linux-stable.git/fs/block_dev.c, branch linux-4.8.y

block: protect iterate_bdevs() against concurrent close

2017-01-09T07:21:53+00:00

commit af309226db916e2c6e08d3eba3fa5c34225200c4 upstream.

If a block device is closed while iterate_bdevs() is handling it, the
following NULL pointer dereference occurs because bdev->b_disk is NULL
in bdev_get_queue(), which is called from blk_get_backing_dev_info() (in
turn called by the mapping_cap_writeback_dirty() call in
__filemap_fdatawrite_range()):

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000508
 IP: [] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
 PGD 9e62067 PUD 9ee8067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 2422 Comm: sync Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7+ #400
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
 task: ffff880009f4d700 ti: ffff880009f5c000 task.ti: ffff880009f5c000
 RIP: 0010:[]  [] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
 RSP: 0018:ffff880009f5fe68  EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000ec17a38 RCX: ffffffff81a4e940
 RDX: 7fffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000ec176c0
 RBP: ffff880009f5fe68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88000ec17860
 R13: ffffffff811b25c0 R14: ffff88000ec178e0 R15: ffff88000ec17a38
 FS:  00007faee505d700(0000) GS:ffff88000fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
 CR2: 0000000000000508 CR3: 0000000009e8a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 Stack:
  ffff880009f5feb8 ffffffff8112e7f5 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff
  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000001
  ffff88000ec178e0 ffff88000ec17860 ffff880009f5fec8 ffffffff8112e81f
 Call Trace:
  [] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x85/0x90
  [] filemap_fdatawrite+0x1f/0x30
  [] fdatawrite_one_bdev+0x16/0x20
  [] iterate_bdevs+0xf2/0x130
  [] sys_sync+0x63/0x90
  [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
 Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 f0 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 <48> 8b 80 08 05 00 00 5d
 RIP  [] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20
  RSP 
 CR2: 0000000000000508
 ---[ end trace 2487336ceb3de62d ]---

The crash is easily reproducible by running the following command, if an
msleep(100) is inserted before the call to func() in iterate_devs():

 while :; do head -c1 /dev/nullb0; done > /dev/null & while :; do sync; done

Fix it by holding the bd_mutex across the func() call and only calling
func() if the bdev is opened.

Fixes: 5c0d6b60a0ba ("vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices")
Reported-and-tested-by: Wei Fang 
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent 
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

block_dev: don't test bdev->bd_contains when it is not stable

2017-01-06T10:16:21+00:00

commit bcc7f5b4bee8e327689a4d994022765855c807ff upstream.

bdev->bd_contains is not stable before calling __blkdev_get().
When __blkdev_get() is called on a parition with ->bd_openers == 0
it sets
  bdev->bd_contains = bdev;
which is not correct for a partition.
After a call to __blkdev_get() succeeds, ->bd_openers will be > 0
and then ->bd_contains is stable.

When FMODE_EXCL is used, blkdev_get() calls
   bd_start_claiming() ->  bd_prepare_to_claim() -> bd_may_claim()

This call happens before __blkdev_get() is called, so ->bd_contains
is not stable.  So bd_may_claim() cannot safely use ->bd_contains.
It currently tries to use it, and this can lead to a BUG_ON().

This happens when a whole device is already open with a bd_holder (in
use by dm in my particular example) and two threads race to open a
partition of that device for the first time, one opening with O_EXCL and
one without.

The thread that doesn't use O_EXCL gets through blkdev_get() to
__blkdev_get(), gains the ->bd_mutex, and sets bdev->bd_contains = bdev;

Immediately thereafter the other thread, using FMODE_EXCL, calls
bd_start_claiming() from blkdev_get().  This should fail because the
whole device has a holder, but because bdev->bd_contains == bdev
bd_may_claim() incorrectly reports success.
This thread continues and blocks on bd_mutex.

The first thread then sets bdev->bd_contains correctly and drops the mutex.
The thread using FMODE_EXCL then continues and when it calls bd_may_claim()
again in:
			BUG_ON(!bd_may_claim(bdev, whole, holder));
The BUG_ON fires.

Fix this by removing the dependency on ->bd_contains in
bd_may_claim().  As bd_may_claim() has direct access to the whole
device, it can simply test if the target bdev is the whole device.

Fixes: 6b4517a7913a ("block: implement bd_claiming and claiming block")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/block_dev: fix potential NULL ptr deref in freeze_bdev()

2016-08-25T14:38:26+00:00

Calling freeze_bdev() twice on the same block device without mounted
filesystem get_super() will return NULL, which will lead to NULL-ptr
dereference later in drop_super().

Check get_super() result to fix that.

Note, that this is a purely theoretical issue. We have only 3
freeze_bdev() callers. 2 of them are in filesystem code and used on a
device with mounted fs. The third one in lock_fs() has protection in
upper-layer code against freezing block device the second time without
thawing it first.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

bdev: fix NULL pointer dereference

2016-08-22T14:06:15+00:00

I got this:

    kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    Dumping ftrace buffer:
       (ftrace buffer empty)
    CPU: 0 PID: 5505 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #161
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
    task: ffff880113415940 task.stack: ffff880118350000
    RIP: 0010:[]  [] bd_mount+0x52/0xa0
    RSP: 0018:ffff880118357ca0  EFLAGS: 00010207
    RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: ffffc90000bb6000
    RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffffffff846d6b20 RDI: 00000000000000c7
    RBP: ffff880118357cb0 R08: ffff880115967c68 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801188211e8
    R13: ffffffff847baa20 R14: ffff8801139cb000 R15: 0000000000000080
    FS:  00007fa3ff6c0700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00007fc1d8cc7e78 CR3: 0000000109f20000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
    DR0: 000000000000001e DR1: 000000000000001e DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
    Stack:
     ffff880112cfd6c0 ffff8801188211e8 ffff880118357cf0 ffffffff8167f207
     ffffffff816d7a1e ffff880112a413c0 ffffffff847baa20 ffff8801188211e8
     0000000000000080 ffff880112cfd6c0 ffff880118357d38 ffffffff816dce0a
    Call Trace:
     [] mount_fs+0x97/0x2e0
     [] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x55e/0x760
     [] vfs_kern_mount+0x7a/0x300
     [] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x2c/0x50
     [] do_mount+0x3d7/0x2730
     [] ? trace_do_page_fault+0x1f4/0x3a0
     [] ? copy_mount_string+0x40/0x40
     [] ? memset+0x31/0x40
     [] ? copy_mount_options+0x1ee/0x320
     [] SyS_mount+0xb2/0x120
     [] ? copy_mnt_ns+0x970/0x970
     [] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0
     [] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    Code: 83 e8 63 1b fc ff 48 85 c0 48 89 c3 74 4c e8 56 35 d1 ff 48 8d bb c8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 75 36 4c 8b a3 c8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc
    RIP  [] bd_mount+0x52/0xa0
     RSP 
    ---[ end trace 13690ad962168b98 ]---

mount_pseudo() returns ERR_PTR(), not NULL, on error.

Fixes: 3684aa7099e0 ("block-dev: enable writeback cgroup support")
Cc: Shaohua Li 
Cc: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

block/mm: make bdev_ops->rw_page() take a bool for read/write

2016-08-07T20:41:02+00:00

Commit abf545484d31 changed it from an 'rw' flags type to the
newer ops based interface, but now we're effectively leaking
some bdev internals to the rest of the kernel. Since we only
care about whether it's a read or a write at that level, just
pass in a bool 'is_write' parameter instead.

Then we can also move op_is_write() and friends back under
CONFIG_BLOCK protection.

Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

mm/block: convert rw_page users to bio op use

2016-08-04T20:25:33+00:00

The rw_page users were not converted to use bio/req ops. As a result
bdev_write_page is not passing down REQ_OP_WRITE and the IOs will
be sent down as reads.

Signed-off-by: Mike Christie 
Fixes: 4e1b2d52a80d ("block, fs, drivers: remove REQ_OP compat defs and related code")

Modified by me to:

1) Drop op_flags passing into ->rw_page(), as we don't use it.
2) Make op_is_write() and friends safe to use for !CONFIG_BLOCK

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

block: remove BLK_DEV_DAX config option

2016-08-04T12:50:07+00:00

The functionality for block device DAX was already removed with commit
acc93d30d7d4 ("Revert "block: enable dax for raw block devices"")

However, we still had a config option hanging around that was always
disabled because it depended on CONFIG_BROKEN.  This config option was
introduced in commit 03cdadb04077 ("block: disable block device DAX by
default")

This change reverts that commit, removing the dead config option.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729182314.6368-1-ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Acked-by: Dan Williams 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

2016-07-29T22:54:19+00:00

Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the
  user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems
  with a backing store.  The real world target is fuse but the goal is
  to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported.  This
  patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that
  goal.

  While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it
  became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules
  that needed special treatment.  That the resolution of those concerns
  would not be fuse specific.  That sorting out these general issues
  made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be
  drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for
  everyone.

  At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things:

   - Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block.

   - Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into
     to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and
     INVALID_GID in vfs data structures.

  By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with
  only user namespace privilege can be detected.  This allows security
  modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted.  This
  also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the
  filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the
  owning user namespace of the filesystem.

  One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes
  whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs.  Most of the code
  simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path
  so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for
  such inodes (aka only reads are allowed).

  This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved
  in user namespace permirted mounts.  Then when things are clean enough
  adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns.  Then additional restrictions
  are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock
  contains owner information.

  These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some
  parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior.

   - Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the
     suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think
     /proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less
     privileged user.

   - The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV
     with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock
     instead.

     Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state
     user invisible.  The user visibility can be managed but it caused
     problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably
     expecting mount flags to be what they were set to.

  There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support
  mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond
  what is in this set of changes.

   - Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device
     during mount.

   - Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems
     mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their
     security xattrs accordingly.

   - Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission
     checks in d_automount and the like.  (Given that overlayfs already
     does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to
     generalize this case).

  Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist:

   - Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix
     acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and
     posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed.  [Maintainability]

   - Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow
     the superblock owner to perform them.

   - Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and
     gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated
     normally.

  I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks
  until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be
  locked down and handled generically.

  Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up
  with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more
  corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my
  changes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits)
  fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds
  fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns
  evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC
  dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns
  quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota
  quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem
  vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
  vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
  cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()
  fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
  vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.
  userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS
  fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns
  selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
  Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
  Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
  fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
  fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block
  userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag
  userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility.
  ...

Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2016-07-28T19:59:05+00:00

Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted cleanups and fixes.

  Probably the most interesting part long-term is ->d_init() - that will
  have a bunch of followups in (at least) ceph and lustre, but we'll
  need to sort the barrier-related rules before it can get used for
  really non-trivial stuff.

  Another fun thing is the merge of ->d_iput() callers (dentry_iput()
  and dentry_unlink_inode()) and a bunch of ->d_compare() ones (all
  except the one in __d_lookup_lru())"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (26 commits)
  fs/dcache.c: avoid soft-lockup in dput()
  vfs: new d_init method
  vfs: Update lookup_dcache() comment
  bdev: get rid of ->bd_inodes
  Remove last traces of ->sync_page
  new helper: d_same_name()
  dentry_cmp(): use lockless_dereference() instead of smp_read_barrier_depends()
  vfs: clean up documentation
  vfs: document ->d_real()
  vfs: merge .d_select_inode() into .d_real()
  unify dentry_iput() and dentry_unlink_inode()
  binfmt_misc: ->s_root is not going anywhere
  drop redundant ->owner initializations
  ufs: get rid of redundant checks
  orangefs: constify inode_operations
  missed comment updates from ->direct_IO() prototype change
  file_inode(f)->i_mapping is f->f_mapping
  trim fsnotify hooks a bit
  9p: new helper - v9fs_parent_fid()
  debugfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative
  ...

block: add QUEUE_FLAG_DAX for devices to advertise their DAX support

2016-07-21T03:01:01+00:00

Currently, presence of direct_access() in block_device_operations
indicates support of DAX on its block device.  Because
block_device_operations is instantiated with 'const', this DAX
capablity may not be enabled conditinally.

In preparation for supporting DAX to device-mapper devices, add
QUEUE_FLAG_DAX to request_queue flags to advertise their DAX
support.  This will allow to set the DAX capability based on how
mapped device is composed.

Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani 
Acked-by: Dan Williams 
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Cc: Ross Zwisler 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe