linux-stable.git/fs/ecryptfs, branch v6.18.50

ecryptfs: show filename encryption options

2026-09-07T15:22:34+00:00

commit 496ec2d0852a02d2e631771b5c439130b9c7dce7 upstream.

ecryptfs_show_options() prints most user-visible mount options but
omits the filename encryption cipher and key size.

Print ecryptfs_fn_cipher and ecryptfs_fn_key_bytes when filename
encryption is enabled so that the displayed mount options reflect the
active filename encryption settings.

Fixes: 87c94c4df014 ("eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option")
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen 
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ecryptfs: release message context on send failure

2026-09-07T15:22:34+00:00

commit 219644a3ad5518217b2d62cad6d2c36a2308c949 upstream.

ecryptfs_send_message_locked() moves a message context from the free
list to the allocated list before sending the request to the userspace
daemon.

If ecryptfs_send_miscdev() fails, the context is left on the
allocated list and cannot be reused. Move it back to the free list on
failure and clear the caller's pointer.

Fixes: f66e883eb618 ("eCryptfs: integrate eCryptfs device handle into the module.")
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen 
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ecryptfs: reject too-small tag 70 packets

2026-09-07T15:22:34+00:00

commit e97bbe1b2bd82ec2ae37ad2e4965b4d3e78bbf7f upstream.

ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() subtracts fixed metadata fields from the
parsed packet body size to derive the encrypted filename size.  A
malformed packet with a body smaller than those fixed fields can underflow
that size calculation.

Reject tag 70 packets before the subtraction unless the body contains the
signature, cipher code, and at least one byte of encrypted filename data.

Fixes: 9c79f34f7ee7 ("eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Tag 70 packets")
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen 
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ecryptfs: reject oversized encrypted_key_size in parse_tag_3_packet

2026-09-07T15:22:34+00:00

commit 5babe9c177c364521e3e682b949c5a8c47f4a441 upstream.

parse_tag_3_packet() set encrypted_key_size from the Tag 3 packet body
without bounding it against ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES (64). When
encrypted_key_size > 64, decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key()
sets decrypted_key_size = encrypted_key_size and performs two
out-of-bounds writes:

1. crypto_skcipher_decrypt() writes encrypted_key_size bytes into
   decrypted_key[64] via scatterlist, overflowing into the parent
   ecryptfs_auth_tok struct.
2. memcpy(crypt_stat->key, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size) writes
   into crypt_stat->key[64], corrupting root_iv, keysig_list, and
   mutexes in ecryptfs_crypt_stat.

Only AES-192 (cipher code 0x08) enables this because it sets
crypt_stat->key_size = 24 independently of encrypted_key_size,
allowing crypto_skcipher_setkey() to succeed while encrypted_key_size
exceeds ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES.

The PKI decryption path (parse_tag_65_packet) already validates
decrypted_key_size <= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES; the passphrase path
omits this check.

Bound encrypted_key_size against ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES (64) rather
than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES (512). The 64-byte limit also
protects the 512-byte encrypted_key[] buffer, so the former 512-byte
check is removed as redundant.

Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: HanQuan 
[tyhicks: Adjust the code comment to refer to macros representing the
 buffer sizes rather than mentioning the buffer size values since they
 may change in the future]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ecryptfs: pass packet set buffer size to parser

2026-09-07T15:22:34+00:00

commit 2602b79c5b3e2f6fce12e38a670f8e3fda4e46a2 upstream.

ecryptfs_parse_packet_set() receives a pointer into the file header, but
it calculates the remaining packet buffer size from PAGE_SIZE - 8.  For
version 1 headers the packet set starts later in the header, so this can
overstate the available buffer.

Pass the actual packet set buffer length from the caller and calculate
per-packet limits from the remaining bytes in that buffer.  Recompute the
remaining length after consuming a tag 3 packet before parsing the
following tag 11 packet.

Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen 
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ecryptfs: hold msg ctx list lock when cleaning daemon queue

2026-09-07T15:22:34+00:00

commit 779972513c2fa8c7938e54976f686091dafff22f upstream.

ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon() drops queued messages from a dying daemon
without holding ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux, but
ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free() requires that lock.

Take the list lock while moving the queued contexts back to the free
list to avoid racing with other global msg ctx list users.

Fixes: f66e883eb618 ("eCryptfs: integrate eCryptfs device handle into the module.")
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen 
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ecryptfs: fix tag 11 packet exact-fit size check

2026-09-07T15:22:34+00:00

commit 8b2ec0f56f55477f547d332526c9ae2a8fabc0a5 upstream.

parse_tag_11_packet() rejects a packet when the already-consumed tag and
length bytes plus the packet body exceed the caller supplied maximum
packet size.  The check currently adds one extra byte, even though
*packet_size already includes the tag byte before the length is parsed.

Remove the extra byte so a tag 11 packet that exactly fits the available
buffer is accepted while oversized packets are still rejected.

Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen 
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

eCryptfs: bound the packet-length peek to the user buffer

2026-09-07T15:22:34+00:00

commit 95540462e630edbc8504e9537d16453d6942d143 upstream.

ecryptfs_miscdev_write() accepts the minimum one-byte packet-length
encoding, but always copies the maximum two-byte encoding from userspace
before parsing it. A six-byte message therefore reads one byte beyond the
submitted user buffer.

Zero-initialize the peek buffer and copy only the packet-length bytes
present. The existing exact packet-size check still rejects truncated
two-byte encodings after the parser determines their encoded length.

Fixes: 8bf2debd5f7b ("eCryptfs: introduce device handle for userspace daemon communications")
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou 
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'pull-mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2025-10-03T17:19:44+00:00

Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
 "Several piles this cycle, this mount-related one being the largest and
  trickiest:

   - saner handling of guards in fs/namespace.c, getting rid of
     needlessly strong locking in some of the users

   - lock_mount() calling conventions change - have it set the
     environment for attaching to given location, storing the results in
     caller-supplied object, without altering the passed struct path.

     Make unlock_mount() called as __cleanup for those objects. It's not
     exactly guard(), but similar to it

   - MNT_WRITE_HOLD done right.

     mnt_hold_writers() does *not* mess with ->mnt_flags anymore, so
     insertion of a new mount into ->s_mounts of underlying superblock
     does not, in itself, expose ->mnt_flags of that mount to concurrent
     modifications

   - getting rid of pathological cases when umount() spends quadratic
     time removing the victims from propagation graph - part of that had
     been dealt with last cycle, this should finish it

   - a bunch of stuff constified

   - assorted cleanups

* tag 'pull-mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (64 commits)
  constify {__,}mnt_is_readonly()
  WRITE_HOLD machinery: no need for to bump mount_lock seqcount
  struct mount: relocate MNT_WRITE_HOLD bit
  preparations to taking MNT_WRITE_HOLD out of ->mnt_flags
  setup_mnt(): primitive for connecting a mount to filesystem
  simplify the callers of mnt_unhold_writers()
  copy_mnt_ns(): use guards
  copy_mnt_ns(): use the regular mechanism for freeing empty mnt_ns on failure
  open_detached_copy(): separate creation of namespace into helper
  open_detached_copy(): don't bother with mount_lock_hash()
  path_has_submounts(): use guard(mount_locked_reader)
  fs/namespace.c: sanitize descriptions for {__,}lookup_mnt()
  ecryptfs: get rid of pointless mount references in ecryptfs dentries
  umount_tree(): take all victims out of propagation graph at once
  do_mount(): use __free(path_put)
  do_move_mount_old(): use __free(path_put)
  constify can_move_mount_beneath() arguments
  path_umount(): constify struct path argument
  may_copy_tree(), __do_loopback(): constify struct path argument
  path_mount(): constify struct path argument
  ...

VFS: unify old_mnt_idmap and new_mnt_idmap in renamedata

2025-09-23T10:37:35+00:00

A rename operation can only rename within a single mount.  Callers of
vfs_rename() must and do ensure this is the case.

So there is no point in having two mnt_idmaps in renamedata as they are
always the same.  Only one of them is passed to ->rename in any case.

This patch replaces both with a single "mnt_idmap" and changes all
callers.

Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown 
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner