<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/ecryptfs, branch v3.12.64</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: don't allow mmap when the lower fs doesn't support it</title>
<updated>2016-07-18T11:52:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Mahoney</name>
<email>jeffm@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-05T21:32:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=114ffc5d2bbf3de6515d294edb9756a6fb35bd73'/>
<id>114ffc5d2bbf3de6515d294edb9756a6fb35bd73</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f0fe970df3838c202ef6c07a4c2b36838ef0a88b upstream.

There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs.  We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.

CVE-2016-1583

Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney &lt;jeffm@suse.com&gt;
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Henry Jensen &lt;hjensen@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f0fe970df3838c202ef6c07a4c2b36838ef0a88b upstream.

There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs.  We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.

CVE-2016-1583

Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney &lt;jeffm@suse.com&gt;
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Henry Jensen &lt;hjensen@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine</title>
<updated>2015-01-07T16:55:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Halcrow</name>
<email>mhalcrow@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-26T17:09:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8ffea99d6f2be99790611282f326da95a84a8cab'/>
<id>8ffea99d6f2be99790611282f326da95a84a8cab</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc upstream.

Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov &lt;dmitryc@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc upstream.

Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov &lt;dmitryc@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled</title>
<updated>2015-01-07T16:55:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-07T20:51:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1b5e3f84f560038d9a71b19d6b0db933140a613'/>
<id>c1b5e3f84f560038d9a71b19d6b0db933140a613</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 332b122d39c9cbff8b799007a825d94b2e7c12f2 upstream.

The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the
functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting
lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the
lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount
option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not
supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more
information:

  e77a56d [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough

This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the
ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the
MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some
broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications
of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in
ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using
system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Priya Bansal &lt;p.bansal@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 332b122d39c9cbff8b799007a825d94b2e7c12f2 upstream.

The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the
functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting
lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the
lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount
option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not
supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more
information:

  e77a56d [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough

This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the
ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the
MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some
broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications
of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in
ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using
system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Priya Bansal &lt;p.bansal@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: avoid to access NULL pointer when write metadata in xattr</title>
<updated>2014-10-31T14:11:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>chao2.yu@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-24T09:25:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=660e27e875b6de94393634edea40d75f844b0f97'/>
<id>660e27e875b6de94393634edea40d75f844b0f97</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 35425ea2492175fd39f6116481fe98b2b3ddd4ca upstream.

Christopher Head 2014-06-28 05:26:20 UTC described:
"I tried to reproduce this on 3.12.21. Instead, when I do "echo hello &gt; foo"
in an ecryptfs mount with ecryptfs_xattr specified, I get a kernel crash:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
PGD d7840067 PUD b2c3c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: nvidia(PO)
CPU: 3 PID: 3566 Comm: bash Tainted: P           O 3.12.21-gentoo-r1 #2
Hardware name: ASUSTek Computer Inc. G60JX/G60JX, BIOS 206 03/15/2010
task: ffff8801948944c0 ti: ffff8800bad70000 task.ti: ffff8800bad70000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
RSP: 0018:ffff8800bad71c10  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000000181a4 RBX: ffff880198648480 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff880172010450 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff880198490e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880172010450 R11: ffffea0002c51e80 R12: 0000000000002000
R13: 000000000000001a R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880198490e40
FS:  00007ff224caa700(0000) GS:ffff88019fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000bb07f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
Stack:
ffffffff811826e8 ffff8800a39d8000 0000000000000000 000000000000001a
ffff8800a01d0000 ffff8800a39d8000 ffffffff81185fd5 ffffffff81082c2c
00000001a39d8000 53d0abbc98490e40 0000000000000037 ffff8800a39d8220
Call Trace:
[&lt;ffffffff811826e8&gt;] ? ecryptfs_setxattr+0x40/0x52
[&lt;ffffffff81185fd5&gt;] ? ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x1b3/0x223
[&lt;ffffffff81082c2c&gt;] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[&lt;ffffffff8118322b&gt;] ? ecryptfs_initialize_file+0xaf/0xd4
[&lt;ffffffff81183344&gt;] ? ecryptfs_create+0xf4/0x142
[&lt;ffffffff810f8c0d&gt;] ? vfs_create+0x48/0x71
[&lt;ffffffff810f9c86&gt;] ? do_last.isra.68+0x559/0x952
[&lt;ffffffff810f7ce7&gt;] ? link_path_walk+0xbd/0x458
[&lt;ffffffff810fa2a3&gt;] ? path_openat+0x224/0x472
[&lt;ffffffff810fa7bd&gt;] ? do_filp_open+0x2b/0x6f
[&lt;ffffffff81103606&gt;] ? __alloc_fd+0xd6/0xe7
[&lt;ffffffff810ee6ab&gt;] ? do_sys_open+0x65/0xe9
[&lt;ffffffff8157d022&gt;] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
RSP &lt;ffff8800bad71c10&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace df9dba5f1ddb8565 ]---"

If we create a file when we mount with ecryptfs_xattr_metadata option, we will
encounter a crash in this path:
-&gt;ecryptfs_create
  -&gt;ecryptfs_initialize_file
    -&gt;ecryptfs_write_metadata
      -&gt;ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_xattr
        -&gt;ecryptfs_setxattr
          -&gt;fsstack_copy_attr_all
It's because our dentry-&gt;d_inode used in fsstack_copy_attr_all is NULL, and it
will be initialized when ecryptfs_initialize_file finish.

So we should skip copying attr from lower inode when the value of -&gt;d_inode is
invalid.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 35425ea2492175fd39f6116481fe98b2b3ddd4ca upstream.

Christopher Head 2014-06-28 05:26:20 UTC described:
"I tried to reproduce this on 3.12.21. Instead, when I do "echo hello &gt; foo"
in an ecryptfs mount with ecryptfs_xattr specified, I get a kernel crash:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
PGD d7840067 PUD b2c3c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: nvidia(PO)
CPU: 3 PID: 3566 Comm: bash Tainted: P           O 3.12.21-gentoo-r1 #2
Hardware name: ASUSTek Computer Inc. G60JX/G60JX, BIOS 206 03/15/2010
task: ffff8801948944c0 ti: ffff8800bad70000 task.ti: ffff8800bad70000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
RSP: 0018:ffff8800bad71c10  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000000181a4 RBX: ffff880198648480 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff880172010450 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff880198490e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880172010450 R11: ffffea0002c51e80 R12: 0000000000002000
R13: 000000000000001a R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880198490e40
FS:  00007ff224caa700(0000) GS:ffff88019fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000bb07f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
Stack:
ffffffff811826e8 ffff8800a39d8000 0000000000000000 000000000000001a
ffff8800a01d0000 ffff8800a39d8000 ffffffff81185fd5 ffffffff81082c2c
00000001a39d8000 53d0abbc98490e40 0000000000000037 ffff8800a39d8220
Call Trace:
[&lt;ffffffff811826e8&gt;] ? ecryptfs_setxattr+0x40/0x52
[&lt;ffffffff81185fd5&gt;] ? ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x1b3/0x223
[&lt;ffffffff81082c2c&gt;] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[&lt;ffffffff8118322b&gt;] ? ecryptfs_initialize_file+0xaf/0xd4
[&lt;ffffffff81183344&gt;] ? ecryptfs_create+0xf4/0x142
[&lt;ffffffff810f8c0d&gt;] ? vfs_create+0x48/0x71
[&lt;ffffffff810f9c86&gt;] ? do_last.isra.68+0x559/0x952
[&lt;ffffffff810f7ce7&gt;] ? link_path_walk+0xbd/0x458
[&lt;ffffffff810fa2a3&gt;] ? path_openat+0x224/0x472
[&lt;ffffffff810fa7bd&gt;] ? do_filp_open+0x2b/0x6f
[&lt;ffffffff81103606&gt;] ? __alloc_fd+0xd6/0xe7
[&lt;ffffffff810ee6ab&gt;] ? do_sys_open+0x65/0xe9
[&lt;ffffffff8157d022&gt;] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
RSP &lt;ffff8800bad71c10&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace df9dba5f1ddb8565 ]---"

If we create a file when we mount with ecryptfs_xattr_metadata option, we will
encounter a crash in this path:
-&gt;ecryptfs_create
  -&gt;ecryptfs_initialize_file
    -&gt;ecryptfs_write_metadata
      -&gt;ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_xattr
        -&gt;ecryptfs_setxattr
          -&gt;fsstack_copy_attr_all
It's because our dentry-&gt;d_inode used in fsstack_copy_attr_all is NULL, and it
will be initialized when ecryptfs_initialize_file finish.

So we should skip copying attr from lower inode when the value of -&gt;d_inode is
invalid.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: fix 32 bit corruption issue</title>
<updated>2013-10-24T19:36:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-24T14:08:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=43b7c6c6a4e3916edd186ceb61be0c67d1e0969e'/>
<id>43b7c6c6a4e3916edd186ceb61be0c67d1e0969e</id>
<content type='text'>
Shifting page-&gt;index on 32 bit systems was overflowing, causing
data corruption of &gt; 4GB files. Fix this by casting it first.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/1243636

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Lars Duesing &lt;lars.duesing@camelotsweb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Shifting page-&gt;index on 32 bit systems was overflowing, causing
data corruption of &gt; 4GB files. Fix this by casting it first.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/1243636

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Lars Duesing &lt;lars.duesing@camelotsweb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: Fix memory leakage in keystore.c</title>
<updated>2013-10-16T22:18:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Geyslan G. Bem</name>
<email>geyslan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-11T19:49:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3edc8376c06133e3386265a824869cad03a4efd4'/>
<id>3edc8376c06133e3386265a824869cad03a4efd4</id>
<content type='text'>
In 'decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key' function:

Initializes 'payload' pointer and releases it on exit.

Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem &lt;geyslan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.28+
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In 'decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key' function:

Initializes 'payload' pointer and releases it on exit.

Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem &lt;geyslan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.28+
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: avoid ctx initialization race</title>
<updated>2013-09-06T23:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-13T22:02:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cb69f36ba1f8d5e73c46538e84a88178fb17f23d'/>
<id>cb69f36ba1f8d5e73c46538e84a88178fb17f23d</id>
<content type='text'>
It might be possible for two callers to race the mutex lock after the
NULL ctx check. Instead, move the lock above the check so there isn't
the possibility of leaking a crypto ctx. Additionally, report the full
algo name when failing.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[tyhicks: remove out label, which is no longer used]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It might be possible for two callers to race the mutex lock after the
NULL ctx check. Instead, move the lock above the check so there isn't
the possibility of leaking a crypto ctx. Additionally, report the full
algo name when failing.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[tyhicks: remove out label, which is no longer used]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: remove check for if an array is NULL</title>
<updated>2013-09-06T23:51:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-31T09:10:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e6cbd6a44d8e263073808da9f295e502d15dc3fe'/>
<id>e6cbd6a44d8e263073808da9f295e502d15dc3fe</id>
<content type='text'>
It doesn't make sense to check if an array is NULL.  The compiler just
removes the check.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It doesn't make sense to check if an array is NULL.  The compiler just
removes the check.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'ecryptfs-3.11-rc1-cleanup' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs</title>
<updated>2013-07-11T17:20:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-11T17:20:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=746919d2668037f297595da9281a22cd558f3d18'/>
<id>746919d2668037f297595da9281a22cd558f3d18</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull eCryptfs updates from Tyler Hicks:
 "Code cleanups and improved buffer handling during page crypto
  operations:
   - Remove redundant code by merging some encrypt and decrypt functions
   - Get rid of a helper page allocation during page decryption by using
     in-place decryption
   - Better use of entire pages during page crypto operations
   - Several code cleanups"

* tag 'ecryptfs-3.11-rc1-cleanup' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs:
  Use ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path in a couple of places
  eCryptfs: Make extent and scatterlist crypt function parameters similar
  eCryptfs: Collapse crypt_page_offset() into crypt_extent()
  eCryptfs: Merge ecryptfs_encrypt_extent() and ecryptfs_decrypt_extent()
  eCryptfs: Combine page_offset crypto functions
  eCryptfs: Combine encrypt_scatterlist() and decrypt_scatterlist()
  eCryptfs: Decrypt pages in-place
  eCryptfs: Accept one offset parameter in page offset crypto functions
  eCryptfs: Simplify lower file offset calculation
  eCryptfs: Read/write entire page during page IO
  eCryptfs: Use entire helper page during page crypto operations
  eCryptfs: Cocci spatch "memdup.spatch"
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull eCryptfs updates from Tyler Hicks:
 "Code cleanups and improved buffer handling during page crypto
  operations:
   - Remove redundant code by merging some encrypt and decrypt functions
   - Get rid of a helper page allocation during page decryption by using
     in-place decryption
   - Better use of entire pages during page crypto operations
   - Several code cleanups"

* tag 'ecryptfs-3.11-rc1-cleanup' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs:
  Use ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path in a couple of places
  eCryptfs: Make extent and scatterlist crypt function parameters similar
  eCryptfs: Collapse crypt_page_offset() into crypt_extent()
  eCryptfs: Merge ecryptfs_encrypt_extent() and ecryptfs_decrypt_extent()
  eCryptfs: Combine page_offset crypto functions
  eCryptfs: Combine encrypt_scatterlist() and decrypt_scatterlist()
  eCryptfs: Decrypt pages in-place
  eCryptfs: Accept one offset parameter in page offset crypto functions
  eCryptfs: Simplify lower file offset calculation
  eCryptfs: Read/write entire page during page IO
  eCryptfs: Use entire helper page during page crypto operations
  eCryptfs: Cocci spatch "memdup.spatch"
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Use ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path in a couple of places</title>
<updated>2013-07-10T06:40:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Wilcox</name>
<email>willy@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-15T11:55:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cc18ec3c8f5dd735c1bff5da30fd33860c08a293'/>
<id>cc18ec3c8f5dd735c1bff5da30fd33860c08a293</id>
<content type='text'>
There are two places in ecryptfs that benefit from using
ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path() instead of separate calls to
ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower() and ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_mnt().  Both
sites use fewer instructions and less stack (determined by examining
objdump output).

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are two places in ecryptfs that benefit from using
ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path() instead of separate calls to
ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower() and ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_mnt().  Both
sites use fewer instructions and less stack (determined by examining
objdump output).

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
