[ Upstream commit 85a6a1aff08ec9f5b929d345d066e2830e8818e5 ]

The 'TAG 66 Packet Format' description is missing the cipher code and
checksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result,
the buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and
write_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the
buffer.

Fix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet
will always fit in the buffer.

This fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
  Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181

  CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu #1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70
   print_report+0xc5/0x610
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   kasan_report+0xc2/0x110
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   __asan_store1+0x62/0x80
   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10
   ? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540
   ? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d]
   ? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0
   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10
   ? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190
   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
   ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
   ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
   ? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0
   ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
   ? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330
   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
   ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
   ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
  RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67
  Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f
  RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67
  RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
  RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040
   </TASK>

  Allocated by task 181:
   kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60
   kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
   kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0
   __kmalloc+0x66/0x160
   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0
   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Fixes: dddfa461fc89 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Brian Kubisiak <brian@kubisiak.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5j2q56p6qkhezva6b2yuqfrsurmvrrqtxxzrnp3wqu7xrz22i7@hoecdztoplbl
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66 upstream.

In parse_tag_1_packet(), if tag 1 packet contains a key larger than
ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES, no cleanup is executed, leading to a
memory leak on the allocated 'auth_tok_list_item'. To fix this issue, go to
the label 'out_free' to perform the cleanup work.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dddfa461fc89 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Pull eCryptfs updates from Tyler Hicks:

 - Fix error handling when ecryptfs_read_lower() encounters an error

 - Fix read-only file creation when the eCryptfs mount is configured to
   store metadata in xattrs

 - Minor code cleanups

* tag 'ecryptfs-5.3-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs:
  ecryptfs: Change return type of ecryptfs_process_flags
  ecryptfs: Make ecryptfs_xattr_handler static
  ecryptfs: remove unnessesary null check in ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig
  ecryptfs: use print_hex_dump_bytes for hexdump
  eCryptfs: fix permission denied with ecryptfs_xattr mount option when create readonly file
  ecryptfs: re-order a condition for static checkers
  eCryptfs: fix a couple type promotion bugs

This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits

   7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
   2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")

that the merge brought in).

It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].

The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.

 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
 "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
  based on an internal ACL by the following means:

   - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
     list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
     Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.

     ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
     on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
     additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
     tags/namespaces.

     Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
     include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
     permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
     a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
     to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
     stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
     acquiring use of possessor permits.

   - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
     permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
     granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"

* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
  keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL

Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split.  This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.

============
WHY DO THIS?
============

The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.

For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:

 (1) Changing a key's ownership.

 (2) Changing a key's security information.

 (3) Setting a keyring's restriction.

And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:

 (4) Setting an expiry time.

 (5) Revoking a key.

and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:

 (6) Invalidating a key.

Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.

Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission.  It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.

As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:

 (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.

 (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.

 (3) Invalidation.

But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.

Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.


===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============

The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:

 (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
     changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.

 (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.

The SEARCH permission is split to create:

 (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.

 (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.

 (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.

The WRITE permission is also split to create:

 (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
     added, removed and replaced in a keyring.

 (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely.  This is
     split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.

 (3) REVOKE - see above.


Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together.  An ACE specifies a subject, such as:

 (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
 (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
 (*) Group - permitted to the key group
 (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone

Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.

Further subjects may be made available by later patches.

The ACE also specifies a permissions mask.  The set of permissions is now:

	VIEW		Can view the key metadata
	READ		Can read the key content
	WRITE		Can update/modify the key content
	SEARCH		Can find the key by searching/requesting
	LINK		Can make a link to the key
	SET_SECURITY	Can change owner, ACL, expiry
	INVAL		Can invalidate
	REVOKE		Can revoke
	JOIN		Can join this keyring
	CLEAR		Can clear this keyring


The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.

The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.

The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.

The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.

The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.

The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.


======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================

To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.

It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.

SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY.  WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR.  JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.

The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.

It will make the following mappings:

 (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH

 (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR

 (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set

 (4) CLEAR -> WRITE

Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.


=======
TESTING
=======

This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:

 (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
     returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
     if the type doesn't have ->read().  You still can't actually read the
     key.

 (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
     work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

request_key and ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key never
return a NULL pointer, so no need do a null check.

Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version this program is distributed in the
  hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
  the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
  purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
  should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
  with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
  59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.

With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP.  These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping.  For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API.  However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.

Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk.  It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.

Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Static checkers complain that we are using "s->i" as an offset before
we check whether it is within bounds.  It doesn't matter much but we
can easily swap the order of the checks to make everyone happy.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>