<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c, branch v3.2.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: avoid to access NULL pointer when write metadata in xattr</title>
<updated>2014-12-14T16:23:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chao Yu</name>
<email>chao2.yu@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-24T09:25:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a4f2b936759706e105436fdfd0312dfe949b5205'/>
<id>a4f2b936759706e105436fdfd0312dfe949b5205</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 35425ea2492175fd39f6116481fe98b2b3ddd4ca upstream.

Christopher Head 2014-06-28 05:26:20 UTC described:
"I tried to reproduce this on 3.12.21. Instead, when I do "echo hello &gt; foo"
in an ecryptfs mount with ecryptfs_xattr specified, I get a kernel crash:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
PGD d7840067 PUD b2c3c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: nvidia(PO)
CPU: 3 PID: 3566 Comm: bash Tainted: P           O 3.12.21-gentoo-r1 #2
Hardware name: ASUSTek Computer Inc. G60JX/G60JX, BIOS 206 03/15/2010
task: ffff8801948944c0 ti: ffff8800bad70000 task.ti: ffff8800bad70000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
RSP: 0018:ffff8800bad71c10  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000000181a4 RBX: ffff880198648480 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff880172010450 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff880198490e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880172010450 R11: ffffea0002c51e80 R12: 0000000000002000
R13: 000000000000001a R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880198490e40
FS:  00007ff224caa700(0000) GS:ffff88019fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000bb07f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
Stack:
ffffffff811826e8 ffff8800a39d8000 0000000000000000 000000000000001a
ffff8800a01d0000 ffff8800a39d8000 ffffffff81185fd5 ffffffff81082c2c
00000001a39d8000 53d0abbc98490e40 0000000000000037 ffff8800a39d8220
Call Trace:
[&lt;ffffffff811826e8&gt;] ? ecryptfs_setxattr+0x40/0x52
[&lt;ffffffff81185fd5&gt;] ? ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x1b3/0x223
[&lt;ffffffff81082c2c&gt;] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[&lt;ffffffff8118322b&gt;] ? ecryptfs_initialize_file+0xaf/0xd4
[&lt;ffffffff81183344&gt;] ? ecryptfs_create+0xf4/0x142
[&lt;ffffffff810f8c0d&gt;] ? vfs_create+0x48/0x71
[&lt;ffffffff810f9c86&gt;] ? do_last.isra.68+0x559/0x952
[&lt;ffffffff810f7ce7&gt;] ? link_path_walk+0xbd/0x458
[&lt;ffffffff810fa2a3&gt;] ? path_openat+0x224/0x472
[&lt;ffffffff810fa7bd&gt;] ? do_filp_open+0x2b/0x6f
[&lt;ffffffff81103606&gt;] ? __alloc_fd+0xd6/0xe7
[&lt;ffffffff810ee6ab&gt;] ? do_sys_open+0x65/0xe9
[&lt;ffffffff8157d022&gt;] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
RSP &lt;ffff8800bad71c10&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace df9dba5f1ddb8565 ]---"

If we create a file when we mount with ecryptfs_xattr_metadata option, we will
encounter a crash in this path:
-&gt;ecryptfs_create
  -&gt;ecryptfs_initialize_file
    -&gt;ecryptfs_write_metadata
      -&gt;ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_xattr
        -&gt;ecryptfs_setxattr
          -&gt;fsstack_copy_attr_all
It's because our dentry-&gt;d_inode used in fsstack_copy_attr_all is NULL, and it
will be initialized when ecryptfs_initialize_file finish.

So we should skip copying attr from lower inode when the value of -&gt;d_inode is
invalid.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 35425ea2492175fd39f6116481fe98b2b3ddd4ca upstream.

Christopher Head 2014-06-28 05:26:20 UTC described:
"I tried to reproduce this on 3.12.21. Instead, when I do "echo hello &gt; foo"
in an ecryptfs mount with ecryptfs_xattr specified, I get a kernel crash:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
PGD d7840067 PUD b2c3c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: nvidia(PO)
CPU: 3 PID: 3566 Comm: bash Tainted: P           O 3.12.21-gentoo-r1 #2
Hardware name: ASUSTek Computer Inc. G60JX/G60JX, BIOS 206 03/15/2010
task: ffff8801948944c0 ti: ffff8800bad70000 task.ti: ffff8800bad70000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
RSP: 0018:ffff8800bad71c10  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000000181a4 RBX: ffff880198648480 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff880172010450 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff880198490e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880172010450 R11: ffffea0002c51e80 R12: 0000000000002000
R13: 000000000000001a R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880198490e40
FS:  00007ff224caa700(0000) GS:ffff88019fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000bb07f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
Stack:
ffffffff811826e8 ffff8800a39d8000 0000000000000000 000000000000001a
ffff8800a01d0000 ffff8800a39d8000 ffffffff81185fd5 ffffffff81082c2c
00000001a39d8000 53d0abbc98490e40 0000000000000037 ffff8800a39d8220
Call Trace:
[&lt;ffffffff811826e8&gt;] ? ecryptfs_setxattr+0x40/0x52
[&lt;ffffffff81185fd5&gt;] ? ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x1b3/0x223
[&lt;ffffffff81082c2c&gt;] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[&lt;ffffffff8118322b&gt;] ? ecryptfs_initialize_file+0xaf/0xd4
[&lt;ffffffff81183344&gt;] ? ecryptfs_create+0xf4/0x142
[&lt;ffffffff810f8c0d&gt;] ? vfs_create+0x48/0x71
[&lt;ffffffff810f9c86&gt;] ? do_last.isra.68+0x559/0x952
[&lt;ffffffff810f7ce7&gt;] ? link_path_walk+0xbd/0x458
[&lt;ffffffff810fa2a3&gt;] ? path_openat+0x224/0x472
[&lt;ffffffff810fa7bd&gt;] ? do_filp_open+0x2b/0x6f
[&lt;ffffffff81103606&gt;] ? __alloc_fd+0xd6/0xe7
[&lt;ffffffff810ee6ab&gt;] ? do_sys_open+0x65/0xe9
[&lt;ffffffff8157d022&gt;] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff8110eb39&gt;] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
RSP &lt;ffff8800bad71c10&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace df9dba5f1ddb8565 ]---"

If we create a file when we mount with ecryptfs_xattr_metadata option, we will
encounter a crash in this path:
-&gt;ecryptfs_create
  -&gt;ecryptfs_initialize_file
    -&gt;ecryptfs_write_metadata
      -&gt;ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_xattr
        -&gt;ecryptfs_setxattr
          -&gt;fsstack_copy_attr_all
It's because our dentry-&gt;d_inode used in fsstack_copy_attr_all is NULL, and it
will be initialized when ecryptfs_initialize_file finish.

So we should skip copying attr from lower inode when the value of -&gt;d_inode is
invalid.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao2.yu@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Revert to a writethrough cache model</title>
<updated>2012-10-17T02:49:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-03T23:50:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a50c5c503ad54c9e9995ecadb745c0180a651f69'/>
<id>a50c5c503ad54c9e9995ecadb745c0180a651f69</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 821f7494a77627fb1ab539591c57b22cdca702d6 upstream.

A change was made about a year ago to get eCryptfs to better utilize its
page cache during writes. The idea was to do the page encryption
operations during page writeback, rather than doing them when initially
writing into the page cache, to reduce the number of page encryption
operations during sequential writes. This meant that the encrypted page
would only be written to the lower filesystem during page writeback,
which was a change from how eCryptfs had previously wrote to the lower
filesystem in ecryptfs_write_end().

The change caused a few eCryptfs-internal bugs that were shook out.
Unfortunately, more grave side effects have been identified that will
force changes outside of eCryptfs. Because the lower filesystem isn't
consulted until page writeback, eCryptfs has no way to pass lower write
errors (ENOSPC, mainly) back to userspace. Additionaly, it was reported
that quotas could be bypassed because of the way eCryptfs may sometimes
open the lower filesystem using a privileged kthread.

It would be nice to resolve the latest issues, but it is best if the
eCryptfs commits be reverted to the old behavior in the meantime.

This reverts:
32001d6f "eCryptfs: Flush file in vma close"
5be79de2 "eCryptfs: Flush dirty pages in setattr"
57db4e8d "ecryptfs: modify write path to encrypt page in writepage"

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Colin King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Colin King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Thieu Le &lt;thieule@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 821f7494a77627fb1ab539591c57b22cdca702d6 upstream.

A change was made about a year ago to get eCryptfs to better utilize its
page cache during writes. The idea was to do the page encryption
operations during page writeback, rather than doing them when initially
writing into the page cache, to reduce the number of page encryption
operations during sequential writes. This meant that the encrypted page
would only be written to the lower filesystem during page writeback,
which was a change from how eCryptfs had previously wrote to the lower
filesystem in ecryptfs_write_end().

The change caused a few eCryptfs-internal bugs that were shook out.
Unfortunately, more grave side effects have been identified that will
force changes outside of eCryptfs. Because the lower filesystem isn't
consulted until page writeback, eCryptfs has no way to pass lower write
errors (ENOSPC, mainly) back to userspace. Additionaly, it was reported
that quotas could be bypassed because of the way eCryptfs may sometimes
open the lower filesystem using a privileged kthread.

It would be nice to resolve the latest issues, but it is best if the
eCryptfs commits be reverted to the old behavior in the meantime.

This reverts:
32001d6f "eCryptfs: Flush file in vma close"
5be79de2 "eCryptfs: Flush dirty pages in setattr"
57db4e8d "ecryptfs: modify write path to encrypt page in writepage"

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Colin King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Colin King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Thieu Le &lt;thieule@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Initialize empty lower files when opening them</title>
<updated>2012-10-17T02:49:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-21T06:50:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5fb231c6b869110087e70b42b1dd6b5279045eb3'/>
<id>5fb231c6b869110087e70b42b1dd6b5279045eb3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e3ccaa9761200952cc269b1f4b7d7bb77a5e071b upstream.

Historically, eCryptfs has only initialized lower files in the
ecryptfs_create() path. Lower file initialization is the act of writing
the cryptographic metadata from the inode's crypt_stat to the header of
the file. The ecryptfs_open() path already expects that metadata to be
in the header of the file.

A number of users have reported empty lower files in beneath their
eCryptfs mounts. Most of the causes for those empty files being left
around have been addressed, but the presence of empty files causes
problems due to the lack of proper cryptographic metadata.

To transparently solve this problem, this patch initializes empty lower
files in the ecryptfs_open() error path. If the metadata is unreadable
due to the lower inode size being 0, plaintext passthrough support is
not in use, and the metadata is stored in the header of the file (as
opposed to the user.ecryptfs extended attribute), the lower file will be
initialized.

The number of nested conditionals in ecryptfs_open() was getting out of
hand, so a helper function was created. To avoid the same nested
conditional problem, the conditional logic was reversed inside of the
helper function.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/911507

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e3ccaa9761200952cc269b1f4b7d7bb77a5e071b upstream.

Historically, eCryptfs has only initialized lower files in the
ecryptfs_create() path. Lower file initialization is the act of writing
the cryptographic metadata from the inode's crypt_stat to the header of
the file. The ecryptfs_open() path already expects that metadata to be
in the header of the file.

A number of users have reported empty lower files in beneath their
eCryptfs mounts. Most of the causes for those empty files being left
around have been addressed, but the presence of empty files causes
problems due to the lack of proper cryptographic metadata.

To transparently solve this problem, this patch initializes empty lower
files in the ecryptfs_open() error path. If the metadata is unreadable
due to the lower inode size being 0, plaintext passthrough support is
not in use, and the metadata is stored in the header of the file (as
opposed to the user.ecryptfs extended attribute), the lower file will be
initialized.

The number of nested conditionals in ecryptfs_open() was getting out of
hand, so a helper function was created. To avoid the same nested
conditional problem, the conditional logic was reversed inside of the
helper function.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/911507

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Unlink lower inode when ecryptfs_create() fails</title>
<updated>2012-10-17T02:49:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-22T20:09:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=04661578e516400ca013a5bba87a2868bfb31610'/>
<id>04661578e516400ca013a5bba87a2868bfb31610</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8bc2d3cf612994a960c2e8eaea37f6676f67082a upstream.

ecryptfs_create() creates a lower inode, allocates an eCryptfs inode,
initializes the eCryptfs inode and cryptographic metadata attached to
the inode, and then writes the metadata to the header of the file.

If an error was to occur after the lower inode was created, an empty
lower file would be left in the lower filesystem. This is a problem
because ecryptfs_open() refuses to open any lower files which do not
have the appropriate metadata in the file header.

This patch properly unlinks the lower inode when an error occurs in the
later stages of ecryptfs_create(), reducing the chance that an empty
lower file will be left in the lower filesystem.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/872905

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8bc2d3cf612994a960c2e8eaea37f6676f67082a upstream.

ecryptfs_create() creates a lower inode, allocates an eCryptfs inode,
initializes the eCryptfs inode and cryptographic metadata attached to
the inode, and then writes the metadata to the header of the file.

If an error was to occur after the lower inode was created, an empty
lower file would be left in the lower filesystem. This is a problem
because ecryptfs_open() refuses to open any lower files which do not
have the appropriate metadata in the file header.

This patch properly unlinks the lower inode when an error occurs in the
later stages of ecryptfs_create(), reducing the chance that an empty
lower file will be left in the lower filesystem.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/872905

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Copy up attributes of the lower target inode after rename</title>
<updated>2012-09-19T14:05:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-13T19:00:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=62ae7bbdbb77a210eb839f34dc0d1923a4842dbd'/>
<id>62ae7bbdbb77a210eb839f34dc0d1923a4842dbd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8335eafc2859e1a26282bef7c3d19f3d68868b8a upstream.

After calling into the lower filesystem to do a rename, the lower target
inode's attributes were not copied up to the eCryptfs target inode. This
resulted in the eCryptfs target inode staying around, rather than being
evicted, because i_nlink was not updated for the eCryptfs inode. This
also meant that eCryptfs didn't do the final iput() on the lower target
inode so it stayed around, as well. This would result in a failure to
free up space occupied by the target file in the rename() operation.
Both target inodes would eventually be evicted when the eCryptfs
filesystem was unmounted.

This patch calls fsstack_copy_attr_all() after the lower filesystem
does its -&gt;rename() so that important inode attributes, such as i_nlink,
are updated at the eCryptfs layer. ecryptfs_evict_inode() is now called
and eCryptfs can drop its final reference on the lower inode.

http://launchpad.net/bugs/561129

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8335eafc2859e1a26282bef7c3d19f3d68868b8a upstream.

After calling into the lower filesystem to do a rename, the lower target
inode's attributes were not copied up to the eCryptfs target inode. This
resulted in the eCryptfs target inode staying around, rather than being
evicted, because i_nlink was not updated for the eCryptfs inode. This
also meant that eCryptfs didn't do the final iput() on the lower target
inode so it stayed around, as well. This would result in a failure to
free up space occupied by the target file in the rename() operation.
Both target inodes would eventually be evicted when the eCryptfs
filesystem was unmounted.

This patch calls fsstack_copy_attr_all() after the lower filesystem
does its -&gt;rename() so that important inode attributes, such as i_nlink,
are updated at the eCryptfs layer. ecryptfs_evict_inode() is now called
and eCryptfs can drop its final reference on the lower inode.

http://launchpad.net/bugs/561129

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Copy up lower inode attrs after setting lower xattr</title>
<updated>2012-03-01T00:30:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-07T23:55:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6b6cd603f9bde174d9cf18060264204587d4a9fb'/>
<id>6b6cd603f9bde174d9cf18060264204587d4a9fb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 545d680938be1e86a6c5250701ce9abaf360c495 upstream.

After passing through a -&gt;setxattr() call, eCryptfs needs to copy the
inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode, as they
may have changed in the lower filesystem's -&gt;setxattr() path.

One example is if an extended attribute containing a POSIX Access
Control List is being set. The new ACL may cause the lower filesystem to
modify the mode of the lower inode and the eCryptfs inode would need to
be updated to reflect the new mode.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/926292

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastien Bacher &lt;seb128@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 545d680938be1e86a6c5250701ce9abaf360c495 upstream.

After passing through a -&gt;setxattr() call, eCryptfs needs to copy the
inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode, as they
may have changed in the lower filesystem's -&gt;setxattr() path.

One example is if an extended attribute containing a POSIX Access
Control List is being set. The new ACL may cause the lower filesystem to
modify the mode of the lower inode and the eCryptfs inode would need to
be updated to reflect the new mode.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/926292

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastien Bacher &lt;seb128@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Check inode changes in setattr</title>
<updated>2012-02-03T17:21:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-20T02:33:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=963f50802b55b7df757ec9c44ccab130524c4d54'/>
<id>963f50802b55b7df757ec9c44ccab130524c4d54</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a261a03904849c3df50bd0300efb7fb3f865137d upstream.

Most filesystems call inode_change_ok() very early in -&gt;setattr(), but
eCryptfs didn't call it at all. It allowed the lower filesystem to make
the call in its -&gt;setattr() function. Then, eCryptfs would copy the
appropriate inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode.

This patch changes that and actually calls inode_change_ok() on the
eCryptfs inode, fairly early in ecryptfs_setattr(). Ideally, the call
would happen earlier in ecryptfs_setattr(), but there are some possible
inode initialization steps that must happen first.

Since the call was already being made on the lower inode, the change in
functionality should be minimal, except for the case of a file extending
truncate call. In that case, inode_newsize_ok() was never being
called on the eCryptfs inode. Rather than inode_newsize_ok() catching
maximum file size errors early on, eCryptfs would encrypt zeroed pages
and write them to the lower filesystem until the lower filesystem's
write path caught the error in generic_write_checks(). This patch
introduces a new function, called ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(), which
checks if the new lower file size is within the appropriate limits when
the truncate operation will be growing the lower file.

In summary this change prevents eCryptfs truncate operations (and the
resulting page encryptions), which would exceed the lower filesystem
limits or FSIZE rlimits, from ever starting.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Li Wang &lt;liwang@nudt.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a261a03904849c3df50bd0300efb7fb3f865137d upstream.

Most filesystems call inode_change_ok() very early in -&gt;setattr(), but
eCryptfs didn't call it at all. It allowed the lower filesystem to make
the call in its -&gt;setattr() function. Then, eCryptfs would copy the
appropriate inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode.

This patch changes that and actually calls inode_change_ok() on the
eCryptfs inode, fairly early in ecryptfs_setattr(). Ideally, the call
would happen earlier in ecryptfs_setattr(), but there are some possible
inode initialization steps that must happen first.

Since the call was already being made on the lower inode, the change in
functionality should be minimal, except for the case of a file extending
truncate call. In that case, inode_newsize_ok() was never being
called on the eCryptfs inode. Rather than inode_newsize_ok() catching
maximum file size errors early on, eCryptfs would encrypt zeroed pages
and write them to the lower filesystem until the lower filesystem's
write path caught the error in generic_write_checks(). This patch
introduces a new function, called ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(), which
checks if the new lower file size is within the appropriate limits when
the truncate operation will be growing the lower file.

In summary this change prevents eCryptfs truncate operations (and the
resulting page encryptions), which would exceed the lower filesystem
limits or FSIZE rlimits, from ever starting.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Li Wang &lt;liwang@nudt.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Prevent file create race condition</title>
<updated>2011-11-23T21:39:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-21T23:31:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b59db43ad4434519feb338eacb01d77eb50825c5'/>
<id>b59db43ad4434519feb338eacb01d77eb50825c5</id>
<content type='text'>
The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and
unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully
allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written
to the lower file.

This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode
operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer
dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and
unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully
allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written
to the lower file.

This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode
operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer
dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>filesystems: add set_nlink()</title>
<updated>2011-11-02T11:53:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2011-10-28T12:13:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bfe8684869601dacfcb2cd69ef8cfd9045f62170'/>
<id>bfe8684869601dacfcb2cd69ef8cfd9045f62170</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace remaining direct i_nlink updates with a new set_nlink()
updater function.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima &lt;toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Replace remaining direct i_nlink updates with a new set_nlink()
updater function.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima &lt;toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: Make inode bdi consistent with superblock bdi</title>
<updated>2011-07-29T04:48:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thieu Le</name>
<email>thieule@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-07-26T23:15:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=985ca0e626e195ea08a1a82b8dbeb6719747429a'/>
<id>985ca0e626e195ea08a1a82b8dbeb6719747429a</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the inode mapping bdi consistent with the superblock bdi so that
dirty pages are flushed properly.

Signed-off-by: Thieu Le &lt;thieule@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt; [2.6.39+]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make the inode mapping bdi consistent with the superblock bdi so that
dirty pages are flushed properly.

Signed-off-by: Thieu Le &lt;thieule@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt; [2.6.39+]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
