008b60492cf6fd31ef127aea6d02fd3d314cd ]

Once inside 'ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all' we should
ignore xattrs entries past the 'end' entry.

This fixes the following KASAN reported issue:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012c120c4 by task repro/2065

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2065 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+ #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1fd/0x300
 ? tcp_gro_dev_warn+0x260/0x260
 ? _printk+0xc0/0x100
 ? read_lock_is_recursive+0x10/0x10
 ? irq_work_queue+0x72/0xf0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
 print_address_description+0x78/0x390
 print_report+0x107/0x1f0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x3ff/0x4b0
 ? __phys_addr+0xb5/0x160
 ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
 kasan_report+0xcc/0x100
 ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
 ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
 ? ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xd30/0xd30
 ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x5f0/0x5f0
 ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x2b/0x5f0
 ? inode_update_timestamps+0x410/0x410
 ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xb64/0xd30
 ? ext4_truncate+0xb70/0xdc0
 ? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x1d20/0x1d20
 ? __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x670/0x670
 ? ext4_journal_check_start+0x16f/0x240
 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x2f2/0x3a0
 ext4_evict_inode+0xc8c/0xff0
 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x8a0
 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
 evict+0x4ac/0x950
 ? proc_nr_inodes+0x310/0x310
 ? trace_ext4_drop_inode+0xa2/0x220
 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x30
 ? iput+0x4cb/0x7e0
 do_unlinkat+0x495/0x7c0
 ? try_break_deleg+0x120/0x120
 ? 0xffffffff81000000
 ? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x210
 ? strncpy_from_user+0x13e/0x250
 ? getname_flags+0x1dc/0x530
 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xc8/0xf0
 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x110
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
RIP: 0033:0x434ffd
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8
RSP: 002b:00007ffc50fa7b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000107
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc50fa7e18 RCX: 0000000000434ffd
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007ffc50fa7be0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007ffc50fa7e08 R14: 00000000004bbf30 R15: 0000000000000001
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012c12000
 which belongs to the cache filp of size 360
The buggy address is located 196 bytes inside of
 freed 360-byte region [ffff888012c12000, ffff888012c12168)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12c12
head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x40(head|node=0|zone=0)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000001 ffffea00004b0481 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888012c11f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff888012c12000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
&gt; ffff888012c12080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                           ^
 ffff888012c12100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
 ffff888012c12180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Reported-by: syzbot+b244bda78289b00204ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b244bda78289b00204ed
Suggested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo &lt;cascardo@igalia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bhupesh &lt;bhupesh@igalia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250128082751.124948-2-bhupesh@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c8e008b60492cf6fd31ef127aea6d02fd3d314cd ]

Once inside 'ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all' we should
ignore xattrs entries past the 'end' entry.

This fixes the following KASAN reported issue:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012c120c4 by task repro/2065

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2065 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+ #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1fd/0x300
 ? tcp_gro_dev_warn+0x260/0x260
 ? _printk+0xc0/0x100
 ? read_lock_is_recursive+0x10/0x10
 ? irq_work_queue+0x72/0xf0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
 print_address_description+0x78/0x390
 print_report+0x107/0x1f0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x3ff/0x4b0
 ? __phys_addr+0xb5/0x160
 ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
 kasan_report+0xcc/0x100
 ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
 ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
 ? ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xd30/0xd30
 ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x5f0/0x5f0
 ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x2b/0x5f0
 ? inode_update_timestamps+0x410/0x410
 ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xb64/0xd30
 ? ext4_truncate+0xb70/0xdc0
 ? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x1d20/0x1d20
 ? __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x670/0x670
 ? ext4_journal_check_start+0x16f/0x240
 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x2f2/0x3a0
 ext4_evict_inode+0xc8c/0xff0
 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x8a0
 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
 evict+0x4ac/0x950
 ? proc_nr_inodes+0x310/0x310
 ? trace_ext4_drop_inode+0xa2/0x220
 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x30
 ? iput+0x4cb/0x7e0
 do_unlinkat+0x495/0x7c0
 ? try_break_deleg+0x120/0x120
 ? 0xffffffff81000000
 ? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x210
 ? strncpy_from_user+0x13e/0x250
 ? getname_flags+0x1dc/0x530
 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xc8/0xf0
 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x110
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
RIP: 0033:0x434ffd
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8
RSP: 002b:00007ffc50fa7b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000107
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc50fa7e18 RCX: 0000000000434ffd
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007ffc50fa7be0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007ffc50fa7e08 R14: 00000000004bbf30 R15: 0000000000000001
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012c12000
 which belongs to the cache filp of size 360
The buggy address is located 196 bytes inside of
 freed 360-byte region [ffff888012c12000, ffff888012c12168)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12c12
head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x40(head|node=0|zone=0)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000001 ffffea00004b0481 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888012c11f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff888012c12000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
&gt; ffff888012c12080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                           ^
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==================================================================

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Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
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