<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/ecryptfs, branch v3.4.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Properly check for O_RDONLY flag before doing privileged open</title>
<updated>2012-07-16T16:04:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-12T18:17:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b6855f6d78cee5d72adc8f07be2646dd83c171c3'/>
<id>b6855f6d78cee5d72adc8f07be2646dd83c171c3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9fe79d7600497ed8a95c3981cbe5b73ab98222f0 upstream.

If the first attempt at opening the lower file read/write fails,
eCryptfs will retry using a privileged kthread. However, the privileged
retry should not happen if the lower file's inode is read-only because a
read/write open will still be unsuccessful.

The check for determining if the open should be retried was intended to
be based on the access mode of the lower file's open flags being
O_RDONLY, but the check was incorrectly performed. This would cause the
open to be retried by the privileged kthread, resulting in a second
failed open of the lower file. This patch corrects the check to
determine if the open request should be handled by the privileged
kthread.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9fe79d7600497ed8a95c3981cbe5b73ab98222f0 upstream.

If the first attempt at opening the lower file read/write fails,
eCryptfs will retry using a privileged kthread. However, the privileged
retry should not happen if the lower file's inode is read-only because a
read/write open will still be unsuccessful.

The check for determining if the open should be retried was intended to
be based on the access mode of the lower file's open flags being
O_RDONLY, but the check was incorrectly performed. This would cause the
open to be retried by the privileged kthread, resulting in a second
failed open of the lower file. This patch corrects the check to
determine if the open request should be handled by the privileged
kthread.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Fix lockdep warning in miscdev operations</title>
<updated>2012-07-16T16:04:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-11T17:21:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b6d7c70709e324e074d3a69249980bba1529fd01'/>
<id>b6d7c70709e324e074d3a69249980bba1529fd01</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60d65f1f07a7d81d3eb3b91fc13fca80f2fdbb12 upstream.

Don't grab the daemon mutex while holding the message context mutex.
Addresses this lockdep warning:

 ecryptfsd/2141 is trying to acquire lock:
  (&amp;ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux){+.+.+.}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa029c213&gt;] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x143/0x470 [ecryptfs]

 but task is already holding lock:
  (&amp;(*daemon)-&gt;mux){+.+...}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa029c2ec&gt;] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x21c/0x470 [ecryptfs]

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -&gt; #1 (&amp;(*daemon)-&gt;mux){+.+...}:
        [&lt;ffffffff810a3b8d&gt;] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x220
        [&lt;ffffffff8151c6da&gt;] __mutex_lock_common+0x5a/0x4b0
        [&lt;ffffffff8151cc64&gt;] mutex_lock_nested+0x44/0x50
        [&lt;ffffffffa029c5d7&gt;] ecryptfs_send_miscdev+0x97/0x120 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffffa029b744&gt;] ecryptfs_send_message+0x134/0x1e0 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffffa029a24e&gt;] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x2fe/0xa80 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffffa02960f8&gt;] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x108/0x250 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffffa0290f80&gt;] ecryptfs_create+0x130/0x250 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffff811963a4&gt;] vfs_create+0xb4/0x120
        [&lt;ffffffff81197865&gt;] do_last+0x8c5/0xa10
        [&lt;ffffffff811998f9&gt;] path_openat+0xd9/0x460
        [&lt;ffffffff81199da2&gt;] do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
        [&lt;ffffffff81187998&gt;] do_sys_open+0xf8/0x1d0
        [&lt;ffffffff81187a91&gt;] sys_open+0x21/0x30
        [&lt;ffffffff81527d69&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

 -&gt; #0 (&amp;ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux){+.+.+.}:
        [&lt;ffffffff810a3418&gt;] __lock_acquire+0x1bf8/0x1c50
        [&lt;ffffffff810a3b8d&gt;] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x220
        [&lt;ffffffff8151c6da&gt;] __mutex_lock_common+0x5a/0x4b0
        [&lt;ffffffff8151cc64&gt;] mutex_lock_nested+0x44/0x50
        [&lt;ffffffffa029c213&gt;] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x143/0x470 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffff811887d3&gt;] vfs_read+0xb3/0x180
        [&lt;ffffffff811888ed&gt;] sys_read+0x4d/0x90
        [&lt;ffffffff81527d69&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 60d65f1f07a7d81d3eb3b91fc13fca80f2fdbb12 upstream.

Don't grab the daemon mutex while holding the message context mutex.
Addresses this lockdep warning:

 ecryptfsd/2141 is trying to acquire lock:
  (&amp;ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux){+.+.+.}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa029c213&gt;] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x143/0x470 [ecryptfs]

 but task is already holding lock:
  (&amp;(*daemon)-&gt;mux){+.+...}, at: [&lt;ffffffffa029c2ec&gt;] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x21c/0x470 [ecryptfs]

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -&gt; #1 (&amp;(*daemon)-&gt;mux){+.+...}:
        [&lt;ffffffff810a3b8d&gt;] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x220
        [&lt;ffffffff8151c6da&gt;] __mutex_lock_common+0x5a/0x4b0
        [&lt;ffffffff8151cc64&gt;] mutex_lock_nested+0x44/0x50
        [&lt;ffffffffa029c5d7&gt;] ecryptfs_send_miscdev+0x97/0x120 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffffa029b744&gt;] ecryptfs_send_message+0x134/0x1e0 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffffa029a24e&gt;] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x2fe/0xa80 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffffa02960f8&gt;] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x108/0x250 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffffa0290f80&gt;] ecryptfs_create+0x130/0x250 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffff811963a4&gt;] vfs_create+0xb4/0x120
        [&lt;ffffffff81197865&gt;] do_last+0x8c5/0xa10
        [&lt;ffffffff811998f9&gt;] path_openat+0xd9/0x460
        [&lt;ffffffff81199da2&gt;] do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
        [&lt;ffffffff81187998&gt;] do_sys_open+0xf8/0x1d0
        [&lt;ffffffff81187a91&gt;] sys_open+0x21/0x30
        [&lt;ffffffff81527d69&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

 -&gt; #0 (&amp;ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux){+.+.+.}:
        [&lt;ffffffff810a3418&gt;] __lock_acquire+0x1bf8/0x1c50
        [&lt;ffffffff810a3b8d&gt;] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x220
        [&lt;ffffffff8151c6da&gt;] __mutex_lock_common+0x5a/0x4b0
        [&lt;ffffffff8151cc64&gt;] mutex_lock_nested+0x44/0x50
        [&lt;ffffffffa029c213&gt;] ecryptfs_miscdev_read+0x143/0x470 [ecryptfs]
        [&lt;ffffffff811887d3&gt;] vfs_read+0xb3/0x180
        [&lt;ffffffff811888ed&gt;] sys_read+0x4d/0x90
        [&lt;ffffffff81527d69&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Gracefully refuse miscdev file ops on inherited/passed files</title>
<updated>2012-07-16T16:04:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-11T16:24:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6dfa530c0b33f1ccd2d8b103a2dea6ec559de66c'/>
<id>6dfa530c0b33f1ccd2d8b103a2dea6ec559de66c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8dc6780587c99286c0d3de747a2946a76989414a upstream.

File operations on /dev/ecryptfs would BUG() when the operations were
performed by processes other than the process that originally opened the
file. This could happen with open files inherited after fork() or file
descriptors passed through IPC mechanisms. Rather than calling BUG(), an
error code can be safely returned in most situations.

In ecryptfs_miscdev_release(), eCryptfs still needs to handle the
release even if the last file reference is being held by a process that
didn't originally open the file. ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid() will not
be successful, so a pointer to the daemon is stored in the file's
private_data. The private_data pointer is initialized when the miscdev
file is opened and only used when the file is released.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/994247

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;levinsasha928@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sasha Levin &lt;levinsasha928@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8dc6780587c99286c0d3de747a2946a76989414a upstream.

File operations on /dev/ecryptfs would BUG() when the operations were
performed by processes other than the process that originally opened the
file. This could happen with open files inherited after fork() or file
descriptors passed through IPC mechanisms. Rather than calling BUG(), an
error code can be safely returned in most situations.

In ecryptfs_miscdev_release(), eCryptfs still needs to handle the
release even if the last file reference is being held by a process that
didn't originally open the file. ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid() will not
be successful, so a pointer to the daemon is stored in the file's
private_data. The private_data pointer is initialized when the miscdev
file is opened and only used when the file is released.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/994247

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;levinsasha928@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sasha Levin &lt;levinsasha928@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: make register_filesystem() the last potential failure exit</title>
<updated>2012-03-21T01:29:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-18T01:29:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0794f569ec307dc25bbb12456ef75aa71f72f744'/>
<id>0794f569ec307dc25bbb12456ef75aa71f72f744</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>switch touch_atime to struct path</title>
<updated>2012-03-21T01:29:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-15T12:21:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=68ac1234fb949b66941d94dce4157742799fc581'/>
<id>68ac1234fb949b66941d94dce4157742799fc581</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>switch open-coded instances of d_make_root() to new helper</title>
<updated>2012-03-21T01:29:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-09T03:15:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=48fde701aff662559b38d9a609574068f22d00fe'/>
<id>48fde701aff662559b38d9a609574068f22d00fe</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: don't bother with -&gt;drop_inode()</title>
<updated>2012-03-21T01:29:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-12T07:58:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e28e832c3e1e1197873cfd0b6ce86868cf5c391d'/>
<id>e28e832c3e1e1197873cfd0b6ce86868cf5c391d</id>
<content type='text'>
generic_drop_inode() is the default

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
generic_drop_inode() is the default

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: fix printk format warning for size_t</title>
<updated>2012-02-29T00:55:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@xenotime.net</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-29T00:31:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=164974a8f2a482f1abcb027c6d1a89dd79b14297'/>
<id>164974a8f2a482f1abcb027c6d1a89dd79b14297</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix printk format warning (from Linus's suggestion):

on i386:
  fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c:433:38: warning: format '%lu' expects type 'long unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'unsigned int'

and on x86_64:
  fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c:433:38: warning: format '%u' expects type 'unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'long unsigned int'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@xenotime.net&gt;
Cc:	Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc:	Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc:	Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com&gt;
Cc:	ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix printk format warning (from Linus's suggestion):

on i386:
  fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c:433:38: warning: format '%lu' expects type 'long unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'unsigned int'

and on x86_64:
  fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c:433:38: warning: format '%u' expects type 'unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'long unsigned int'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@xenotime.net&gt;
Cc:	Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc:	Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc:	Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com&gt;
Cc:	ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()</title>
<updated>2012-02-16T22:06:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>amwang@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-10T05:39:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=465c9343c5b746ec2325a220fa3e50cc647d2db7'/>
<id>465c9343c5b746ec2325a220fa3e50cc647d2db7</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;amwang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;amwang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Copy up lower inode attrs after setting lower xattr</title>
<updated>2012-02-16T22:06:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-07T23:55:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=545d680938be1e86a6c5250701ce9abaf360c495'/>
<id>545d680938be1e86a6c5250701ce9abaf360c495</id>
<content type='text'>
After passing through a -&gt;setxattr() call, eCryptfs needs to copy the
inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode, as they
may have changed in the lower filesystem's -&gt;setxattr() path.

One example is if an extended attribute containing a POSIX Access
Control List is being set. The new ACL may cause the lower filesystem to
modify the mode of the lower inode and the eCryptfs inode would need to
be updated to reflect the new mode.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/926292

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastien Bacher &lt;seb128@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
After passing through a -&gt;setxattr() call, eCryptfs needs to copy the
inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode, as they
may have changed in the lower filesystem's -&gt;setxattr() path.

One example is if an extended attribute containing a POSIX Access
Control List is being set. The new ACL may cause the lower filesystem to
modify the mode of the lower inode and the eCryptfs inode would need to
be updated to reflect the new mode.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/926292

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastien Bacher &lt;seb128@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
