<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/ceph, branch v6.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ceph: flush cap releases when the session is flushed</title>
<updated>2023-02-07T15:55:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiubo Li</name>
<email>xiubli@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-07T05:04:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e7d84c6a1296d059389f7342d9b4b7defb518d3a'/>
<id>e7d84c6a1296d059389f7342d9b4b7defb518d3a</id>
<content type='text'>
MDS expects the completed cap release prior to responding to the
session flush for cache drop.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/38009
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar &lt;vshankar@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
MDS expects the completed cap release prior to responding to the
session flush for cache drop.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/38009
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar &lt;vshankar@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: blocklist the kclient when receiving corrupted snap trace</title>
<updated>2023-02-02T12:58:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiubo Li</name>
<email>xiubli@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-01T01:36:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a68e564adcaa69b0930809fb64d9d5f7d9c32ba9'/>
<id>a68e564adcaa69b0930809fb64d9d5f7d9c32ba9</id>
<content type='text'>
When received corrupted snap trace we don't know what exactly has
happened in MDS side. And we shouldn't continue IOs and metadatas
access to MDS, which may corrupt or get incorrect contents.

This patch will just block all the further IO/MDS requests
immediately and then evict the kclient itself.

The reason why we still need to evict the kclient just after
blocking all the further IOs is that the MDS could revoke the caps
faster.

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/57686
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar &lt;vshankar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When received corrupted snap trace we don't know what exactly has
happened in MDS side. And we shouldn't continue IOs and metadatas
access to MDS, which may corrupt or get incorrect contents.

This patch will just block all the further IO/MDS requests
immediately and then evict the kclient itself.

The reason why we still need to evict the kclient just after
blocking all the further IOs is that the MDS could revoke the caps
faster.

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/57686
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar &lt;vshankar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: move mount state enum to super.h</title>
<updated>2023-02-02T12:40:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiubo Li</name>
<email>xiubli@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-01T01:36:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b38b17b6a01ca4e738af097a1529910646ef4270'/>
<id>b38b17b6a01ca4e738af097a1529910646ef4270</id>
<content type='text'>
These flags are only used in ceph filesystem in fs/ceph, so just
move it to the place it should be.

Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar &lt;vshankar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
These flags are only used in ceph filesystem in fs/ceph, so just
move it to the place it should be.

Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar &lt;vshankar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: avoid use-after-free in ceph_fl_release_lock()</title>
<updated>2023-01-02T11:27:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiubo Li</name>
<email>xiubli@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-17T02:57:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8e1858710d9a71d88acd922f2e95d1eddb90eea0'/>
<id>8e1858710d9a71d88acd922f2e95d1eddb90eea0</id>
<content type='text'>
When ceph releasing the file_lock it will try to get the inode pointer
from the fl-&gt;fl_file, which the memory could already be released by
another thread in filp_close(). Because in VFS layer the fl-&gt;fl_file
doesn't increase the file's reference counter.

Will switch to use ceph dedicate lock info to track the inode.

And in ceph_fl_release_lock() we should skip all the operations if the
fl-&gt;fl_u.ceph.inode is not set, which should come from the request
file_lock. And we will set fl-&gt;fl_u.ceph.inode when inserting it to the
inode lock list, which is when copying the lock.

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/57986
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When ceph releasing the file_lock it will try to get the inode pointer
from the fl-&gt;fl_file, which the memory could already be released by
another thread in filp_close(). Because in VFS layer the fl-&gt;fl_file
doesn't increase the file's reference counter.

Will switch to use ceph dedicate lock info to track the inode.

And in ceph_fl_release_lock() we should skip all the operations if the
fl-&gt;fl_u.ceph.inode is not set, which should come from the request
file_lock. And we will set fl-&gt;fl_u.ceph.inode when inserting it to the
inode lock list, which is when copying the lock.

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/57986
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: switch to vfs_inode_has_locks() to fix file lock bug</title>
<updated>2023-01-02T11:27:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiubo Li</name>
<email>xiubli@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-17T02:43:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=461ab10ef7e6ea9b41a0571a7fc6a72af9549a3c'/>
<id>461ab10ef7e6ea9b41a0571a7fc6a72af9549a3c</id>
<content type='text'>
For the POSIX locks they are using the same owner, which is the
thread id. And multiple POSIX locks could be merged into single one,
so when checking whether the 'file' has locks may fail.

For a file where some openers use locking and others don't is a
really odd usage pattern though. Locks are like stoplights -- they
only work if everyone pays attention to them.

Just switch ceph_get_caps() to check whether any locks are set on
the inode. If there are POSIX/OFD/FLOCK locks on the file at the
time, we should set CHECK_FILELOCK, regardless of what fd was used
to set the lock.

Fixes: ff5d913dfc71 ("ceph: return -EIO if read/write against filp that lost file locks")
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For the POSIX locks they are using the same owner, which is the
thread id. And multiple POSIX locks could be merged into single one,
so when checking whether the 'file' has locks may fail.

For a file where some openers use locking and others don't is a
really odd usage pattern though. Locks are like stoplights -- they
only work if everyone pays attention to them.

Just switch ceph_get_caps() to check whether any locks are set on
the inode. If there are POSIX/OFD/FLOCK locks on the file at the
time, we should set CHECK_FILELOCK, regardless of what fd was used
to set the lock.

Fixes: ff5d913dfc71 ("ceph: return -EIO if read/write against filp that lost file locks")
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'ceph-for-6.2-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client</title>
<updated>2022-12-14T18:35:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-14T18:35:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cfb3162495fe5b8702cf3854995508ef78a3f962'/>
<id>cfb3162495fe5b8702cf3854995508ef78a3f962</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull cph update from Ilya Dryomov:
 "A fix to facilitate prompt cap releases on async creates from Xiubo.

  This should address sporadic "client isn't responding to mclientcaps
  (revoke) ..." warnings and potential associated MDS hangs"

* tag 'ceph-for-6.2-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
  ceph: try to check caps immediately after async creating finishes
  ceph: remove useless session parameter for check_caps()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull cph update from Ilya Dryomov:
 "A fix to facilitate prompt cap releases on async creates from Xiubo.

  This should address sporadic "client isn't responding to mclientcaps
  (revoke) ..." warnings and potential associated MDS hangs"

* tag 'ceph-for-6.2-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
  ceph: try to check caps immediately after async creating finishes
  ceph: remove useless session parameter for check_caps()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T02:46:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T02:46:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6a518afcc2066732e6c5c24281ce017bbbd85506'/>
<id>6a518afcc2066732e6c5c24281ce017bbbd85506</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull VFS acl updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains the work that builds a dedicated vfs posix acl api.

  The origins of this work trace back to v5.19 but it took quite a while
  to understand the various filesystem specific implementations in
  sufficient detail and also come up with an acceptable solution.

  As we discussed and seen multiple times the current state of how posix
  acls are handled isn't nice and comes with a lot of problems: The
  current way of handling posix acls via the generic xattr api is error
  prone, hard to maintain, and type unsafe for the vfs until we call
  into the filesystem's dedicated get and set inode operations.

  It is already the case that posix acls are special-cased to death all
  the way through the vfs. There are an uncounted number of hacks that
  operate on the uapi posix acl struct instead of the dedicated vfs
  struct posix_acl. And the vfs must be involved in order to interpret
  and fixup posix acls before storing them to the backing store, caching
  them, reporting them to userspace, or for permission checking.

  Currently a range of hacks and duct tape exist to make this work. As
  with most things this is really no ones fault it's just something that
  happened over time. But the code is hard to understand and difficult
  to maintain and one is constantly at risk of introducing bugs and
  regressions when having to touch it.

  Instead of continuing to hack posix acls through the xattr handlers
  this series builds a dedicated posix acl api solely around the get and
  set inode operations.

  Going forward, the vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(), and vfs_set_acl()
  helpers must be used in order to interact with posix acls. They
  operate directly on the vfs internal struct posix_acl instead of
  abusing the uapi posix acl struct as we currently do. In the end this
  removes all of the hackiness, makes the codepaths easier to maintain,
  and gets us type safety.

  This series passes the LTP and xfstests suites without any
  regressions. For xfstests the following combinations were tested:
   - xfs
   - ext4
   - btrfs
   - overlayfs
   - overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts
   - orangefs
   - (limited) cifs

  There's more simplifications for posix acls that we can make in the
  future if the basic api has made it.

  A few implementation details:

   - The series makes sure to retain exactly the same security and
     integrity module permission checks. Especially for the integrity
     modules this api is a win because right now they convert the uapi
     posix acl struct passed to them via a void pointer into the vfs
     struct posix_acl format to perform permission checking on the mode.

     There's a new dedicated security hook for setting posix acls which
     passes the vfs struct posix_acl not a void pointer. Basing checking
     on the posix acl stored in the uapi format is really unreliable.
     The vfs currently hacks around directly in the uapi struct storing
     values that frankly the security and integrity modules can't
     correctly interpret as evidenced by bugs we reported and fixed in
     this area. It's not necessarily even their fault it's just that the
     format we provide to them is sub optimal.

   - Some filesystems like 9p and cifs need access to the dentry in
     order to get and set posix acls which is why they either only
     partially or not even at all implement get and set inode
     operations. For example, cifs allows setxattr() and getxattr()
     operations but doesn't allow permission checking based on posix
     acls because it can't implement a get acl inode operation.

     Thus, this patch series updates the set acl inode operation to take
     a dentry instead of an inode argument. However, for the get acl
     inode operation we can't do this as the old get acl method is
     called in e.g., generic_permission() and inode_permission(). These
     helpers in turn are called in various filesystem's permission inode
     operation. So passing a dentry argument to the old get acl inode
     operation would amount to passing a dentry to the permission inode
     operation which we shouldn't and probably can't do.

     So instead of extending the existing inode operation Christoph
     suggested to add a new one. He also requested to ensure that the
     get and set acl inode operation taking a dentry are consistently
     named. So for this version the old get acl operation is renamed to
     -&gt;get_inode_acl() and a new -&gt;get_acl() inode operation taking a
     dentry is added. With this we can give both 9p and cifs get and set
     acl inode operations and in turn remove their complex custom posix
     xattr handlers.

     In the future I hope to get rid of the inode method duplication but
     it isn't like we have never had this situation. Readdir is just one
     example. And frankly, the overall gain in type safety and the more
     pleasant api wise are simply too big of a benefit to not accept
     this duplication for a while.

   - We've done a full audit of every codepaths using variant of the
     current generic xattr api to get and set posix acls and
     surprisingly it isn't that many places. There's of course always a
     chance that we might have missed some and if so I'm sure we'll find
     them soon enough.

     The crucial codepaths to be converted are obviously stacking
     filesystems such as ecryptfs and overlayfs.

     For a list of all callers currently using generic xattr api helpers
     see [2] including comments whether they support posix acls or not.

   - The old vfs generic posix acl infrastructure doesn't obey the
     create and replace semantics promised on the setxattr(2) manpage.
     This patch series doesn't address this. It really is something we
     should revisit later though.

  The patches are roughly organized as follows:

   (1) Change existing set acl inode operation to take a dentry
       argument (Intended to be a non-functional change)

   (2) Rename existing get acl method (Intended to be a non-functional
       change)

   (3) Implement get and set acl inode operations for filesystems that
       couldn't implement one before because of the missing dentry.
       That's mostly 9p and cifs (Intended to be a non-functional
       change)

   (4) Build posix acl api, i.e., add vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(),
       and vfs_set_acl() including security and integrity hooks
       (Intended to be a non-functional change)

   (5) Implement get and set acl inode operations for stacking
       filesystems (Intended to be a non-functional change)

   (6) Switch posix acl handling in stacking filesystems to new posix
       acl api now that all filesystems it can stack upon support it.

   (7) Switch vfs to new posix acl api (semantical change)

   (8) Remove all now unused helpers

   (9) Additional regression fixes reported after we merged this into
       linux-next

  Thanks to Seth for a lot of good discussion around this and
  encouragement and input from Christoph"

* tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (36 commits)
  posix_acl: Fix the type of sentinel in get_acl
  orangefs: fix mode handling
  ovl: call posix_acl_release() after error checking
  evm: remove dead code in evm_inode_set_acl()
  cifs: check whether acl is valid early
  acl: make vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr() static
  acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers
  9p: use stub posix acl handlers
  cifs: use stub posix acl handlers
  ovl: use stub posix acl handlers
  ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers
  evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change()
  xattr: use posix acl api
  ovl: use posix acl api
  ovl: implement set acl method
  ovl: implement get acl method
  ecryptfs: implement set acl method
  ecryptfs: implement get acl method
  ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl()
  acl: add vfs_remove_acl()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull VFS acl updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains the work that builds a dedicated vfs posix acl api.

  The origins of this work trace back to v5.19 but it took quite a while
  to understand the various filesystem specific implementations in
  sufficient detail and also come up with an acceptable solution.

  As we discussed and seen multiple times the current state of how posix
  acls are handled isn't nice and comes with a lot of problems: The
  current way of handling posix acls via the generic xattr api is error
  prone, hard to maintain, and type unsafe for the vfs until we call
  into the filesystem's dedicated get and set inode operations.

  It is already the case that posix acls are special-cased to death all
  the way through the vfs. There are an uncounted number of hacks that
  operate on the uapi posix acl struct instead of the dedicated vfs
  struct posix_acl. And the vfs must be involved in order to interpret
  and fixup posix acls before storing them to the backing store, caching
  them, reporting them to userspace, or for permission checking.

  Currently a range of hacks and duct tape exist to make this work. As
  with most things this is really no ones fault it's just something that
  happened over time. But the code is hard to understand and difficult
  to maintain and one is constantly at risk of introducing bugs and
  regressions when having to touch it.

  Instead of continuing to hack posix acls through the xattr handlers
  this series builds a dedicated posix acl api solely around the get and
  set inode operations.

  Going forward, the vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(), and vfs_set_acl()
  helpers must be used in order to interact with posix acls. They
  operate directly on the vfs internal struct posix_acl instead of
  abusing the uapi posix acl struct as we currently do. In the end this
  removes all of the hackiness, makes the codepaths easier to maintain,
  and gets us type safety.

  This series passes the LTP and xfstests suites without any
  regressions. For xfstests the following combinations were tested:
   - xfs
   - ext4
   - btrfs
   - overlayfs
   - overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts
   - orangefs
   - (limited) cifs

  There's more simplifications for posix acls that we can make in the
  future if the basic api has made it.

  A few implementation details:

   - The series makes sure to retain exactly the same security and
     integrity module permission checks. Especially for the integrity
     modules this api is a win because right now they convert the uapi
     posix acl struct passed to them via a void pointer into the vfs
     struct posix_acl format to perform permission checking on the mode.

     There's a new dedicated security hook for setting posix acls which
     passes the vfs struct posix_acl not a void pointer. Basing checking
     on the posix acl stored in the uapi format is really unreliable.
     The vfs currently hacks around directly in the uapi struct storing
     values that frankly the security and integrity modules can't
     correctly interpret as evidenced by bugs we reported and fixed in
     this area. It's not necessarily even their fault it's just that the
     format we provide to them is sub optimal.

   - Some filesystems like 9p and cifs need access to the dentry in
     order to get and set posix acls which is why they either only
     partially or not even at all implement get and set inode
     operations. For example, cifs allows setxattr() and getxattr()
     operations but doesn't allow permission checking based on posix
     acls because it can't implement a get acl inode operation.

     Thus, this patch series updates the set acl inode operation to take
     a dentry instead of an inode argument. However, for the get acl
     inode operation we can't do this as the old get acl method is
     called in e.g., generic_permission() and inode_permission(). These
     helpers in turn are called in various filesystem's permission inode
     operation. So passing a dentry argument to the old get acl inode
     operation would amount to passing a dentry to the permission inode
     operation which we shouldn't and probably can't do.

     So instead of extending the existing inode operation Christoph
     suggested to add a new one. He also requested to ensure that the
     get and set acl inode operation taking a dentry are consistently
     named. So for this version the old get acl operation is renamed to
     -&gt;get_inode_acl() and a new -&gt;get_acl() inode operation taking a
     dentry is added. With this we can give both 9p and cifs get and set
     acl inode operations and in turn remove their complex custom posix
     xattr handlers.

     In the future I hope to get rid of the inode method duplication but
     it isn't like we have never had this situation. Readdir is just one
     example. And frankly, the overall gain in type safety and the more
     pleasant api wise are simply too big of a benefit to not accept
     this duplication for a while.

   - We've done a full audit of every codepaths using variant of the
     current generic xattr api to get and set posix acls and
     surprisingly it isn't that many places. There's of course always a
     chance that we might have missed some and if so I'm sure we'll find
     them soon enough.

     The crucial codepaths to be converted are obviously stacking
     filesystems such as ecryptfs and overlayfs.

     For a list of all callers currently using generic xattr api helpers
     see [2] including comments whether they support posix acls or not.

   - The old vfs generic posix acl infrastructure doesn't obey the
     create and replace semantics promised on the setxattr(2) manpage.
     This patch series doesn't address this. It really is something we
     should revisit later though.

  The patches are roughly organized as follows:

   (1) Change existing set acl inode operation to take a dentry
       argument (Intended to be a non-functional change)

   (2) Rename existing get acl method (Intended to be a non-functional
       change)

   (3) Implement get and set acl inode operations for filesystems that
       couldn't implement one before because of the missing dentry.
       That's mostly 9p and cifs (Intended to be a non-functional
       change)

   (4) Build posix acl api, i.e., add vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(),
       and vfs_set_acl() including security and integrity hooks
       (Intended to be a non-functional change)

   (5) Implement get and set acl inode operations for stacking
       filesystems (Intended to be a non-functional change)

   (6) Switch posix acl handling in stacking filesystems to new posix
       acl api now that all filesystems it can stack upon support it.

   (7) Switch vfs to new posix acl api (semantical change)

   (8) Remove all now unused helpers

   (9) Additional regression fixes reported after we merged this into
       linux-next

  Thanks to Seth for a lot of good discussion around this and
  encouragement and input from Christoph"

* tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (36 commits)
  posix_acl: Fix the type of sentinel in get_acl
  orangefs: fix mode handling
  ovl: call posix_acl_release() after error checking
  evm: remove dead code in evm_inode_set_acl()
  cifs: check whether acl is valid early
  acl: make vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr() static
  acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers
  9p: use stub posix acl handlers
  cifs: use stub posix acl handlers
  ovl: use stub posix acl handlers
  ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers
  evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change()
  xattr: use posix acl api
  ovl: use posix acl api
  ovl: implement set acl method
  ovl: implement get acl method
  ecryptfs: implement set acl method
  ecryptfs: implement get acl method
  ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl()
  acl: add vfs_remove_acl()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T02:29:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T02:29:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=75f4d9af8b67d7415afe50afcb4e96fd0bbd3ae2'/>
<id>75f4d9af8b67d7415afe50afcb4e96fd0bbd3ae2</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull iov_iter updates from Al Viro:
 "iov_iter work; most of that is about getting rid of direction
  misannotations and (hopefully) preventing more of the same for the
  future"

* tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers
  iov_iter: saner checks for attempt to copy to/from iterator
  [xen] fix "direction" argument of iov_iter_kvec()
  [vhost] fix 'direction' argument of iov_iter_{init,bvec}()
  [target] fix iov_iter_bvec() "direction" argument
  [s390] memcpy_real(): WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [s390] zcore: WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [infiniband] READ is "data destination", not source...
  [fsi] WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [s390] copy_oldmem_kernel() - WRITE is "data source", not destination
  csum_and_copy_to_iter(): handle ITER_DISCARD
  get rid of unlikely() on page_copy_sane() calls
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull iov_iter updates from Al Viro:
 "iov_iter work; most of that is about getting rid of direction
  misannotations and (hopefully) preventing more of the same for the
  future"

* tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers
  iov_iter: saner checks for attempt to copy to/from iterator
  [xen] fix "direction" argument of iov_iter_kvec()
  [vhost] fix 'direction' argument of iov_iter_{init,bvec}()
  [target] fix iov_iter_bvec() "direction" argument
  [s390] memcpy_real(): WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [s390] zcore: WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [infiniband] READ is "data destination", not source...
  [fsi] WRITE is "data source", not destination...
  [s390] copy_oldmem_kernel() - WRITE is "data source", not destination
  csum_and_copy_to_iter(): handle ITER_DISCARD
  get rid of unlikely() on page_copy_sane() calls
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random</title>
<updated>2022-12-13T00:22:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-13T00:22:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=268325bda5299836a6ad4c3952474a2be125da5f'/>
<id>268325bda5299836a6ad4c3952474a2be125da5f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:

 - Replace prandom_u32_max() and various open-coded variants of it,
   there is now a new family of functions that uses fast rejection
   sampling to choose properly uniformly random numbers within an
   interval:

       get_random_u32_below(ceil) - [0, ceil)
       get_random_u32_above(floor) - (floor, U32_MAX]
       get_random_u32_inclusive(floor, ceil) - [floor, ceil]

   Coccinelle was used to convert all current users of
   prandom_u32_max(), as well as many open-coded patterns, resulting in
   improvements throughout the tree.

   I'll have a "late" 6.1-rc1 pull for you that removes the now unused
   prandom_u32_max() function, just in case any other trees add a new
   use case of it that needs to converted. According to linux-next,
   there may be two trivial cases of prandom_u32_max() reintroductions
   that are fixable with a 's/.../.../'. So I'll have for you a final
   conversion patch doing that alongside the removal patch during the
   second week.

   This is a treewide change that touches many files throughout.

 - More consistent use of get_random_canary().

 - Updates to comments, documentation, tests, headers, and
   simplification in configuration.

 - The arch_get_random*_early() abstraction was only used by arm64 and
   wasn't entirely useful, so this has been replaced by code that works
   in all relevant contexts.

 - The kernel will use and manage random seeds in non-volatile EFI
   variables, refreshing a variable with a fresh seed when the RNG is
   initialized. The RNG GUID namespace is then hidden from efivarfs to
   prevent accidental leakage.

   These changes are split into random.c infrastructure code used in the
   EFI subsystem, in this pull request, and related support inside of
   EFISTUB, in Ard's EFI tree. These are co-dependent for full
   functionality, but the order of merging doesn't matter.

 - Part of the infrastructure added for the EFI support is also used for
   an improvement to the way vsprintf initializes its siphash key,
   replacing an sleep loop wart.

 - The hardware RNG framework now always calls its correct random.c
   input function, add_hwgenerator_randomness(), rather than sometimes
   going through helpers better suited for other cases.

 - The add_latent_entropy() function has long been called from the fork
   handler, but is a no-op when the latent entropy gcc plugin isn't
   used, which is fine for the purposes of latent entropy.

   But it was missing out on the cycle counter that was also being mixed
   in beside the latent entropy variable. So now, if the latent entropy
   gcc plugin isn't enabled, add_latent_entropy() will expand to a call
   to add_device_randomness(NULL, 0), which adds a cycle counter,
   without the absent latent entropy variable.

 - The RNG is now reseeded from a delayed worker, rather than on demand
   when used. Always running from a worker allows it to make use of the
   CPU RNG on platforms like S390x, whose instructions are too slow to
   do so from interrupts. It also has the effect of adding in new inputs
   more frequently with more regularity, amounting to a long term
   transcript of random values. Plus, it helps a bit with the upcoming
   vDSO implementation (which isn't yet ready for 6.2).

 - The jitter entropy algorithm now tries to execute on many different
   CPUs, round-robining, in hopes of hitting even more memory latencies
   and other unpredictable effects. It also will mix in a cycle counter
   when the entropy timer fires, in addition to being mixed in from the
   main loop, to account more explicitly for fluctuations in that timer
   firing. And the state it touches is now kept within the same cache
   line, so that it's assured that the different execution contexts will
   cause latencies.

* tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (23 commits)
  random: include &lt;linux/once.h&gt; in the right header
  random: align entropy_timer_state to cache line
  random: mix in cycle counter when jitter timer fires
  random: spread out jitter callback to different CPUs
  random: remove extraneous period and add a missing one in comments
  efi: random: refresh non-volatile random seed when RNG is initialized
  vsprintf: initialize siphash key using notifier
  random: add back async readiness notifier
  random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand
  random: always mix cycle counter in add_latent_entropy()
  hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy
  random: modernize documentation comment on get_random_bytes()
  random: adjust comment to account for removed function
  random: remove early archrandom abstraction
  random: use random.trust_{bootloader,cpu} command line option only
  stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()
  stackprotector: move get_random_canary() into stackprotector.h
  treewide: use get_random_u32_inclusive() when possible
  treewide: use get_random_u32_{above,below}() instead of manual loop
  treewide: use get_random_u32_below() instead of deprecated function
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:

 - Replace prandom_u32_max() and various open-coded variants of it,
   there is now a new family of functions that uses fast rejection
   sampling to choose properly uniformly random numbers within an
   interval:

       get_random_u32_below(ceil) - [0, ceil)
       get_random_u32_above(floor) - (floor, U32_MAX]
       get_random_u32_inclusive(floor, ceil) - [floor, ceil]

   Coccinelle was used to convert all current users of
   prandom_u32_max(), as well as many open-coded patterns, resulting in
   improvements throughout the tree.

   I'll have a "late" 6.1-rc1 pull for you that removes the now unused
   prandom_u32_max() function, just in case any other trees add a new
   use case of it that needs to converted. According to linux-next,
   there may be two trivial cases of prandom_u32_max() reintroductions
   that are fixable with a 's/.../.../'. So I'll have for you a final
   conversion patch doing that alongside the removal patch during the
   second week.

   This is a treewide change that touches many files throughout.

 - More consistent use of get_random_canary().

 - Updates to comments, documentation, tests, headers, and
   simplification in configuration.

 - The arch_get_random*_early() abstraction was only used by arm64 and
   wasn't entirely useful, so this has been replaced by code that works
   in all relevant contexts.

 - The kernel will use and manage random seeds in non-volatile EFI
   variables, refreshing a variable with a fresh seed when the RNG is
   initialized. The RNG GUID namespace is then hidden from efivarfs to
   prevent accidental leakage.

   These changes are split into random.c infrastructure code used in the
   EFI subsystem, in this pull request, and related support inside of
   EFISTUB, in Ard's EFI tree. These are co-dependent for full
   functionality, but the order of merging doesn't matter.

 - Part of the infrastructure added for the EFI support is also used for
   an improvement to the way vsprintf initializes its siphash key,
   replacing an sleep loop wart.

 - The hardware RNG framework now always calls its correct random.c
   input function, add_hwgenerator_randomness(), rather than sometimes
   going through helpers better suited for other cases.

 - The add_latent_entropy() function has long been called from the fork
   handler, but is a no-op when the latent entropy gcc plugin isn't
   used, which is fine for the purposes of latent entropy.

   But it was missing out on the cycle counter that was also being mixed
   in beside the latent entropy variable. So now, if the latent entropy
   gcc plugin isn't enabled, add_latent_entropy() will expand to a call
   to add_device_randomness(NULL, 0), which adds a cycle counter,
   without the absent latent entropy variable.

 - The RNG is now reseeded from a delayed worker, rather than on demand
   when used. Always running from a worker allows it to make use of the
   CPU RNG on platforms like S390x, whose instructions are too slow to
   do so from interrupts. It also has the effect of adding in new inputs
   more frequently with more regularity, amounting to a long term
   transcript of random values. Plus, it helps a bit with the upcoming
   vDSO implementation (which isn't yet ready for 6.2).

 - The jitter entropy algorithm now tries to execute on many different
   CPUs, round-robining, in hopes of hitting even more memory latencies
   and other unpredictable effects. It also will mix in a cycle counter
   when the entropy timer fires, in addition to being mixed in from the
   main loop, to account more explicitly for fluctuations in that timer
   firing. And the state it touches is now kept within the same cache
   line, so that it's assured that the different execution contexts will
   cause latencies.

* tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (23 commits)
  random: include &lt;linux/once.h&gt; in the right header
  random: align entropy_timer_state to cache line
  random: mix in cycle counter when jitter timer fires
  random: spread out jitter callback to different CPUs
  random: remove extraneous period and add a missing one in comments
  efi: random: refresh non-volatile random seed when RNG is initialized
  vsprintf: initialize siphash key using notifier
  random: add back async readiness notifier
  random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand
  random: always mix cycle counter in add_latent_entropy()
  hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy
  random: modernize documentation comment on get_random_bytes()
  random: adjust comment to account for removed function
  random: remove early archrandom abstraction
  random: use random.trust_{bootloader,cpu} command line option only
  stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()
  stackprotector: move get_random_canary() into stackprotector.h
  treewide: use get_random_u32_inclusive() when possible
  treewide: use get_random_u32_{above,below}() instead of manual loop
  treewide: use get_random_u32_below() instead of deprecated function
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: try to check caps immediately after async creating finishes</title>
<updated>2022-12-12T18:15:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiubo Li</name>
<email>xiubli@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-17T14:17:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=68c62bee9d081cf815310b3a96e38d94fc16007d'/>
<id>68c62bee9d081cf815310b3a96e38d94fc16007d</id>
<content type='text'>
We should call the check_caps() again immediately after the async
creating finishes in case the MDS is waiting for caps revocation
to finish.

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/46904
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We should call the check_caps() again immediately after the async
creating finishes in case the MDS is waiting for caps revocation
to finish.

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/46904
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
