<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs/btrfs, branch v6.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-6.2-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux</title>
<updated>2023-02-12T19:26:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-12T19:26:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=711e9a4d52bf4e477e51c7135e1e6188c42018d0'/>
<id>711e9a4d52bf4e477e51c7135e1e6188c42018d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:

 - one more fix for a tree-log 'write time corruption' report, update
   the last dir index directly and don't keep in the log context

 - do VFS-level inode lock around FIEMAP to prevent a deadlock with
   concurrent fsync, the extent-level lock is not sufficient

 - don't cache a single-device filesystem device to avoid cases when a
   loop device is reformatted and the entry gets stale

* tag 'for-6.2-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: free device in btrfs_close_devices for a single device filesystem
  btrfs: lock the inode in shared mode before starting fiemap
  btrfs: simplify update of last_dir_index_offset when logging a directory
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:

 - one more fix for a tree-log 'write time corruption' report, update
   the last dir index directly and don't keep in the log context

 - do VFS-level inode lock around FIEMAP to prevent a deadlock with
   concurrent fsync, the extent-level lock is not sufficient

 - don't cache a single-device filesystem device to avoid cases when a
   loop device is reformatted and the entry gets stale

* tag 'for-6.2-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: free device in btrfs_close_devices for a single device filesystem
  btrfs: lock the inode in shared mode before starting fiemap
  btrfs: simplify update of last_dir_index_offset when logging a directory
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: free device in btrfs_close_devices for a single device filesystem</title>
<updated>2023-02-09T16:02:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anand Jain</name>
<email>anand.jain@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-20T13:47:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5f58d783fd7823b2c2d5954d1126e702f94bfc4c'/>
<id>5f58d783fd7823b2c2d5954d1126e702f94bfc4c</id>
<content type='text'>
We have this check to make sure we don't accidentally add older devices
that may have disappeared and re-appeared with an older generation from
being added to an fs_devices (such as a replace source device). This
makes sense, we don't want stale disks in our file system. However for
single disks this doesn't really make sense.

I've seen this in testing, but I was provided a reproducer from a
project that builds btrfs images on loopback devices. The loopback
device gets cached with the new generation, and then if it is re-used to
generate a new file system we'll fail to mount it because the new fs is
"older" than what we have in cache.

Fix this by freeing the cache when closing the device for a single device
filesystem. This will ensure that the mount command passed device path is
scanned successfully during the next mount.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reported-by: Daan De Meyer &lt;daandemeyer@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We have this check to make sure we don't accidentally add older devices
that may have disappeared and re-appeared with an older generation from
being added to an fs_devices (such as a replace source device). This
makes sense, we don't want stale disks in our file system. However for
single disks this doesn't really make sense.

I've seen this in testing, but I was provided a reproducer from a
project that builds btrfs images on loopback devices. The loopback
device gets cached with the new generation, and then if it is re-used to
generate a new file system we'll fail to mount it because the new fs is
"older" than what we have in cache.

Fix this by freeing the cache when closing the device for a single device
filesystem. This will ensure that the mount command passed device path is
scanned successfully during the next mount.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reported-by: Daan De Meyer &lt;daandemeyer@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: lock the inode in shared mode before starting fiemap</title>
<updated>2023-02-09T16:02:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-23T16:54:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=519b7e13b5ae8dd38da1e52275705343be6bb508'/>
<id>519b7e13b5ae8dd38da1e52275705343be6bb508</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently fiemap does not take the inode's lock (VFS lock), it only locks
a file range in the inode's io tree. This however can lead to a deadlock
if we have a concurrent fsync on the file and fiemap code triggers a fault
when accessing the user space buffer with fiemap_fill_next_extent(). The
deadlock happens on the inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore, which is taken both
by fsync and btrfs_page_mkwrite(). This deadlock was recently reported by
syzbot and triggers a trace like the following:

   task:syz-executor361 state:D stack:20264 pid:5668  ppid:5119   flags:0x00004004
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline]
    __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6606
    schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682
    wait_on_state fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:707 [inline]
    wait_extent_bit+0x577/0x6f0 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:751
    lock_extent+0x1c2/0x280 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:1742
    find_lock_delalloc_range+0x4e6/0x9c0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:488
    writepage_delalloc+0x1ef/0x540 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1863
    __extent_writepage+0x736/0x14e0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2174
    extent_write_cache_pages+0x983/0x1220 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3091
    extent_writepages+0x219/0x540 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3211
    do_writepages+0x3c3/0x680 mm/page-writeback.c:2581
    filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x11e/0x170 mm/filemap.c:388
    __filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:421 [inline]
    filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x175/0x200 mm/filemap.c:439
    btrfs_fdatawrite_range fs/btrfs/file.c:3850 [inline]
    start_ordered_ops fs/btrfs/file.c:1737 [inline]
    btrfs_sync_file+0x4ff/0x1190 fs/btrfs/file.c:1839
    generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2885 [inline]
    btrfs_do_write_iter+0xcd3/0x1280 fs/btrfs/file.c:1684
    call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline]
    new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
    vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584
    ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
   RIP: 0033:0x7f7d4054e9b9
   RSP: 002b:00007f7d404fa2f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d405d87a0 RCX: 00007f7d4054e9b9
   RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000006
   RBP: 00007f7d405a51d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 61635f65646f6e69
   R13: 65646f7475616f6e R14: 7261637369646f6e R15: 00007f7d405d87a8
    &lt;/TASK&gt;
   INFO: task syz-executor361:5697 blocked for more than 145 seconds.
         Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00376-g7c6984405241 #0
   "echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
   task:syz-executor361 state:D stack:21216 pid:5697  ppid:5119   flags:0x00004004
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline]
    __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6606
    schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682
    rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x5f9/0x930 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1095
    __down_read_common+0x54/0x2a0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1260
    btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x417/0xc80 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8526
    do_page_mkwrite+0x19e/0x5e0 mm/memory.c:2947
    wp_page_shared+0x15e/0x380 mm/memory.c:3295
    handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:4949 [inline]
    __handle_mm_fault mm/memory.c:5073 [inline]
    handle_mm_fault+0x1b79/0x26b0 mm/memory.c:5219
    do_user_addr_fault+0x69b/0xcb0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1428
    handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1519 [inline]
    exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x110 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1575
    asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570
   RIP: 0010:copy_user_short_string+0xd/0x40 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:233
   Code: 74 0a 89 (...)
   RSP: 0018:ffffc9000570f330 EFLAGS: 00050202
   RAX: ffffffff843e6601 RBX: 00007fffffffefc8 RCX: 0000000000000007
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9000570f3e0 RDI: 0000000020000120
   RBP: ffffc9000570f490 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffff52000ae1e83
   R10: fffff52000ae1e83 R11: 1ffff92000ae1e7c R12: 0000000000000038
   R13: ffffc9000570f3e0 R14: 0000000020000120 R15: ffffc9000570f3e0
    copy_user_generic arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:37 [inline]
    raw_copy_to_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:58 [inline]
    _copy_to_user+0xe9/0x130 lib/usercopy.c:34
    copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:169 [inline]
    fiemap_fill_next_extent+0x22e/0x410 fs/ioctl.c:144
    emit_fiemap_extent+0x22d/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3458
    fiemap_process_hole+0xa00/0xad0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3716
    extent_fiemap+0xe27/0x2100 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3922
    btrfs_fiemap+0x172/0x1e0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8209
    ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:219 [inline]
    do_vfs_ioctl+0x185b/0x2980 fs/ioctl.c:810
    __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:868 [inline]
    __se_sys_ioctl+0x83/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
   RIP: 0033:0x7f7d4054e9b9
   RSP: 002b:00007f7d390d92f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d405d87b0 RCX: 00007f7d4054e9b9
   RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000005
   RBP: 00007f7d405a51d0 R08: 00007f7d390d9700 R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 00007f7d390d9700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 61635f65646f6e69
   R13: 65646f7475616f6e R14: 7261637369646f6e R15: 00007f7d405d87b8
    &lt;/TASK&gt;

What happens is the following:

1) Task A is doing an fsync, enters btrfs_sync_file() and flushes delalloc
   before locking the inode and the i_mmap_lock semaphore, that is, before
   calling btrfs_inode_lock();

2) After task A flushes delalloc and before it calls btrfs_inode_lock(),
   another task dirties a page;

3) Task B starts a fiemap without FIEMAP_FLAG_SYNC, so the page dirtied
   at step 2 remains dirty and unflushed. Then when it enters
   extent_fiemap() and it locks a file range that includes the range of
   the page dirtied in step 2;

4) Task A calls btrfs_inode_lock() and locks the inode (VFS lock) and the
   inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore in write mode. Then it tries to flush
   delalloc by calling start_ordered_ops(), which will block, at
   find_lock_delalloc_range(), when trying to lock the range of the page
   dirtied at step 2, since this range was locked by the fiemap task (at
   step 3);

5) Task B generates a page fault when accessing the user space fiemap
   buffer with a call to fiemap_fill_next_extent().

   The fault handler needs to call btrfs_page_mkwrite() for some other
   page of our inode, and there we deadlock when trying to lock the
   inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore in read mode, since the fsync task locked
   it in write mode (step 4) and the fsync task can not progress because
   it's waiting to lock a file range that is currently locked by us (the
   fiemap task, step 3).

Fix this by taking the inode's lock (VFS lock) in shared mode when
entering fiemap. This effectively serializes fiemap with fsync (except the
most expensive part of fsync, the log sync), preventing this deadlock.

Reported-by: syzbot+cc35f55c41e34c30dcb5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000032dc7305f2a66f46@google.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently fiemap does not take the inode's lock (VFS lock), it only locks
a file range in the inode's io tree. This however can lead to a deadlock
if we have a concurrent fsync on the file and fiemap code triggers a fault
when accessing the user space buffer with fiemap_fill_next_extent(). The
deadlock happens on the inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore, which is taken both
by fsync and btrfs_page_mkwrite(). This deadlock was recently reported by
syzbot and triggers a trace like the following:

   task:syz-executor361 state:D stack:20264 pid:5668  ppid:5119   flags:0x00004004
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline]
    __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6606
    schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682
    wait_on_state fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:707 [inline]
    wait_extent_bit+0x577/0x6f0 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:751
    lock_extent+0x1c2/0x280 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:1742
    find_lock_delalloc_range+0x4e6/0x9c0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:488
    writepage_delalloc+0x1ef/0x540 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1863
    __extent_writepage+0x736/0x14e0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2174
    extent_write_cache_pages+0x983/0x1220 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3091
    extent_writepages+0x219/0x540 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3211
    do_writepages+0x3c3/0x680 mm/page-writeback.c:2581
    filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x11e/0x170 mm/filemap.c:388
    __filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:421 [inline]
    filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x175/0x200 mm/filemap.c:439
    btrfs_fdatawrite_range fs/btrfs/file.c:3850 [inline]
    start_ordered_ops fs/btrfs/file.c:1737 [inline]
    btrfs_sync_file+0x4ff/0x1190 fs/btrfs/file.c:1839
    generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2885 [inline]
    btrfs_do_write_iter+0xcd3/0x1280 fs/btrfs/file.c:1684
    call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline]
    new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
    vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584
    ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
   RIP: 0033:0x7f7d4054e9b9
   RSP: 002b:00007f7d404fa2f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d405d87a0 RCX: 00007f7d4054e9b9
   RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000006
   RBP: 00007f7d405a51d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 61635f65646f6e69
   R13: 65646f7475616f6e R14: 7261637369646f6e R15: 00007f7d405d87a8
    &lt;/TASK&gt;
   INFO: task syz-executor361:5697 blocked for more than 145 seconds.
         Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00376-g7c6984405241 #0
   "echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
   task:syz-executor361 state:D stack:21216 pid:5697  ppid:5119   flags:0x00004004
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline]
    __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6606
    schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682
    rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x5f9/0x930 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1095
    __down_read_common+0x54/0x2a0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1260
    btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x417/0xc80 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8526
    do_page_mkwrite+0x19e/0x5e0 mm/memory.c:2947
    wp_page_shared+0x15e/0x380 mm/memory.c:3295
    handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:4949 [inline]
    __handle_mm_fault mm/memory.c:5073 [inline]
    handle_mm_fault+0x1b79/0x26b0 mm/memory.c:5219
    do_user_addr_fault+0x69b/0xcb0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1428
    handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1519 [inline]
    exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x110 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1575
    asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570
   RIP: 0010:copy_user_short_string+0xd/0x40 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:233
   Code: 74 0a 89 (...)
   RSP: 0018:ffffc9000570f330 EFLAGS: 00050202
   RAX: ffffffff843e6601 RBX: 00007fffffffefc8 RCX: 0000000000000007
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9000570f3e0 RDI: 0000000020000120
   RBP: ffffc9000570f490 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffff52000ae1e83
   R10: fffff52000ae1e83 R11: 1ffff92000ae1e7c R12: 0000000000000038
   R13: ffffc9000570f3e0 R14: 0000000020000120 R15: ffffc9000570f3e0
    copy_user_generic arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:37 [inline]
    raw_copy_to_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:58 [inline]
    _copy_to_user+0xe9/0x130 lib/usercopy.c:34
    copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:169 [inline]
    fiemap_fill_next_extent+0x22e/0x410 fs/ioctl.c:144
    emit_fiemap_extent+0x22d/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3458
    fiemap_process_hole+0xa00/0xad0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3716
    extent_fiemap+0xe27/0x2100 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3922
    btrfs_fiemap+0x172/0x1e0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8209
    ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:219 [inline]
    do_vfs_ioctl+0x185b/0x2980 fs/ioctl.c:810
    __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:868 [inline]
    __se_sys_ioctl+0x83/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
   RIP: 0033:0x7f7d4054e9b9
   RSP: 002b:00007f7d390d92f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d405d87b0 RCX: 00007f7d4054e9b9
   RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000005
   RBP: 00007f7d405a51d0 R08: 00007f7d390d9700 R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 00007f7d390d9700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 61635f65646f6e69
   R13: 65646f7475616f6e R14: 7261637369646f6e R15: 00007f7d405d87b8
    &lt;/TASK&gt;

What happens is the following:

1) Task A is doing an fsync, enters btrfs_sync_file() and flushes delalloc
   before locking the inode and the i_mmap_lock semaphore, that is, before
   calling btrfs_inode_lock();

2) After task A flushes delalloc and before it calls btrfs_inode_lock(),
   another task dirties a page;

3) Task B starts a fiemap without FIEMAP_FLAG_SYNC, so the page dirtied
   at step 2 remains dirty and unflushed. Then when it enters
   extent_fiemap() and it locks a file range that includes the range of
   the page dirtied in step 2;

4) Task A calls btrfs_inode_lock() and locks the inode (VFS lock) and the
   inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore in write mode. Then it tries to flush
   delalloc by calling start_ordered_ops(), which will block, at
   find_lock_delalloc_range(), when trying to lock the range of the page
   dirtied at step 2, since this range was locked by the fiemap task (at
   step 3);

5) Task B generates a page fault when accessing the user space fiemap
   buffer with a call to fiemap_fill_next_extent().

   The fault handler needs to call btrfs_page_mkwrite() for some other
   page of our inode, and there we deadlock when trying to lock the
   inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore in read mode, since the fsync task locked
   it in write mode (step 4) and the fsync task can not progress because
   it's waiting to lock a file range that is currently locked by us (the
   fiemap task, step 3).

Fix this by taking the inode's lock (VFS lock) in shared mode when
entering fiemap. This effectively serializes fiemap with fsync (except the
most expensive part of fsync, the log sync), preventing this deadlock.

Reported-by: syzbot+cc35f55c41e34c30dcb5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000032dc7305f2a66f46@google.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: simplify update of last_dir_index_offset when logging a directory</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T22:08:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-10T14:56:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6afaed53cc9adde69d8a76ff5b4d740d5efbc54c'/>
<id>6afaed53cc9adde69d8a76ff5b4d740d5efbc54c</id>
<content type='text'>
When logging a directory, we always set the inode's last_dir_index_offset
to the offset of the last dir index item we found. This is using an extra
field in the log context structure, and it makes more sense to update it
only after we insert dir index items, and we could directly update the
inode's last_dir_index_offset field instead.

So make this simpler by updating the inode's last_dir_index_offset only
when we actually insert dir index keys in the log tree, and getting rid
of the last_dir_item_offset field in the log context structure.

Reported-by: David Arendt &lt;admin@prnet.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/ae169fc6-f504-28f0-a098-6fa6a4dfb612@leemhuis.info/
Reported-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy &lt;maxtram95@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/Y8voyTXdnPDz8xwY@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Hunter Wardlaw &lt;wardlawhunter@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1207231
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216851
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When logging a directory, we always set the inode's last_dir_index_offset
to the offset of the last dir index item we found. This is using an extra
field in the log context structure, and it makes more sense to update it
only after we insert dir index items, and we could directly update the
inode's last_dir_index_offset field instead.

So make this simpler by updating the inode's last_dir_index_offset only
when we actually insert dir index keys in the log tree, and getting rid
of the last_dir_item_offset field in the log context structure.

Reported-by: David Arendt &lt;admin@prnet.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/ae169fc6-f504-28f0-a098-6fa6a4dfb612@leemhuis.info/
Reported-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy &lt;maxtram95@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/Y8voyTXdnPDz8xwY@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Hunter Wardlaw &lt;wardlawhunter@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1207231
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216851
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-6.2-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T22:05:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-06T22:05:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=66fcf74e5c0d771a456b96ec9aebfb53d648eede'/>
<id>66fcf74e5c0d771a456b96ec9aebfb53d648eede</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:

 - explicitly initialize zlib work memory to fix a KCSAN warning

 - limit number of send clones by maximum memory allocated

 - limit device size extent in case it device shrink races with chunk
   allocation

 - raid56 fixes:
     - fix copy&amp;paste error in RAID6 stripe recovery
     - make error bitmap update atomic

* tag 'for-6.2-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: raid56: make error_bitmap update atomic
  btrfs: send: limit number of clones and allocated memory size
  btrfs: zlib: zero-initialize zlib workspace
  btrfs: limit device extents to the device size
  btrfs: raid56: fix stripes if vertical errors are found
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:

 - explicitly initialize zlib work memory to fix a KCSAN warning

 - limit number of send clones by maximum memory allocated

 - limit device size extent in case it device shrink races with chunk
   allocation

 - raid56 fixes:
     - fix copy&amp;paste error in RAID6 stripe recovery
     - make error bitmap update atomic

* tag 'for-6.2-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: raid56: make error_bitmap update atomic
  btrfs: send: limit number of clones and allocated memory size
  btrfs: zlib: zero-initialize zlib workspace
  btrfs: limit device extents to the device size
  btrfs: raid56: fix stripes if vertical errors are found
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: raid56: make error_bitmap update atomic</title>
<updated>2023-01-27T13:57:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-21T08:06:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a9ad4d87aa263de36895402b66115a3a4b88bf1c'/>
<id>a9ad4d87aa263de36895402b66115a3a4b88bf1c</id>
<content type='text'>
In the rework of raid56 code, there is very limited concurrency in the
endio context.

Most of the work is done inside the sectors arrays, which different bios
will never touch the same sector.

But there is a concurrency here for error_bitmap. Both read and write
endio functions need to touch them, and we can have multiple write bios
touching the same error bitmap if they all hit some errors.

Here we fix the unprotected bitmap operation by going set_bit() in a
loop.

Since we have a very small ceiling of the sectors (at most 16 sectors),
such set_bit() in a loop should be very acceptable.

Fixes: 2942a50dea74 ("btrfs: raid56: introduce btrfs_raid_bio::error_bitmap")
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In the rework of raid56 code, there is very limited concurrency in the
endio context.

Most of the work is done inside the sectors arrays, which different bios
will never touch the same sector.

But there is a concurrency here for error_bitmap. Both read and write
endio functions need to touch them, and we can have multiple write bios
touching the same error bitmap if they all hit some errors.

Here we fix the unprotected bitmap operation by going set_bit() in a
loop.

Since we have a very small ceiling of the sectors (at most 16 sectors),
such set_bit() in a loop should be very acceptable.

Fixes: 2942a50dea74 ("btrfs: raid56: introduce btrfs_raid_bio::error_bitmap")
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: send: limit number of clones and allocated memory size</title>
<updated>2023-01-27T13:57:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Sterba</name>
<email>dsterba@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T19:32:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=33e17b3f5ab74af12aca58c515bc8424ff69a343'/>
<id>33e17b3f5ab74af12aca58c515bc8424ff69a343</id>
<content type='text'>
The arg-&gt;clone_sources_count is u64 and can trigger a warning when a
huge value is passed from user space and a huge array is allocated.
Limit the allocated memory to 8MiB (can be increased if needed), which
in turn limits the number of clone sources to 8M / sizeof(struct
clone_root) = 8M / 40 = 209715.  Real world number of clones is from
tens to hundreds, so this is future proof.

Reported-by: syzbot+4376a9a073770c173269@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The arg-&gt;clone_sources_count is u64 and can trigger a warning when a
huge value is passed from user space and a huge array is allocated.
Limit the allocated memory to 8MiB (can be increased if needed), which
in turn limits the number of clone sources to 8M / sizeof(struct
clone_root) = 8M / 40 = 209715.  Real world number of clones is from
tens to hundreds, so this is future proof.

Reported-by: syzbot+4376a9a073770c173269@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: zlib: zero-initialize zlib workspace</title>
<updated>2023-01-25T19:11:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T11:32:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eadd7deca0ad8a83edb2b894d8326c78e78635d6'/>
<id>eadd7deca0ad8a83edb2b894d8326c78e78635d6</id>
<content type='text'>
KMSAN reports uses of uninitialized memory in zlib's longest_match()
called on memory originating from zlib_alloc_workspace().
This issue is known by zlib maintainers and is claimed to be harmless,
but to be on the safe side we'd better initialize the memory.

Link: https://zlib.net/zlib_faq.html#faq36
Reported-by: syzbot+14d9e7602ebdf7ec0a60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
KMSAN reports uses of uninitialized memory in zlib's longest_match()
called on memory originating from zlib_alloc_workspace().
This issue is known by zlib maintainers and is claimed to be harmless,
but to be on the safe side we'd better initialize the memory.

Link: https://zlib.net/zlib_faq.html#faq36
Reported-by: syzbot+14d9e7602ebdf7ec0a60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: limit device extents to the device size</title>
<updated>2023-01-25T19:11:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-18T21:35:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3c538de0f2a74d50aff7278c092f88ae59cee688'/>
<id>3c538de0f2a74d50aff7278c092f88ae59cee688</id>
<content type='text'>
There was a recent regression in btrfs/177 that started happening with
the size class patches ("btrfs: introduce size class to block group
allocator").  This however isn't a regression introduced by those
patches, but rather the bug was uncovered by a change in behavior in
these patches.  The patches triggered more chunk allocations in the
^free-space-tree case, which uncovered a race with device shrink.

The problem is we will set the device total size to the new size, and
use this to find a hole for a device extent.  However during shrink we
may have device extents allocated past this range, so we could
potentially find a hole in a range past our new shrink size.  We don't
actually limit our found extent to the device size anywhere, we assume
that we will not find a hole past our device size.  This isn't true with
shrink as we're relocating block groups and thus creating holes past the
device size.

Fix this by making sure we do not search past the new device size, and
if we wander into any device extents that start after our device size
simply break from the loop and use whatever hole we've already found.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There was a recent regression in btrfs/177 that started happening with
the size class patches ("btrfs: introduce size class to block group
allocator").  This however isn't a regression introduced by those
patches, but rather the bug was uncovered by a change in behavior in
these patches.  The patches triggered more chunk allocations in the
^free-space-tree case, which uncovered a race with device shrink.

The problem is we will set the device total size to the new size, and
use this to find a hole for a device extent.  However during shrink we
may have device extents allocated past this range, so we could
potentially find a hole in a range past our new shrink size.  We don't
actually limit our found extent to the device size anywhere, we assume
that we will not find a hole past our device size.  This isn't true with
shrink as we're relocating block groups and thus creating holes past the
device size.

Fix this by making sure we do not search past the new device size, and
if we wander into any device extents that start after our device size
simply break from the loop and use whatever hole we've already found.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: raid56: fix stripes if vertical errors are found</title>
<updated>2023-01-25T19:11:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tanmay Bhushan</name>
<email>007047221b@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-15T20:32:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f7c11affde9e29316d24b6736d16faeaac8278f2'/>
<id>f7c11affde9e29316d24b6736d16faeaac8278f2</id>
<content type='text'>
We take two stripe numbers if vertical errors are found.  In case it is
just a pstripe it does not matter but in case of raid 6 it matters as
both stripes need to be fixed.

Fixes: 7a3150723061 ("btrfs: raid56: do data csum verification during RMW cycle")
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tanmay Bhushan &lt;007047221b@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We take two stripe numbers if vertical errors are found.  In case it is
just a pstripe it does not matter but in case of raid 6 it matters as
both stripes need to be fixed.

Fixes: 7a3150723061 ("btrfs: raid56: do data csum verification during RMW cycle")
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tanmay Bhushan &lt;007047221b@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
