<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/crypto, branch v5.9</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()</title>
<updated>2020-08-07T18:33:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-07T06:18:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=453431a54934d917153c65211b2dabf45562ca88'/>
<id>453431a54934d917153c65211b2dabf45562ca88</id>
<content type='text'>
As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]

Suggested-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]

Suggested-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: don't load -&gt;i_crypt_info before it's known to be valid</title>
<updated>2020-07-30T21:21:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-27T17:41:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=55e32c54bbd5741cad462c9ee00c453c72fa74b9'/>
<id>55e32c54bbd5741cad462c9ee00c453c72fa74b9</id>
<content type='text'>
In fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(), -&gt;i_crypt_info isn't known to be
non-NULL until we check fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto().  So, load
-&gt;i_crypt_info after the check rather than before.  This makes no
difference currently, but it prevents people from introducing bugs where
the pointer is dereferenced when it may be NULL.

Suggested-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Cc: Satya Tangirala &lt;satyat@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727174158.121456-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(), -&gt;i_crypt_info isn't known to be
non-NULL until we check fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto().  So, load
-&gt;i_crypt_info after the check rather than before.  This makes no
difference currently, but it prevents people from introducing bugs where
the pointer is dereferenced when it may be NULL.

Suggested-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Cc: Satya Tangirala &lt;satyat@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727174158.121456-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: use smp_load_acquire() for -&gt;i_crypt_info</title>
<updated>2020-07-21T23:02:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-21T22:59:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ab673b987488c4fab7a0bc4824a48211f9d910e3'/>
<id>ab673b987488c4fab7a0bc4824a48211f9d910e3</id>
<content type='text'>
Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire().  Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE().  However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself.  This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.

fscrypt_info includes various sub-objects which are internal to and are
allocated by other kernel subsystems such as keyrings and crypto.  So by
using READ_ONCE() for -&gt;i_crypt_info, we're relying on internal
implementation details of these other kernel subsystems.

Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.

(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here.  This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)

Fixes: e37a784d8b6a ("fscrypt: use READ_ONCE() to access -&gt;i_crypt_info")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire().  Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE().  However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself.  This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.

fscrypt_info includes various sub-objects which are internal to and are
allocated by other kernel subsystems such as keyrings and crypto.  So by
using READ_ONCE() for -&gt;i_crypt_info, we're relying on internal
implementation details of these other kernel subsystems.

Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.

(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here.  This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)

Fixes: e37a784d8b6a ("fscrypt: use READ_ONCE() to access -&gt;i_crypt_info")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: use smp_load_acquire() for -&gt;s_master_keys</title>
<updated>2020-07-21T23:02:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-21T22:59:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=777afe4e68d7ac37711d36098bea65650ec305a0'/>
<id>777afe4e68d7ac37711d36098bea65650ec305a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire().  Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE().  However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself.  This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.

super_block::s_master_keys is a keyring, which is internal to and is
allocated by the keyrings subsystem.  By using READ_ONCE() for it, we're
relying on internal implementation details of the keyrings subsystem.

Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.

(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here.  This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)

Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire().  Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE().  However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself.  This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.

super_block::s_master_keys is a keyring, which is internal to and is
allocated by the keyrings subsystem.  By using READ_ONCE() for it, we're
relying on internal implementation details of the keyrings subsystem.

Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.

(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here.  This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)

Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: use smp_load_acquire() for fscrypt_prepared_key</title>
<updated>2020-07-21T23:02:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-21T22:59:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=97c6327f7192d7312eabc033b26a41ad6816496c'/>
<id>97c6327f7192d7312eabc033b26a41ad6816496c</id>
<content type='text'>
Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire().  Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE().  However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself.  This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.

fscrypt_prepared_key includes a pointer to a crypto_skcipher object,
which is internal to and is allocated by the crypto subsystem.  By using
READ_ONCE() for it, we're relying on internal implementation details of
the crypto subsystem.

Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.

(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here.  This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)

Fixes: 5fee36095cda ("fscrypt: add inline encryption support")
Cc: Satya Tangirala &lt;satyat@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire().  Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE().  However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself.  This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.

fscrypt_prepared_key includes a pointer to a crypto_skcipher object,
which is internal to and is allocated by the crypto subsystem.  By using
READ_ONCE() for it, we're relying on internal implementation details of
the crypto subsystem.

Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.

(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here.  This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)

Fixes: 5fee36095cda ("fscrypt: add inline encryption support")
Cc: Satya Tangirala &lt;satyat@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: switch fscrypt_do_sha256() to use the SHA-256 library</title>
<updated>2020-07-21T23:02:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-21T22:59:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bd0d97b7191e8f3573681fa854fdb04c1a970c1e'/>
<id>bd0d97b7191e8f3573681fa854fdb04c1a970c1e</id>
<content type='text'>
fscrypt_do_sha256() is only used for hashing encrypted filenames to
create no-key tokens, which isn't performance-critical.  Therefore a C
implementation of SHA-256 is sufficient.

Also, the logic to create no-key tokens is always potentially needed.
This differs from fscrypt's other dependencies on crypto API algorithms,
which are conditionally needed depending on what encryption policies
userspace is using.  Therefore, for fscrypt there isn't much benefit to
allowing SHA-256 to be a loadable module.

So, make fscrypt_do_sha256() use the SHA-256 library instead of the
crypto_shash API.  This is much simpler, since it avoids having to
implement one-time-init (which is hard to do correctly, and in fact was
implemented incorrectly) and handle failures to allocate the
crypto_shash object.

Fixes: edc440e3d27f ("fscrypt: improve format of no-key names")
Cc: Daniel Rosenberg &lt;drosen@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
fscrypt_do_sha256() is only used for hashing encrypted filenames to
create no-key tokens, which isn't performance-critical.  Therefore a C
implementation of SHA-256 is sufficient.

Also, the logic to create no-key tokens is always potentially needed.
This differs from fscrypt's other dependencies on crypto API algorithms,
which are conditionally needed depending on what encryption policies
userspace is using.  Therefore, for fscrypt there isn't much benefit to
allowing SHA-256 to be a loadable module.

So, make fscrypt_do_sha256() use the SHA-256 library instead of the
crypto_shash API.  This is much simpler, since it avoids having to
implement one-time-init (which is hard to do correctly, and in fact was
implemented incorrectly) and handle failures to allocate the
crypto_shash object.

Fixes: edc440e3d27f ("fscrypt: improve format of no-key names")
Cc: Daniel Rosenberg &lt;drosen@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: restrict IV_INO_LBLK_* to AES-256-XTS</title>
<updated>2020-07-21T18:12:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-21T18:10:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f000223c981a7c75f6f3ab7288f0be7b571c3644'/>
<id>f000223c981a7c75f6f3ab7288f0be7b571c3644</id>
<content type='text'>
IV_INO_LBLK_* exist only because of hardware limitations, and currently
the only known use case for them involves AES-256-XTS.  Therefore, for
now only allow them in combination with AES-256-XTS.  This way we don't
have to worry about them being combined with other encryption modes.

(To be clear, combining IV_INO_LBLK_* with other encryption modes
*should* work just fine.  It's just not being tested, so we can't be
100% sure it works.  So with no known use case, it's best to disallow it
for now, just like we don't allow other weird combinations like
AES-256-XTS contents encryption with Adiantum filenames encryption.)

This can be relaxed later if a use case for other combinations arises.

Fixes: b103fb7653ff ("fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies")
Fixes: e3b1078bedd3 ("fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721181012.39308-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
IV_INO_LBLK_* exist only because of hardware limitations, and currently
the only known use case for them involves AES-256-XTS.  Therefore, for
now only allow them in combination with AES-256-XTS.  This way we don't
have to worry about them being combined with other encryption modes.

(To be clear, combining IV_INO_LBLK_* with other encryption modes
*should* work just fine.  It's just not being tested, so we can't be
100% sure it works.  So with no known use case, it's best to disallow it
for now, just like we don't allow other weird combinations like
AES-256-XTS contents encryption with Adiantum filenames encryption.)

This can be relaxed later if a use case for other combinations arises.

Fixes: b103fb7653ff ("fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies")
Fixes: e3b1078bedd3 ("fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721181012.39308-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: rename FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE</title>
<updated>2020-07-21T00:26:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-08T21:57:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1d6217a4f9905917ee63315c8ea3d63833792f51'/>
<id>1d6217a4f9905917ee63315c8ea3d63833792f51</id>
<content type='text'>
The name "FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE" is a bit outdated since due to
the addition of FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY, the file nonce may now
be used as a tweak instead of for key derivation.  Also, we're now
prefixing the fscrypt constants with "FSCRYPT_" instead of "FS_".

Therefore, rename this constant to FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200708215722.147154-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The name "FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE" is a bit outdated since due to
the addition of FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY, the file nonce may now
be used as a tweak instead of for key derivation.  Also, we're now
prefixing the fscrypt constants with "FSCRYPT_" instead of "FS_".

Therefore, rename this constant to FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200708215722.147154-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: add comments that describe the HKDF info strings</title>
<updated>2020-07-21T00:26:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-08T21:55:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e455de313ef8bd1fa05a3eb6ef1bfd96eaf38e2a'/>
<id>e455de313ef8bd1fa05a3eb6ef1bfd96eaf38e2a</id>
<content type='text'>
Each HKDF context byte is associated with a specific format of the
remaining part of the application-specific info string.  Add comments so
that it's easier to keep track of what these all are.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200708215529.146890-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Each HKDF context byte is associated with a specific format of the
remaining part of the application-specific info string.  Add comments so
that it's easier to keep track of what these all are.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200708215529.146890-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: add inline encryption support</title>
<updated>2020-07-08T17:29:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Satya Tangirala</name>
<email>satyat@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-02T01:56:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5fee36095cda45d34555aed3a2e8973b80cd6bf8'/>
<id>5fee36095cda45d34555aed3a2e8973b80cd6bf8</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/.  With "inline
encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part
of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via
Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of
the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs.

To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with
'-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional
filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents
of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key
and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same;
therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification
tests.

Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and
also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt,
this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline
encryption hardware.

Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when
submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option.  This
patch just adds the common code.

Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala &lt;satyat@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com
Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/.  With "inline
encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part
of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via
Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of
the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs.

To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with
'-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional
filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents
of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key
and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same;
therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification
tests.

Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and
also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt,
this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline
encryption hardware.

Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when
submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option.  This
patch just adds the common code.

Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala &lt;satyat@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com
Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
