linux-stable.git/fs/ext4, branch v3.18.52

posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions

2017-05-08T05:44:10+00:00

commit 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef upstream.

When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok().  Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2).  Fix that.

References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher 
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ext4: check if in-inode xattr is corrupted in ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea()

2017-05-08T05:44:07+00:00

commit 9e92f48c34eb2b9af9d12f892e2fe1fce5e8ce35 upstream.

We aren't checking to see if the in-inode extended attribute is
corrupted before we try to expand the inode's extra isize fields.

This can lead to potential crashes caused by the BUG_ON() check in
ext4_xattr_shift_entries().

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: Julia Lawall 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ext4: mark inode dirty after converting inline directory

2017-04-22T05:15:05+00:00

commit b9cf625d6ecde0d372e23ae022feead72b4228a6 upstream.

If ext4_convert_inline_data() was called on a directory with inline
data, the filesystem was left in an inconsistent state (as considered by
e2fsck) because the file size was not increased to cover the new block.
This happened because the inode was not marked dirty after i_disksize
was updated.  Fix this by marking the inode dirty at the end of
ext4_finish_convert_inline_dir().

This bug was probably not noticed before because most users mark the
inode dirty afterwards for other reasons.  But if userspace executed
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY with invalid parameters, as exercised by
'kvm-xfstests -c adv generic/396', then the inode was never marked dirty
after updating i_disksize.

Fixes: 3c47d54170b6a678875566b1b8d6dcf57904e49b
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ext4: return -ENOMEM instead of success

2017-01-15T14:49:51+00:00

[ Upstream commit 578620f451f836389424833f1454eeeb2ffc9e9f ]

We should set the error code if kzalloc() fails.

Fixes: 67cf5b09a46f ("ext4: add the basic function for inline data support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter 
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ext4: add sanity checking to count_overhead()

2017-01-15T14:49:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit c48ae41bafe31e9a66d8be2ced4e42a6b57fa814 ]

The commit "ext4: sanity check the block and cluster size at mount
time" should prevent any problems, but in case the superblock is
modified while the file system is mounted, add an extra safety check
to make sure we won't overrun the allocated buffer.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ext4: use more strict checks for inodes_per_block on mount

2017-01-15T14:49:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit cd6bb35bf7f6d7d922509bf50265383a0ceabe96 ]

Centralize the checks for inodes_per_block and be more strict to make
sure the inodes_per_block_group can't end up being zero.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ext4: sanity check the block and cluster size at mount time

2017-01-15T14:49:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9e47a4c9fc58032ee135bf76516809c7624b1551 ]

If the block size or cluster size is insane, reject the mount.  This
is important for security reasons (although we shouldn't be just
depending on this check).

Ref: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/539661
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1332506
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov 
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ext4: fix stack memory corruption with 64k block size

2017-01-13T23:00:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 30a9d7afe70ed6bd9191d3000e2ef1a34fb58493 ]

The number of 'counters' elements needed in 'struct sg' is
super_block->s_blocksize_bits + 2. Presently we have 16 'counters'
elements in the array. This is insufficient for block sizes >= 32k. In
such cases the memcpy operation performed in ext4_mb_seq_groups_show()
would cause stack memory corruption.

Fixes: c9de560ded61f
Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra 
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ext4: fix mballoc breakage with 64k block size

2017-01-13T23:00:45+00:00

[ Upstream commit 69e43e8cc971a79dd1ee5d4343d8e63f82725123 ]

'border' variable is set to a value of 2 times the block size of the
underlying filesystem. With 64k block size, the resulting value won't
fit into a 16-bit variable. Hence this commit changes the data type of
'border' to 'unsigned int'.

Fixes: c9de560ded61f
Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra 
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ext4: validate that metadata blocks do not overlap superblock

2016-09-12T18:52:54+00:00

[ Upstream commit 829fa70dddadf9dd041d62b82cd7cea63943899d ]

A number of fuzzing failures seem to be caused by allocation bitmaps
or other metadata blocks being pointed at the superblock.

This can cause kernel BUG or WARNings once the superblock is
overwritten, so validate the group descriptor blocks to make sure this
doesn't happen.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin