Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Make certain RPC operations non-interruptible, including:

 (*) Set attributes
 (*) Store data

     We don't want to get interrupted during a flush on close, flush on
     unlock, writeback or an inode update, leaving us in a state where we
     still need to do the writeback or update.

 (*) Extend lock
 (*) Release lock

     We don't want to get lock extension interrupted as the file locks on
     the server are time-limited.  Interruption during lock release is less
     of an issue since the lock is time-limited, but it's better to
     complete the release to avoid a several-minute wait to recover it.

     *Setting* the lock isn't a problem if it's interrupted since we can
      just return to the user and tell them they were interrupted - at
      which point they can elect to retry.

 (*) Silly unlink

     We want to remove silly unlink files if we can, rather than leaving
     them for the salvager to clear up.

Note that whilst these calls are no longer interruptible, they do have
timeouts on them, so if the server stops responding the call will fail with
something like ETIME or ECONNRESET.

Without this, the following:

	kAFS: Unexpected error from FS.StoreData -512

appears in dmesg when a pending store data gets interrupted and some
processes may just hang.

Additionally, make the code that checks/updates the server record ignore
failure due to interruption if the main call is uninterruptible and if the
server has an address list.  The next op will check it again since the
expiration time on the old list has past.

Fixes: d2ddc776a458 ("afs: Overhaul volume and server record caching and fileserver rotation")
Reported-by: Jonathan Billings <jsbillings@jsbillings.org>
Reported-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

afs_check/update_server_record() should be setting fc->error rather than
fc->ac.error as they're called from within the cursor iteration function.

afs_fs_cursor::error is where the error code of the attempt to call the
operation on multiple servers is integrated and is the final result,
whereas afs_addr_cursor::error is used to hold the error from individual
iterations of the call loop.  (Note there's also an afs_vl_cursor which
also wraps afs_addr_cursor for accessing VL servers rather than file
servers).

Fix this by setting fc->error in the afs_check/update_server_record() so
that any error incurred whilst talking to the VL server correctly
propagates to the final result.

This results in:

	kAFS: Unexpected error from FS.StoreData -512

being seen, even though the store-data op is non-interruptible.  The error
is actually coming from the server record update getting interrupted.

Fixes: d2ddc776a458 ("afs: Overhaul volume and server record caching and fileserver rotation")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The in-kernel afs filesystem client counts the number of server-level
callback invalidation events (CB.InitCallBackState* RPC operations) that it
receives from the server.  This is stored in cb_s_break in various
structures, including afs_server and afs_vnode.

If an inode is examined by afs_validate(), say, the afs_server copy is
compared, along with other break counters, to those in afs_vnode, and if
one or more of the counters do not match, it is considered that the
server's callback promise is broken.  At points where this happens,
AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED is cleared to indicate that the status must be
refetched from the server.

afs_validate() issues an FS.FetchStatus operation to get updated metadata -
and based on the updated data_version may invalidate the pagecache too.

However, the break counters are also used to determine whether to note a
new callback in the vnode (which would set the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag)
and whether to cache the permit data included in the YFSFetchStatus record
by the server.


The problem comes when the server sends us a CB.InitCallBackState op.  The
first such instance doesn't cause cb_s_break to be incremented, but rather
causes AFS_SERVER_FL_NEW to be cleared - but thereafter, say some hours
after last use and all the volumes have been automatically unmounted and
the server has forgotten about the client[*], this *will* likely cause an
increment.

 [*] There are other circumstances too, such as the server restarting or
     needing to make space in its callback table.

Note that the server won't send us a CB.InitCallBackState op until we talk
to it again.

So what happens is:

 (1) A mount for a new volume is attempted, a inode is created for the root
     vnode and vnode->cb_s_break and AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED aren't set
     immediately, as we don't have a nominated server to talk to yet - and
     we may iterate through a few to find one.

 (2) Before the operation happens, afs_fetch_status(), say, notes in the
     cursor (fc.cb_break) the break counter sum from the vnode, volume and
     server counters, but the server->cb_s_break is currently 0.

 (3) We send FS.FetchStatus to the server.  The server sends us back
     CB.InitCallBackState.  We increment server->cb_s_break.

 (4) Our FS.FetchStatus completes.  The reply includes a callback record.

 (5) xdr_decode_AFSCallBack()/xdr_decode_YFSCallBack() check to see whether
     the callback promise was broken by checking the break counter sum from
     step (2) against the current sum.

     This fails because of step (3), so we don't set the callback record
     and, importantly, don't set AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED on the vnode.

This does not preclude the syscall from progressing, and we don't loop here
rechecking the status, but rather assume it's good enough for one round
only and will need to be rechecked next time.

 (6) afs_validate() it triggered on the vnode, probably called from
     d_revalidate() checking the parent directory.

 (7) afs_validate() notes that AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED isn't set, so doesn't
     update vnode->cb_s_break and assumes the vnode to be invalid.

 (8) afs_validate() needs to calls afs_fetch_status().  Go back to step (2)
     and repeat, every time the vnode is validated.

This primarily affects volume root dir vnodes.  Everything subsequent to
those inherit an already incremented cb_s_break upon mounting.


The issue is that we assume that the callback record and the cached permit
information in a reply from the server can't be trusted after getting a
server break - but this is wrong since the server makes sure things are
done in the right order, holding up our ops if necessary[*].

 [*] There is an extremely unlikely scenario where a reply from before the
     CB.InitCallBackState could get its delivery deferred till after - at
     which point we think we have a promise when we don't.  This, however,
     requires unlucky mass packet loss to one call.

AFS_SERVER_FL_NEW tries to paper over the cracks for the initial mount from
a server we've never contacted before, but this should be unnecessary.
It's also further insulated from the problem on an initial mount by
querying the server first with FS.GetCapabilities, which triggers the
CB.InitCallBackState.


Fix this by

 (1) Remove AFS_SERVER_FL_NEW.

 (2) In afs_calc_vnode_cb_break(), don't include cb_s_break in the
     calculation.

 (3) In afs_cb_is_broken(), don't include cb_s_break in the check.


Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Send probes to all the unprobed fileservers in a fileserver list on all
addresses simultaneously in an attempt to find out the fastest route whilst
not getting stuck for 20s on any server or address that we don't get a
reply from.

This alleviates the problem whereby attempting to access a new server can
take a long time because the rotation algorithm ends up rotating through
all servers and addresses until it finds one that responds.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Eliminate the address pointer from the address list cursor as it's
redundant (ac->addrs[ac->index] can be used to find the same address) and
address lists must be replaced rather than being rearranged, so is of
limited value.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Implement support for talking to YFS-variant fileservers in the cache
manager and the filesystem client.  These implement upgraded services on
the same port as their AFS services.

YFS fileservers provide expanded capabilities over AFS.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Add a couple of tracepoints to log the production of I/O errors within the AFS
filesystem.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Track VL servers as independent entities rather than lumping all their
addresses together into one set and implement server-level rotation by:

 (1) Add the concept of a VL server list, where each server has its own
     separate address list.  This code is similar to the FS server list.

 (2) Use the DNS resolver to retrieve a set of servers and their associated
     addresses, ports, preference and weight ratings.

 (3) In the case of a legacy DNS resolver or an address list given directly
     through /proc/net/afs/cells, create a list containing just a dummy
     server record and attach all the addresses to that.

 (4) Implement a simple rotation policy, for the moment ignoring the
     priorities and weights assigned to the servers.

 (5) Show the address list through /proc/net/afs/<cell>/vlservers.  This
     also displays the source and status of the data as indicated by the
     upcall.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The recent patch to fix the afs_server struct leak didn't actually fix the
bug, but rather fixed some of the symptoms.  The problem is that an
asynchronous call that holds a resource pointed to by call->reply[0] will
find the pointer cleared in the call destructor, thereby preventing the
resource from being cleaned up.

In the case of the server record leak, the afs_fs_get_capabilities()
function in devel code sets up a call with reply[0] pointing at the server
record that should be altered when the result is obtained, but this was
being cleared before the destructor was called, so the put in the
destructor does nothing and the record is leaked.

Commit f014ffb025c1 removed the additional ref obtained by
afs_install_server(), but the removal of this ref is actually used by the
garbage collector to mark a server record as being defunct after the record
has expired through lack of use.

The offending clearance of call->reply[0] upon completion in
afs_process_async_call() has been there from the origin of the code, but
none of the asynchronous calls actually use that pointer currently, so it
should be safe to remove (note that synchronous calls don't involve this
function).

Fix this by the following means:

 (1) Revert commit f014ffb025c1.

 (2) Remove the clearance of reply[0] from afs_process_async_call().

Without this, afs_manage_servers() will suffer an assertion failure if it
sees a server record that didn't get used because the usage count is not 1.

Fixes: f014ffb025c1 ("afs: Fix afs_server struct leak")
Fixes: 08e0e7c82eea ("[AF_RXRPC]: Make the in-kernel AFS filesystem use AF_RXRPC.")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>